

# THE “DISCOURSE ON VERBAL SUFFIXES” (ĀKHYĀTAVĀDA) OF RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĪROMAṆI (2)

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## Introduction

The present paper represents the second installment of my edition and annotated translation of Raghunātha’s *Ākhyātavāda*. In the first installment, Wada [2015a], I discussed the various editions and commentaries of the text, its general content, and the different Sanskrit titles that have been assigned it. There I provided a division of the text into eleven parts (A through K), which is given below.<sup>1</sup> The present paper deals with Parts A, B, C, and D. As noted in Wada [2015a: 41], I have provided in the brackets the page and line numbers of the S2 edition due to its being the basis for my edition of Raghunātha’s text, those of the K edition due to its popularity among modern scholars, and those of the S edition due to its easy availability.

- A. The General View of Old Nyāya  
(S2, p. 1,3-6; K, pp. 867- 876,1; S, pp. 1-2)
- B. The General View of New Nyāya  
(S2, p. 1,7-12; K, pp. 876,1- 888,1; S, p. 3)
- C. The Mīmāṃsā Refutation of Nyāya  
(S2, pp. 1,13-2,5; K, pp. 888,1-903,3; S, pp. 5-7)
- D. The Old and New Nyāya Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā View  
(S2, p. 12,6-13; K, pp. 903,3-909,1; S, p. 8)

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<sup>1</sup> As the present project proceeds, the title of each Part may be slightly changed, as noted in Wada [2015a: 41]. In this paper I have changed the previous titles of Part C: “The Mīmāṃsā Refutation of Old Nyāya”, Part F: “The New Nyāya Refutation of the Vaiyākaraṇa View”, and Part J: “The New Nyāya Refutation of Maṇḍana’s Followers” given in Wada [2015: 42].

E. The Vaiyākaraṇa View

(S2, p. 2,14-30; K, pp. 909,1-924,1; S, pp. 9-11)

F. The Nyāya Refutation of the Vaiyākaraṇa View

(S2, pp. 2,31-3,12; K, pp. 924,1-939,2; S, pp. 12-14)

G. The Old Nyāya View on the Verbal Understanding of a Passive Sentence

(S2, p. 3,13-20; K, pp. 939,2-942,4; S, p. 15)

H. The New Nyāya View on the Verbal Understanding of a Passive Sentence and the *kṛt* Suffix for the Agent or Object

(S2, p. 3,21-5,19; K, pp. 942,5-990; S, pp. 16-29)

I. The View of the Followers of Maṇḍana Miśra

(S2, pp. 5,20- 6,15; K, pp. 991-1006,2; S, pp. 30-34,1)

J. The Nyāya Refutation of Maṇḍana's Followers

(S2, p. 6,15-17; K, pp. 1006,2-1007; S, p. 34,2-4)

K. The View of the Prabhākara School and Its Refutation

(S2, p. 6,18-21; K, pp. 1008-1009; S, 35)

In this list 'Old Nyāya' refers to not only Nyāya before Gaṅgeśa but also Gaṅgeśa himself, and 'New Nyāya', to Nyāya after him and Raghunātha himself.<sup>2</sup> In the following translation of Raghunātha's text, the similar interpretation should be adopted to 'Old Naiyāyika' and 'New Naiyāyika'.

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<sup>2</sup> Part A, for example, includes the views of Old Nyāya and Gaṅgeśa, which is explained in the footnote to the translation of Part A. Ingalls [1951: 5] states "Because of the originality of Raghunātha's work, many Indian use the term Navya-nyāya only of him and his followers". One of the grounds for Ingalls' statement will be Raghunātha's usage of the terms 'Old' (*prāc*) or 'New' (*navya*). It is obvious that those terms are relatively employed in the Navya-nyāya texts. The term Navya-nyāya, on the other hand, is not relatively used in papers or books of modern scholars. For example, Ingalls [1951: 5] uses it to refer to Gaṅgeśa and his followers, while I have used for Naiyāyikas after Udayana's period and designated the Naiyāyikas between Udayana's and Gaṅgeśa's periods as early Navya-naiyāyikas. Ganeri [2013: 56-57] points out that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries philosophers are willing to describe themselves as new; he reports the terms used by Mahādeva Puṇatāmakara (ca. 17th cent.) to denote the new such as *navya* (new), *navyatara* (newer), *navīna* (modern), *atinavīna* (very modern), *ādhunika* (contemporaires).

## Basic Concepts<sup>3</sup>

### (a) *ākhyāta*

The word *ākhyāta* has two meanings: the finite verb and the personal ending of the finite verb (*tiṅ* suffix).<sup>4</sup> Gaṅgeśa's argument with the Mīmāṃsā and Grammarian schools is confined to an analysis of the second of these two meanings. Unless otherwise specified, the suffixes he discusses are those used in the active voice and the present tense. He discusses the meaning of verbal suffixes used in the passive voice in Parts F and G of the "Verbal Suffix Chapter" (Ākhyātavāda) of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TC).<sup>5</sup>

Navya-naiyāyikas, including Gaṅgeśa, hold that a verbal suffix denotes effort, while Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhaṭṭa School<sup>6</sup> hold that it denotes operation (*vyāpāra*), whether internal or external.<sup>7</sup> Internal operation, which Navya-naiyāyikas regard as effort, occurs in the soul (*ātman*). External operation, which occurs in the body and things, is perceived by the sense organs. Navya-naiyāyikas generally call this operation action (*kriyā*). It should be noted that 'operation' and

<sup>3</sup> This section is based upon Wada [2014a: Basic Concepts] but includes an explanation of new concepts: verbal root (*dhātu*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*), and epistemic qualifier (*prakāra*).

<sup>4</sup> On these two meanings, see Joshi [1993(1960): 22]. He reports that the *Mīmāṃsā-nyāyaparakāśa* (MNP), which was written in the seventeenth century, uses the word in the second sense listed above. But the TC shows an earlier use of the word in this sense. On *tiṅ* suffixes, see Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (P)3.4.78; Abhyankar and Shukla [1977: 197].

<sup>5</sup> For a translation of those parts, see Wada [2013].

<sup>6</sup> The view of the Prābhākara School is briefly referred to and refuted at the end of Part C.

<sup>7</sup> The operation of Vedic injunctions is not discussed here. However, since the Mīmāṃsakas' method of interpreting sentences in common usage is based on their exegesis of Vedic sentences, we have to consider this exegesis in order to follow their arguments as presented in the "Verbal Suffix Chapter". On their exegesis, see Edgerton [1929]. The verbal suffixes of Vedic injunctions denote the word-efficient-force (*śābdī-bhāvanā*) which resides in the injunctions themselves. On the 'word-efficient-force', see MNP, no. 4 and Edgerton [1929: 40]. Diaconescu [2012: 47] points out the differences among the Mīmāṃsakas' views on what the term *bhāvanā* means. According to him, Kumārila and Pārthasārathi use it in the sense of operation (*vyāpāra*) or action (*kriyā*), Maṇḍanamiśra and Umbekabhāṭṭa in the sense of operation and effort (*kṛti*), and Someśvara or Khaṇḍadeva in the sense of effort. (Diaconescu renders *kṛti* as effort, while I have rendered as resolution. Effort is a rendering of *yatna*, which is used in the sense of *kṛti* in the Nyāya discussion of the meaning of verbal suffixes. Based upon this, Diaconescu seems to render *kṛti* as effort.)

‘action’ are not synonymous in the Navya-nyāya and Mīmāṃsā discussion of Sanskrit semantics; in some cases ‘operation’ means contact (*saṃyoga*) or separation (*vibhāga*), which are classified in the category of quality (*guṇa*) in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools.<sup>8</sup>

The Grammarians (*pāṇinīya*) argue that a verbal suffix denotes agent, object, or action.<sup>9</sup> Navya-naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas accept Panini’s grammar in general, but when they disagree with the grammarians, and with one another, they attempt to prove their own views by analyzing common linguistic usage, in this case the usage of the finite verb. It should be noted that all three schools agree that the suffix of a finite verb denotes a particular tense and number. In the present paper, when I need to refer to the suffixes of finite verbs, I will simply mention ‘verbal suffix’ or ‘finite verbal suffix’. When I need to deal with other verbal suffixes such as the *kṛt* suffixes, I will indicate them by supplying Sanskrit terms.

### (b) Effort (*yatna*, *prayatna*)

Effort, which is regarded as the meaning of a finite verbal suffix by Navya-naiyāyikas, is one of twenty-four kinds of qualities (*guṇa*), and we know of its existence in the soul through inference. Nyāya holds that knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) causes desire (*icchā*), which produces effort, which in turn brings about action.<sup>10</sup> To understand

<sup>8</sup> We have the following case in which ‘operation’ means contact and separation. With regard to the sentence *ratho grāmaṃ gacchati* (“The chariot goes to the village”), *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (p. 272, Text 389) says as follows: *tatra ko 'sau vyāpāra ity apekṣāyām pūrvottarāvāntaradeśavibhajanasaṃyojanarūpa iti paścād avagamyate: pūrveṇa pradeśena vibhajottareṇa saṃyujya ratho grāmaṃ gacchati prayogāt, udyamya nipātya kuthāreṇa chinnaṭṭivat.* (Trans. by Edgerton [1929: 187]: So then, in response to the question “What is that operation?”, afterwards it is defined (as to manner) as consisting of separation from and uniting with (advancing to) earlier, later, and intermediate places, by the employment (or understanding) of such a sentence as “By separating (departing) from an earlier place and uniting with (advancing to) a later one, the wagon goes to the village.” Just as in the words “By raising and lowering (it), with the axe he cuts.”)

<sup>9</sup> On these three meanings, see *P.3.4.69: laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyah.* Vasu [1977(1891): 584] translates this *sūtra* as follows: “The tense-affixes called *la* are used in denoting the object and the agent; and after intransitive verbs, they denote the action as well as the agent”. This means that when transitive verbs are used in the active voice, the suffixes denote the agent; when these verbs are used in the passive, the suffixes denote the object. On this issue, see also Cardona [1975: 266].

<sup>10</sup> For the causal relationship among these four, Marui [1987: 145-146 and notes 24, 26] gives two Sanskrit references and their explanation. One is from Udayana’s *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* (*NKu*) 5.7: *pravṛtīḥ kṛtir evātra sā cecchāto yataś ca sā / taj jñānaṃ ... //*

the relation among cognition, desire, and effort, let us consider the case in which we quench our thirst with water. First, we must know that water can remove our thirst and recognize that there is some water within our reach. Second, we must have the desire to take and drink some water. If we have no desire, action does not take place. However, due to certain reasons we do not always take action immediately after we have such a desire. For instance, there may be dead insects in the water and so on. Hence, we can infer that there must be an intervening factor which is produced by the preceding desire and which brings about the action of drinking. That factor is effort.

Note that effort is often designated as resolution (*kṛti*) in the Navya-nyāya discussion on the meaning of a verbal suffix. Udayana states in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (*NKu*) that resolution is nothing more than effort.<sup>11</sup> Udayana's statement is quoted by Gaṅgeśa in the "Verbal Suffix Chapter" (Ākhyātavāda, Part B2) of his *TC*.<sup>12</sup>

### (c) Verbal root (*dhātu*)<sup>13</sup>

To understand the meaning of a verbal root, it is necessary to first refer to the Grammarians', or Vyākaraṇa, tradition. Kātyāyana (3rd century B.C.) provides two major categories of the definitions of verbal root: formal and semantic definitions. He semantically defines a verbal root in terms of *kriyā* or *bhāva*. The former term, commonly translated as 'action', is used to define verbal roots such as *pac* (to cook), *paṭh* (to read), *kr* (to make), etc., and the latter is used to define

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and the other from *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* p. 74,1-4: *pravṛttiparavākyaśravaṇāntaram prajoyasya tattadarthasambandhavyāpārānukūlām ceṣṭām paśyams taṣasthaḥ svaceṣṭāyām kṛteḥ kṛtau ca cikīrṣāyās cikīrṣāyām samānādhikaraṇasamānaviṣayakajñānasyaivāva-dhṛtakāraṇabhāva iti prajoyasyāpi tatkāraṇībhūtam jñānam anumāya tasya jñānasya vākyaṇyatāpravṛttau janayitavyāyām śabdavyāpāratvam cāvadhārayati. For a translation of the former passage, see Cowell [1980: 71] and N. Dravid [1996: 433].*

<sup>11</sup> *NKu* k. 5.9:

*kṛtākṛtavibhāgena kartṛrūpavyavasthayā |  
yatna eva kṛtiḥ pūrvā parasmin saiva bhāvanā ||*

For a translation of this *kārikā*, see Cowell [1980: 74] and N. Dravid [1996: 439].

<sup>12</sup> Gaṅgeśa's *Ākhyātavāda*, Part B2 deals with the Mīmāṃsā view, which includes the Nyāya objection. This objection quotes Udayana's *kārikā*. On this, see Wada [2007a: 421].

<sup>13</sup> The explanation of Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's views in this subsection is based upon Diaconescu [2012: 200-215]. On the issue of *kriyā* and *bhāva*, see also Joshi [1993(1960): 19-22].

ones such as *bhū* (to be, become), *vid* (to exist), etc. Patañjali (2nd century B.C.) interprets *bhāva* as that which is brought about or as that which comes into being. He defines *kriyā* with regard to time issues, as time is understood only in association with action (*kriyā*). Later Grammarians such as Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa (17th century), who is sometimes regarded as a Navya-vaiyākaraṇa, hold that a verbal root denotes result (*phala*) and action (*kriyā*).<sup>14</sup> This double meaning of the root can be traced back to Patañjali's suggestion on P1.4.49,<sup>15</sup> but more precisely, this meaning is asserted by Helārāja (10th century) in his commentary on Bhartṛhari (5th century).

In the Nyāya tradition Udayana, who greatly influenced Gaṅgeśa, claims in his *NKu* that a verbal root denotes action (*kriyā*) and result (*phala*), but he does not make clear the relation between both.<sup>16</sup> In the "Verbal Root Chapter" (Dhātuvāda) of his *TC* Gaṅgeśa clarifies that relation and gives two alternatives of the meaning of a verbal root: operation conducive to the result (*phalānukūlavypāra*) and operation (*vyāpāra*).<sup>17</sup> Raghunātha claims in Part H in his *Ākhyātavāda* that the meaning of a verbal root is operation qualified by a particular result (*phalaviśeṣāvachchinnavyāpāra*).<sup>18</sup> In this paper the term *dhātu* is

<sup>14</sup> On Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's and Nāgeśa's views, see also Joshi [1993(1960): 17]; Rao [1969: 106-110].

<sup>15</sup> P1.4.49: *kartuḥ tpsitamam karma*. (Trans. by Vasu [1977(1891): 186]: That which it is intended should be most affected by the act of the agent is called the object or karma. But my translation is: that which is most desired by the agent is called the object or *karman*.)

<sup>16</sup> *NKu*, p. 533,2: *dhātunām kriyāphalamātrābhidhāyivāt*. Dravid [1996: 445] translates this as "as it is the nature of verbs to mean only that which results from an activity". Dravid inserts the relation between result and action into his translation. There is the possibility that Dravid is influenced by the later Nyāya tradition, in drawing attention to this relation.

<sup>17</sup> On Gaṅgeśa's view, see Wada [forthcoming a, b]. Wada [forthcoming b] is an annotated translation of Gaṅgeśa's Dhātuvāda. This text is summarized and translated with explanation respectively by Bhatta [2005: 102-107] [2005: 908-915]. 'Operation' (*vyāpāra*) here is used in the sense of action (*kriyā*). On this, see Basic Concepts: (a) *ākhyāta* subsection.

<sup>18</sup> *Ākhyātavāda*(S2), p. 4,22-24: *tad asat, grāmaṃ gacchati tyajati tyādau dvitīyāditaḥ phalasāmānyalābhe 'pi niyatasamyogavibhāgādyalābhena phalaviśeṣāvachchinnavyāpārasyaiva dhātvarthatvāt, itarathā tyajigamiprabhṛtīnām paryāyatvāpatteh*. This Sanskrit text corresponds to Part H7.2 in the present project. (Trans.: [Raghunātha will answer:] That [view] is not correct. The reason [for this] is that though, in the cases of *grāmaṃ gacchati* ("[x] goes to the village"), *tyajati* ("[x] abandons [the village]"), etc., general result is obtained from the second case-ending, specific contact, separation, etc., are not obtained; hence that the meaning of the root is indeed operation qualified by a

rendered as ‘verbal root’ or simply ‘root’ when this does not cause an inconvenience.

**(d) The signifying function (*vṛtti*)**

Any meaningful linguistic unit, or morpheme, as well as any word possesses the signifying function and thus can mean something. Navya-nyāya accepts only two kinds of signifying function: the denotative function (*śakti*) and the indicative function (*lakṣaṇā*).<sup>19</sup> For instance, when we hear the word ‘*śaśin*’ (the moon) at night, this word first reminds us of the moon in the sky; furthermore it reminds us of a rabbit (*śaśa*). In this case the moon is the direct meaning of the word, and the function pointing to this meaning is called denotative. A rabbit is the indirect meaning of the word, and the function pointing to it is called indicative.

**(e) Verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*, *śābdajñāna*)**

The concept of verbal understanding is quite often utilized in analyzing the meaning of language units, e.g., a root (*dhātu*), suffix (*pratyaya*), nominal base (*prātipadika*), case-ending (*sUP*), and so on. Since we cannot determine the meaning of an isolated verbal suffix such as *-ti*, we have to deal with a complete word, such as ‘*pacati*’ ([he] cooks). From *pacati* we obtain a verbal understanding which has some content or structure. Gaṅgeśa and his opponents presuppose that all of this understanding is generated only by the word *pacati*; they attempt to find the correspondence between the constituents of the understanding we obtain upon hearing *pacati* and the linguistic constituents, such as the verbal suffix, which make up this word.

There are three competing views of verbal understanding which identify different elements in a sentence as being predominant. According to the first view, the meaning of the noun in the nominative

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particular result. Otherwise, the roots *tyaj* (to abandon), *gam* (to go), etc., would be synonymous.)

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (NSM), p. 292,3: *vṛttiś ca śaktīlakṣaṇānyatarāḥ sambandhaḥ*. See also Matilal [1968: 25]. The indicative function is defined as the relation with the denoted object/meaning (NSM k. 82ab: *lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhas ...* /). To explain this definition, when word A denotes meaning B and further indicates the meaning C, the indicative function of A attains C through B. This function also represents the relation between A and C. The relation between A and B is expressed by ‘the denoted object’ in the definition; the relation between B and C by ‘the relation’ in the definition.

case is predominant (*prathamāntārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*); according to the second view, the meaning of the verbal suffix is predominant (*ākhyātārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*); according to the third view the meaning of the root is predominant (*dhātvarthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*).<sup>20</sup> The Nyāya school upholds the first view; the Mīmāṃsā school the second; and the Grammarian school the third.

Take the sentence *caitraḥ pacati* as an example. Let us see what Navya-nyāya regards as the verbal understanding brought about by hearing this sentence. The word *caitra* denotes a person called Caitra; the case-ending *-ḥ* (*sU*) denotes the number of Caitras; the root *pac* denotes the action of cooking (*pāka*); the suffix *-ti* denotes effort. Effort generates the action of cooking. This relation between effort and cooking is not denoted by any meaningful unit of the sentence, but it is understood from the juxtaposition of the two units, *pac* and *-ti*. Similarly, the relation between the effort and Caitra is understood; he (i.e., his *ātman*) possesses effort. Finally, the sentence generates the understanding “Caitra is the possessor of effort conducive to cooking” (*pākānukūlaprayatnavān caitraḥ*).<sup>21</sup>

Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, present the following verbal understanding as generated by the same sentence: “There is productive operation conducive to cooking and residing in Caitra” (*caitraniṣṭhā pākānukūlā bhāvanā*). Grammarians give the following analysis: “There is operation conducive to the softening of the cooked substance and occurring in Caitra” (*caitrāśrayakaḥ viklittyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ*). Here I have only briefly illustrated how the three schools analyze verbal understanding.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Rao [1969: 4-34]. The expression of verbal understanding may appear to represent its structure, but this is not accepted by some schools of Indian philosophy, i.e., those schools subsumed under the term ‘Indian Realism’, such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā. This point will be referred to later on under (e).

<sup>21</sup> This type of verbal understanding is presented as Udayana’s view in *NKu*, p. 531,4: *pākānukūlavartamānaprayatnavān*.

<sup>22</sup> For example, it has not been illustrated how tense and mood are expressed, what the suffix *-a* inserted between *pac* and *-ti* denotes, and so forth. For a general illustration of verbal understanding, see Rao [1969:4-34] and Joshi [1993: 29-36]. Cardona [1975] discusses whether or not paraphrase and the analysis of verbal understanding decisively serve to assign partial meanings to the constituents of a sentence or word, such as a root and a suffix. Cardona [1975: 272] remarks that the different schools assign meanings in different ways, based on their particular backgrounds, premises, and aims. Diaconescu [2012: 30, 35, 37] points out a difference between the Nyāya view and the Mīmāṃsā and

**(f) Differentiating factors: qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*), and epistemic qualifier (*prakāra*)<sup>23</sup>**

These three terms for the function of differentiation are used to clarify the structure of phenomena/facts in general and, in particular, of those phenomena/facts referred to by verbal understanding.<sup>24</sup> This function seems to depend upon the recognizer or recognizer's intention, and the function in itself does not seem to exist in the outer world. In this sense it might be less meaningful for us to classify differentiating factors as two types: ontological and epistemological. However, when we read Sanskrit texts, these categories are significant. A qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and an indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*), which operate in the ontological sphere,<sup>25</sup> are used with reference to entities which exist in the world and which are independent of cognition. For example, when there is a pot on a particular part (locus) of the ground, the pot is often regarded as the qualifier of that particular part. To put it another way, the pot is assumed to differentiate that part from other parts of the ground or from anything that does not possess a pot. Let us next look at an example of an indicator. Suppose, person *A* asks person *B* where the house of Devadatta is, and person *B* answers person *A* by saying that his house is the one over which the crow hovers. In this case the crow does not exist on the house, but it functions to differentiate Devadatta's house from others. Such a differentiating factor is an indicator. Both indicator and qualifier cannot be used when they do not exist in or over entities to be differentiated in particular cases:

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Grammarians views. The former view takes a preceding meaning element placed in the expression of verbal understanding as the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), and the following element as the qualificand, as stated above. The latter views, on the other hands, respectively take productive operation and operation (or, action) as the qualificands, and all the other meaning elements as their (direct or indirect) qualifiers.

<sup>23</sup> This subsection deals only with a case in which a property is regarded as the qualifier of its property-possessor. In Navya-nyāya there are also cases in which the property-possessor is regarded as the qualifier of its property. For a detailed discussion of both concepts of qualifier and indicator, see Wada [1990: 45-65]. On the concept of epistemic qualifier, I have revised the analysis given in Wada [1990: 53, 94 n.4], which does not refer to the case of false cognition.

<sup>24</sup> For realists, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, and Mīmāṃsakas, words directly refer to facts or the outer world, and not to meanings obtained through cognition. On this, see also Basic Concepts: (f) Meaning (*artha*).

<sup>25</sup> The other sphere is linguistic analysis. In this case 'qualifier' means 'adjective'. For example, in the case of *nīlam utpalam* ("The lotus is blue") the word *nīlam* (blue) is an adjective qualifying the word *utpalam* (lotus). Here the concept of qualifier represents the relation between the two words.

cases in which the pot is absent from that part of the ground and in which the crow does not hover over Devadatta's house. Thus, a qualifier and an indicator are employed to explain the structure of the constituent fact of the world, which may or may not generate a cognition.

An epistemic qualifier (*prakāra*), on the other hand, which is classified as an epistemological factor, is used when an entity is 'recognized' as differentiating something else. It does not matter whether the epistemic qualifier in reality exists in the qualified entity (i.e., qualificand) or not. Let us take for example a case in which an epistemic qualifier exists in its qualificand (*viśeṣya*). This is a case of true cognition (*pramā*). When one recognizes that there is a blue pot on the table, the blue color of the pot functions as differentiating the pot from non-blue things and this color is the qualifier of the pot. The color is recognized as blue by the person, so for him the color of the pot appears as blue. Hence, blue color is the epistemic qualifier as well. An epistemic qualifier informs us how or in what form the object of cognition is recognized.

As long as both the qualifier and epistemic qualifier exist in one entity, there appears to be no difference between them. Let us take for example the case in which a person is looking at a blue pot. There are many properties (*dharma*) in this pot: particular color, weight, smell, taste, size, and so on — which are qualities (*guṇa*), and earthiness (*prthivītvā*), potness (*ghaṭatva*) — which are universals (*jāti*), and properties other than qualities and universals. These are all the qualifiers of the pot. If the recognizer, looking at the blue pot, understands that it is a blue earthy product, he takes up or focuses on the blue color and earthiness possessed by the pot. These two properties function as the epistemic qualifiers of the entity called a pot.

Let us next take for example a case in which an epistemic qualifier in reality does not exist in its qualificand. This is a case of false cognition (*apramā*). When one sees a rope in the darkness and mistakes it for a snake, the entity recognized by the person is in reality a rope, and in the rope there exists no snakesness. Truly speaking, since snakesness is absent from the rope, it can be neither the qualifier nor the indicator of the rope. In this example, snakesness is the epistemic qualifier of the rope for the recognizer. It should be noted here that in

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, or Indian realism, an epistemic qualifier must be real, and a rabbit's horn, for example, cannot be such a qualifier.<sup>26</sup>

When Navya-naiyāyikas deal with verbal understanding, they almost always use true cases in their semantic analysis. The sentence *pacati caitraḥ* ("Caitra cooks") generates in its hearer that *pākā-nukūlayatnāvān caitraḥ* ("Caitra is the possessor of effort conducive to cooking"), in which *pāka* (cooking) is the qualifier of *anukūlatva* (conduciveness). In addition, *pāka* (cooking) is grasped as cooking and not anything else, so it is also the epistemic qualifier of *anukūlatva*. Thus, in the analysis of verbal understanding both terms, qualifier and epistemic qualifier, are used; but the connotations of the terms differ. To be general, a qualifier/indicator refers to a distinguishing factor independently of cognition, while an epistemic qualifier refers to such a factor dependently on cognition.<sup>27</sup>

### (g) Meaning (*artha*)

Finally, I would like to call the reader's attention to the word 'meaning', which appears throughout my translation. This word does not always stand for 'mental representation' in the Indian context. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā hold the view that knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) has no content in itself (*nirākāravāda*) and that recognizing an object means that a cognitive relation occurs between

<sup>26</sup> On what is real in Indian realism, and in particular in Navya-nyāya, see Wada [2012b].

<sup>27</sup> It may happen that an epistemic qualifier, existing in its locus in reality, is referred to as a qualifier. In other words, when one is concerned with a distinguishing factor not as an epistemic qualifier even in the case of explaining a specific cognition, it may be called a qualifier. This means that one focuses on the ontic aspect of the object of a cognition, and not on the relation between a distinguishing factor and its cognition. For example, the *Tarkasamgraha* (*TS*) provides the following case: when the piece of the ground is recognized as the possessor of the absence of a pot, the absence is called the qualifier even in the case of explaining the cognition of the absence (*TS*, p. 32,1-2: *abhāva-pratyakṣe viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ saṃnikarṣo ghatābhāvavad bhūtaḥ ity atra cakṣuḥ-samyukte bhūtale ghaṭābhāvasya viśeṣaṇatvāt*). Here the relation between the absence and its cognition is picked up; the absence should be the epistemic qualifier with reference to the cognition and that piece of the ground should be to be qualified (*viśeṣya*) by the absence. However, since the *TS* explains the ontic aspect of the absence and that piece, it takes the absence as the qualifier and not as the epistemic qualifier. It should also be noted that in the analysis of expressions by the Grammarian school there would be no need of distinguishing between a qualifier and an epistemic qualifier since expressions naturally indicate that their meanings to be understood from expressions are dependent on verbal understanding.

the cognition and the object (*grāhyagrāhakabhāva*). For example, when for these three schools the meaning of the root *pac* is said to be the action of cooking, this does not refer to the understanding of cooking or the concept of cooking but rather to the physical action of cooking which takes place in the outer world. Even the expression of verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*) does not represent the structure of understanding or cognition itself but the structure of part of the outer world.

By contrast, the Grammarian school maintains that knowledge has content.<sup>28</sup> For this school the expression of verbal understanding represents the structure of the understanding. This expression also represents the structure of a phenomenon in the outer world as long as the understanding corresponds to this phenomenon. When I am referring to this sense of ‘meaning’ in the course of my translation, I have provided a footnote.

Though we often render *padārtha* as ‘the meaning of a word’,<sup>29</sup> this rendering conveys different connotations in the Grammarian school and the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. According to the former school, the meaning of a word may be contained in the consciousness, while according to the latter schools the meaning of a word is the referent in the outer world. It should be noted that in this paper *pada* is rendered as ‘word’ in some cases and as ‘linguistic unit’ (i.e., morpheme) in others.<sup>30</sup> To be general, while ‘word’ excludes ‘prefix’, ‘suffix’, and ‘infix’, ‘linguistic unit’ includes them. However, I have not followed this general practice of ‘word’ and ‘linguistic unit’.

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28 The Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism also takes this position. Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha do not debate with the followers of this school and other Sākāravādins in the “Verbal Suffix Chapter” (*Ākhyātavāda*) and the “Discourse on Verbal Suffixes” (*Ākhyātavāda*) respectively.

29 The word is sometimes rendered as ‘category’; the other rendering ‘meaning of a word’ can mean an individual thing. As a result, this word means a category or an individual.

30 According to the Grammarians, *pada* means that which ends in a case-ending (*suP*) or a personal ending (*tiN*). (Cf. *P1.4.14: sūptiñantam padam.*)

**A Translation with Annotation of the Ākhyātavāda  
of Raghunātha with the edited Sanskrit text<sup>31</sup>**

A. The General View of Old Nyāya  
(S2, p. 1,3-6; K, pp. 867-876,1; S, pp. 1-2)

A: *ākhyātasya yatno vācyaḥ pacati pākaṃ karotītyādiyatnārthakakarotinā sarvākhyātavivaraṇāt. vyavahārād iva bādhakaṃ vinā vivaraṇād api vyutpatteḥ, kiṃ karotītyādiyatnaprasne<sup>1</sup> pacatītyādyuttarasya<sup>2</sup> yatnārthakatvaṃ vinānupapatteś ca. acetane ratho gacchatītyādau ca anukūlavyāpāre lakṣaṇā<sup>3</sup>.*

Variants: (1) T, *karotīti yatnaprasne*; (2) T *pacatīty uttarasya*; (3) B, T, *lakṣaṇēti prāñcaḥ*.

A: [The Old Naiyāyikas claim the following.]<sup>32</sup> Effort is the denoted [meaning] of a verbal suffix, because all verbal suffixes are paraphrased with [the expression] *karoti* (to do) which denotes effort in the case where *pacati* is [paraphrased with] *pākaṃ karoti* (“[x] does cooking”). And [another] reason [for that is] that since in the absence of an impediment [the relation between a verbal suffix and its meaning] is also understood from paraphrase (*vivaraṇa*), as in the case of the verbal usage [of people], it is not the case that when [you] ask about the effort (or intention) [of someone with the sentence] *kiṃ karoti* (“What does [that person] do?”), etc., [you] answer *pacati* (“The person cooks”), etc., unless [you assign] the meaning of effort

31 The Sanskrit text of Raghunātha’s *Ākhyātavāda* is divided and provided with the numbered parts of the translation to be given later on, with the following alterations: *sarvva* → *sarva*, the same treatment for its declensions; *maryyādā* → *maryādā*, the same treatment for its declensions; *kartṭr* → *kartṛ*, the same treatment for its declensions; *dharmmin* → *dharmin*, the same treatment for its declensions, and so on.

32 This sentence is supplied, following Sen [1979: 593] and Sadhukan [2013: xvi]. Part A is similar to the beginning portion of Gaṅgeśa’s *Ākhyātavāda* (Part A), which (portion) represents Udayana’s view. On Gaṅgeśa’s text (Part A) and its annotated translation, see Wada [2007a: 419-420]. Raghunātha refers to the view that indicative function of a verbal suffix is accepted to analyze the case of *ratho gacchati* (“The chariot goes”). He regards this view as different from that of new scholars, i.e., new Navya-naiyāyikas. Moreover, Gaṅgeśa has recourse to indicative function to analyze the case of *ratho gacchati* in his *Ākhyātavāda* (Part E1: For his view on *ratho gacchati*, see Wada [2012a: 542] [2014a: 67]). Hence, the proponents of Raghunātha’s Part A include not only so-called old Naiyāyikas but also Gaṅgeśa.

[to the suffix *-ti*]. When [the agent of action is] insentient in the case of [sentences such as] *ratho gacchati* (“The chariot goes”), and so on, a verbal suffix possesses indicative function (*lakṣaṇā*) with reference to operation (*vyāpāra*) conducive [to effect].

### B. The General View of New Nyāya

(S2, p. 1,7-12; K, pp. 876,1-888,1; S, p. 3)

B: *anyadīyagamanānukūlanodanādīmati gacchatīty aprayogāt, jānātīcchati-yatate-dveṣṭi-vidyate-nidrātītyādau ca<sup>1</sup> kriyānukūlakṛtivyāpārayor apratīteḥ gatyādimattvamātrapratīteś cāśrayatve naśyatītyādau pratiyogitve nirūḍhalakṣaṇā, caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulaḥ, maitraḥ pacyate taṇḍula ityādāv anvayābodhāt dhātvarthapratīpadikārthayor bhedena sākṣādanvaya-syāvyyutpannatayā sambandhamaryādayā tadbhānasyāsambhavād iti tu navyāḥ.*<sup>2</sup>

Variants: (1) T omits; (2) T omits *iti tu navyāḥ* and ends with *-sambhavāt*.

B: The New Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, [argue] the following. Because there is no usage of *gacchati* (“[x] goes”) with reference to [a person, i.e.] the possessor of [the intension of] urging, etc., conducive to [the action of] going of other things,<sup>33</sup> and because no one understands that there is resolution (*kṛti*) or operation in the case of [the sentences] *jānāti* (“[x] knows”), *icchati* (“[x] desires”), *yatate* (“[x] makes effort”), *dveṣṭi* (“[x] hates”), *vidyate* (“[x] exists”), *nidrāti* (“[x] sleeps”),<sup>34</sup> and because one understands only [the state of possessing the action of] going, etc., [in those cases of the above verbs], [the verbal suffixes possess] conventional indicative function

<sup>33</sup> This case refers to the situation in which a person pushes a chariot but he himself does not move and the chariot begins moving. The person possesses effort conducive to the chariot’s movement. Thus, people would be able to say *sa gacchati* (“He goes”) with regard to that person. However, in this case they do not say *sa gacchati* (“He goes”). On this case, see Sadhukhan [2014: xvii].

<sup>34</sup> There is no need of resolution or effort to generate cognition (*jñāna*) in the case of *jānāti*, desire (*icchā*) in the case of *icchati*, and so on.

(*nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*) with reference to supportness (*āśrayatva*)<sup>35</sup> [in those cases], counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitva*) in the case of [the sentences] *naśyati* (“[x] destroys”), and so forth. The reason [for this] is as follows. Since one does not understand the relation [between the meanings of the words] in [hearing the wrong sentences] *caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulaḥ* (\*“Caitra husked rice cooks”), *maitraḥ pacyate taṇḍulaḥ* (\*“Maitra husked rice is cooked”),<sup>36</sup> or others, due to the difference of the meanings of the verbal root and the nominal base (*prātipadika*) in each case,<sup>37</sup> the relation [of those meanings] cannot be directly understood; and hence the understanding of those [meanings] cannot be generated by means of agreement of relation (*sambandhamaryādā*).<sup>38</sup>

35 The concept of support (*āśraya*) subsumes not only the concepts of container (*ādihāra*) and locus (*adhikaraṇa*) but also those of non-container and non-locus to which the other relatum/relata are related. Gaṅgeśa uses the concept of support to present the Nyāya objection to the Mīmāṃsā view of an agent (*kartr*) and an action generator (*kāraka*) in his Ākhyātavāda. On his use of the concepts, see Wada [2007a: 422]. On the Vaiśeṣika concept of *āśraya*, see Hirano [2015].

36 If these two sentences were correct, the verbal understandings generated by them would respectively take the following forms: that Caitra and/or husked rice are/is the possessor of resolution conducive to cooking and that Maitra and/or husked rice are/is the locus of the result of cooking, i.e., softening of husked rice. (Here these forms are given in the simplest way.) Both understandings are not regarded as true, because in the former understanding husked rice cannot possess resolution and because in the latter Maitra is not the locus of the result. The correct sentences are *caitraḥ pacati taṇḍulam* (“Caitra cooks husked rice”), *maitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ* (“Husked rice is cooked by Maitra”).

37 An example in which the meanings of a verbal root and a nominal base are identical is *stokaṃ pacati* (“[x] cooks slightly”). The verbal understanding of this sentence would be that [x is] the possessor of resolution conducive to cooking, i.e., softening, which is slight (*stokābhinnapākānukūlakṛtimān*, which is reconstructed from *Vivṛti*, p. 884, 6-7: *stokaṃ pacatītyādau dhātvarthānāmārthayor abhedasamsargeṇā-nvayabodhadarśanād uktaṃ bhedeneti* ...).

38 Agreement of relation is the function of generating an understanding of a relation between meanings/referents in a particular framework. For instance, when a person who knows Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontological categories hears that a pot has color, that person understands that the relation between the pot (i.e., a substance [*dravya*]) and its color (i.e., a quality [*guṇa*]) is inherence (*samavāya*). On this function, see Matilal [1968: 152-153], which makes reference to G. Sastri [1983(1959): 233], and Kunjnuni Raja [1977: 187, 221, 294]; G. Bhattacharya [1980].

C. The Mīmāṃsā Refutation to Nyāya<sup>39</sup>  
 (S2, pp. 1,13-2,5; K, pp. 888,1-903,3; S, pp. 5-7)

C1: *kr̥ṇās ca yatnābhīdhāyakatvaṃ, kriyājanyatvapratīsandhānā-  
 viśeṣe 'pi yatnājanyatvājanyatvapratīsandhānāt paṭāṅkurayoḥ  
 kṛtākṛtavayavahārāt, jñātrādivad āśrayaparatr̥jantakar̥tr̥padasya  
 yatnāśrayabodhakatvāc ca. kriyāyās tadanukūlavāpārasya vā  
 kr̥ṇārthatve tadāśrayaḥ kārakamātraṃ vā kar̥tr̥padārthaḥ syāt.*

C1:<sup>40</sup> [The Naiyāyika claims as follows. The root] *kr̥* denotes effort. The reasons [for this] are that though to conceive of the state of being produced by action does not differ [in the cases of a piece of cloth and a sprout], [one] conceives of the state of being produced [by effort] or of being not [produced] by effort in those cases, that [people] express that [a piece of] cloth and a sprout are made [by effort] and not made [by effort respectively],<sup>41</sup> and that like [the word] *jñātr̥* (knower) a word [expressive] of an agent ending in [the suffix] *tr̥C*,<sup>42</sup> which means support (*āśraya*),<sup>43</sup> causes [one] to comprehend the support of that effort. When [the root] *kr̥* denotes action or operation conducive to that [action], the support of that [action] or any action generator (*kāraka*) would be the meaning of [the word] *kar̥tr̥* (agent of action).

C2.1: *atha ratho gacchati gamanaṃ karoti bījādināṅkurādiḥ kṛta iti  
 vināpi yatnaṃ kr̥ṇaḥ prayogān na tasya yatnavācakatvaṃ, kar̥tr̥-  
 pade ca kr̥ṇo yatne nirūḍhalakṣaṇā<sup>1</sup> yadi kriyādyaśrayamātre<sup>2</sup>  
 na tatprayogaḥ, evaṅ cācetanē 'pi pacatītyādiprayogāt kriyā-*

<sup>39</sup> Sen [1993: 536-537] interprets that in Part C Raghunātha presents the view of traditional Nyāya and the objection to it, but does not identify the objector. A similar objection is found in Gaṅgeśa's Ākhyātavāda, Part B2 (Wada [2007a: 420-421]), which is raised by the Mīmāṃsaka. Hence, I conjecture that the objector in part C is a Mīmāṃsaka.

<sup>40</sup> A similar discussion is found in Gaṅgeśa's Ākhyātavāda, Part B2, which is the Nyāya objection to the Mīmāṃsā refutation. On this part, see Wada [2007a: 420-421].

<sup>41</sup> The first reason gives a general description of the usage of the root *kr̥*, and the second, examples of its usage. When one has proper usage such as *striyā paṭaḥ kṛtaḥ* ("[A piece of] cloth is produced by the woman") and *bījenāṅkuraḥ kṛtaḥ* ("A sprout is produced by a seed"), we are aware that the former case involves effort, while the latter is not. Thus, we can confirm the general description.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. P3.1.133: *ṅvultr̥cau*. (Trans. by Vasu [1977(1891): 399]: The affixes *ṅvul* (*aka*) and *tr̥C* (*tr̥*) are placed after all verbal roots, expressing the agent.)

<sup>43</sup> On the concept of support, see fn. 34.

*nukūlavyāpārapratīter bādhakaṃ vinā gaṇatvāyogāt janakavyāpāra evākhyātārthaḥ, taṇḍulakrayaṇādeś ca na pākādi-janakatvam iti nātiprasaṅgaḥ.*

Variants: (1) T, *nirūḍhilakṣaṇā*; (2) B, *-mātreṇa*

C2.1:44 [The Mīmāṃsaka will answer as follows:] In the case of [the sentences] *ratho gacchati* (“The chariot goes”), *gamaṇaṃ karoti* (“[The chariot] makes going”),<sup>45</sup> and *bījādināṅkurādiḥ kṛtaḥ* (“A sprout, etc., are produced by a seed, etc.”), even without effort [in those cases the root] *kr* is used. Hence, that [root] does not denote effort, and [the root] *kr* in the word *karṭṛ* (agent of action) possesses conventional indicative function with reference to effort, if that [root] is not used with reference to all supports of action. And similarly, the meaning of a verbal suffix is nothing more than operation producing [action] because of the availability of [the expression] *pacati* (“[x] cooks”) even with regard to an insentient [agent]<sup>46</sup> and because of there being no possibility of [interpreting such a usage as] figurative from [the fact of there being] no impediment to the understanding of operation<sup>47</sup> conducive to action [in the case of insentient agents]. Moreover, buying husked rice and other [actions] do not produce the action of cooking and so forth. Therefore, [our view that a verbal suffix denotes operation producing action] does not suffer from [the defect of] over-application (*atiprasaṅga*) [of the verb *pacati*].<sup>48</sup>

44 A similar discussion is found in Gaṅgeśa’s Ākhyātavāda, Parts B1 and B3, which represent the Mīmāṃsā view. On this view, see Wada [2007a: 420-421].

45 I have interpreted the second Sanskrit sentence *gamaṇaṃ karoti* as a paraphrase of the first *ratho gacchati*. The reasons for this are as follows: only the second lacks the subject (or nominative), so the subject should be the same with that of the first; If the second deals with a very common case, the suffix *-ti* of *karoti* may denote effort like in the case of *devadatto gamaṇaṃ karoti* (“Devadatta makes going”), which means that the second cannot represent the case in which the suffix never denotes effort, like the first *ratho gacchati*. I consider that the objector, the Mimamasaka, has given those three sentences to indicate that the suffix does not denote effort, so the second must serve for this purpose.

46 Mathurānātha considers fire, fuel, etc., as insentient agents. Cf. *Vivṛti*, p. 895, 10-11: *acetane 'pīti agnikāṣṭhādāu apīty arthaḥ*.

47 Here operation includes contact or separation. On the difference between operation and action, see Basic Concepts: (a) *ākhyāta* subsection.

48 Since buying husked rice does not immediately produce the action of cooking, no one says *pacati* (“[x] cooks”) with reference to a person who is buying husked rice. Moreover, the person may not cook by himself/herself. Gaṅgeśa also argues in his

C2.2.1: *kathaṃ tarhi pacatītyādau pākajanakayatnānubhava iti cet,*

C2.2.1: [The Naiyāyika will object to the Mīmāṃsaka:] How, then, does the understanding of effort producing [the action of] cooking take place in the case of [the sentence] *pacati* (“[x] cooks”)?

C2.2.2: *yatnāvinābhūtapākādinā kriyāviśeṣakāraṇasya yatnasyānumānāt.<sup>1</sup> pacati pākaviśayakayatnavān iti tātparyavivaraṇam. anyathā dharmiṇo ’pi vācyatāpatteḥ.*

Variant: (1) S2, *yatnasyānumānāta*.

C2.2.2: [The Mīmāṃsaka<sup>49</sup> will answer: Our view also acknowledges that such an understanding takes place] because from [the action of] cooking, etc., connected with effort invariably [we] infer [the existence of] effort which is the cause of a particular action. It is [merely] a paraphrase of the speaker’s intention that *pacati* (“[x] cooks”) means *pākaviśayakayatnavat* (“[x] is] the possessor of effort which has [the action of] cooking for the object”). Otherwise, a property-possessor (*dharmīn*) would be denoted, [which is absurd].<sup>50</sup>

C2.3.1: *athaivaṃ yatnasya vartamānatvaṃ na praṭīyeta, tasyāpadārthatvāt, anyatra dhātvarthakriyāyāṃ svārthavyāpāre vā laḍāder vartamānatvādyanubhāvakatvavyutpannatvāc ca. na ca pākajanakavartamānayatnānumānaṃ, yatnavigame ’pi vyāpārānuvṛtteḥ<sup>1</sup>. dharmiviśeṣaṇiṣṭhatā ca yatnasya na syāt<sup>2</sup> tadvyadhikaraṇavyāpārasyāpi pākajanakatvāt. caitanyāvinābhūtacaitratvādiviśeṣitena tena<sup>3</sup> yatnānumānam iti cet,*

Variants: (1) B, *vyāpārā nuvṛtteḥ*; (2) B, T, *praṭīyeta*; (3) T omits.

Ākhyātavāda Chapter, Part F.3, that buying husked rice cannot be operation conducive to the action of cooking. On his discussion, see Wada [2013: 9].

<sup>49</sup> According to Gaṅgeśa’s Ākhyātavāda, Part C5, the followers of Prabhākara hold that effort is inferred from the meaning of the root. On Gaṅgeśa’s text, see Wada [2012a: 538]. It is doubtful that the objector in text C2.1 is identical to the one in Part C2.2.2. On how the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas obtain effort from the meaning of the verbal suffix, see Basic Concepts: (a) *ākhyāta* subsection.

<sup>50</sup> According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the verbal suffix *-ti* denotes operation, and not its possessor; it is the speaker’s intention that allows the hearer to interpret the suffix as denoting the possessor of effort.

C2.3.1: [The Naiyāyika will object:] If so, it would not be understood that effort belongs to present time. [This is] because that [effort] is not the meaning of the linguistic unit [-*ti*] and because it is understood in other [cases] that the *laṭ* [suffix],<sup>51</sup> etc., cause [one] to comprehend present time, etc., of action, which is the meaning of a root, or of operation which is the meaning of [the suffix] itself. Neither [can we] infer [from present operation producing the action of cooking] that [the verbal suffix denotes] present effort producing [the action of] cooking. The reason [for this] is that even when effort ceases, operation continues. Effort could not occur in a particular property-possessor, for operation, not sharing a locus with that [effort], [could] also produce [the action of] cooking.<sup>52</sup> Since that [operation] is particularized by Caitra-ness, etc., connected with sentientness (*caitanya*) invariably, [we can] infer [the existence of] effort from that [present operation producing the action of cooking].

C2.3.2: <sup>(1)</sup> *satyaṃ, caitratvādyapratītvāpī śobhanaḥ pacatītyādau śobhanādeḥ pāka<sup>2</sup>-yatnavattvapatīteḥ* <sup>(3)</sup> *tatrākhyātasya janakayatne lākṣaṇikatvāt.*

Variants: (1) B inserts *na*; (2) B and T insert *-janaka-*; (3) B and T insert *iti cet satyaṃ.*

51 This is one of ten L-suffixes, which are personal endings applied to roots in six tenses and four modes: *laṭ* (present indicative), *liṭ* (perfect), *luṭ* (periphrastic future), *lṛṭ* (simple future), *leṭ* (subjunctive mode), *loṭ* (imperative), *lañ* (imperfect), *liñ* (optative mode), *luñ* (aorist), and *lṛñ* (conditional). These suffixes, applied to roots, are replaced by verbal suffixes. On this, see Abhyankar [1985: 137-138]. On the rule that L-suffixes denote the agent or object, see P3.4.69: *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ* “The tense-affixes called ‘la’ are used in denoting the object and the agent; after intransitive verbs, they denote the action as well as the agent” (Translation by Vasu [1977: 584]). An L-suffix does not denote a particular number to be related with the agent or object, while a verbal suffix substituted for the suffix denotes such a number. It follows from this that the agent or object should be denoted by the same verbal suffix that denotes its number. It is a rule that the basic meaning of an L-suffix is passed on its substitute, i.e., the verbal suffix. As a result, it is inferred that the meaning of a verbal suffix, i.e., the agent or object, comes from that of the L-suffix. The question is whether or not we can ascribe such meanings to a verbal suffix as ascribed by the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Grammarian schools to L-suffixes. (This note is based on Wada [2013: 10 fn. 39].)

52 This sentence purports that if the inference of effort’s belonging to present time is valid, the inference must take place in all cases. However, in some cases such as *sthālī pacati* (“The pan cooks”) the inference would not be possible. In this case operation conducive to the action of cooking occurs in the pan, while effort conducive to the action of cooking occurs in the person who is cooking. Operation and effort do not share a locus, and thus it is impossible to infer the time of effort from the present time of operation.

C2.3.2: [The Mīmāṃsaka will answer: That is] true. The reason [for this] is that because in spite of the case of *śobhanaḥ pacati* (“An excellent thing cooks”) and so on, which does not [cause one to] comprehend Caitra-ness, etc., [the hearer] understands that an excellent thing,<sup>53</sup> etc., possess<sup>54</sup> effort [conducive to the action] of cooking, the verbal suffix in that [case] possesses indicative function (*lākṣāṇika*) with reference to effort conducive [to action].

#### D. The Old and New Nyāya Refutation to the Mīmāṃsā View

(S2, p. 2,6-13; K, pp. 903,3-909,1; S, p. 8)

D1: *maivam, janakavyāpāram apekṣya lāghavena<sup>1</sup> janakayatna-syaiva śakyatvāt.*

Variant: (1) T omits.

D1: [The Old Naiyāyika<sup>55</sup> will answer as follows: The above view is] not correct, for [the verbal suffix] denotes only effort producing [action] due to being simple (*lāghava*) in comparison to operation producing [action].<sup>56</sup>

<sup>53</sup> The expression ‘excellent things’ is meant to refer to the effective factors, such as the pan, fuel, etc., as well as the agent, which cause the action of cooking. For example, when the speaker feels that it is due to the fine pan that the person cooks rice well, the speaker regards the pan, instead of the person, as the agent of cooking and expresses *sthālī pacati* (“The pan cooks”). In this case the pan is intended by the speaker to be the excellent thing.

<sup>54</sup> Some excellent things are animate like the agent of cooking, i.e., the property-possessor of effort, while others are not, like a cooking pot, the place of cooking, etc. The inanimate things are considered to be connected with effort through the other factors of cooking such as a cooking pot, the place of cooking, the agent.

<sup>55</sup> I have interpreted Part D1 as an answer of the Old Naiyāyika since that of the New Naiyāyika is independently given in Part D2.3.

<sup>56</sup> The view that the verbal suffix denotes effort producing action is simpler than the view that the suffix denotes operation producing action. Producing action is common to both views, so when comparing them it does not matter if we remove this common constituent. In the former view the delimiter of denotedness (*śakyatāvachedaka*) is effortness, which is a universal (*jāti*); in the latter view the delimiter is operationness (*vyāpāratva*), which is not a universal but an imposed property (*upādhi*). The view which takes a universal for the delimiter is simpler than the view which takes an imposed property for the delimiter. Cf. *Vivṛti*, p. 903,10-13: *maivam iti, janakavyāpārah janakavyāpāratvam, janakayatnasya janakapravṛttivasya, śakyatvāt śakyatāvachedakatvāt, janakatvapraveśasyāviśiṣṭatve ’pi pravṛttivasya jātitayā tad apekṣya dharmatvarūpasya vyāpāratvasya upādhitvād gurutvam iti bhāvaḥ*. On the concepts of delimiter and

D2.1: *yatnaṃ<sup>1</sup> vihāya janakamātre śaktir astu lāghavāt, tathā cācetane 'pi prayogo mukhya eveti cen,*

Variant: (1) T, *janakam*

D2.1: If [some<sup>57</sup> object:] Discarding effort, the denotative function [of a verbal suffix] should function with reference only to producing on account of simplicity; therefore, even with reference to inanimate [agents], the usage [of *pacati* (“[x] cooks”), etc.] is primary, [then the Old Naiyāyika will answer the following].

D2.2: *na, apacaty api pākajanakādr̥ṣṭavati pacatīti prayogāpatteḥ. pākajanakādr̥ṣṭajanakakṛteś ca na pākajanakatvaṃ mānābhāvāt. ata eva kṣityādeḥ kṛtyādir̥ṣṭanyatve sādhye tajjanakādr̥ṣṭajanakakṛtyādinā arthāntaraprasaṅgo 'pi pratyuktaḥ. bhāve vā<sup>(1)</sup> tādṛśa-kṛtinirākaraṇāya adr̥ṣṭādvārakajanakatāyās<sup>(1)</sup> tvayāpi vācyatvāt.*

Variants: (1) T, *tādṛśakṛtinirākaraṇāya adr̥ṣṭādvārakatvena janakatāyāḥ*; B, *tādṛśakṛtinivāraṇāyādr̥ṣṭādvārakatvenajana katāyās*

D2.2: [This view is] not correct. [This is] because there would be [the inappropriate] usage of *pacati* (“[x] cooks”) with regard to [a person] who is not cooking but who possesses an unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*)<sup>58</sup> producing cooking. Moreover, resolution producing an unseen force which produces cooking does not produce cooking, for there is no

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imposed property, see Wada [1990: 81-98] [2007b: 28-29] and Wada [2006a: 76-78] respectively. On the comparison of the delimiters of denotedness, see Wada [2006a: 77-78].

<sup>57</sup> This objection may be raised by Taraṇi Mīśra, i.e., the Navya-nyāya author of the *Ratnakośa*. A similar objection is represented by Gaṅgeśa's Ākhyātavāda, Part D, in which the term used by Taraṇi to explain the meaning of the verbal suffix is *utpādanā* (generating). On Part D, see Wada [2012a: 539-540]. On Taraṇi Mīśra, see D. Bhattacharya [1958: 76-79]. Bhattacharya states that Maṇikaṅṭha (1275-1325, Potter [1977: 12]) and Gaṅgeśa cite the *Ratnakośa*, and he suggests that Taraṇi came after Maṇikaṅṭha and is more or less contemporary with Gaṅgeśa. According to Potter [1977: 12], the text of the *Ratnakośa* is available only in manuscript. G. Bhattacharya [1978: 12-18] allots one chapter to Taraṇi Mīśra in his book and mainly gives Taraṇi's view on condition (*upādhi*) and counter-balanced probans (*satpratipakṣa*). The chapter is entitled “Ratnakośakāra — A Forgotten Naiyāyika”.

<sup>58</sup> Here the term ‘unseen force’ stands for merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharmā*), which are two of twenty-four kinds of qualities (*guṇa*). Both qualities reside only in the soul (*atman*). Any person possesses unseen forces imprinted by his/her past behavior, and some forces are capable of causing the action of cooking.

proof [of that].<sup>59</sup> That is why in the case of it being proved that the earth, etc., are produced by resolution, etc., it is answered that another purpose<sup>60</sup> is concerned with resolution, etc., producing an unseen force which produce that [earth]. [Our view is correct.] The reason [for this] is that if there is [the proof that resolution produces an unseen force],<sup>61</sup> in order to exclude such resolution [of God as producing an unseen force which produces the earth, etc.], you should also mention that [producing as the meaning of the verbal suffix is] producing which does not [function] through an unseen force.

D2.3: *yatnamātram*<sup>1</sup> *śakyam viṣayitvam janakatvam vā sambandhamaryādayā*<sup>2</sup> *bhāsata iti tu navyāḥ.*

Variants: (1) T, *yatnavān na*; (2) T, *samsargamaryādayā*

D2.3: The New Naiyākikas, on the other hand, [claim] that only effort is denoted [by the verbal suffix]<sup>62</sup> and that the state of possessing the object (*viṣayitva*) or the state of producing [action] (*janakatva*)<sup>63</sup>

59 We cannot experience or recognize merit or demerit, or resolution, so we cannot say whether resolution can produce such entities or not. Resolution is logically required to be the cause of certain action, and not of those entities. On this, see Basic Concepts: (b) Effort (*yatna*, *prayatna*).

60 The proof of the existence of God.

61 Cf. *Vivṛti*, p. 905,6-8: *abhyupetyāha, bhāve veti, tādrṣeti pākajanakādrṣṭajanakety arthaḥ, tvayāpi janakasāmānye śaktivādinā tvayāpi, ...*

62 According to this view, the verbal suffix denotes effort in the active or passive voice. This is quite similar to Kumāriḥ's view. On his view, see Yoshimizu [2006] [2007] [2012].

63 The problem is how to relate effort, i.e., the single meaning of the verbal suffix, with the meaning of the constituents of sentences in the active or passive voice. In the case of the active voice, the verbal understanding of, for example, *caitraḥ pacati* ("Caitra cooks") is that Caitra is the possessor of resolution producing the action of cooking (*pākānukūlakṛtimān caitraḥ*). In this understanding resolution, i.e., the meaning of the verbal suffix *-ti*, has the action of cooking for its object (*viṣaya*), so the relation of the action to the resolution is the state of possessing the object (*viṣayitva*). In the case of the passive voice, on the other hand, the verbal understanding of, for example, *taṇḍulaḥ pacate* ("Husked rice is cooked") is that husked rice is the possessor of the state of being an object (*karman*), which (state) is nothing more than the state of possessing result produced by the action of cooking produced by resolution (*kṛtijanyapākajanyaphala-śālitvarūpapākakarmatvavat*). In this understanding resolution, i.e., the meaning of the verbal suffix *-te*, produces the action of cooking, so the relation of the action to the resolution is the state of producing [action] (*janakatva*). It may be questioned why in the former case of the active voice the relation of the action to the resolution is not objectness (*viṣayatva*) and why in the latter case of the passive voice the relation of the action to the

appears<sup>64</sup> through agreement of relation [to the hearer of the sentence].

(to be continued)

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 C: *Ākhyātaśaktivāda* included in Chatterjee [1981].  
 K: *Ākhyātaśaktivāda* included in *Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya*, 4 Volumes, edited by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Vrajajivan Prachyabharati Granthamala 47, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, 1990, pp. 867-1009. (First published: Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1884-1901)  
 S: *Ākhyātavāda* included in Sen [1979].  
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*Ākhyātaśaktivādavivṛti* or *Ākhyātavādarahasya* of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, included in *Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya*, 4 Volumes. See *Ākhyātavāda*: K.  
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 TC: *Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya*, 4 Volumes. See *Ākhyātavāda*: K.  
 Vivṛti: See *Ākhyātaśaktivādavivṛti*.

resolution is not producedness (*janyatva*). In order to answer these questions, it needs to understand the concepts of relation and its 'direction' in Navya-nyāya. On these concepts, see Wada [1990: 66-68] [2007b: 27-29].

<sup>64</sup> The word 'appear' does not mean that those two states appear in the cognition which grasps them. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers take the view that the object (*viśaya*) of cognition does not exist in the cognition, and instead that cognition grasps or understands the object, which means that the object is related with the cognition. On this, see also Basic Concepts: (g) Meaning (*artha*).

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\* Correction to Wada [2015]:

Read p. 38, fn. 7, line 10, ‘38,4: *pratīpadikā*- (K: p. 964,1: *pratīpadikā*-)’ for ‘38,4: *pratīpadkā*- (K: p. 964,1: *pratīpadkā*-)’.

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