

Eli Franco and Miyoko Notake, *Dharmakīrti on the Duality of the Object: Pramāṇavārttika III 1-63*, Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Süd- und Zentralasiens Band 5, Berlin/Munster/Wien/Zurich/London: Lit verlag, 2014, xvi + 173 Pp. € 24.90. (Paperback)

A great volume has been added to the rising series: *Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Süd- und Zentralasiens*. This book, written by Eli Franco and Miyoko Notake, presents the Dharmakīrti's theory about the object of knowledge as the premise of his epistemology. Their well-timed research came to fruition, receiving a boost from the multiple factors of our age, such as the incredible improvement of access to manuscripts in this field and the rapid advance of the study of Dharmakīrti's successors. The book consists of critical Sanskrit text with two Tibetan translations, and the English translation of the first 63 verses of the third chapter on perception (*pratyakṣa*) in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV); it also contains an attentive introduction and annotations regarding information about commentaries, citations, and previous studies, as well as an enlightening foreword by Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Leipzig University.

We already have an elaborative work on the whole of PV III by Hiromasa Tosaki, (*Bukkyō ninshiki-ron no kenkyū*, Tokyo: Daitō-syuppansha, 2 vols. 1979/1985), but its benefits have hardly touched people outside of Japan. One advantage of this book is its skillful use of academic achievements written in Japanese like Tosaki's book, and the collaboration between Franco and Notake functioned very well in this regard. Thanks to the publication of this book, many more readers around the world can be fascinated by Dharmakīrti's epistemology.

The introduction of this book provides a useful summary of its argument. The topic discussed in PV III.1-63 is the duality of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its object. Dignāga, who is often regarded as the founder of Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, held that the means of knowledge is of only two kinds, i.e., perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), on the grounds that its object is also of only two kinds, i.e., the particular (*svalakṣana*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣana*); his successor, Dharmakīrti, refined this theory. The two beginning verses show five essential topics, namely, four criteria to divide the two kinds of objects (corresponding to points 1, 3, 4, and 5 given below) and one additional reason for limiting the objects to two kinds (corresponding to point 2 given below). The five topics are extracted from their translation and Sanskrit text of vv. 1-2 as follows:

1. Because the object of knowledge is capable or incapable of efficient action (*arthakriyāyām śaktyaśaktitah*).
2. The [illusory] hair and so forth are not [real] objects, for they are not determined as [real objects] (*keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣatah*).
3. Because the object of knowledge is similar or dissimilar (*sadrśāsadrśa-tvāt*).

4. Because the object of knowledge is an object of a word or not an object [of it] (*śabdasya viṣayāviṣayataḥ*).
5. Because when [all] the [requisite] causes other [than the object itself] are present, [its] cognition arises or does not arise (*anyanimittānām bhāve dhīśadasattvataḥ*).

According to Franco's analysis, the following section, vv. 3-62, explains each of them in detail.

This book is an excellent product of collaborative research, but it also shows the difficulty of it. We can easily find disagreement between Franco and Notake on the structure of PV III. 1-63 (pp. 3-4, n. 9, p. 53, n. 1, and so forth). The significant difference between their opinions is as follows. Franco regards the two verses at the beginning to be programmatic verses, and the rest are comments on them. On the other hand, Notake finds a different topic, "refutation of the existence of the universal" in vv. 11-50, following Tosaki's idea in the outline. Notake's interpretation is not so unreasonable, and is supported by the Indian and Tibetan commentaries.¹ However, the contents of vv. 11-50 are closely related to the four criteria shown in vv. 1-2, that is, these criteria are applied as reasons for the non-existence of the universal. This relationship can be rephrased as that of programmatic verses and comments on them, as Franco did.² In other words, Franco performed an innovative analysis using the attractive notion of programmatic verse, whereas Notake basically kept the traditional one.

A distinct feature of this book is adopting positively Prajñākaragupta's interpretation for reading the PV. The research on Prajñākaragupta's commentary, *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (PVA) has dramatically progressed in these two decades, and Franco himself is one of the pioneers. They made good use of the study by Inami *et al.* (including Notake), "*Prajñākaraguputa ni okeru nishu no taishō to ninshiki-shudan*" ("Prajñākaraguputa's View on the Two Kinds of Valid Cognitions and the Two Kinds of Objects"), *Nanto Bukkyō* 81 (2002): 225-257 for the commentary on vv. 1-2. However, in the following verses, Franco and Notake performed the philological procedures themselves using manuscripts, Tibetan translations, and sub-commentaries in the important parts for grasping the contents of the PV; the reader can see the results in the introduction and annotations.

As for the Sanskrit text in this book, I testify that Franco and Notake's

¹ For the synopses presented in the Tibetan commentaries, see Yoichi Fukuda and Yumiko Ishihama, *A Comparative Table of Sa-bcad of the Pramāṇavārttika Found in Tibetan Commentaries on the Pramāṇavārttika*, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1986.

² Franco emphasizes that the five topics are discussed in exactly the order in which they appear in the two beginning verses as the reason for their being programmatic (pp. 3-4, n. 9), but I am not sure whether it is true. Shinya Moriyama also points out the difficulty of connecting vv. 9cd-10 with *sadrśatva*, and states that this topic is examined in vv. 45-50 as Notake indicates. If Franco can give up the order, Franco and Notake probably find their way to reach agreement, maintaining the idea of programmatic verse. For Moriyama's analysis in detail, see his review on this book that will appear in *Rivista degli studi orientali* (2016). I thank him for showing me the manuscript.

edition should be treated as a new standard with regard to PV III.1-63. We do not possess any reliable edition that covers the whole of the PV, regrettably, and it has usually been the case to refer to Tosaki's edition for the third chapter. According to Franco, these verses "are well transmitted and present few philological problems in the choice of variants" (p. 24). Their alterations to Tosaki's edition are as follows:

1a: <i>mānaṃ dvididhaṃ viṣaya-</i> >	28c: <i>-āvagāhā-</i> > <i>-āvatārā-</i>
<i>pramānaṃ dvididhaṃ meya-</i>	37c: <i>tadsāmyād</i> > <i>tatsāmyād</i>
3c: <i>proktaṃ</i> > <i>prokte</i>	42d: <i>duṣyate</i> > <i>duṣyati</i>
17b: <i>-matih</i> > <i>-matir</i>	57b: <i>-ābhidhāvataḥ</i> > <i>-ābhidhāvatoḥ</i>
26b: <i>-hetutaḥ</i> > <i>-hetunā</i>	62d: <i>ekāntenai-</i> > <i>ekaṃ tenai</i>

We can accept most of them without difficulty according to Sanskrit grammar and manuscripts' support, and only the alterations on 26b, 28c, and 62d relate to its meaning. The copious notes provide enough information for the readers' reconsideration in each case.

I am not yet sure of the priority of the new reading in 28c. Their choice of *avatāra* follows the primary source, the manuscript of the PV in Italy, and Prajñākaragupta's commentary reasonably efficiently. The meaning is, however, still ambiguous. I add some information on its interpretation here. This is the relevant Sanskrit text and English translation by Franco and Notake (emphasis mine):

28cd: *tadviśeṣāvatārārthair jātiḥ śabdaiḥ prakāśyate //*

"A universal is manifested by words whose purpose is to enter into these particulars."

The problematic term, "*avatāra/avagāha*", means the purpose of the words (*śabda*) here, and it concerns the particulars (*viśeṣa*). The original meanings of *ava√tī-* and *ava√gāh-* are respectively "decent into" and "plunge into," but certain meaning in this context is not clear in either wording. Tibetan translations read "'jug" (enter), and we can find examples of this translation for both wordings. Franco and Notake annotate Manorathanandin's interpretation that he chose in the reading "*avagāha*", and he rephrased it as "the pervading [of these] as objects of activity" (*pravṛtṭiviśayatvena vyāpanam*). Moreover, we can find other paraphrases of "'jug" in commentaries preserved only in the Tibetan translation, such as "attainment" (*thob par bya ba*),³ "activity" (*rab tu 'jug pa, *pravṛtti*),⁴ and "to make someone to understand" (*rtogs par byed pa*).⁵ Considering these

³ See PVV_R P28b3/D23b3-4: *khyad par de la 'jug pa'i don can te thob par bya ba'i don du sgra yis* (P: *sgras* D) ... //.

⁴ See PVAT_J P31a3/D26a7: *de la 'jug pa ni rab tu 'jug pa'o //*.

⁵ See PVAT_J P31a5/D26b2: *de la 'jug pa ni rtogs par byed pa ste /*; PVAT_Y P101b8/D77a4-5: *de la 'jug pa ni rtogs par byed pa ... //*. This interpretation is mentioned as being by someone (*kha cig*) in both commentaries.

paraphrasings, the function of *avatāra/ avagāha* seems to be concerned with human action, but I have not reached any decisive conclusion yet.

The English translation provided in this book is generally accurate and clear in my view, and I appreciate that they keep multiple possibilities of interpretation in the notes referring to different commentaries. Franco and Notake's great achievement will be a significant milestone toward more detailed research in the future. Moreover, it shows a trace of effort to make the translation fluent as long as it does not depart from its original Sanskrit. This point is important especially for Japanese readers who have enjoyed Tosaki's Japanese translation because he uses classical Chinese translation for many terminologies, and it is essential for a deeper understanding to paraphrase them in plain modern language.

In conclusion, I offer my heartiest congratulations on the publication of this book. The book's theme, the particular and the universal, is one of the most major philosophical problems of long discussion. I am sure that this book will stimulate positive responses not only from those in Buddhist and Indian studies, but also from other philosophical fields.

Waseda University
Tokyo, Japan

Mai MIYO

Devendra Nath Tiwari, *The Central Problems of Bhartrhari's Philosophy*, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2008, xix + 434 Pp. Rs. 530. (Hardback)

After Vedas, a few works have been regarded by Indian tradition as authoritative. Unlike Manu, Yājñavalkya and a few others, Bhartrhari is also accepted as one of such authority. The work of Bhartrhari is so original that it has been profusely quoted as an authoritative text not only in grammatical tradition but also in other traditions. Many a times it has been quoted also by the authors for strengthening one's own position, theory etc. However, the detailed study on Bhartrhari was quite away as it appears, from the curriculum of education for centuries which is a matter of research.

The book, namely, *The Central Problems of Bhartrhari's Philosophy* by Devendra Nath Tiwari is one of such humble attempts to understand Bhartrhari and his philosophy. The problem here is Bhartrhari himself represents a tradition which is subtle and unique. However, the author has tried to churn it out to the extent possible for him with a long standing background and tried to reach out to those puzzling issues.

At the beginning pages he has clarified his position regarding the base of his study. His study is based on Bhagirath Prasad Tripathy's edition published from Varanaseya Sanskrit Viswavidyalaya with ancient commentaries followed by a