

also true that Brahmin society was maintained and gradually changed by individual human beings, even if their mentality was different from that of European individuals. The ideal of *jīvanmukti* is surely an antithesis to the impossibility of individual freedom within caste society. Recent studies of early medieval religions have revealed that Tantrism is not restricted to obscene radicalism but has a more profound influence in lay society than Dumont assumed. Therefore, is it not possible to consider the development of logic and epistemology from the time of Dignāga, not only as a result of the intensified competition among different schools for patronage, but also as a result of the intellectual interest in the ability of an individual human being, an interest that increased in a society which was relatively more affluent than in ancient times? In the eyes of the present reviewer, even the ontology of Kumārila, the most eloquent spokesman of the Aryan orthodoxy, shows the intention to investigate how an individual who is given free will and a physical body can use a limited number of things in this world to act in conformity with traditional norms.

If we succeed in elucidating the image of individual human beings as being newly built up in the early medieval period, not only by using philosophical treatises and religious scriptures, but also by using secular literatures and historical documents, then we may be able to investigate how it was taken over by Hindu theologians in the next period, from about the eleventh century onward, when Abhinavagupta, Udayana, and Rāmānuja appeared. Reading through the present volume, the present reviewer has come to the conclusion that Dumont's dichotomy is much harder to deal with than Frauwallner's, and needs to be overcome more urgently by researchers of Indian philosophy.

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Vincent Eltschinger and Isabelle Ratié, *Self, No-Self, and Salvation: Dharmakīrti's Critique of the Notions of Self and Person*, Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 75, Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Klasse 837, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013, xiii + 382 Pp. € 49.00. (Paperback)

Introductory Remarks

To deal with the concept of the self is an important but difficult task both in Indology and in Buddhist studies, mainly for the following two reasons.

First, this concept is connected with a variety of indigenous terms (e.g., in Sanskrit, *ātman*, *jīva*, *pudgala*, *cittasantāna*, and so on), each of which has its own philosophical background. This also means that the concept itself is involved in a wide range of contexts. In any context, however, it is the reality of the self

that always comes into question. On the one hand, the *ātman* is defined or categorized as a “real” entity, according to the Upaniṣadic tradition or to some schools of thought such as the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. On the other hand, there is also something that can be called a self or a person in a more general or secular sense, such as an enduring personality (*santāna*), which Buddhist thinkers generally regard as “unreal” from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth.¹ Thus, when inquiring into the concept of the self in Indology or in Buddhist studies, we are always required to take the reality of the self into account.

Second, there are many ways to explore the concept of the self. Even if we limit the discussion to the *ātman* as a real entity, there exist several perspectives on the *ātman*. As the subject of cognition, the *ātman* serves as the basis of epistemological phenomena. When it comes to the identification of the *ātman* with the *Brahman*, which underlies this phenomenal world, the *ātman* also assumes a key role in the ontological context, although the permanence of its existence was severely criticized by the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Soteriologically, it is well known that a correct knowledge of the *ātman* is essential for the path to liberation (*mokṣa*).² This admirable work attempts to shed light mainly on the soteriological side of the concept of the self, analyzing Dharmakīrti’s (and his commentators’) arguments against the *ātmavāda* in a systematic way.

Contents of the Book

As mentioned by the authors (p. 1 fn. 1), Eltschinger and Ratié, the introduction of this book is given the role of outlining Dharmakīrti’s attitude toward the concept of the self. First of all, they stress that Dharmakīrti identifies the belief in the self with nescience (*avidyā*), which in turn can be equated with some other terms such as “personalistic false view (*satkāyadrṣṭi-darśana*)”, “false view of a self (*ātmadarśana*)”, “belief in/adhesion to a self (*ātmagraha, ātmaniveśa*)” and “false view of/belief in a [substantial] living being (*sattvadrṣṭi, sattvadarśana, sattvagraha*)” in Dharmakīrti’s works (p. 7). Here it would be important to touch on the authors’ view of Dharmakīrti’s arguments in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV hereafter) 2.220-256, which are made against Brahmanical soteriologies and closely examined in the third chapter of this book. According to the authors, Dharmakīrti’s arguments in PV 2.220-256 are basically within the framework of his analysis of the truth of the path (*mārgasatya*) and are to be seen as “the critical evaluation of the sixth-century Indian philosophical systems as religious paths” (p. 36).

On the basis of some key ideas given in the introduction, the authors go into detail about Dharmakīrti’s arguments in the following three chapters:

¹ As the authors rightly point out, this issue is also associated with how to use a definite/an indefinite article for the term “self”. Cf. p. 1 (Introduction), fn. 2.

² It should also be noted that the Brahmanical schools had to argue whether or not the self, which has a transcendent character at any rate, should be regarded as transmigrating in or as attached to the *samsāra*.

- Chapter 1. Dharmakīrti against the *pudgala*
 Chapter 2. Dharmakīrti against Ātmavādin Arguments
 Chapter 3. Dharmakīrti against the Self as the Basis of Brahmanical
 Soteriologies

In the first chapter, the authors deal with the *buddha*-nature teachings (*tathāgatagarbha*) and personalism (*pudgalavāda*), both of which fall under the heading “the Buddhist substantialism” in this book. The authors’ concern regarding these theories comes from their understanding (or the “strong hypothesis”, as they say) that Dharmakīrti’s attempt to establish the theory of selflessness should have been confronted by many other Buddhist thinkers, who were all inclined to relativize the theory of selflessness. However, the authors’ careful considerations lead them to believe that Dharmakīrti was silent on the *buddha*-nature teachings and that his critique of Buddhist personalism is too brief and implicit to be regarded as targeting the *pudgalavāda*, even though his commentators unambiguously refer to his criticism as being directed toward the *pudgalavāda*.

The second chapter, which presents Dharmakīrti’s method of criticizing the arguments of the *ātmavāda*, draws our attention to the following four topics:

- (1) Against the So-Called *vyatirekin*
- (2) Against the Inferability of the Self
- (3) The Refutation of the Sāṅkhya’s Teleological Argument for the Existence of the Self
- (4) On Memory: PV 2.267-269.

The first two topics are concerned with Dharmakīrti’s critique of the proof of establishing the existence of the self (*ātmāsiddhi*), which was propounded mainly by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. In the third topic, the authors highlight the Sāṅkhya’s proof of establishing the existence of the *puruṣa*, which can be seen as analogous to the *ātman*. The fourth topic takes up Dharmakīrti’s critical attitude toward the function of memory (*smṛti*), the concept of which is used for justifying the continuous existence of the self. Here, the authors also clarify that Dharmakīrti’s argument in PV 2.267-269 is indebted to what Vasubandhu stated with regard to the *smṛti*.

In the third chapter, the authors scrutinize a number of important materials from the Sāṅkhyas, Naiyāyikas, and Vaiśeṣikas, all of which regard the *ātman* (or the *puruṣa*) as the basis of their soteriologies. In any case, Dharmakīrti is consistent in his argument that the (belief in the) existence of a self makes salvation impossible. In this regard, the authors also focus on Dharmakīrti’s critique of the Naiyāyikas’ interpretation of the “cultivation of suffering” or “the cultivation [of the thought of] pain” (*duḥkhabhāvanā*), the concept of which is central to the system of Buddhist soteriology too. According to the authors’ understanding, the Naiyāyikas’ biased interpretation is the very reason why Dharmakīrti was keen to distinguish it from the original Buddhist concept of

selflessness.

Comments on the Book

We can say that this book is the first attempt to thoroughly examine Dharmakīrti's arguments against the *ātmavāda*. There are two dimensions for evaluating this precious work: one is the diachronic perspective on the Buddhist-internal history, and the other is the synchronic viewpoint of the interaction between Dharmakīrti and the Brahmanical schools during his time. This joint work of the two eminent scholars enabled us to delve into both contexts – Buddhist and non-Buddhist – from the abovementioned dimensions. Viewed in this light, I would like to make two brief remarks, although they might be rather marginal to this remarkable achievement.

As related to the first dimension, we must pay attention to the authors' "strong hypothesis", among other things. The hypothesis, which is given at the very beginning of this book, runs as follows:

"An additional remark is called for concerning Chapter 1. Before dealing with Pudgalavāda Buddhism and Dharmakīrti's critique of his coreligionists' "person", we have devoted considerable attention to the *tathāgatagarbha* or *buddha*-nature strand of Indian Mahāyāna. And this we have done in spite of the fact that the (at least prima facie) substantialist leaning of this tradition has never been made the explicit target of "mainstream" philosophers, and even less so by Dharmakīrti. This addition has no other justification than our wish to call attention to the fact – or let us say the strong hypothesis – that Dharmakīrti, like Vasubandhu before him, elaborated his ideas on self and selflessness in an environment in which Buddhist attempts to relativize selflessness and resort to an enduring personality principle are likely to have been in far greater number than is generally recognized."³

The abovementioned passage, which describes the *raison d'être* of the first chapter, is important in showing that the authors are also concerned with the philosophical situation, especially the Buddhist-internal situation, in which Dharmakīrti had to compose his works. It should also be seen as reflecting the cautiousness of the authors, who intend to first describe the whole landscape of the period when Dharmakīrti was active as a Buddhist thinker and then to visit his arguments against the self. According to the authors' view, Dharmakīrti was surrounded not only by the Brahmanical schools that advocated the *ātmavāda* but also by quite a few Buddhists such as the followers of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory and the Pudgalavādins, who did not appear to accept the absolute value of the

³ Cf. "Foreword": xi-xii. This hypothesis is rephrased in pp. 37-39. Cf. esp. p. 38: "... In other words, the Buddhist scholars and practitioners who showed reservations about the strongest versions of selflessness and/or subscribed to "substantializing" doctrines might well have been in much higher number than is generally recognized, something which, taken together with other alleged "heresies" (doctrines akin to *satkāryavāda*, *sphoṭa* and *apauruṣeyatā*, attitudes towards caste, ethics and permanence, etc., not to speak of Buddhist "tantric" symbols and practices), raises fairly interesting questions regarding issues of orthodoxy and heterodoxy – and the non-emic applicability of such concepts – within Indian Buddhism (and Buddhism as a whole)." I am not sure whether Dharmakīrti's theory of an enduring personality (i.e., *santāna*) is included in the authors' concept of "an enduring personality principle" or of "substantializing doctrines".

doctrine of selflessness.

Concerning the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, the first chapter explains the theory at length, thus providing an excellent introduction to this theory. The authors are right in emphasizing that the *tathāgatagarbha* theory tries to avoid the danger of being regarded as a variation of the *ātmavāda*, and that the *ātmavāda*-oriented character of this theory is a kind of expedient for ordinary people (pp. 44-50). However, we would then need to admit that the *tathāgatagarbha* theory shows an aspect of reconciling itself with the idea of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) or of the *anātmavāda*. In that case, it would probably be oversimplifying to define this theory just as subscribing to the “substantializing” doctrines (or as a Buddhist modification of the *ātmavāda*) (p. 38).

Turning to the *pudgalavāda*, it is true that this strand of thought is criticized as being parallel to the *ātmavāda* in the ninth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*. Nevertheless, it still seems uncertain whether the Pudgalavādins thought themselves to be a variant of the *ātmavāda*. As suggested by the authors themselves (p. 63; p. 84), the Pudgalavādins’ statement on the ontologically indeterminate relationship between the *pudgala* and five constituents (*pañca-skandha*) – according to which the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor different from the five constituents – is to be understood as an echo of the historical Buddha’s well-known attitude towards any metaphysical arguments, i.e., the *avyākṛta* (or the *avyākata*).⁴ Then, it would also be possible to say the Pudgalavādins, as the followers of the historical Buddha who kept away from such arguments, would have subscribed neither to the *ātmavāda*, nor to the *anātmavāda*, avoiding both of these extremes.⁵ This reminds us of the Pudgalavādin’s five categories of knowable things (*jñeya*), among which the *pudgala* is considered as the fifth one, i.e. “what is ineffable” (*avaktavya*).⁶ If the *pudgala* is something ineffable, it goes even beyond the two extremes – the *ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda*.

For these reasons, I still hesitate to agree that many of Dharmakīrti’s coreligionists are seen as subscribing to the “substantializing” doctrines or as rather being close to the *ātmavāda*, and I am also afraid that the authors’ hypothesis might be misinterpreted as applying the simple dichotomy between the *ātmavāda* and the *anātmavāda* to the ideologically complicated situation around the time of Dharmakīrti and his coreligionists.⁷ At the same time, however, we

⁴ Since this attitude of the historical Buddha was originally a reaction against a set of metaphysical arguments in the Brahmanical schools, I doubt that the *pudgalavāda* was purely a product of the Buddhist-internal history and had nothing to do with the Brahmanical polemics from the outset. For this point, see Leonard C.D.C. Priestley, *Pudgalavāda Buddhism, The Reality of the Indeterminate Self*, South Asian Studies Papers No. 12 (Monograph 1), Toronto: Centre of South Asian Studies, 1999, p. 217.

⁵ This assumption may be associated with one of Priestley’s conclusions. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 210-211.

⁶ These categories, including the *avaktavya*, are mentioned by the authors themselves more than once. Cf. p. 63; p. 71; p. 81; p. 83; p. 88.

⁷ In this connection, we may need to think about the authors’ concept of “an enduring personality principle” or of “substantializing doctrines” in terms of the theory of the twofold truth (*satyadvaya*).

must also admit that very little has so far been written on this type of historical argument in the *pramāṇa* studies, in spite of its vital importance. In that sense, the value of the question addressed by the authors can hardly be overemphasized.

Another significant point, which is closely associated with the second dimension given above, is the authors' understanding that Dharmakīrti's main target in his PV 2.220-256 was the Naiyāyikas. Their understanding originally comes from Tilmann Vetter's suggestion in his annotated translation of the second chapter of PV.⁸ However, the authors further attempt to reinforce Vetter's argument with their in-depth analysis of many relevant materials. Immediately after referring to the fact that the Naiyāyikas' soteriology, more specifically, the notion of the *duḥkhabhāvanā*, was influenced by that of Buddhism through the intermediary of the *Yogasūtra* and *Yogabhāṣya* (p. 207), the authors continue:

“These borrowings might be the reason why Dharmakīrti is so eager to present the Naiyāyikas' soteriological doctrine as a sort of misunderstanding of the Buddhist doctrine of salvation – a misunderstanding that, according to him, stems from the belief in the self's existence to which the Naiyāyikas continue to cling.” (pp. 207-208)

Their insight is based on the assumption that Dharmakīrti should have tried to severely criticize the Naiyāyikas' “crypto-Buddhist but *ātman*-centered soteriology” (p. xi). On the other hand, however, we may also need to consider why Dharmakīrti himself did not explicitly criticize the Naiyāyikas by name and why his commentators referred to his main opponent rather as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Vaiśeṣikas, or others, as noted by the authors themselves (p. 199). This problem would drive us to ask about the consensus of Dharmakīrti and his successors with regard to the relationship between the Naiyāyikas and the other Brahmanical schools, especially the Vaiśeṣikas. Even though Dharmakīrti's main target was actually the Naiyāyikas' “crypto-Buddhist but *ātman*-centered soteriology”, we could also imagine that Dharmakīrti might have already seen that the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas have merged with each other in some way and that his commentators might have just been following Dharmakīrti. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to consider the possibility that Dharmakīrti might have been trying to avoid mentioning the proper name of any of the schools, in an attempt to make his critique more effective than those of the other schools. In any case, these possibilities may well be left to scholars to argue.

In closing, I would like to add that this book includes an excellent annotated translation of many important passages from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti* in the first and the second chapters and an informative translation and commentary of PV 2.220-256 in the third chapter. The authors should be congratulated not only for describing in great detail Dharmakīrti's arguments against the self but also for providing a clear-cut overview of the soteriologies of

⁸ Cf. Tilmann Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika, Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramāṇasiddhi-Kapitel*, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 12, Wien, 1990 (1984¹), p. 120 (fn. 1); pp. 126-127 (fn. 1).

the Brahmanical schools. No doubt this work is a great contribution to both Indology and Buddhist studies.

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Subash C. Dash and Toshihiro Wada, *A Navya-nyāya Discussion on the Meaning of the Negative Particle Nañ: A Study of the Nañvādakārikā of Udayana*, Studia Asiatica 10, Nagoya: Nagoya University Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 2013, viii + 89. (Paperback)

A small manuscript of a Navya-nyāya text, attributed to the author Udayana, was found at the Orissa State Museum, Bhubaneswar, in 2007 (p. v). The manuscript, consisting of four folios and written in Old Oriya script, is entitled the *Nañvādakārikā* (NVK), which means the ‘Discourse in Verse of the Negative Particle’. The well-respected Udayana is reputed to have synthesized the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya doctrines in the eleventh century, and the NVK is not included his genuine works. If this Udayana is identified as the author of the NVK, this may mean a revision in the history of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika or of Indian philosophy. Chapter 1 of the present book discusses whether the above identification holds true or not, as will be discussed later. The authors of the book, Dash and Wada, could neither find other manuscripts of the NVK nor commentary manuscripts on this in any of the major manuscript collections in India (p. 1). Under such difficult conditions, they have edited, translated, and annotated the NVK.

The NVK represents the semantic discussion of the negative particle *nañ*. As far as the research on the Navya-nyāya theory of negation is concerned, the first great achievement was B. K. Matilal’s *The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Harvard Oriental Series 46, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968). The present book may be the second major work of similar content to deal with a Navya-nyāya text. The contents of the book are as follows:

Preface

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Basic Concepts

- 2.1: Absence (*abhāva*) and related concepts
- 2.2: Delimitor (*avacchedaka*) and describer (*nirūpaka*)
- 2.3: The signifying function (*vṛtti*)
- 2.4: Suffix of a finite verb (*ākhyāta*)
- 2.5: Effort (*yatna, prayatna*)
- 2.6: Verbal understanding (*śābdabodha, śābdajñāna*)
- 2.7: Meaning (*artha*)

Chapter 3: Issues discussed in the *Nañvādakārikā*