The Politics of Disaster in ASEAN: Development of International Cooperation in ASEAN in Disaster Management

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AADMER = ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response

ACDM = ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management

ADRC = Asian Disaster Reduction Centre

AEC = ASEAN Economic Community

AEGDM = ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management

AFTA = ASEAN Free Trade Agreement

AHA Centre = ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management

APSC = ASEAN Political and Security Community

ARDEX = ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise

ARF = ASEAN Regional Forum

ARF-ISMDR = ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief

ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEM = Asia–Europe Meeting

ASCC = ASEAN Social and Cultural Community

AU = African Union

BNPB = *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana* (National Disaster Management Agency)

CAN = Andean Community of Nations

CARICOM = Caribbean Community

CCFSC = Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control

CoE = Council of Europe

COP = Conference of Parties

CSO = Civil Society Organisation

DANIDA = Danish International Development Agency

DDMFSC = Department of Dyke Management, Flood, and Storm Control

DMHA = Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action

DDPM = Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

DRFI = Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance

DRR = Disaster Risk Reduction

DRM = Disaster Risk Management

ECHO = European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office

ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States

EU = European Union

GAM = *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement)

GoI = Government of Indonesia

GFDRR = Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

ICJ = International Court of Justice

ICISS = International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

IDRL = International Disaster Response Laws, Rules, and Principles

IWHC = International Women's Health Coalition

LAS = League of Arab States

LIPI = *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (Indonesian Institute of Science)

LTTE = Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MDGs = Millennium Development Goals

MKN = *Majlis Keselamatan Negara* (National Security Council)

MRC = Mekong River Commission

NDMO = National Disaster Management Organisation

NDRRMC = National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and Administrator

NGO = Non-Governmental Organisation

OAS = Organisation of American States

PAD = People's Alliance of Democracy

PTOMS = Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure

R2P = Responsibility to Protect

SAARC = South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SADC = Southern African Development Community

SASOP = Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations

SCDF = Singapore Civil Defence Force

SICA = Central American Integration System

SPC = Secretariat of the Pacific Community

TAC = Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

UDD = United Front for Democracy against Dictatorships

UN = United Nations

UNFPA = United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund

UNISDR = United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

USAID = United States Agency for International Development

VAP = Vientiane Action Programme

ZOPFAN = Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1. Background of the Study

Over the past 50 years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has evolved from an intergovernmental group established merely to contain communism into a more profound regional organisation dealing with cooperation in the fields of economics, society and culture, and politics. On many occasions, economic cooperation has appeared to be dominant in ASEAN. Many believe that the pragmatic approach of ASEAN member states make economic matters more easily discussed, even as member states remain sensitive to political issues. However, due to the dynamics that have led to the evolution of regionalism since the Cold War and the complex-interdependency of our world, the political development of ASEAN regionalism is now an important agenda. Cooperation in the political sector is explicitly mentioned in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint and was officially initiated in 2009. This dissertation is meant to assess the political development of ASEAN regionalism.

This dissertation seeks to understand the political development of ASEAN regionalism, to find its own niche, by examining the experiences of member states in selected disasters and their effect on the evolution of regionalism. For that rationale, the term Politics of Disaster is used in this dissertation to help redefine how political exercises have been used to draw interest and utilise momentum after the occurrence of disasters. In mapping design for this research, many questions were raised, such as: to what extent do competing actors (states, elite leaders, bureaucrats, pressure groups, civil societies, etc.) in the region play a role and maximise benefits through ASEAN

mechanisms? How can it contribute to changes in political behaviour? How can experiences with these political exercises be used and shape the behaviour of member states? Finally, how can such cases affect regionalism? However, to ensure that this dissertation remains focused, it will limit its study to how ASEAN member states have successfully established regional cooperation in disaster management and emergency response activities.

In supporting the argument of this research, several significant cases within Southeast Asia will be examined. Cases such as the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004) and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008) are examples of how disasters might affect political decisions. Also, it is feasible to examine the nature of political entrepreneurship, including seeking benefits and avoiding further losses, within a disaster context. Both cases give the opportunity to address vulnerability issues and enable more profound regional enhancement. Such experiences could reshape the way ASEAN cooperates. Although political matters are traditionally considered sensitive issues in ASEAN, positive connections have been made in dealing with non-traditional issues such as cooperation in disaster response and management (in Myanmar) and monitoring disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (in post-conflict Aceh). ASEAN, as an international organisation, has learned new things that have enabled it to develop its principles, even as it retains the principle of non-interference.

This dissertation hypothesises that the critical factor driving ASEAN's successful cooperation in disaster management and emergency response is ASEAN member states' ability to adapt to new international norms and pressures. Without member states willingness to adopt new behaviours, there would be no change or transformation in ASEAN regionalism. As a regional organisation, ASEAN reflects the interests and domestic politics of its members. Transformations in domestic politics, as argued by Andrew Hurrell, thereby affects regionalism (Hurrell,

Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, 1995). This dissertation, thus, suggests that post-disaster situations have led ASEAN to improve its level of cooperation in less sensitive matters, which offers the opportunity (if not the "only way") to deal with political matters in a very cautious manner. This dissertation tries to show that the success of ASEAN in formulating and implementing the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Responses (AADMER) is related to its success in these two cases. This dissertation also aims to explain that success has been achieved because certain pre-conditions have contributed to the shaping of political consensuses between member states. This dissertation hypothesises that, without such enabling pre-conditions, the political outcomes of disaster responses might be different. Taking a look at other examples of political-security issues in ASEAN, including border disputes (i.e. the Thai–Cambodian Preah Vihear Temple dispute that has lasted since 2008) as well as recent South China Sea disputes, might suggest that traditional security issues cannot be readily solved through ASEAN mechanism. Some people might believe that one decisive factor in ASEAN's successful disaster management derives from this issue's characteristic as non-traditional. However, we should not forget that the implementation of disaster management and emergency responses in ASEAN is related to the deployment of military personnel and vehicles, the opening of borders for foreign aid, and political openness of ruling regimes. Regional disaster management and emergency responses, thus, also require the political will to engage with the demands of the international community.

This dissertation will formulate its arguments to identify factors that have been decisive in ASEAN's successful disaster management and emergency response activities and hopefully help pinpoint the pre-conditions for success. These pre-conditions might lie within the debate on the

"ASEAN Way".[1] Critics believe that the ASEAN Way principles are major stumbling blocks for progressive regionalism, due to their emphasis on maintaining harmony and avoiding open and frank criticism (Henry, 2007). However, it may be seen that ASEAN has successfully bridged member states and the international community through its principles of non-interference, consultation, and consensus. These mechanisms have allowed ASEAN to maintain its growth and stability while simultaneously creating a comfortable forum for member states. The non-interference principle is regarded as a major tool for ensuring the adaptability of Southeast Asian countries. This dissertation argues that ASEAN, in principle, is standing in the middle of a spectrum of regionalism, being neither a mere club nor a supra-national mechanism. In a mere club, member states would not effectively engage in cooperation; meanwhile, in a supra-national mechanism, nation-states' sovereignty would incrementally fade. National sovereignty remains regarded as very important and sacred in Southeast Asia, and although ASEAN member states may form consensuses and understandings, preserving warm and close cooperation, they do not sacrifice their ultimate interests as nations. Nevertheless, disaster response is a matter of human security, which is the core concern of humanity. Therefore, in ASEAN, the Politics of Disaster could have a broader arena of negotiation than political matters *per se*. As such, the pre-conditions for ASEAN's successful formulation and implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) relates to various aspects that have shaped or transformed the "ASEAN Way." These include: 1) newly established international norms, 2) the trust built from experiences with the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami as well as Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in 2008, and 3) Southeast Asian interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect.

[1] The ASEAN Way involves the principles of consensus, non-interference, and the renunciation of military force.

I.2. Objective and Significance of the Research

First, the main objective of this dissertation is to explore the results of ASEAN cooperation in disaster management and emergency response and how the regional organisation has successfully formulated cooperation. This study will enrich perspectives on ASEAN and Southeast Asian studies, as well as international relations discourses. It also encompasses elements of peace studies, as the experiences of Aceh and Myanmar not only provided ASEAN with lessons learned in the field of humanitarian actions and pressure to continue democratisation but also highlighted the contribution of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) to peace-building.

Second, this dissertation will also contribute to a better understanding of the future of ASEAN. This study will formulate a model that can be used to forecast trends in ASEAN regionalism, which will be made possible by this dissertation's identification of pre-conditions that can help project trends. Since 2008, ASEAN has transformed itself into a full-fledged regional organisation with its own legal personhood. This has marked a new era in Southeast Asian regionalism and given momentum to deepen regional integration. Under a ratified charter, ASEAN has established three pillars of cooperation, namely the ASEAN Political and Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Social and Cultural Community. These pillars encompass several issues, ranging from traditional issues such as security and politics, to non-traditional issues with less sensitivity. The achievement of an ASEAN community will depend on the effectiveness of ASEAN cooperation frameworks. Some frameworks may experience faster development, while others may be hindered by more difficult challenges.

Third, this dissertation will provide an explanation as to why regional cooperation in disaster management is more likely to succeed. According to this study, success depends not on the nature or inherent character of the issue itself. Rather, there are specific rationales that influence states' compliance and cooperation on particular issues. This dissertation aims to identify those rationales. Humanitarian actions and disaster management could be some of the fastest-growing cooperation frameworks, given that they are characterised by a need for immediate response. On the other hand, humanitarian and disaster management issues could be utilised to endorse a deeper sense of belonging within the region, thereby helping ASEAN build the community and determining whether ASEAN member states can orchestrate good deeds. In responding to major disasters within the region, Southeast Asian countries have tried to take their cooperation to a new level.

Fourth, this study will test and combine the important theories of 1) constructivism to understand the internalisation of international norms, 2) two-level game examination to explain member states' rationales in AADMER negotiations, and 3) degree of regional adaptation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to help explain how ASEAN principles have been transformed. The combination of these three theoretical frameworks will offer an adequate explanation of why ASEAN has made rapid progress in cooperative disaster management. The cases of Aceh and Myanmar do not prove that any major natural disaster will be a decisive factor in peacebuilding or political change. However, it will provide a momentum for political actors to exercise their interests at both the domestic and international level (two-level games). The approaches taken by different actors in response to this momentum has a more decisive role. In a conflict situation, for example, a major natural disaster could result in reconciliation, but it also exacerbates the situation. As shown by Firawati, it will depend on how the involved actors build mutual empathy (Firawati, 2010, p.

63). The cases of Aceh and Sri Lanka following the 2004 tsunami, for example, show different results. Aceh successfully achieved reconciliation, while Sri Lanka could not produce a peace settlement. Firawati suggests that intra-group situations, inter-group dynamics, and external actors will impact transformational efforts made following a disaster, and argues that disasters give conflicting parties time to rethink alternative means of conflict resolution (Firawati, 2010, p. 84). This is what ASEAN member states such as Indonesia and Myanmar have done after a disaster. Experience building trust within the context of cooperative disaster response will be beneficial as a factor contributing to political change. Second, this dissertation argues that the ability to play at both the international and domestic levels will be the main factor determining the success of the regional engagement.

I.3. Research Questions

In helping organise the structure of this dissertation, three questions are asked: 1) Why has ASEAN successfully formulated regional disaster management and emergency response mechanism? 2). How have the political exercises of competing actors, ranging from the domestic level to elite leaders and regional-level bureaucrats, negotiated regional disaster management cooperation? 3) How does ASEAN regional disaster management cooperation relate to the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)? These three questions will be answered in Chapters III, IV, and V, respectively.

I.4. Literature Review

This section aims to map influential works by scholars in various field related to disaster management. The mapping will help this dissertation to take its position in filling the gap and contribute new knowledge to understudied disaster management aspects. In order to understand the politics of disaster in ASEAN, the literature reviewed was ranged from disaster management issue, ASEAN regionalism, and international relations theories.

I.4.1. On the Politics of Disaster

The term "political change" as used in this research refers to a range of transformations that might occur in Southeast Asia, both at the domestic and regional level. This study's primary purpose is to expose the importance of non-traditional issues such as disaster response in enhancing regional cooperation.

Vatikiotis defines political change as the transformation of authoritarian regimes into more democratic governance (Vatikiotis, 1996). Vatikiosis's work was noted as a complementary political assessment to the economic World Bank report on the Asian Miracles in 1995. Quoting Adam Smith, Vatikiotis argued that better economic conditions would enable people to see more options. After accumulating wealth, people might seek better lives, including civil liberty and political rights (Vatikiotis, 1996, p. 4). Using this theory, Vatikiosis assessed the rise of the middle class and democratic aspirations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Borrowing Vatikiosis' logic of transformation as an essential concept, this dissertation uses the term "political change" in explaining the successful negotiation processes in 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Aceh

and 2008 Myanmar Cyclone Nargis, as well as its hypothetical effect on the enhancement of regional cooperation in ASEAN.

Meanwhile, the politics of disaster can be understood as interrelated actions in response to phenomena that endanger human security in order to achieve specific political interests. For example, in responding to natural disasters, political entities tend to act based on their calculations of which actions could generate more support for them. Political entrepreneurs, usually at the domestic level, will use sympathetic measures such as distributing resources or setting better recovery mechanisms to help people. At the international level, some disasters can be utilised for realising specific national interests. As such, disasters can be exploited pragmatically. This research aims to understand how different actors in different layers of politics maximise their momentum after the occurrence of disasters. Some actors may face difficult negotiations with other actors, as well as the public; some may succeed in achieving their goals, while others may be less successful.

Some of the literature on the link between the occurrence of major disasters and politics distinguish between the domestic and regional/international levels. Marvin Olasky, for example, emphasised normative prescription in domestic politics (Olasky, 2006). Olasky's work critically reviewed the United States government's failures in responding to Hurricane Katrina while simultaneously underlining the emergence of civil society- and religion-based organisations as paving the way for a new paradigm. Olasky also highlights how different actors responded to the disaster in New Orleans. Its examination involves different actors, ranging from media to senators. As a normative book, this work examines what went wrong through a broad study. Regarding media, Olasky points out that hysteria created by the media could lead to different agents using distorted measurements. Ultimately, the performance of an administration in tackling disasters influences the election preferences of the public (Olasky, 2006, pp. 1-6). The basic principle in his

argument is that certain natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes are subject to God (this statement indicates that the author is compromising with popular belief), while the extent of these disasters' effects is determined through human political and economic exercises (Olasky, 2006, p. 6). Using Hurricane Katrina as an example, *The Politics of Disaster* examines what went wrong with the government and media in their responses to Katrina, as well as what went right in the assessments of businesses, the military, and religious groups. Finally, the book proposes a concept of collaborative disaster response, incorporating different effective key responders in overcoming challenges (Olasky, 2006, p. 7).

Meanwhile, in his *Disaster and the Politics of Intervention* (2010) Andrew Lakoff underscored both the role of the government (public) and the market (private) sectors in responding to disasters. Some questions related to how market-based intervention deals with vulnerability mitigation and its link to the urgency of governments' critical role in responding to disasters; in other words, it asks how both sectors can collaborate. Lakoff uses the word "intervention" to highlight the increased role of governments in managing collective risks. Meanwhile, it examines the broader debate on the relative role of governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in collective security. Tension and accustomisation, then, are his main arguments (Lakoff, 2010, pp. 1-11).

Mark Peeling and Kathleen Dill give examples of sociopolitical transformations that were successfully initiated in post-disaster periods utilizing a different sense of disaster and political change (Pelling and Drill, 2010). Using the example of the Aceh Peace Agreement, which was signed following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (Gailard, 2008, pp. 11-13), the book argued that reconstruction could reshape the governance and political patterns between actors. Analysis has seen post-disaster situations as potentially producing new compositions of political

regimes that are egalitarian, as can be seen from the case of earthquakes in Nicaragua in 1972 (the Somoza regime's failure in distributing resources) and Mexico City in 1985 (the de-legitimacy of the Institutional Revolutionary Party) (Pelling and Drill, 2010, p. 22). Cuny also mentions that major natural disasters can revitalise civil societies and even produce new leaders that replace those who have proven unreliable (Cuny, 1983).

Peeling and Dill use the 1999 Marmara earthquake as an example of political competition between the State and civil society organisations/CSOs (Pelling and Drill, 2010, p. 30). The lack of government capacity and its inability to respond to disasters led to doubt, and public discourse emerged as to the inefficiency of the State's efforts. On the other hand, CSOs—particularly Islamic ones—tried to perform and gain public attention. Concerned with the manoeuvres of such sympathetic Islamic groups, the government sought to perform better. This competition resulted in a high level of state mobilisation in disaster management as well as repression of non-accredited CSOs through the blocking of bank accounts. This led to more pervasive public debate through the media. Moreover, the government's reaction following Marmara influenced Turkey's position as the European Union expanded. It is important to mention that the level of democracy is one of the most decisive criteria for European Union candidacy. Therefore, the Turkish government's treatment of CSOs devastated its reputation.

At the international level, politics correlates with disaster in several ways. From a foreign policy point of view, Drury, Olson and Van Belle (2005) suggest that humanitarian assistance has become more relevant to the foreign policy of the United States after the Cold War. It is said that United States aid for humanitarian assistance cannot be separated from other foreign policy goals. Moreover, the provision of humanitarian aid can be an indicator of strong political influences over foreign decision-making processes (Drury, Olson & Van Belle, 2005, p. 455). In the case of the

United States, there are three political considerations for performing humanitarian assistance: "(1) U.S. foreign policy concerns or reservations about the potential recipient state, (2) Domestic U.S. political concerns, and (3) domestic politics within the potential recipient state" (Drury, Olson & Van Belle, 2005, p. 456). Based on analysis of the country's foreign humanitarian assistance, the researchers indicate that the findings suggested that the aid is strongly political: "Indeed, our results paint a picture of high US foreign policy decision-makers as realists at heart, seeing disasters as opportunities to enhance security" (Drury, Olson & Van Belle, 2005, p. 470). Correlated with the above findings, at the Southeast Asian regional level, different actors responded to disasters to pursue political interests or negotiate goals. William Sabandar (2010) suggests that ASEAN has played a "unique role" in bridging the interests of Myanmar's military junta and the international community. ASEAN facilitated resource distribution and international assistance in a tripartite core group, together with the United Nations and the Myanmar government. As such, ASEAN managed to convince the Myanmar government to cooperate. Cyclone Nargis can thus be considered a test case for ASEAN's improved involvement since the implementation of the ASEAN Charter. Operations since Cyclone Nargis also show international cooperation that has been unprecedented in Myanmar since 1988 (Sabandar, 2010). The experience of loosening political control could produce progressive trajectories and promote democratic transition.

Regarding the debate of disaster management and international norm, this dissertation argues that international cooperation to respond and mitigate disaster can be considered as a set of institutionalised norms. The case of ASEAN cooperation in disaster management can be defined as an institutionalised set of international norms because its implementation relates to other international norms such as human rights protection, democracy, good governance, and the responsibility to protect. Several works have demonstrated a similar path of applying a set of norms

such as Millennium Development Goals as international norms as suggested by Fukuda-Par and Hulme by tracing the formation of this norm through norm life cycle approach. Millennium Development Goals can be regarded as a super-norm in which a collection of inter-related norms is clustered into a coherent framework (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 4). Following the logic of super-norm, this dissertation argues that international disaster management relates to notable universal norms. As a coherent framework, the well-coordinated regional or international disaster management needs political openness, protections of human security, a certain degree of democratisation, and human rights protection.

In the case of Aceh peace negotiations after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, the politics of disaster played an essential role as peace impetus through political interventions. Meanwhile, in the case of negotiating tri-partite joint operation in Myanmar after the Cyclone Nargis 2008, a direct political intervention was absent. There were negotiations process between ASEAN and Myanmar government. ASEAN gave pressures and the Myanmar government finally agreed on the terms. This dissertation argues that although there was no direct political intervention, pressures and negotiation options are signifying a non-forcible intervention.

Direct military and political intervention[2] towards a government that violates the human rights of their citizen is traditionally known as forcible humanitarian intervention (Ramsbotham, 1997, p. 445). Non-forcible intervention is now viable as one of the option to help protect the fundamental human rights everywhere in the world due to the changing international political

[2] Such as NATO's operation of imposing no-fly zone in Libya to limit the capacity of Gaddafi's regime in March 2011. This action was a respond to the regime's potential attacks to Libyan civilians in February 2011. See NATO's official release available online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_71652.htm accessed on 22 January 2020.

structure in post-cold war era because of the de-escalation of the conflict. Non-forcible intervention is a method to alleviate massive human rights violations in another country without the use of military force. Ramsbotham categorised different variations of intervention as follows (Ramsbotham, 1997, p. 457):

1. Coercive governmental humanitarian intervention
    a. Coercive military humanitarian intervention (forcible)

        The example of this category is the coalition action to stop Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990.

    b. Coercive non-military humanitarian intervention (non-forcible)

        The example of this category is applying economic sanction or trade blockade to a regime threatening its citizens. Such as sanctions implied to North Korea.
2. Non-coercive governmental humanitarian intervention
    a. Non-coercive military humanitarian intervention (non-forcible)

        The example of this category is the Operation Sea Angle to help response cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991.

    b. Non-coercive, non-military humanitarian intervention (non-forcible)

        The example of this category is the deployment of UN missions to respond to a disaster and to provide humanitarian aid.
3. Transnational, intergovernmental and non-governmental humanitarian intervention (non-forcible).

The example of this category is the role of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent operation in conflicting area, the UNHCR works for internally displaced persons, and the UNDP programmes in developing countries.

Based on Ramsbotham's categorisation of humanitarian intervention above, this dissertation argues that what the international community and ASEAN did to pressure the Myanmar government in 2008 as a non-forcible intervention done by transnational and intergovernmental actors.

I.4.2. ASEAN Legal Framework

This section is designed to review some relevant ASEAN documents to map where disaster management cooperation can be located within ASEAN. In examining the legal framework of ASEAN, this dissertation traces its evolution through important milestones. Politically, there are six agreements that need to be discussed: the ASEAN Declaration of 1967 (Bangkok Declaration), the 1971 Declaration on the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the 1976 ASEAN Concord, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the ASEAN Charter (2007), and the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint.[3]

The ratification of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 may be seen as having provided the momentum for deeper regional integration. ASEAN established three pillars of cooperation, namely the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); and ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (ASCC). Those pillars encompass a range of

[3] Other frameworks, such as the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (1996) and Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (2004), are focused on economic cooperation; as such, these documents will be not included in this assessment.

issues, from traditional ones such as security and politics to non-traditional ones of less sensitivity. The achievement of an ASEAN Community will depend on the effectiveness of frameworks for ASEAN cooperation. Some frameworks may experience more rapid development, while others may face more significant hurdles.

Political matters have been among the hardest for ASEAN to negotiate. Member states engage with each other carefully. Apart from functioning to give ASEAN status as a legal body and transform its administration, the ASEAN Charter is politically essential for those who are willing to achieve "values" within Southeast Asian regionalism. Several terms are emphasised within the text of the ASEAN Charter, namely Human Rights and Democracy, as evident in the Preamble; Article 1, Paragraph 7; and Article 14 on the ASEAN Human Rights Body.[4] Nevertheless, in order to conform with ASEAN's purposes, including strengthening democracy and protecting Human Rights, ASEAN member states must apply the principles as mentioned in point (e), (f), (g) and (k) in Paragraph 2 of Article 2. Point (e), (f) and (k) have been strictly practised for decades, while point g has the potential for multiple interpretations.

"*2. ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles:*

a. Respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all ASEAN member states;

[4] Preamble: *"Adhering to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms."* Article 1: (Purposes of ASEAN) … 7. *To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and rule of law, and promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the member states of ASEAN*." Article 14 (ASEAN Human Rights Body) "1. *In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body*. 2. *This ASEAN Human Rights Body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.*" See ASEAN Charter. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2008.

b. *Shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity;*

c. *Renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force, or other actions in any manner inconsistent with international law,*

d. *Reliance on peaceful settlement of disputes;*

e. *Non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states;*

f. *Respect of the right of every Member States to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion;*

g. *Enhanced consultation on matters seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN;*

h. *Adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government;*

i. *Respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice;*

j. *Upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States;*

k. *Abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by any Member State or non-ASEAN State or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States;*

l. *Respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of ASEAN, while emphasising their common values, in the spirit of unity in diversity;*

m. *The centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural relations while actively engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and non-discriminatory; and*

n. *Adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN's rules-based regimes for effective implementation of economic commitments and progressive reduction towards elimination of all barriers to regional economic integration, in a market-driven economy.*" (ASEAN, 2008)

The formulation of these principles as a code of conduct for the ASEAN member states has been called the ASEAN Way. As Rodolfo Severino, the former Secretary-General of ASEAN stated in a speech at the University of Malaya in 2001, and the ASEAN Way is very cultural. State behaviour, thus, is a manifestation of culture:

> "*Southeast Asians' way of dealing with one another has been through manifestations of goodwill and the slow winning and giving of trust. And the way to arrive at agreements has been through consultation and consensus – mushawara and mufakat – rather than across-the-table negotiations involving bargaining and give-and-take that result in deals enforceable in a court of law*."[5]

[5] Rodolfo Severino, "The ASEAN Way and the Rule of Law" (International Law Conference on ASEAN Legal Systems and Regional Integration, sponsored by the Asia–Europe Institute and Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 2001). Source: http://www.asean.org/resources/2012-02-10-08-47-56/speeches-statements-of-the-former-secretaries-general-of-asean/item/the-asean-way-and-the-rule-of-law

Humanitarian and disaster management activities, hypothetically, offer one of the fastest-growing frameworks for cooperation, as the issues are less politically sensitive and require an immediate response. As such, humanitarian and disaster management issues could be utilised to endorse a deeper sense of belonging among ASEAN member states, thereby helping ASEAN build the community and show that ASEAN member states can not only coordinate in tackling problems but also act based on the values of consultation and consensus.

This dissertation restates that major disasters within the region, including the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in 2008, have been used by Southeast Asian countries within the Politics of Disaster framework to exercise the values of democracy and human rights in ASEAN. Experiences exercising these values could result in political change, both domestically and regionally. To analyse the development of regional disaster management cooperation and to understand the possibility of political change (i.e. evolution in the ASEAN Way), this dissertation correlates and investigates the politics of disaster and political change.

A. Bangkok Declaration

As the foundation of ASEAN, the Bangkok Declaration aims to promote regional cooperation to achieve peace, progress, and prosperity in the region. Although it is already aware of an interdependent world,[6] as well as the need to respect justice and the rule of law in adherence

[6] As stated in the Bangkok Declaration; "*Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding…"*

to the principles of the United Nations.[7] The declaration does not mention any framework for regional intervention or dispute settlement mechanisms. The declaration serves to adhere to Asian countries' position to recognize national or regional particularities and different socio-cultural backgrounds in understanding human rights (Freeman, 2007, p. 3). Institutions whose creation was mandated through this declaration include: 1) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 2) Standing Committee to work in between the Meetings of Foreign Ministers, 3) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects, and 4) A National Secretariat in each member country; these have not been realised for more than forty years.

B. 1971 Declaration on the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)

The ZOPFAN declaration was the first legislative milestone to focus on security matters during the pre-ASEAN Secretariat period. It is inspired by the same approach used in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Lusaka Declaration on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Africa.[8] The ZOPFAN Declaration is also relevant to this research because of its initial commitment for a mechanism for peaceful settlement mechanism: "Inspired… abstention from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in affairs of States." This declaration emphasises a fundamental principle of the ASEAN Way: the importance of

[7] Second paragraph, point 2, of the Bangkok Declaration (Aims and Purposes of the Association): *"To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter*."

[8] As mentioned in the ZOPFAN Declaration; *"Cognisant of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa as a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tension"*

independent Southeast Asia by ensuring member states avoid external interference in any form.[9] These principles are summarised in the declaration section:

> *"That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers."* (Paragraph 1)

C. The ASEAN Concord

Signed by the original five ASEAN member states in 1976, the ASEAN Concord covers six sectors, tackling politics, economics, society, culture & information, security, and the improvement of ASEAN machinery (institutions). In its first paragraph, the Concord reaffirms that the stability of domestic politics is important to strengthen regional stability. Therefore, member states shall resolve threats from subversive forces. [10] Again, member states shall rely importantly on peaceful approaches in solving the intra-regional problem.[11] Institution-wise, the Concord is an endorsement for the establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat.

In its political section, the important improvements achieved by the Concord are: 1) the initiation of regular meetings for the Heads of Governments when necessary (the embryo of the ASEAN Summit; previously, ASEAN only had annual meetings of Foreign Ministers); 2)

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[9] The Considerance of ZOPFAN Declaration "Reiterating… determined to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples"

[10] 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, par.1; "*… Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.*"

[11] 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, par. 6; "*Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences.*"

preparation for the Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (which was later signed by countries outside Southeast Asia; this will be discussed below); and, 3) the initiation of a study to develop judicial cooperation, including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty.[12]

Meanwhile, in its security section, the Concord lacks a rigid conception but provides a foundation for such arrangements as greater regional security. It is stated that the ASEAN member states will continue to cooperate with non-ASEAN countries in security matters in accordance with their mutual interests.[13]

D. 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

Following the tradition of its predecessors, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) reiterates the importance of non-interference and self-determination for sovereign states. However, unlike previous documents, the TAC allows for the possibility for the non-ASEAN state to participate by providing protocols for accession. As of 2011, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation has been signed by 19 non-ASEAN states.

Regarding political security concerns in the Pacific region, TAC suggests contracting parties to prevent disputes from arising. As disputes arise, contracting parties should avoid military force and solve problems through friendly negotiations.[14] This offers a very initial rule for general

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[12] 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, A. Political.
[13] 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, E. Security; *"Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests."*
[14] Article 13 of TAC: "*The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them should arise, especially disputes likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations*. "

dispute settlement mechanisms. Meanwhile, the technical aspects of dispute settlement are handled in Articles 14 and 15;

> *"To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at the ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognisance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony."* (art. 14)
>
> *"In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall take cognisance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of deterioration of the dispute or the situation."* (Art 15)

Until now, such a High Council has never been established (Center for International Law, National University of Singapore, 2011). Another important feature is that mediation should be approved by conflicting parties, but other states might offer assistance to settle disputes (Art. 16).[15]

[15] Article 16 of TAC: "*The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance."*

E. The ASEAN Charter

For over 40 years, ASEAN lacked legal personhood. The ASEAN Charter is meant to provide the basis for the association's legal recognition as an international organisation. The passage of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 brought a new era for ASEAN, many institutional improvements were made, such as giving legal personhood (Article 3), introduction of permanent representatives to ASEAN (Article 12), enhancement of interactions between member states by multiplying Summits and sectoral meetings (see Article 7, 8, 9, and 10), the ASEAN Human Rights Body (Article 14), and the Settlement of Disputes (Chapter VIII, Articles 22–28).

The basic principles remain the same: non-interference, consultation, and consensus. In term of intervention in disputes, Chapter VIII of the Charter stipulates that conflicting parties could request the ASEAN Chair or the ASEAN Secretariat to act as a good office and offer mediation.[16] When disputes are unresolved, the ASEAN Summit should be consulted.[17] Compliance, meanwhile, shall be monitored by the ASEAN Secretary-General with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat, with the results submitted to the ASEAN Summit.[18] Although such a mechanism is stated in the ASEAN Charter, the contents and redactional aspects are not clear. Furthermore,

[16] Article 23, paragraph 1 & 2 of the ASEAN Charter; *"1). Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation in order to resolve the dispute within an agreed time limit. 2). Parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation."*
[17] Article 26 of the ASEAN Charter; *"When a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of the preceding provisions of this Chapter, this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, for its decision."*
[18] Article 27, Paragraph 1 & 2 of the ASEAN Charter; *"1). The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other designated ASEAN body, shall monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit. 2). Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision."*

decisions are submitted to the ASEAN Summit, while Leaders of Member States can traditionally veto such decisions.

F. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint

Adopted by the Member States on 1 March 2009, the Blueprint is meant as a tool, guided by the ASEAN Charter, to channel regionalism towards the establishment of an ASEAN Political-Security Community by 2015.[19] It is the replacement for the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP), which expired in 2010.

Important elements of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint are the recognition of the need to promote political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and good governance, as well as respect and promotion of human rights as stated in the ASEAN Charter.[20] According to research done by Rizal Sukma, the term "political development" is intentionally used in place of "democratisation" because the latter is considered offensive by authoritarian countries. The term "political development" was used by Indonesian diplomats to introduce the concept of democracy in ASEAN (Sukma, 2009); however, this was done cautiously, to avoid rejection from other member states. This dissertation identifies the term "political development" as manifesting a conformist approach to mitigate accusations that Indonesian diplomats are opposed to their authoritarian or pseudo-democratic counterparts.

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[19] ASEAN Secretariat online, "*ASEAN Political-Security Community*," http://www.aseansec.org/18741.htm

[20] See: ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint, Section II, Article 6; *"The APSC shall promote political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN Charter."*

Listed actions in the blueprint that are related to the enhancement of political development include: promoting and protecting human rights by establishing an ASEAN Human Rights Body; dealing with migrant worker and civil society organisation issues; and establishing ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (Section A.1.5.). In promoting democracy, the Blueprint only covers effort to initiate seminars, training/capacity building sessions, and annual research on experiences and lessons learned from democracy (Section A.1.8.). As such, it cannot be identified as a straightforward roadmap.

Related to conflict management, the Blueprint suggests several strategies for preventing conflict: 1) Confidence Building Measures, entailing the regional exchange of information among the military officials of member states; 2) Preventive Diplomacy, focusing on maintaining territorial integrity, improving the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), enhancing transparency in security policy, and developing shared norms; 3) Post-Conflict Peace Building, which entails efforts to strengthen ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and research into conflict management and conflict resolution (Section B.1.). In correlation with non-traditional security, the Blueprint incorporates sections on transnational crime (B.4.1.), the implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (B.4.2.), and strengthens ASEAN cooperation on disaster management by finalising the standard operating procedures for regional standby arrangements and the coordination of joint disaster relief and emergency response operations to provide relief aid to disaster-affected areas in Member States (B.5.).

For the purpose of mapping disaster management cooperation within ASEAN legal frameworks, this dissertation correlates the evolution of these frameworks with important milestones in disaster management cooperation (refer to Figure 1):

Figure 1. ASEAN Legal Frameworks and Major Disaster Management Cooperation



I.4.3. The ASEAN Way

Not only a political term but "The ASEAN Way" is also the title of ASEAN's anthem. At any ASEAN occasion, this anthem should be sung as a symbol of solidarity. "The ASEAN Way" is arranged by a Thai composer, Kittikhun Sodprasert, with lyrics written by his colleague Payom Valaiphatchra. This anthem was written following a contest in 2008. From the judges' decision, we can argue that the ASEAN Way remains its most basic principle, surviving for over four decades within ASEAN's bureaucracy.

In 2009, Termsak Charlermpalanupap, at the time ASEAN Secretary of the Political and Security Directorate, said to internship students from the University of Malaya (including the author) that said principles are meant to maintain the comfort of Member States. It signifies that, within the ASEAN bureaucracy, there is a belief that the ASEAN Way has had a positive effect and contributed to the existence of the Association for over forty years. Principles such as "saving face" are essential in maintaining mutual respect and creating harmony through informal consensus and negotiation can be traced to the roots of ASEAN's establishment.

Former ASEAN Secretary-General, Rodolfo Severino writes that five eminent persons—Adam Malik of Indonesia, Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia, Narcisco Ramos of the Philippines, S. Rajaratnam of Singapore, and Thanat Khoman of Thailand—designed ASEAN while at a golf course in Bangsaen. Severino characterises this occasion as "tie-less and easy chair"; with golf in the morning, meetings in the afternoon, and informal dinners in the evening (Severino, 2006, p. 2). In its development, ASEAN took informality as a means of embracing regionalism, thereby differentiating itself from the European style of legally binding agreements and avoiding becoming

a supranational institution. This was driven by the fact that Europe was still recovering from a catastrophic war, while in the east there was the threat of the Soviets' aggressive ideological spread. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries were newcomers. They had risen from colonialism; they were fragile and had many threats within their own territories; they had multiple ethnic groups, rebellious movements, and ongoing nation-building processes (Severino, 2006, p. 6). Therefore, domestic sovereignty was the most paramount interest of each State. Giving others the chance to intervene in internal affairs would lead to a serious conflict. Furthermore, ASEAN faced a security dilemma. Territorial disputes between Member States were sensitive issues, as they involved not only space (territory) but also cross-border distribution of ethnic groups (e.g. the Moro in the Southern Philippines, which is historically part of Malay Sulu Sultanate; as well as the Malay societies in the regions of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in Southern Thailand) (Severino, 2006, p. 7).

Apart from disputes among states mentioned above, also interesting is Severino's attempt to analyse the post-colonial condition, which could be traced to the relationships between Southeast Asian countries. They were used to trading with European "masters" rather than their neighbours. As a result, they hardly knew each other (Severino, 2006, p. 8). Furthermore, Southeast Asia is extremely diverse. In terms of religion alone, Southeast Asia has fragmented distribution: a large Buddhist community in Thailand, Myanmar, and Indochina; a large Islamic community in Indonesia and Malaysia; a large Christian community in the Philippines; and a strong presence of Confucianism in Singapore. European countries, in this aspect, share more commonality. Given the complicated relations between countries, ASEAN preferred a loose arrangement and informality overpressure and hostile political negotiations.

Nevertheless, according to Severino, another element important in formulating the ASEAN Way is the importance of substance over the institution ("Institutions Following Substance") (Severino, 2006, p. 23). This means that ASEAN has the character of progress by responding to dynamics for which member states strive. An example is the creation of the ASEAN Secretariat in 1976, which followed Member States' agreement to cooperate in the economic sector (Severino, 2006, p. 23); as such, the ASEAN Secretariat was initially established as an economic tool. Another example is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was established in response to the end of the Cold War (Severino, 2006, p. 24).

The work of Severino corresponds with that of later researchers such as Ruukun Katanyuu (2006) and Stephen McCharty (2008), who used case-based studies to test the ASEAN Way's mechanisms for dealing with Myanmar. Both researchers restated the characteristics of the ASEAN Way while also highlighting some reform attempts launched by *par excellence* diplomats and statesmen.

Drawing from research by Ruukun Katanyuu, three important principles inform ASEAN's code of conduct in the interactions between member states. First, member states are discouraged from criticising other member states' internal affairs. Second, member states are prohibited from providing any kind of protection or sanctuary to rebellious/ subversive forces that are trying to oust another member state's government. Third, member states are prohibited from giving any kind of support to external powers who are seeking to subvert other member states (e.g. by giving foreign powers space and support necessary to establish a military presence intended to oust a government) (Katanyuu, 2006, p. 826). These principles have been developed by the Association based on its past experiences, as argued by Severino.

Regarding the principle of discouraging major external powers from entering ASEAN, the Association declared the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, which was supported through the passage of the ASEAN Concord in 1976. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar in her work "Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia", the basic idea for ZOPFAN was formulated by Indonesia (Anwar, 1992). The feeling of being surrounded by external powers was dominant within Sukarno's administration. The regime's anti-colonial tendencies had brought Indonesia into a military confrontation with Malaysia (1962–1966). Sukarno accused against the formation of Malaysia, incorporating (at the time) Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Brunei, and Sarawak. Sukarno argued that the Malaysian Federation would be utilised by major powers to undermine Indonesia's "radical" foreign policy. This led to skirmishes along the Indonesian–Malaysian border, involving Indonesian, Malaysian, British, Australia, and New Zealand forces. These skirmishes ended in 1966 after the Sukarno regime was replaced by that of Suharto. Although Suharto's administration was pragmatic and less ideological (and therefore keen to cooperate with western powers), the foreign policy of *Bebas Aktif* (translated as "Independent and Active") was still in practice (Anwar, 1992, p. 2). Indonesia was reluctant to declare itself part of the western bloc and believed that any defence arrangement would be a manifestation of a foreign political bloc. Even arrangements without the influence of foreign powers would be considered a type of political bloc. According to Anwar, Indonesia's foreign policymakers at the time believed that such an act would violate the *Bebas Aktif* principle (Anwar, 1992, p. 58).

Therefore, the original idea was to eliminate the presence of major external powers in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Indonesia tried not to give the impression of being aggressive in promoting its own foreign policy. Rather, other member states could consider welcoming major powers if they were still uncertain about a truly independent Southeast Asia (Anwar, 1992, pp. 58-

60). Malaysia, thus, had a different interpretation of ZOPFAN after its formal initiation. Malaysia's stance was that external powers should guarantee Southeast Asian stability; meanwhile, Indonesia expected the total absence of external powers.

In 2006, however, Myanmar was successfully forced to skip its chairmanship of ASEAN. McCarthy argues that there was a degree of change in Southeast Asian attitudes regarding the ASEAN Way, as the pressure came from the United States and the European Union. ASEAN traditionally adhered firmly to the concept of non-interference, and this caught the eyes of Myanmar's leaders when the country joined the Association in 1997 (McCarthy, 2008, p. 911). However, it seems that developments and dynamics within ASEAN (e.g. Indonesian newly emerging democratic society) affected a reassessment of the ASEAN Way. McCarthy highlighted the evolution of these principles. Initially a concept of "Constructive Intervention" was proposed by Anwar Ibrahim—then the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. This concept was progressive, in that it provided ASEAN with the opportunity to become involved in other countries' domestic affairs due to the enlargement of ASEAN and the expectation that other countries would join the Association. This proposal, however, was never approved. Then, regarding the case of Myanmar, Surin Pitsuwan proposed the idea of "Flexible Engagement", which would allow member states to discuss or comment (criticise) the domestic affairs of other countries if they have cross-border implications. Again this proposal was rejected, mainly by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. As an alternative, "Enhanced Interaction" was proposed as giving room for other member states' comments, but this was not possible for ASEAN as an institution.

Similarly, Kantanyuu highlighted that the idea of "Flexible Engagement" was raised within a consideration of Chuan Lek Pai's administration in July 1998. He cited the words "Frank and Open Discussion" and "a dose of peer pressure or friendly pressure" to explain Flexible

Engagement (Katanyuu, 2006, p. 830). Only the Philippines supported the proposal. ASEAN then replaced "Flexible Engagement" with "Enhanced Interaction", which still preserved the non-interference principle of the ASEAN Way. A development, initiated by Thaksin Shinawatra's administration, occurred in 2003 when Surin Pitsuwan introduced Thailand's foreign policy of "Forward Engagement" (Katanyuu, 2006, p. 830). Under this framework, Thailand proposed a "road map" to reconciliation and democracy in Myanmar through a series of consultations. Nevertheless, this act was solely the foreign policy of Thailand.

Speaking of the main characteristics of the ASEAN Way in settling disputes, Yukiko Nishikawa suggests that the ASEAN approach to a conflict may be better identified as conflict management rather than conflict resolution. *Conflict Resolution* means strategies to terminate conflict, with the outcome being that the source of differences and grievances is resolved and all parties feeling there is a foundation for further conflict. Meanwhile, *Conflict Management* will ease violence; however, it will not eliminate the foundation of the conflict (Nishikawa, The 'ASEAN Way' and Asian Regional Security, 2007, p. 46). In some cases, ASEAN has successfully reduced tensions among member states, even as the roots of the conflict remain. There is an adage that ASEAN's style of reducing tensions is to "*sweep the problem under the rug*" as its very first step. Nevertheless, Nishikawa points out that ASEAN has had a certain level of achievement by utilising this approach. Even though there is still much potential for conflict, most importantly over disputed territories, the renunciation of the usage of military force is in practice (Nishikawa, The 'ASEAN Way' and Asian Regional Security, 2007). Several regional organisations have more or less similar characteristics, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Arab League, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). All of these are oriented towards controlling conflict but have difficulty deepening involvement because of the basic principle of non-interference. The

nature of these regions is also quite similar, being dominated by potential inter-state conflict (Tavares & Schulz, 2006, p. 237).

To sum up the literature review, this dissertation finds that many works of literature in disaster management are focusing more into public policies and domestic politics (Cuny, 1983; Olasky, 2006; Lakoff, 2010; Peeling and Drill, 2010). The work of Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) touches upon foreign policy. However, it is still limited to the foreign policy of a single state. Hence, the relations between disaster management and politics among nations is understudied. Therefore, this dissertation is designed to contribute to the discourse of disaster management cooperation among nations in the case of ASEAN regionalism. In ASEAN, there is previous research done by Sabandar (2010). However, this work relies more on the perspective of ASEAN bureaucrats and tend to be descriptive. There is a lack of explanations understanding why ASEAN succeeds in initiating regional cooperation on disaster management. This dissertation is influenced by the perspective of Kantanyuu (2006), Freeman (2007), Nishikawa (2007), and Sukma (2009) that emphasize cultural particularity in Southeast Asian politics. Countries in Southeast Asia is still developing its democracy and facing challenges in upholding universal values such as human rights and human security. Hence, it creates tensions when dealing with the establishment of regional cooperation on disaster management. How far human rights and human security are involved in disaster management is subject to continuous, and dynamics change within the region.

I.5. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this study is formulated to guide its understanding of the decisive factors behind ASEAN's success in Aceh (2004) and Myanmar (2008). The two-level game theory and its expanded version will be used as the main tools for analysing three cases. The main argument is that, in the case of Aceh and Myanmar, competing actors cooperated to achieve a win-win solution through their two-level games. Meanwhile, in the case of the Thai–Cambodian border, there is at least one stage that the government has failed to address. In this case, the failure of the Thai government to win its domestic contestations with the political opposition and the military.

I.5.1. The Logic of Two-Level Games

Political change might happen after natural disaster strikes because it increases the attention paid to the problem related to policies (Birkland, 2006). People put more attention on the inability of previously failed institutions and create change for reforms. Therefore, it is relevant for researchers to explore contributing factors for political change. In Southeast Asia, there are at least three layers of examples of disasters being utilised to achieve political goals. At the domestic level, the Indian Ocean tsunami, which struck Aceh (among other areas in Southeast Asia), was followed by both administrative and political change. The Government of Indonesia (GoI) used the momentum to negotiate peace with the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM/Free Aceh Movement); at the same time, GAM sought to benefit from negotiations by ensuring greater autonomy for Aceh. This was a positive-sum game, with every actor seeking to obtain maximum strategic value. The peace process was paramount in ensuring Aceh's expedient recovery, while GoI benefited from the

continuity of the President's administration and maintenance of its legitimacy. Both were assisted by the international community, and as such global discourse was involved. As such, post-disaster recovery and reconstruction required a multi-dimensional approach; this represented a shift in the GoI's response, as it had previously considered the situation in Aceh to be purely a domestic problem.

This can also be seen in the case of Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis in 2008 when the military junta faced international pressure for some degree of openness. However, true political change has yet to be manifested in Myanmar. ASEAN and the UN have constantly engaged with and pressured the military junta to ensure political openness. However, the process is still ongoing. While the international focus has highlighted Myanmar's "road to democracy", discontent has been expressed over its mostly symbolic change and the manipulation of the 2010 general elections.

Within the logic of two-level games, all political actors have paramount interests. For states, the ultimate interest is to maintain sovereignty and security. For Indonesia and Myanmar, domestic affairs are very important; however, gaining international legitimacy is also important. As suggested by Robert Putnam, every administration will tend to play two-level games in order to gain maximum benefits. In other words, governments play in two arenas: foreign politics and domestic politics. When they have a focus on the international arena, leaders must also regard their domestic constituencies in their decision-making processes, and vice-versa; both arenas are intertwined (Putnam, 1988, pp. 427–460). Therefore, there should not be any perceptions of single decision-makers from states negotiating with their counterparts from other states/international organisations; what is discussed at the regional or international level should intersect with mutual interests. As Putnam suggested; States—meaning central "decision-makers"—should be treated as plural actors. Ideally, the executive branch (central decision-maker) should mediate domestic and

international pressure in an (ideally) perfect balance (Putnam, 1988, pp. 432–433). This is well illustrated by the play of different boards of negotiation when central decision-makers face the international advisors, foreign counterparts, and international organisations at the international level, as well as parties, opponents, political advisors, and pressure groups at the domestic level. As a consequence, decision-makers tend to choose options that can maximise the satisfaction of both the other side and their own bureaucracy (Druckman, 1978, pp. 100–101). Based on these prepositions, it can be understood that certain principles govern win-set size.

The winnability of a package is determined by certain reactions. For constituents, a lower cost of "no-agreement"—understood as the status quo—means a lower win-set. In other words, if the status quo will not benefit domestic conditions or may even be detrimental to the situation, international deals are more likely. In economic terms, a more independent community creates a lower cost of no-agreement; conversely, dependent communities have higher costs of "no-agreement". The domestic division could also improve the prospects of negotiation. In a probability created by simulated numbers of constituent percentages, governments with divided domestic opinions tend to deal internationally more often than governments with a predominance of public opinion. In Southeast Asia, these principles can be used to measure the conditions, both in Aceh and Myanmar, in (1) calculating the benefits of cooperation and (2) international pressure and domestic division.

I.5.2. The Expanded Version of Two-Level Games

However, this two-level game framework alone may not be sufficient to explain cases related to morality and values. For disaster cooperation, we cannot doubt that morality is the main

force driving towards enhanced cooperation between different political actors, both domestic and multilateral. Debates among constituents in many involved countries may be suppressed by the moral values of humanity. As such, it seems easy to realise actions that support intervention to promote humanitarian ideals.

Morals alone, however, may still be challenged by political choice. Problems occur when we must also compromise with different interests. For example, in the case of Myanmar, the military junta has imposed attempts to isolate the country from humanitarian actions proposed by the international community. There are thus difficulties initiating humanitarian action due to political restriction. The authoritarian military regime might worry about the uncontrollable effect of international actors' intrusion in their vulnerable society, creating choices for people and opening their minds to a better future.

The negotiation process in Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis did not only involve Myanmar and the international community; it also needed another table of negotiation. The intra-regional table, overlapping in the two-level game approach, was used in solving the problem when Myanmar and other ASEAN countries discussed the possibility of humanitarian assistance. This required multi-layered negotiations, opening the possibility for negotiations at the intra-regional, inter-regional, and international levels. In the case of Aceh, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was established by the European Union in conjunction with ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), Norway and Switzerland. AMM provided monitors for the peace process in Aceh following the signing of the Helsinki Agreement, from 15 September 2005 to 15 December 2006.[21]

[21] Please refer to "About AMM" http://www.aceh-mm.org/english/amm_menu/about.htm

As suggested by David Camroux and Renaud Egreteau, engagement with Myanmar also involved a normative agenda, as illustrated by the interest of the European Union (Camroux & Egreteau, 2010, p. 269). The milieu goals comprised of efforts ranging from humanitarian actions to democratisation. By using the same logic, these milieu goals could also incorporate disaster recovery as well as peacebuilding and human rights protection in Aceh.

Using the terminologies of David Camroux in a sort of Three/Four-Level game, this research aims to develop the concept. Quoting Clausewitz, Camroux and Egreteau argue that foreign policy is an extension of a domestic polity. This is logical for his usage of Two-Level Game theory in assessing the European Union's engagement with Myanmar. In pursuing its milieu goals, the European Union dealt with a three-level game (at the intra-regional level) and four-level game (at the inter-regional level) (Camroux & Egreteau, 2010, p. 270). For the example of Myanmar, the humanitarian intervention will first be discussed intra-regionally, with member states negotiating and reaching a single position. Such action was also discussed with various actors, especially transnational NGOs and advocacy groups. As stated by Camroux and Egreteau, national leaders might negotiate not only with their national constituencies, such as national branches of the World Wildlife Fund or Doctors without Borders but also with the international branch of these organisations (Camroux & Egreteau, 2010, p. 270). Inter-regional and international tables, thus, can be seen in the engagement of ASEAN and different international organisations, the United Nations, East Asian countries, the European Union, etc. By projecting the European Union's approach through Camroux's multi-level game framework, ASEAN's engagement in regional disaster management activities does involve not only moral issues but also political negotiations on some different levels. In regards to the negotiation process within ASEAN involved in setting

a regional disaster management regime, the three-level game theory will be useful as an analytical tool.

I.5.3. Other Major Cases in ASEAN

It is beneficial to examine other cases that have required ASEAN involvement to supplement the study of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2008 Myanmar Cyclone Nargis. In the period between 2004 and 2011, there were few cases of open fire between belligerents.

Some cases of minimal military engagement were noted. Take, for example, the Ambalat case of April 2005, when the Indonesian fast patrol boat KRI *Tedung Naga* and the Malaysian fast patrol boat KD *Renchong* collided (Dharmastuti, 2005). In this case, both countries decided to resolve the problem bilaterally rather than bring the case to ASEAN. Previously, the countries had resolved the case of Sipadan and Ligitan before the International Court of Justice; this had a different effect on both countries. Indonesia was confident in its historical arguments and its own maps, while Malaysia was supported by its continuous effective occupation of the disputed islands. In result, the court concluded that the islands legally belong to Malaysia. With this experience, Indonesia was careful in assessing whether the condition in Ambalat could lead to legal missteps such as those that had happened in the Sipadan and Ligitan case. Apparently, ASEAN has not been involved; as such, this case is not suitable for analysis here.

For examination in this dissertation, a case with deeper ASEAN engagement is necessary. Serious military deployment occurred as a result of a dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over territories surrounding Preah Vihear Temple, near these countries' border. This conflict is a legacy of territorial disputes that have gone unsettled since the French colonial era. Soldiers began to be

deployed in 2008 after UNESCO listed the temple as a World Heritage Site (BBC News Online, 2009). The open fire began in October of that year when the two armies defended their positions. For most of the time, a cease-fire was in effect; however, a 2009 clash led to more casualties from both sides. Thousands of villages on both sides of the border have been evacuated since the military conflict broke out.

In the case of the Thai–Cambodia border dispute, there are differences position between two competing actors related to inviting third-party intervention. The Thai government was initially hesitant to invite third party intervention, hoping to ensure that the dispute over the Preah Vihear Temple could be resolved bilaterally. Meanwhile, the Cambodian government was willing to invite the United Nations Security Council to arbitrate (BBC News Online, 2011).

ASEAN played a role in proposing mediation effort by sending observers. After a meeting held in concurrence with the 2011 ASEAN Summit in Jakarta, both the Thai and Cambodian government agreed to allow Indonesian observers to come and monitor the situation. The Indonesian team was comprised of 40 unarmed military and civilian experts. The role of the team was merely to give advice, and it did not have any authority for peace enforcement (BBC News Online, 2011). Nevertheless, the team's entry into the disputed area was stalled due to the concerns of the Thai military (Haywood, 2011).

The Preah Vihear Temple case is one ongoing challenge for ASEAN regionalism. Both sides have signed the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the new Charter has an ASEAN Political and Security Community as one of its three pillars (Kesayapany, 2011). The clash of military forces is already incompatible with the obligation to adhere to the 1976 TAC. Meanwhile, Thailand's reluctance in welcoming ASEAN in a mediating could even damage

confidence in the ability of ASEAN regionalism to maintain political and security within the region.

This problem cannot be seen merely as inter-state tension. As suggested by the two-level game framework, ASEAN's limits are highly correlated with the domestic politics within conflicting parties. In the case of Preah Vihear Temple, the long-standing Hun Sen administration gave a foundation for uniformity in foreign policy within Cambodia, while the 2006 Thai political crisis has resulted in competing views of foreign policy. A 2011 report by the International Crisis Group supported this idea, arguing that, to gain the patriotic sentiment of Thai people, the People's Alliance of Democracy (PAD, also known as the yellow shirts) utilised the issue of Preah Vihear Temple in order to gather the popular support they needed to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra's political group, led by then-Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat (International Crisis Group, 2011). In Cambodia, Hun Sen utilised the division within Thai politics to strengthen his image within domestic politics. By having some level of success in defending Preah Vihear Temple against a much more modernised military force, Hun Sen has allegedly deterred opposition forces (International Crisis Group, 2011).

When the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party was in charge, Thai administration supported Cambodia's bid for the temple being designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Abhisit Vejjajiva's government, supported by the Democratic Party and PAD, clearly signified support for further conflict with Cambodia as an opportunity to strengthen its domestic supremacy over the Pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy against Dictatorships (UDD, also known as the Red Shirts).

Contestation of these blocs within Thai domestic politics produced different administrations, bouncing from PAD- to UDD-supported governments and back. In 2011, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, from the UDD-supported Pue Thai Party, initiated football diplomacy to ease the tension. Traditionally having a cordial relation with Hun Sen's administration, UDD leaders came to Phnom Penh to play against Hun Sen's team. Hun Sen himself played the game as part of the team, along with several Cambodian government officials; meanwhile, Member of Parliament and UDD Leader Jatuporn Promphan played on the opposition team along with Thai lawmakers. Hun Sen's team won 10-7 in this friendly match, and some said that this "football diplomacy" helped restore cordial relations between these two nations (Gosh, 2011).

There is a clear connection between the cordial relations between the Cambodian government and the Shinawatra bloc in Thailand and the de-escalation of the conflict. Indonesia's role as an observer, appointed through ASEAN consultation, is limited compared to the bilateral negotiations between these two administrations. Nevertheless, the initiative taken by ASEAN did offer a conflict management strategy in maintaining the status quo. Although tensions gradually reduced, forces within Thai domestic politics have still been keen on using the issue for their political benefit. Much of this has been related to nationalist sentiment; recognising Cambodian ownership of Preah Vihear Temple is considered as unconstitutional.

In Thai domestic polity, we cannot isolate the military from politics due to its role as praetorian. The Thai military is highly influenced by its ability to intervene in politics. Top military generals were not in favour of the Thaksin-backed government, and as such, they are suspected of

having intensified the conflict before Thailand's July 2011 election, which led to the victory of Pue Thai Party's Yingluck Shinawatra (Roberts, 2011).

Since problems within Thai domestic politics continued to exist, Prime Minister Yingluck sought to address the dispute carefully in a way that the opposition and military could not transform into pressure for ending the administration. The status of the dispute froze when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered the creation of a demilitarized zone in the surrounding area (International Crisis Group, 2011). There happened to be different policies enforced by the Thai foreign minister (in welcoming the Indonesian observers) and Thai military generals (in objecting to agreements reached in Indonesia) (Haywood, 2011). The administration was very cautious (sweeping the problem under the rug) to win in the domestic arena, as the military and certain lawmakers have continued to exploit the issue.

This dissertation suggests that the two-level game is applicable to link the dynamics of domestic politics with foreign policies. The story of the Thai-Cambodian dispute above is portraying how different administrations in both Thailand and Cambodia utilizes their own two-level game. In Cambodia, Hun Sen has a smaller risk domestically due to his ability to suppress oppositions. In launching his foreign policy against Thailand, Hun Sen got no challenge domestically, and the image he got from challenging Thailand in international dispute plays as an advantage for him to further strengthen his authority in Cambodia. Meanwhile, the Thai administration, especially Abhisit Vejjajiva's government, needs to win more solidify supports within Thailand domestic politics by launching an aggressive stance towards Cambodia. By doing so, Vejajiva could distance his administration with Thaksin Shinawatra’s policy, acquiring the

supports of PAD camp, as well as the military. In each country, one foreign policy influences both international and domestic politics.

I.5.4. The framework to Measure the Level of Regionalism

Another framework that might be useful for this research is to adopt the mechanism for assessing regional integration. ASEAN's achievements will be compared with those of other regional organisations using parameters that have been set by previous scholars:

Philippe Lombarde argues that regionalism must be measured in relation to the quality of democracy (Lombarde, 2006). Noting the common misunderstanding that the measurement is too abstract to be implemented, such as by comparing it with regional economic integration, scholars like Edward Best, Monica Blagescu and Robert Lloyd, and Rodrigo Tavares and Michael Schulz have argued that a political assessment is feasible (Best, 2006; Blagescu & Llyod, 2016; Tavares & Schulz, 2006). In the case of governance quality in regionalism, Edward Best suggests that there are common measurement items. Those items are universal and could be used as tools for measuring the level of every regionalism. They are *openness*, *accountability*, *participation*, *effectiveness* and *appropriateness* (Lombarde, 2006, p. 6).

Complementing previous research, Blagescu and Llyod's work emphasises the scope of analysis. They believe that the concept of accountability should be applied not only in inter-state relations within a region but also across different levels to cover the relations with non-governmental organisations and transnational corporations (Lombarde, 2006, p. 6). Many problems cannot be solved simply through inter-state institutions; as such, a multi-level understanding is

necessary. This will help the author understand the necessity of regional organisations as an influence on sub-state and non-state actors.

The work of Tavares & Schulz offers an important tool for measuring the quality of regional democracy by suggesting a means of measuring regional intervention (Lombarde, 2006, pp. 4–5). Tavares & Schulz underscore three important aspects of regional relations: 1) regional integration, 2) regional peace, and 3) regional intervention. The design of regionalism could affect the degree of intervention in the context of regional peace-building. As such, a regional intervention can differ in terms of member states' rationales.

Tavares & Schulz note that two major approaches have been used to define the correlation between regionalism and peacebuilding (the regionalism–peace nexus). The first school is what they term "Old Regionalism", while the latter may be called "New Regionalism". The first school emphasises a realist approach, viewing regionalism as an anarchical arena of sovereign states seeking security. As categorised by Tavares & Schulz, Old Regionalist literature presents a theory that proposes peace as likely being provided by specific regional institutions such as security communities (as suggested by Karl Deutsch), functional institutions (as suggested by David Mitrany), regional geographical groupings (as suggested by Bruce M. Russett), and micro-regional economic organisations (as suggested by Joseph Nye) (Tavares & Schulz, 2006, pp. 232–233).

Meanwhile, "New Regionalism" is more likely to emphasise the importance of values within regional governance by setting normative conceptualisation as "zones of peace", the application of democratic peace theory, and the study of regions as regional security complexes and order (Tavares & Schulz, 2006, p. 233). Neo-liberal and constructivist approaches are dominant in this school. Old Regionalism is heavily influenced by the bipolar structure of the Cold

War, while New Regionalism is a manifestation of responses to multipolar systems and the erosion of Westphalian concepts (Tavares & Schulz, 2006, p. 234). Examining this categorisation, we can conclude that the evolution of limits on the sovereignty of the state (in order to open broader opportunities for the "right" or the "duty" to intervene, as commonly surmised by later scholars of regionalism). More specifically, when Tavares & Schulz review Article 2(4) of the UN Charter on the prohibition against member states using force in violation of territorial integrity, they hold that it is important to defend the norm of non-intervention as a basic rule of the international system while simultaneously underscoring the need to find better arguments that allow some level of intervention (Tavares & Schulz, 2006, p. 236), citing the belief that the conservative idea of Westphalian non-intervention is no longer relevant to the logic of interdependence and the growing role of non-state actors.

How far foreign intervention to other countries is justified is subject of debates. One of the terms utilized to support the justification of such action is called a humanitarian intervention. In recent years, the term humanitarian intervention has been used to advocate intervention to help populations in specific circumstances. The concept of humanitarian intervention was first developed theoretically in the late 1980s by Mario Bettati, an academic, and Bernard Kouchner, the founder of Doctors without Borders (Kioko, 2003, p. 808). Kouchner's main reason for utilising the concept of humanitarian intervention was to counter the misuse of conservative ideas of sovereignty and non-interference to justify the act of killing (Corten, 1991, p. 664). According to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, member states are prohibited from intervening in the domestic affairs of other member states except in situations approved by the Charter (such as massive violation of human rights, genocide, the risk to international security and stability). Several regional

organisations have developed unique approaches to implementing this idea. In the case of the African Union, according to the Constitutive Act of the Union that came into force in 2001, an act of intervention is permitted in circumstances of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as follows:

> *h. "The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."*
>
> *j. "The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security."*

In 2004, the African Union was able to send 5,000 peacekeeping troops to Sudan (Tavares & Schulz, 2006, p. 239). Although it was later sanctioned by the UN Security Council, this legal framework empowered the African Union to deal with the cliché justifications used by rogue regimes to stop international intervention in cases of massive human rights violations within the territory of a sovereign state. This shows that, in terms of awareness of liberalism, freedom, and human rights, the African regional organisation has been one step ahead of ASEAN, its counterpart in Southeast Asia.

Another example of a regional organization that acknowledges the principle of humanitarian intervention is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As recorded by Jeremy Levitt, African organisations have successfully shown applicable practices of

regional intervention. This can be seen, for example, in ECOWAS' involvement in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast (Levitt, 2005). ECOWAS intervened unilaterally in the case of Liberian Civil War (1989–1997), two years before the UN made any resolution to act. ECOWAS received support from the Security Council, underlining the importance of humanitarian intervention. The legal framework for its action was provided by the Revised Treaty of 1993, which empowered ECOWAS to "establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate" (Article 58) (Levitt, 2005). In the case of Sierra Leone (1997), ECOWAS intervened to delegitimise a military junta's coup against the democratically elected President Ahmed Tijan Kabbah. The intervention was undertaken to prevent the outbreak of civil chaos and supported by the UN through an oil and military blockade to weaken the junta (Levitt, 2005). Later, in 2002, ECOWAS' intervention in Ivory Coast was in response to a request from President Laurent Gbagbo to help him restore peace to the nation, which had been torn apart by intensive fighting between the rebellious north and loyalist south since 2000. Under its legal framework, ECOWAS was able to conduct peace operations by deploying peacekeeping forces and monitoring the cease-fire agreement between the conflicting parties. The UN-supported intervention through Resolution 1527, which mandated ECOWAS and France to promote peace and settle the conflict in the Ivory Coast (Levitt, 2005).

The African case shows that it is possible to develop shared principles while respecting a certain degree of liberal values. This situation was highly underrated when conflict overshadowed the African regional organisations' measures to settle problems. However, a significant difference exists in the occurrence of major conflict in Africa and ASEAN. Recent conflicts in Southeast Asian countries have mostly been related to border disputes, for example, the Ambalat block

(between Indonesia and Malaysia) or Preah Vihear Temple (between Cambodia and Thailand). However, ASEAN failed to engage in the Cambodian Problem in the early 1990s. Instead, intervention mechanisms were used outside the ASEAN framework (Jakarta Informal Meeting I and II, with French involvement). Overall, the level of peace is different between the two regions.

To ensure appropriate measurements are possible, Tavares & Schulz—based on the work of Joseph Nye—suggest several parameters that may be examined in comparing the degree of regional integration, as follows (Tavares & Schulz, 2006):

1. Political Integration: the emergence of the regional political system: institutional integration and common policy formation. Indicators include distribution of information; administrative regulations; institutional resources; scope, extent, and salience of common policies; regional conflict management mechanisms.
2. Economic Integration: the emergence of regional and transnational economy, regional interdependence and regional welfare. Indicators include price convergence; convergence of interest rates; trade integration of goods and services; business investment; import and export of goods; the balance of trade, etc.
3. Social Integration: the emergence of a pluralistic security community. Indicators include regional internet contacts; telephone calls; inter-regional tourism; academic mobility and cooperation.
4. Military Integration: the emergence of a regional military capability, integration of police, army, and intelligence services. Indicators include common military exercises; exchange of intelligence information; regional military agreement/protocols.

According to Tavares & Schulz (2006), those four aspects above having different sub-dimensions and different measurements, as shown in table 1.

Table 1. Regional Integration Matriculated Indicators

Type of Integration	Sub-dimensions	Measurements
Political Integration (PI)	Institutional Bureaucratic (PI.1)	Budget and staff as a percentage of all member countries' budgets and administrative staff
	Jurisdictional	Supranationality of decisions; legal scope; expansion of jurisdiction
	Policy (PI.2)	Scope, salience, extent
	Attitudinal (PI.3)	Elite and mass polls probing intensity and urgency; bargaining behaviour; flexibility in the length of time; the number of fields
Economic Integration (EI)	Trade (EI.1)	Regional exports as percentage of total exports
	Service (EI.2)	Expenditures on joint services as a percentage of GNP
Social Integration (SI)	Mass (SI.m)	Transactions (trade, mail, etc.)
	Elite (SI.e)	Intra-regional air passengers; student in neighbouring countries as a percentage of total students; the intensity of regional scientific networks, etc.
	Identification (SI.i)	Elite and mass polls of identification with regional identity; the sense of

		belonging; a low degree of fear of "other", etc.
Military Integration (MI)	Security Arrangement (MI.c)	Formal agreements and coordinated actions
	Security System (MI.s)	Supranationality of decisions; legal scope; expansion of jurisdiction

Source: Joseph Nye, 1987; Tavares and Schulz, 2006 with minor modification

These measures could help this dissertation correlates the experience gained by ASEAN through the cases of Aceh and Myanmar and its impact on Southeast Asian regionalism. In ASEAN, those aspects above are divided into 1). ASEAN Politics and Security Community, 2). ASEAN Economic Community and 3). ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. However, the last aspect of Military Integration does not take place in ASEAN. Based on the matrix provided by Tavarez and Schulz (2006), ASEAN regionalism cannot be deemed as profoundly integrated.

Lastly, in order to provide a framework in explaining the progress made by ASEAN cooperation in disaster management, this dissertation develops a research flow chart below (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Research Flow Chart



CHAPTER II

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF ASEAN COOPERATION ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT

With the ASEAN Charter put into force in 2008, ASEAN is moving towards deeper regional cooperation. At the same time, challenges to this development have emerged, as can be seen in the occurrence of such major natural disasters like the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004) and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008). From ASEAN's experiences with these disasters, we find that regions affected by this disaster are also conflict regions. This adds another level of complexity in disaster management and humanitarian assistance. This research concentrates on regional cooperation in disaster management and risk reduction in correlation with the political complexity of the region. Pressure from the international community was frequent and critical. On the other hand, ASEAN has remained committed to the principle of the "ASEAN Way", which emphasises consensus and consultation that avoid sensitive issues for the sake of harmony. As such, the main objective of the research is to examine how ASEAN and different actors have responded to certain situations, then address the question of how ASEAN regionalism can be enhanced through the lessons learned from major natural disasters in the region. This section details the second chapter's outline of the processes through which ASEAN member states have cooperated on disaster management, encompassing frameworks, organisations, and political overlays.

Established in 1967, ASEAN was originally formed to contain communism.[22] However, in its development, ASEAN has become an organisation with cooperation in many sectors. Only in 2008 did ASEAN legally become a regional organisation.[23] Prior to that, the association was regarded as a mere regional grouping without legal personhood. However, mere legal personhood is not enough in and of itself. There must be a way to measure whether ASEAN has finally achieved the status of a regional organisation.

This chapter aims to examine ASEAN's development as a regional organisation by maximising the data gathered on its disaster management cooperation. In correlation with disaster management cooperation, the nature of the ASEAN regional organisation and its membership can be verified by three means. First, regional cooperation in disaster management has to be accepted by all member states. Secondly, any actions resulting from the regional arrangement must have enough legitimacy and fulfil a sense of justice. Third, there should be functioning cooperation in regional groups.

First is the issue of acceptance. ASEAN's changing characteristics were examined by Nesadurai (2009). He highlighted that ASEAN has moved from a low-level regional grouping created for security reasons into a regional community that can address economic and socio-

[22] According to Richard Stubbs' interpretation, ASEAN emerged amidst tensions on the Cold War era in which the Unites States presence is escalated in Vietnam, communism is considered as an ever-present threat, and ASEAN members start to worry that the Chinese cultural spillover might happens to Southeast Asia (Stubbs, 2008, p. 456). ASEAN is the genuine alternative regional organization version of SEATO that has been established in order to contain communism (Stubbs, 2008, p. 457). However, there is another opinion arguing that ASEAN is distancing itself from cold war politics. Other scholar like Roger Irvine argues that ASEAN was the revision for Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) that was being accused accusations of politically motivated as a pro-Western and anti-communist group (Irvine, 1982, p. 9).

[23] Regional organization in this context means ASEAN evolved from a mere club into an organization with three legal issues, namely acquired legal personality, privileges and immunities, and disputes settlement mechanism. These three legal status were absent prior to the enactment of ASEAN Charter (Chalermpalanupap, The ASEAN Secretariat and Legal Issues Arising from the ASEAN Charter , 2009, p. 178).

cultural issues (Nesadurai, 2009). As such, it has gained acceptance from the broader Southeast Asian community. States have welcomed the expansion of cooperation within ASEAN and remained aligned with its progress and willing to be part of its development. The signing of the ASEAN Charter was the milestone for this, as the regional organisation formalised its identity and symbols (flag, anthem, working languages, and so forth).

Although there was debate over the ASEAN Charter, as highlighted by Mely Caballero-Anthony, this polarisation did not create any significant gap between those supporting and opposing the Charter. Both sides agreed with the goal of signing the Charter, namely the establishment of a single ASEAN community. However, opponents addressed reluctance in ratifying the ASEAN Charter due to scepticism over member states' commitment to upholding human rights and universal values. Meanwhile, positive reactions from supporters of the ASEAN Charter positioned it as a momentous event, one belying sceptics criticism of ASEAN being full of talk and short in action (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). Nevertheless, the ASEAN Charter was successfully ratified and promoted progress in the region. This included regional disaster management cooperation, which we will examine in this chapter.

The mechanism applied in disaster management cooperation can be used to determine whether ASEAN can be considered a full-fledged regional organisation. This paper will utilise the indicators provided by Ferris and Petz for assessing regional organisations around the world to measure whether this mechanism can serve as an indicator of a functioning regional organisation (Ferris & Petz, 2013). These indicators are re-structured into several categories (Ferris & Petz, 2013, p. 8):

1. Does the regional organisation have regular intergovernmental meetings on disaster management?
2. Has the regional organisation approved an agreement or convention as the formal basis for disaster management cooperation?
3. Does the regional organisation have a specific organisation to implement the agreement and an operating arm to play the role of management centre?
4. Does the regional organisation have funds deployable for early responses as well as regional projects?
5. Does the regional organisation have a channel to provide humanitarian assistance and rapidly deploy a team to assess and to deliver said assistance?
6. Does the regional organisation have an early warning system?
7. Does the regional organisation have joint simulations, exercises, and technical capacity building activities for staff?
8. Does the regional organisation have continuous research and publications, including websites, on related issues?
9. Does the regional organisation have a military protocol to assist in disaster management operations?

This chapter will focus on ascertaining whether ASEAN cooperation on disaster management can be categorised as fully functioning. This chapter maps the cooperation on risk reduction and disaster management in ASEAN by utilising above-mentioned guiding questions. The purpose of this study is to determine whether the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of

2004 and Cyclone Nargis in 2008 gave ASEAN a significant push in the development of disaster management cooperation.

By examining ASEAN's development of the framework in disaster response sector since 1971, two specific trends have been identified: the introduction of the idea of disaster risk reduction and management cooperation, advocated primarily during the 2000s, and the development of legal framework starting in 2005. Although the acceleration of cooperation in 2005 coincided with the aftermath of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, assessment cannot ignore previous developments—in the early 2000s and even as early as 1971. For this assessment, two main reports have been used for mapping.

This dissertation divides two periods of ASEAN regional cooperation on disaster management based on the enactment of a regional legal binding agreement. The cornerstone for regional disaster management in Southeast Asia is the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management, and Emergency Response (AADMER) signed on 26 July 2005. The document is the first ASEAN arrangement to mandate concerted regional efforts in responding disasters including provisions to mobilize relief aids, establishing AHA Center, immigration clearance, and expedited customs. [24] Hence the periodization would be divided into 1). ASEAN regional disaster management institutional building before AAMER, and 2). ASEAN regional disaster management institutional building under AAMER.

[24] Please refer to the official release and the copy of the agreement provided by the ASEAN Secretariat available online at https://asean.org/?static_post=the-asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response re-visited on 12 August 2012.

II.1. Institutional Building before AADMER

In understanding ASEAN regional disaster management institutional building prior to AADMER, this dissertation examines a report written by Bildan (2003). Focusing on how far Southeast Asia had developed its disaster management as of 2003, Bildan's report uses as its units of analysis ASEAN and selected member states (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, and Vietnam). Bildan focuses on the national agencies responsible for disaster risk reduction and management (Bildan, 2003). The episteme of the idea of risk reduction and disaster management in ASEAN began as early as four years following its establishment, although the tipping point came in 2005. From time to time, ASEAN has engaged in regional institutional building on this matter.

The influence of the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) has shaped the trajectory of cooperation in ASEAN. Institutional cooperation-building in risk reduction and disaster management has evolved for more than four decades and can be traced back to the establishment of AEGDM in 1971—four years after the establishment of ASEAN. AEGDM was intended to coordinate cooperation for minimising the losses caused by the disaster. It met biennially to discuss disaster management strategies; including prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Bildan, 2003, p. 11). AEGDM's main activities can be divided into three categories: 1) promoting cross-sectoral integrated programmes between relevant ASEAN bodies; 2) bridging ASEAN and civil societies in the region by promoting NGO involvement, facilitating collaborative research, and initiating awareness through educative programmes; 3) providing a hub for experts to share information and best practices (Bildan, 2003, p.11).

The status and function of AEGDM were not elevated into a fully functioned regional operating arm for almost 30 years, and cooperation on risk reduction and disaster management remained limited to a network of experts. There was no sustainable regional forum for member states to officially exchange information and collaborating efforts in risk reduction and disaster management. Meanwhile, the ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disaster, made in Manila in 1976, provided a foundation for promoting national governments' abilities to establish national committees for disaster management. This mechanism has focused more on domestic development.

A milestone was reached in 2000 when the group of experts agreed to propose the transformation of AEGDM into a body that was integrated into the ASEAN bureaucracy through an ASEAN committee/ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting. This newly established body was supposed to report to the governing body of ASEAN: the standing committee or ministerial meeting on disaster management (Bildan, 2003, p. 9). Only in 2002 did ASEAN establish its Regional Programme on Disaster Management body, which provided the framework for member states to form collaborations and undertake joint projects (Bildan, 2003, p. 9). Through this regional framework, member states could propose and lead specific programmes to be integrated into regional projects (Bildan, 2003, p. 9).

This finding is important, as it convincingly shows that disaster management has been one of ASEAN's focuses ever since the 1970s. In interviews with AHA Centre officers,[25] they expressed the belief that the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami served as a cornerstone in

[25] Interview has been conducted with AHA Center representatives, Mr. Rio Augusta as Preparedness and Response (Logistic) Officer and Ms. Asri Wijayanti as Communication Officer on Tuesday, 17 July 2013 at BPPT Building, 17th Floor, M.H. Thamrin street No. 8, Jakarta.

the formulation of legally-binding ASEAN agreement on disaster management. The initial response to the tsunami in ASEAN was the signing of the Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention in the Aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004, which was adopted at the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on the Aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami held in Jakarta on 6 January 2005. This arrangement was later manifested in AADMER, which provided a legal basis for deeper cooperation.

II.2. Comparison of Regional Organisations

There are 13 regional organizations in the world that have started to establish their regional disaster management cooperation (Ferris and Petz, 2013, p. 12). Ferris and Petz's report is significant to the study because it compares different regional organisations, including their cooperation mechanisms for risk reduction and disaster management. This can help us understand the bigger picture of regional disaster management cooperation across the globe. Ferris and Petz collect data from thirteen regional organisations, as follows:

Table 2. List of Regional Organisations

1. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)	2. LAS (League of Arab States)
3. AU (African Union)	4. OAS (Organisation of American States)
5. CAN (Andean Community of Nations)	6. SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)

7. CARICOM (Caribbean Community)	8. SADC (Southern African Development Community)
9. CoE (Council of Europe)	10. SICA (Central American Integration System)
11. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African State)	12. SPC (Secretariat of the Pacific Community)
13. EU (European Union)	

Source: Ferris & Petz (2013, p. 12)

Meanwhile, in their comparisons, Ferris & Petz establish seventeen indicators, as follows:

Table 3. Indicators for Measuring the Deepening of Regional Disaster Management Cooperation

1.	Regular intergovernmental meetings on Disaster Risk Management (DRM)
2.	A regional Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) framework
3.	A regional disaster risk management framework
4.	A specific organisation for DRM
5.	A regional or sub-regional disaster management centre
6.	A regional disaster relief fund
7.	A regional disaster insurance scheme
8.	A way of providing regional funding for DRR projects
9.	A means of providing humanitarian assistance
10.	A regional rapid response mechanism
11.	Regional technical cooperation (warning mechanism)
12.	Joint disaster management exercises or simulations
13.	Regional capacity building for the National Disaster Management Organisation (NDMO) staff/technical training
14.	Research on DRM issues

15.	Regional military protocols for disaster assistance
16.	Regional web portal on DRM
17.	Regional International Disaster Response Laws, Rules, and Principles (IDRL) treaty or guidelines

Source: Ferris and Petz (2013, p. 23)

ASEAN's mechanisms fulfil 8 of 17 indicators. It has regular intergovernmental meetings on DRM (Indicator 1), as embedded in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Pillar of Cooperation. ASEAN also has a regional DRR framework (Indicator 2); a regional DRM framework (Indicator 3); both are accommodated in the AADMER, which was signed and became effective in 2005. AADMER has also called for preparing standard operating procedures that can possibly involve the military and civilian personnel in disaster assistance (Indicator 15). ASEAN has established a regional/sub-regional disaster management centre (Indicator 5), namely the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) in Jakarta. AHA Centre has established a web portal for the dissemination of information (Indicator 16). The deployment of ASEAN-ERAT (Emergency Rapid Assessment Team) provides a regional rapid response mechanism (Indicator 10). Lastly, the mechanisms within the AHA Centre and ASEAN DMRS (Disaster Monitoring and Response System) provide adequate regional technical cooperation/warning mechanisms (Indicator 11).

Ferris and Petz indicate that every regional organisation, in general, develops its own unique approach. The dynamics within ASEAN are culturally and politically shaped by the interactions of member states, and the product of this intra-regional interaction constitutes the governance within ASEAN (Ferris and Petz, 2013).

The work of Ferris and Petz is limited, however, as it fails to explore the processes through which agreements on disaster management cooperation are negotiated. Ferris and Petz focus more on the final products of the agreement. Conversely, this dissertation argues that development processes and backstage negotiations, while small in its significance, may indicate progress in ASEAN. For example, in the regional disaster insurance scheme, ASEAN is now working to find a regional solution that will help countries with disaster budgeting and insurance, as ASEAN still lacks the resources for responding to disasters. A UN report on the Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk reduction in 2012 showed how ASEAN is facing great challenges, both in its rampantly progressing society and its flourishing economy. Despite lavish economic booms, there has been an increased vulnerability to disasters within the Asia-Pacific region (UNISDR, 2012). Therefore, the inability to minimise disaster damage and loss is a direct threat to the regional economy and development.

Regional funding schemes for disaster response, therefore, are important. Both the Hyogo Framework of Action and AADMER require ASEAN to establish a mechanism for risk financing. Funding cooperation in disaster management is urgent as ASEAN aims to pursue a more pervasive disaster management strategy by improving the resilience of member states. This logic is built on the basis of regional support for governments' fiscal balances. By ensuring the availability of financial support, such mechanisms will improve governments' capacity to response disaster. Reliable financial and insurance support would also protect long-term fiscal balance and development plans, as argued by the World Bank (UNISDR, 2011).

The sustainability of the regional framework must be supported by a resilient financing mechanism. As part of its disaster diplomacy, ASEAN has formed a Disaster Risk Financing and

Insurance (DRFI) body under the framework of AADMER. DRFI engages in discussion with the international community and international organisations, including the World Bank, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR),[26] and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR).[27] The performance of DRFI will be one parameter for successful regional cooperation on disaster risk reduction.

II.3.1. Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Cooperation in ASEAN under AADMER

Since AADMER was put into force in 2009, five core institutions have been involved in the governance of ASEAN cooperation in disaster management and risk reduction: ACDM, NDMO, ASEAN Secretariat (Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division), and AHA Centre. To better understand the linkages and nuances in ASEAN governance, during data gathering information regarding the links between COP, ACDM, NDMO, ASEAN Secretariat, and AHA Centre was collected.

Governance of ASEAN cooperation on disaster management and risk reduction is mentioned in the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). Under this arrangement, final decisions are made by the Conference of the Parties (COP), which is comprised of member states' higher ministerial-level executive bodies that are responsible for disaster management and risk reduction. COP's main task is to monitor and evaluate

[26] The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery was established in 2006 to support developing countries in managing and reducing risk from natural hazards, as well as to cope with the environmental problems caused by climate change. It is supported by the World Bank, 37 countries, and 11 international organisations, and collaborates with hundreds of sub-national, national, and international partners.

[27] The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction is established in 1993 by the United Nations to coordinate relevant activities involving UN agencies as well as international and regional organisations in promoting and implementing strategies to reduce risk from disasters and engage in humanitarian assistance.

the implementation of AADMER (Article 21 of AADMER). Meanwhile, in its implementation, ASEAN member states are required to have a national focal point and one or more authorities competent in the respective matter (Article 22 of AADMER).

To govern ASEAN cooperation on disaster management and disaster risk reduction, AADMER provides the mandate for the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM). Although AADMER was put into force in 2009, ACDM had already been established in 2005. By law, the Committee comprises of representatives of member states' national disaster management organisation (NDMO). Table 4 lists the NDMOs and ministerial bodies responsible for disaster management and risk reduction in ASEAN.

Table 4. NDMOs in ASEAN Countries

Member States	National Disaster Management Office
Brunei Darussalam	National Disaster Management Centre
Cambodia	National Committee for Disaster Management
Indonesia	National Disaster Management Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*/BNPB)
Lao PDR	National Disaster Management Office
Malaysia	National Security Council (*Majlis Keselamatan Negara*/MKN)
Myanmar	Relief and Resettlement Department
Philippines	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and Administrator (NDRRMC)
Singapore	Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF)
Thailand	Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM)
Vietnam	Department of Dyke Management, Flood, and Storm Control (DDMFSC) Standing Office of Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control (CCFSC)

Source: Compiled from various sources and interviews

It should be emphasised that the disaster management systems in ASEAN countries are varied, and not all ASEAN member states have the same coordinating structure. For example, in Malaysia, the competent body for dealing with disaster management is the National Security Council, which is under the Prime Minister's Department; meanwhile, in Indonesia, the National Disaster Management Agency is under the Coordinating Ministry for Public Welfare. In Vietnam, there is a collaboration between the Department of Dyke Management, Flood, and Storm Control (DDMFSC) and the Standing Office of Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control (CCFSC), which are under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). Nonetheless, ACDM should be composed of representatives of the national bodies responsible for disaster management; COP is the highest ministerial level responsible for this issue.

Important decisions regarding disaster management in ASEAN, such as the regulation of the deployment of humanitarian assistance, should be discussed and approved by ACDM. [28] Some of the most important documents produced by ACDM are: 1) The Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), passed in March 2008, and 2) the AADMER Work Programme 2010–2015 (AADMER WP 2010–2015), passed in March 2010. Together with AADMER, both SASOP and AADMER WP 2010–2015 are the most referenced documents on ASEAN cooperation in disaster management and humanitarian assistance. AHA Centre called these three documents the "Three Bibles".[29]

[28] Interview with Mrs. Neni Marlina, Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division Officer at the Headquarters of the ASEAN Secretariat, Sisingamangajara street No. 70A Jakarta, Indonesia on 2 August 2013.
[29] Interview with AHA Center representatives, Mr. Rio Augusta as Preparedness and Response (Logistic) Officer and Ms. Asri Wijayanti as Communication Officer on Tuesday, 17 July 2013 at BPPT Building, 17th Floor, M.H. Thamrin street No. 8, Jakarta.

Nevertheless, the products of ACDM must be endorsed by the COP. Recently, for example, discussions have occurred at ACDM related to the forthcoming Emergency Logistic System initiative. This programme will also be supported through funding from the Japanese government. Since 2013, the programme has been in the design process. ACDM is tasked with carefully reviewing and discussing the initiative, and will make a decision once a programme is agreed upon. However, at the end of the day, it would be politically required to receive the endorsement of the COP.

While important decisions are made and supervised by ACDM, implementation is handled by the AHA Centre. According to interviews, at least two rationales have been used to justify ACDM as a decision-making body at the operational level: 1) ACDM is basically a community of expertise which deals specifically with the issues of disaster management, risk reduction, and humanitarian assistance, 2) disaster management and humanitarian assistance operations cannot be separated from national interests, and 3) ACDM, which is comprised of representatives of several NDMOs, supposedly has the best knowledge of the conditions and disasters within specific countries.

ACDM also discusses the statutes and organisational structure of the AHA Centre. Administrative positions within the AHA Centre are specified by the ACDM, including Executive Director, Head of Operations, etc. Meanwhile, the ASEAN Secretariat has a limited role in AHA Centre's statutes and structure. The ASEAN Secretariat can only give suggestions regarding technicalities as well as perspectives on non-technical issues with political implications.

The function of the AHA Centre, which must always refer to the Three Bibles in its technical operations, is to provide monitoring. AHA Centre officers may join AADMER working

group meetings because all administration and office facilitation should be done by the ASEAN Secretariat. The AHA Centre cannot invite ACDM members to sessions or meetings, while the ASEAN Secretariat may give ACDM notices or reminders of the need to achieve specific targets that have been agreed upon by member states. The AHA Centre, in conjunction with the ASEAN Secretariat (DMHA Division), may host sessions such as workshops for NDMOs.[30]

In ASEAN, the mandate for disaster management cooperation has been clearly drawn, and this impedes the ASEAN Secretariat's role in advocating for a more progressive attitude to deepen cooperation. The ASEAN Secretariat has the main function of facilitating policymaking processes as a good office, such as through meetings, the dissemination of information, and ensuring the necessary coordination with other relevant organisations. In interviews, the fact that AADMER is a legally binding regional document was frequently underscored. It was also stated that AADMER is derived from the international commitment of Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), and as such, it is the ASEAN Secretariat's duty to help involved actors focus on the track. HFA is intended to limit disasters impacts by promoting bilateral, regional and international cooperation (Olowu, 2010, p. 315). Signed in January 2005, HFA is significant to boost improvements of disaster management in many different countries because it provides a platform for developed and developing countries, international organisations and donors to collaborate globally to reduce disaster risks in the world.[31]

[30] For example, when the author visited the AHA Centre offices in the first week of July 2013, joint sessions were held with NDMO representatives to share information.

[31] It has been noted by the scholars about the significance of HFA implementation in different countries such as in the case of the African States (Olowu, 2010), the practice of HFA implementation in Italia (Stanganelli, 2008), and the incorporation of HFA in within Malaysian disaster management framework (Komoo, Aziz, & Lim, 2011). These three literatures signify positive correlation of the signing of HFA in January 2005 with the improvement of regional and national disaster management offices.

A focus on cooperation is ensconced within the AADMER Work Programme for 2010–2015 and subsequent Work Programme for 2016–2020. These plans are operational translations of AADMER, and consequently, support the ideas stated in the Hyogo Framework of Action. As such, the ASEAN Secretariat is to monitor compliance with these working programmes. The ASEAN Secretariat has been mandated to accommodate the internalisation of the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005, and since 2013, the harmonisation of actions has continued to be translated into programmes.

The notion of compliance is important when regional organisation member states deal with legally binding documents. To measure the level of compliance and achievement in implementing AADMER, ASEAN utilised AADMER WP 2010–2015 as a "balanced scorecard". The document is equipped with output-activity matrixes for different goals. It includes four strategic components, namely 1) Risk Assessment, Early Warning and Monitoring, 2) Prevention and Mitigation, 3) Preparedness and Response, and 4) Recovery. Each output-activity matrix defines the activity; the expected output; the organisation/persons in charge; the timeline of implementation; and the milestones to measure. For example, the Preparedness and Response Matrix includes a programme to develop a system for facilitating information sharing among member states and resource tracking within the AHA Centre, with the intent of helping achieve goal outputs. The AHA Centre is the one in charge of this programme, Phase 1 of which was conducted between 2010 and 2011. Its milestones are identified as 1) the transfer of databases from the ASEAN Secretariat to the AHA Centre by the end of 2010, and 2) the development of an IT system for resource requests, mobilisation and tracking by the end of 2011. After the five years of the plan, the AADMER Work Programme was updated for the upcoming period.

Member states were actively engaged in the working groups described by AADMER WP 2010–2015, and working groups were mandated to fulfil the outputs of the AADMER WP. In an interview, [32] a representative of the ASEAN Secretariat (DMHA Division) shared an opinion about performance achieving the outputs. According to the interview, the best performing working groups were the Working Group on Preparedness and Response and the Working Group on Risk Assessment, Early Warning, and Monitoring. One notable achievement, according to this interview, is the establishment of AHA Centre itself, which was formed in November 2011. The ASEAN Secretariat also facilitated the verification and evaluation of the Working Groups. In August 2013, verification was undertaken for the Working Group on Prevention and Mitigation, while the Working Group on Preparedness and Response underwent verification in September 2013. Each working group was also required to prepare a report to ACDM as the highest sectoral body.

Although the ASEAN Secretariat has the mandate of helping monitor AADMER implementation, interview findings suggest that it is strictly doing its best as a secretariat. When asked to explain more about the ASEAN Secretariat's initiatives to deepen cooperation, the representative said that the Secretariat was not a member state, and therefore no "initiative" should come from the Secretariat. The word "initiative" here refers to efforts to influence or shape new paradigms or further generate progressive movement within Southeast Asian regionalism. Such an idea has been rejected by the ASEAN Secretariat, especially the DMHA division, as it has been professionally fulfilling its mandated role. Regarding progress, if any element appears to be facing

[32] Interview with Mrs. Neni Marlina, Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division Officer at the Headquarters of the ASEAN Secretariat, Sisingamangajara street No. 70A Jakarta, Indonesia on 2 August 2013.

some difficulties or late in its delivery, the ASEAN Secretariat gives a reminder to those responsible and facilitates meetings.

Any published statement delivered on behalf of ASEAN in the sector of disaster management and risk reduction must have been a decision by the ACDM. Moreover, the principles of consultation and consensus are incorporated within all sectors of cooperation. As such, if there are objections from an ACDM member, there should not be a published ASEAN product. This mechanism is fundamental in the decision-making logic in ASEAN, which centres on values of harmony. In dealing with projects, the ASEAN Secretariat works in conjunction with the AHA Centre, representatives of the ACDM, and partners/ donors; the COP is not involved. Technical discussions involve the ASEAN Secretariat, AHA Centre, partners, and donors, but related political and security issues are exclusively the realm of the ACDM.

At the time interviews were conducted in 2013, not all of the mandated tasks had been completely transferred to AHA Centre. According to the informant from the AHA Centre, the ASEAN Secretariat (DMHA Division) was incrementally transferring the mandates from AADMER. In mid-2013, tasks related to disaster response, operations, and capacity building had been transferred to the AHA Centre. Meanwhile, risk reduction-related tasks had stopped pending further discussion. Risk reduction had not yet become a mandate of the AHA Centre. As such, this dissertation argues that the process of institution-building remained ongoing in the AHA Centre's second year. Prior to the AADMER, in its 2008 operations responding to Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN did operate a body similar to the AHA Centre called the Humanitarian Task Force. According to the AHA Centre informant, this task force was a "prototype" of the AHA Centre but with a different political context. The Humanitarian Task Force was meant to promote Myanmar's reconsideration

of its restrictions on international humanitarian operations. As such, the Humanitarian Task Force played a significant role in building a foundation for trust-building, even while meeting greater obstacles than those the AHA Centre has faced.

Since 2013, the ASEAN Secretariat (DMHA Division) were gradually transferring the administration of the ASEAN Disaster Risk Reduction Portal (DRR Portal) from the Secretariat to the AHA Centre. The DRR Portal is an online tool used by ASEAN to encourage and disseminate knowledge about disaster risk reduction to stakeholders in the region. It hosts accessible information on disaster management and risk reduction, as well as downloadable resources and reports from ASEAN and its partners. The ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) had also been transferred to the AHA Centre. This team is tasked with conducting field assessments and supporting NDMOs in areas affected by natural disaster during the initial response phase. Although the AHA Centre has the right to offer, the team's departure is based on the request of the affected country. For example, the deployment of the team was requested following the Bener Meuria Aceh Earthquake in July 2013, although it was not a regional-scale disaster. Similarly, the team was requested following Typhoon Bopha in the Philippines in December 2012. Meanwhile, the informant from the AHA Centre mentioned during the interview that the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Simulation Exercise (ARDEX), a platform for member states and different actors to collaborate in a simulation, remained under the facilitation of the ASEAN Secretariat.

From the data gathered, it can be concluded that institutional building in the governance of ASEAN cooperation on disaster management and risk reduction remained in progress in 2013, with responsibilities incrementally shifting from the ASEAN Secretariat to the AHA Centre. Political decisions remained fully under the authority of the COP, while ACDM was tasked (with the

assistance of the AHA Centre as the operating arm of AADMER) with monitoring and operational-level decision-making. NDMOs worked closely with the AHA Centre in humanitarian operations, knowledge exchange and sharing, interconnectivity building, and harmonisation. Meanwhile, the ASEAN Secretariat played a support role, seeking to ensure compliance with a clearly drawn mandate.

Figure 3 presents a chart showing the governance of ASEAN cooperation on disaster management and risk reduction under the AADMER, adding the factual situation and updates (as ascertained through interviews) to a base originally featured in the AADMER Work Programme 2010–2015.

Figure 3.

Governance in ASEAN Disaster Management Cooperation



Source: ASEAN AADMER Work Programme 2010–2015 with modification

II.3.2. The Perspectives of the ASEAN Secretariat (DMHA Division) and AHA Centre on Deeper Southeast Asia Regionalism

The purpose of this section is to ascertain whether the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre share an idea of progressive regionalism. In previous sections, the author found that major natural disasters—such as the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, which devastatingly struck Aceh in 2004, and Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in 2008—could have played a role in accelerating the progress of ASEAN regionalism. Furthermore, a report prepared by PONJA (Post Nargis Joint Assessment) included the interesting statement that experience responding to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 might serve as a "critical juncture of this regional coming of age with regard to integration". It is interesting to know whether the ASEAN Secretariat (DMHA Division) and the AHA Centre fully support the idea and could play a bigger role in achieving a single ASEAN community.

Although in the previous sub-chapter we have concluded that both the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre are working in clear and limited roles as a good office and an operating arm, respectively. However, their perspectives of the milieu goals within their projects of regional cooperation and integration are important in building stronger positions and enhancing deeper regional integration.

The representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat agreed with this perspective,[33] emphasising that the ties between and solidarity of ASEAN member states are important for moving towards

[33] As it is manifested in two interviews both with Mrs. Neni Marlina, Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division Officer at the Headquarters of the ASEAN Secretariat, Sisingamangajara street No. 70A Jakarta, Indonesia on 2 August 2013, and with Dr. AKP Mochtan, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for Community and Corporate Affairs, at Faculty of Law Building, Nagoya University, 30 October 2014.

deeper regional cooperation, given that Southeast Asian countries are prone to natural disasters.[34] The representative also underscored that major disasters such as the Indonesian Ocean earthquake and tsunami provided not only a lesson learned for ASEAN but also the world. 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar posed a significant test for ASEAN's ability to implement the AADMER and deploy the humanitarian task force; ultimately, it was praised for its determination to bridge different views and approaches.

The AHA Centre representative shared the same principle,[35] referring to the need to intensify cooperation in dealing with natural disasters as Southeast Asia is a disaster-prone region. The representative agreed that both the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and Cyclone Nargis provided momentum or triggers for ASEAN to accelerate and intensify cooperation on disaster management and risk reduction. In one document regarding the milestones of ASEAN cooperation in this sector, the AHA Centre identified both major disasters as important events. Nevertheless, given its nature as the operating arm of AADMER, the AHA Centre has to perform when dealing with sensitive issues carefully. The AHA Centre concentrates primarily on the "Three Bibles" of ASEAN cooperation on disaster management, namely the AADMER, AADMER WP, and SASOP. In every humanitarian operation conducted by the AHA Centre, it should position

[34] Some of the major earthquakes and tsunamis in ASEAN region in recent times are 1990 Northern Luzon of 7.7 magnitude, 2004 Aceh 7.9 magnitude with tsunami, 2006 Yogyakarta of 5.6 magnitude, 2009 Padang 7.5 magnitude, 2016 Aceh of 6.5 magnitude, 2018 Lombok of 7.0 magnitude, and 2018 Palu-Donggala of 7.5 magnitude with tsunami (USGS, 2019). Meanwhile, according to the International Disaster Database, Hydro-met disasters, including storm, flood, drought and landslide is accounted for more than 80% of total disaster occurrence in ASEAN, affecting more than 45% of deaths in ASEAN region caused by disasters in the period of 2000-2015 (EM-DAT, 2016).
[35] Interview with AHA Center representatives, Mr. Rio Augusta as Preparedness and Response (Logistic) Officer and Ms. Asri Wijayanti as Communication Officer on Tuesday, 17 July 2013 at BPPT Building, 17th Floor, M.H. Thamrin street No. 8, Jakarta.

itself as serving the broader interests of ASEAN member states. As such, the job should be done smoothly and appropriately.

The interview, therefore, suggested that there would be no political initiatives from the AHA Centre. The policy is not the domain of the AHA Centre, and it focuses more on operational guidelines for the field. For instance, when the AHA Centre held an interconnectivity workshop, it was not a workshop on policy coordination but an operational tool for equipping NDMOs with familiarity in the operations of other countries' emergency operation centres. For the AHA Centre, it is important to know what kind of system they will face in the countries where they are deployed for operations. Such workshops are also important to synchronise the work rhythm when dealing with NDMOs. The SASOP is in place to guide operations, but awareness of the need to refer to the SASOP varies from one country to another.

Another important aspect is the involvement of the people in ASEAN regionalism. To endorse a more people-centred approach, ASEAN established the AADMER Partnership Group (APG), a consortium of international NGOs collaborating with ASEAN for a people-centred implementation of AADMER. This group, which involves NGOs such as ChildFund International, Oxfam, Save the Children, Mercy Malaysia, and Plan, also receives funding also from European Union Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office.[36] This could help ASEAN promote activities for wider audiences in the region. According to the interview, the ASEAN Secretariat is most welcome to this kind of progressive idea.

[36] Please refer to http://www.aadmerpartnership.org and https://www.preventionweb.net/organizations/10337

II.3. Institutionalising the ASEAN Way in the AHA Centre

ASEAN has a set of principles, termed the "ASEAN Way", which include dealing with disputes through consensus and consultation, respect for the sovereignty of member states, harmony, prioritising peace, renunciation of violence, and ensuring stability. This section discusses how this principle is being institutionalised in the ASEAN Secretariat and the AHA Centre.

In dealing with natural disasters, ASEAN must also indirectly deal with human security problems.[37] In a Southeast Asian context, problems are complicated when affected areas are also conflicting zones. This is a big dilemma for those who are working with this type of situation. The role of ASEAN in dealing with Cyclone Nargis in 2008 is one example. Since the establishment of the AHA Centre in November 2011, in the first year of AHA Center operation, two disaster response operations have been undertaken.[38]

The interview with the AHA Centre representative got some fascinating insight. When Cyclone Mahasen was approaching Myanmar in May 2013, the international community had enormous concern for the tens of thousands of Rakhine refugees who were vulnerable. Similarly,

[37] Human security has been understood as means in reducing human cost in violent conflicts (Acharya, Human Security: East versus West, 2001, p. 442). Not only dealing with military-threats, human security is now moving into wider arrange of human needs (Acharya, Human Security: East versus West, 2001, p. 443). When a disaster struck an area with internal conflict, it will add complexity on the response and recovery process. Nishikawa highlighted that the complex roots for internal violent conflicts in Southeast Asia has generated existing threats to human security in the region through the case of Southern Thailand. Nishikawa argued that not only violent threat, human security should also encompass non-traditional issues such hunger, disease, and natural disasters (Nishikawa, Human Security in Southeast Asia: Viable Solution or Empty Slogan?, 2009, p. 215).

[38] Responses team were Deployed ERAT on a flood mission to Thailand on 15-24 October 2011. The second mission was deployed to response 6.8 magnitude earthquake occurred nearby Shwe Bo, Myanmar on 11 November 2012 (AHA Center, 2012, pp. 27-30). Meanwhile for the latest update in 2018, AHA Center has deployed response teams for six times; 1). preparedness mission in Rakhine State in January 2018, 2). Yangon landfill fire in April 2018, 3). TS-11 Floods in Myanmar and Laos in July-August 2018, 4). Lombok earthquakes in Indonesia in July 2018, 5). Typhoon Mangkhut in the Philippines in September 2018, and 6). Palu-Donggala earthquakes in Indonesia in September 2018. Please refer to the AHA Centre Annual Report 2018: Breaking New Ground (AHA Centre, 2018, p. 36).

when responding to Typhoon Bopha after it struck Mindanao in the Philippines in December 2012, the international community was concerned about whether or not Muslims would receive equal protection. Flooding in Thailand, from late 2011 through the beginning of 2012, was also marked by internal political tensions when newly elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra faced a significant challenge from her political opponents, who criticised her administration's ability to deal with the flooding. As such, the ASEAN operations were conducted carefully to avoid any uncomfortable situations that could cause the failure of humanitarian operations.

Director of ASEAN Socio-Cultural Cooperation at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Riaz Januar Putra Saehu, mentioned in the interview that Indonesia considers ASEAN cooperation on disaster management as an important instrument to strengthen member states solidarity.[39] Hence, the Indonesian administration fully supported the establishment of the AHA Centre. Indonesia provides AHA Centre headquarter and technology infrastructures in Jakarta. The latest progress in AHA Centre shows limited expansion of AHA Centre's operation. Recently, AHA Centre is deployed to response human-induced disaster such as humanitarian issue in Rohingya. Saehu informed that this policy is endorsed by Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi. Saehu affirmed that ASEAN Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi supported Joko Widodo and Retno Marsudi's idea to expand AHA Centre's role in addressing the humanitarian issue in Myanmar. In response to the pressure, Myanmar's government decided to welcome AHA Centre's team for Rohingya's case. Thus, AHA Centre could deploy an assessment team and aids to Rohingya people in Rakhine State. Saehu added that

[39] The interview with Riaz Saehu is conducted in 10 July 2019 in the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Retno Marsudi also directed the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send staffs to join AHA Centre operations.

As gathered from interviews, focal points or competent bodies in affected countries have generally expressed satisfaction with the operations performed by the AHA Centre, which utilises the modalities of trust and confidence-building. Person-to-person contact is another relevant factor in the success of operations. According to the AHA Centre, operations must also give the government of the affected country space to play its centrality. As such, the findings strengthen the initial hypothesis that the ASEAN Way is still a paramount principle. However, it incrementally moves toward progress as showcased to the recent Rohingya's case.

CHAPTER III

A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING HOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS TRAVEL: THE CASE OF REGIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN ASEAN

This chapter attempts to demonstrate how constructivism could be used to understand the rationale behind growing trends in international relations, particularly regional cooperation in disaster management. Neighbouring nations have found that this issue has become more relevant since the early years of the new millennium. There are now thirteen regional organisations around the world, implementing concerted regional efforts to respond to and reduce the risk of natural disasters. In this dissertation, the focus is given to disaster management cooperation in Southeast Asia. It suggests that national interest is not the sole motive for member states' behaviour. There are also norms that could dictate how states recognise the appropriateness of such behaviour. Normatively, regional disaster management is appropriate behaviour. In its attempt to discuss how disaster management norms have been adopted in Southeast Asia, this dissertation underscores the importance of the international dynamics of norms in the formation of ASEAN's regional disaster management architecture. This chapter, thus, uses the norm life cycle[40] framework to track the journey of international/regional disaster management norms. Ideas do travel from one's mind to others' minds; such a thing also happens in international politics. This chapter shows that the

[40] To international scholar such as Englekamp and Glaab, norm life cycle is considered as Finnemore and Sikkink's constructivist norm research. Scholars regard norm life cycle as the first effort of to consolidate constructivists' point of view in criticizing realist scholars' approach that relying the behavior of a state into the influence of national interests. It enriches the discussion on previous constructivist works that argue ideational aspects such as identity, culture, and norm matter on international politics (Engelkamp & Glaab, 2015, p. 202).

disaster management norms have travelled from norm entrepreneurs to the international stage, then from the international stage to the Southeast Asian region.

III.1. ASEAN and Global Trends in Regional Disaster Management Cooperation

Through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ten member countries began cooperating on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster risk management (DRM) under the framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), signed in 2005 and coming into force in 2009. The cooperation under AADMER is an institutionalised form of member states' joint efforts and is highly shaped by ASEAN's previous experiences dealing with major natural disasters, especially the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004) and Cyclone Nargis (2008).

To facilitate the institutionalisation of sectoral cooperation, the ASEAN Secretariat established a Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DMHA) division. This division has been working to help the ten ASEAN member states formulate Agreement, facilitate meetings to set standard operating procedures for cooperation and help parties formulate working plans for future development. Meanwhile, to execute such mandated tasks as dispatching emergency response and survey teams, coordinating aid from different member states, and delivering this aid to the field, the ten ASEAN member states established the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (the AHA Centre) in November 2011. To present, the AHA Centre, headquartered in Jakarta, has been involved in major humanitarian operations such as the Thai Floods of 2011–2012, Typhoon Bopha in December 2012 (Philippines), preparation for Cyclone Mahasen in May 2013 (Myanmar), the Bener Meuria Earthquake in July

2013 (Aceh, Indonesia), and Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013 (Philippines).[41] This development is considered relatively progressive for ASEAN, which was originally established in 1967 as a political means of containing communism.

The developments in ASEAN are not singular phenomena in the contemporary world. Within the past decade, many other inter-governmental arrangements have been made by different actors (including regional organisations). The international community has agreed to further support the use of the 2005 Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) as the basis for strengthening global, regional, and local empowerment in tackling disasters. This growing trend of empowering inter-governmental cooperation in disaster management is interesting to be examined from the perspective of international relations.

Regional organisations are also strongly urged to establish their own frameworks for disaster management cooperation. According to Ferris & Petz, thirteen regional organisations, from the European Union to ASEAN, are working on perfecting their own frameworks for disaster risk reduction and management (Ferris & Petz, 2013). This means that international disaster management has involved a large number of different nations, including ASEAN, in this "bandwagon".

One motive seems to be agreeable; in today's international politics, regionalism plays an important role in effectively bridging international and national systems (Ferris & Petz, 2013). Regionalism has also moved from hard politics into more specific issues. The Functionalist School argues that more technical or sectoral cooperation is needed to achieve a more significant regional

[41]Collected through direct interviews with AHA Centre officers and official news from the Centre.

identity.[42] For example, by cooperating on combating common problems, member states in a region can learn that there are more advantages in cooperation than in conflict, thereby decreasing military conflict. This, in turn, makes more space for peace and could lead to regional stability, a blissful condition that would nurture further economic development. When interactions through trade and cultural exchange are intensified, the feeling of belonging (*togetherness*) increases.

Nevertheless, conventional or rational motives as suggested by the Realist[43] and Liberalist schools[44] could lead to the inability to explain different regions' specific reasoning for specific socio-political development. The trend of international disaster management could be explained globally using both Realist and Liberalist approaches; however, it would be a generalisation as both schools neglect the importance of ideas and normative reasoning on cooperation in disaster management. From an international relations perspective, it is necessary to answer questions about States' behaviour. Why do different nations do the same thing? What makes them do it at the relatively same period of time? Both the Realist and Liberalist schools might have difficulty answering these questions, as they require material proof. For example, must the number of disasters have increased within the past two decades in every region in the world to meet the requirement of rational justification?

This chapter, thus, aims to understand the institutionalisation of regional/international cooperation in disaster management by using an alternative approach in a specific region. Such an

[42] As suggested by Haas that in technical cooperation, interlocking of cooperation between different sectors in any unit will produce a dynamic behavioral mechanism that would help build consensus and institution (Haas, 1964, p. 34).
[43] Such as the works of Morgenthau, 'Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law' (1940) and 'Politics among Nations' (1948), also the notable work of Kenneth Waltz, 'Men, the State, and War' (1959).
[44] Such as the work of Keohane, 'After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy' (1984) and Ohmae's 'The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies' (1995).

alternative approach is necessary as conventional approaches fail to understand why such trends happen globally in the same period. This chapter could help understand this matter from a Southeast Asian perspective. Instead of picking the global stage, this paper tries to understand regional disaster management cooperation by examining the case of ASEAN to discover how regional disaster management norms have been introduced, socialised, demonstrated, and internalised as a normative drive for the ASEAN Member States.

III.2. Constructivism as a Perspective to Understand Norm Dynamics in ASEAN

This section is designed to explain the selection of the approach used in this chapter as well as to identify research with proximity or framework similarities. Different approaches can be used to answer questions about the most important motives. International relations theorists in the Realist School will try to rationalise the needs of States in doing so.[45] States tend to maximise their gains first. There should be clear causality; in other words, any international arrangement is pragmatic in its nature. Realists emphasise political interest. Nevertheless, other perspectives will recognise the limitations of the realist perspective. For instance, in this perspective, a state with no pragmatic interests will avoid contributing to specific cooperation projects, as states are driven to seek benefits and minimise lost.

Meanwhile, the Liberal School of international relations believes that international politics, including regionalism, resembles a bowl of interdependency (Hurrell, Explaining the Resurgence

[45] The rationalization of state's interest is dominating the work of realist scholars due to the influence of positivism in their method especially of the formalist and conceptualist interpretation within the study of international law (Morgenthau, 1940, p. 272).

of Regionalism in World Politics, 1995, p. 338). States have the freedom to pursue their interests, but a set of conditions should be applied, and international organisations should be involved in regulation. States are endorsed to pursue long-term gains rather than short-term benefits. There are not only political interests involved; another aspect is important: economic interests. Liberalism might be able to explain how states are willing to cooperate in global frameworks, but the calculation of benefits—either political or economic, short-term or long-term—is always there. On the other hand, some people might ask: do we have another subtle driving force for a particular behaviour? Is there something non-material which could influence behaviour?

According to Martha Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink, the Constructivist School believes that other factors that can influence a state's behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). For example, a democratic state would try to shape its foreign policy by following democratic principles. It may be driven by several factors, including identity, norms/values, and discourse/debate. As such, norms are described as appropriate behaviours for actors of a particular identity. Democratic states should behave democratically; should they find another way; it should always be in accordance with the principles of discourse.

Why may global normative norms be influential in ASEAN? A "norm" is generally defined as a behaviour appropriate for a given identity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). We can define a norm by seeing its indirect evidence because a norm promotes justification for action and embodies a quality of moral "oughtness" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). In other words, we could see norms as behavioural rules. How ASEAN countries behave will be informed by the norms they believe.

There are many examples of international norms. For example, the rules of engagement during war include respect for civilians and prisoners of war, as well as protection of cultural heritage. Nevertheless, such international norms are not taken for granted. They evolve from time to time. In ancient times, entitlement to a norm could be more limited than today. Presently, international norms have been translated into international declarations, agreements, and conventions. Similarly, in the past the rules of engagement were limited to particular cultures or applied to particular groups of people, with their own limited code of chivalry; for example, some medieval knights would fight other knights following mutually approved codes.

Understandings of human rights are also evolving. For example, the anti-slavery principle is a product of the continuous improvement of humanity. Several centuries ago, some people believed that slavery was economically beneficial and useful, with manpower before the industrial revolution perhaps similar in function to oil in today's economy. The United States overcame this discourse/debate with a bitter civil war. Later, humanity evolved and disbanded slavery because it became seen as not in accordance with our universal identity as human beings, and the anti-slavery principle was recognised internationally. Once an idea becomes an international norm, nobody is able to reject it; everyone must behave accordingly.

However, there is a debate over how to use the term "norm" itself. From a sociological point of view, the set of rules that constitute and govern behaviour is called an "institution"; meanwhile, political scientists from the constructivist school prefer the term "norm" in dealing with the same idea. As such, there is debate over the terminological distinctions between "norm" and "institution". Finnemore and Sikkink suggests that it is important for political scientists to be careful in using term "norm" because it should refer to a single standard of behaviour; where the object of

examination is a combination of behavioural standards or set of rules, it should not be called a norm but rather an institution (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). This issue is pertinent to the definition of international disaster management; is it a single standard of behaviour, or is it actually a collection of standards applied in one institution? In the case of ASEAN, cooperation in disaster management could be defined as an institutionalised set of norms because it relates to other norms such as human rights, democratisation, political openness, and the responsibility to protect.

Several works are similar in topic and framework for this dissertation. A study by Katsumata titled is relevant in explaining the changing in the intra-ASEAN style of diplomacy that shift from a secretive approach towards more open and frank discussions (Katsumata, 2004). To answer the question about why the style of diplomacy in ASEAN has changed from refrained interference into open and frank discussion/peer-pressure within the last decade, Hiro Katsumata writes that conventional or rational explanations tend to suggest that ASEAN countries have tried to deal with new challenges such as economic and environmental issues. However, these countries might have failed to express other important influences of global normative shifts, such as human rights and democracy (Katsumata, 2004, p. 237). His constructivist approach led to the conclusion that changes in ASEAN diplomacy have been triggered mostly by the shifting of norms in the global arena, such as strong advocacy for human rights and democracy. Inspired by these shifts, political elites—particularly from Thailand and the Philippines—have tried to introduce these norms into ASEAN practices (Katsumata, 2004, p. 252). It has also been influenced by concern that a conservative stance may prove detrimental to the reputation of ASEAN in the eyes of the international community (Katsumata, 2004, p. 245). This wariness has led ASEAN to be more active in developing human rights and democratic institutions.

Learning from Katsumata's method, this dissertation will apply a constructivist point of view to understand ASEAN cooperation in disaster management. As such, it must examine why the constructivist approach is preferred over other conventional theories such as realism and liberalism. This dissertation's hypothesis is that ASEAN's move to strengthen regional disaster management cooperation has been strongly influenced by global normative shifts and strong international advocacy. It means that the international dynamics of norms have been involved in internalising the norms of regional disaster management. This dissertation will utilize Sikkink and Finnemore's method of the norm life cycle in order to operationalize the analysis. Norm life cycle could help explain how states behaviour could be gradually shaped by a new international norm. In the cycle, a new international norm was formulated in the earlier stage of emergence, reaching critical mass or tipping point, being promoted by state apparatus, and finally being internalized in the bureaucratic habits (Finnemore & Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 1998, p. 898). That cycle strengthens the argument that states behave not solely influenced by cost and benefit rationalization, but also pre-conditioned by cognitive awareness on norms.

III.3. Operationalising Norm Life Cycles

This section aims to explain the most influential driving forces in ASEAN cooperation on international disaster management. Are states' behaviour to comply and achieve better mechanisms for international disaster management related to global normative shifts and strong advocacy for universal values?

This section will examine ideas on international disaster management, applying the framework of international norm dynamics and political change suggested by Finnemore and

Sikkink (1998). They offer their framework as a means of understanding how international norms are established in a pattern they call the "norm life cycle". They identify three stages, namely: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalisation. Finnemore and Sikkink further describe the characteristics of these three different stages by categorising the proponents/advocates of norms at every stage, their motives, and their approaches to advocate (Finnemore & Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 1998, p. 895).

This dissertation has collected corresponding data on its discursive development. The beginning of the norm life cycle is called norm-emergence to examine the status of international disaster management as a set of principles. In this phase, norms are formulated. In examining this phase, one should answer the question of who are the norm entrepreneurs of this idea—i.e., who proposed it and why. Results vary among actors, who may be academics, protesters, and activists. They might use specific platforms to spread their ideas effectively, with organisational platforms such as NGOs and think tanks used for the socialisation and promotion of the ideas to decision-makers. These actors constitute the epistemic community of international disaster management. Their motives are basically normative and ideational, emphasising altruism and strengthening commitment. Collection of data regarding the persuasive actions of these actors, who may—in this case—come from within or without ASEAN—is important.

The second stage, Norm Cascade, requires data regarding the implementation of a proposed norm into cooperation framework. One indication is to measure the number of states and regional/international organisations which have established disaster management frameworks, either for disaster risk reduction (DRR) or disaster risk management (DRM). Actors at this stage may include international organisations, states, and global networks of advocates. They will usually

try to establish sets of legitimacy and pursue good reputations. In the case of ASEAN, this dissertation will identify the actors within ASEAN/its partners who are involved in socialising, institutionalising and demonstrating how regional disaster management could work.

Finally, the third stage—internalisation—involves the determination of whether a normative shift has been institutionalised. This can be proven through the collection of data on the practical implementation of agreements. If ASEAN can sustainably deliver humanitarian aid under the framework of AADMER, it means disaster management has become a habit within the region.

After the supporting data was collected, we developed a matrix of identification as shown below (Table 1); by examining the matrix, we can assumedly conclude in what phase ASEAN's activities are right now. As such, we could define the forces driving ASEAN countries to implement regional disaster management.

Table 5. Stages of Norm Life Cycle

Tipping Point

	Stage 1 Norm Emergence	Stage 2 Norm Cascade	Stage 3 Internalisation
Actors	Norms entrepreneurs with organisational platforms	States, international organisations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant Mechanism	Persuasion	Socialisation, institutionalisation, demonstration	Habit, institutionalisation

Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898

One may ask why this dissertation uses the norm life cycle as its framework of analysis. The reasons for this are explained in the two sub-sections below.

III.3.1. The Origins of the Method

The basic concept and fundamental elements of important actors, motives, and dominant mechanisms within the norm life cycle were previously introduced by Kathryn Sikkink in her article "Transnational Politics, International Relations, and Human Rights" (1998). Sikkink argues that the dominant perspectives of international relations (including the realist and liberalist schools) see human rights as an insignificant issue that is simply a tool for states to pursue their interests (Sikkink, 1998, p. 517). Sikkink suggests that the norm of human rights is not only an "ideational cover", but indeed has become a driving force for states' behaviour in relation to society and the international community. This could challenge our understanding of states' sovereignty (Sikkink, 1998, p. 517).

The norm life cycle method is used in this dissertation owing to the comprehensive mapping of important constructivist elements. The matrix suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink is able to portray the dynamic shifts in international perspectives on newly formulated norms, even without using conventional ways of explanation. It differs from the work of critical constructivist theorists because the norm life cycle framework may offer an empirical causal theory.

Sikkink and Finnemore consistently use three logical core features of constructivism, the same cores that were also suggested by other constructivist scholars. First, human interaction is

more highly influenced by ideational factors than material factors, distinguishing constructivism from the liberal or realist approach. In the norm life cycle, the idea is the most important object of analysis; the interest itself is something that is created. Second, the behaviour of states is constructed by inter-subjective ideas or beliefs. As such, the norm life cycle incorporates the interactions of different actors in socialising and promoting newly formulated norms. Lastly, these inter-subjective ideas create a sense of universality that urges states to behave in accordance with shared beliefs and norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 1998, p. 888). It means that interactions of socialisation and persuasion help shape the identities of actors in international politics. Actors, thus, behave not because of mere material objectives but because of interests that are the consequences of how they perceive their own identity; i.e. their consciousness of who they are.

This is reflective of arguments by other constructivist scholars. For example, Ruggie believes that constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life (Ruggie, 1998, p. 856). The norm life cycle could connect with some other important aspects of analysis that have been proposed by other constructivist scholars, such as the importance of norm entrepreneurs (Wapner 1996; Klotz 1995; Thomas 2001), international organisations (Finnemore 1993, 1998; Ratner 2000), epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Adler 1992, 1998; Finnemore 1993, 1998), and speech and persuasion (Kratochwil, 1989).

Different types of works have been produced by constructivist scholars. The norm life cycle has been considered an important tool because it can be used as a causal theory. Other scholars have examined the topic of ideas of powers, including Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas and Michael Foucault, but their works are regarded as critical constructivism (Finnemore & Sikkink,

2001, p. 398). Critical constructivism aims to unmask the creation of ideas, the domination of debates and discourses, and the use of ideas to gain material power. Critical constructivist scholars try to show us the connection between power domination and newly built norms or ideas. However, critical constructivism theorists do not create or test new causal theories (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 398).

III.3.2. Other Research Utilising the Norm Life Cycle Method

Two works using the norm life cycle method are examined in this section to help survey how the theoretical framework has been used to explain the spread of new international norms. The first work, by Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, focuses on the international level (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011); meanwhile, the work by Locher uses the European Union as a regional-level case study (Locher, 2003).

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and David Hulme use the norm life cycle framework to explain the emergence of antipoverty norms through the millennium development goals (MDGs) in the realm of international cooperation. This norm was institutionalised in 2000 through the adoption of the UN Millennium Declaration; as such, Fukuda-Parr and Hulme explain the process through the three stages of norm emergence (with the explanation of its tipping point), norm cascade, and norm institutionalisation (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, pp. 19–20). This work is relevant to be cited because it simulates how the international initiative could be proposed in the UN forum, reaching cascade and be applied globally. This case reflects the versatility of the norm life cycle method to be applied in the case of ASEAN disaster management cooperation. Regional cooperation on

disaster management can be seen as the extension of a successful international campaign in setting new international disaster management norm.

In the early period of its emergence, the antipoverty norm remained minor until the 1990s, when it began to be formulated into a super-norm. The formulation of the MDG super-norm was being done through various separate initiatives. One of the earliest was the 1990 World Summit for Children. Although specific events advocated specific purposes, the common denominator was the promotion of an inclusive globalisation and poverty eradication. At this time, the international development goals (IDG) were introduced, including such issues as poverty, education, gender disparity, maternal and child deaths, reproduction health, and environmental sustainability. These finally became the millennium development goals (MDGs), declared in the year 2000 (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 19). This dissertation reflects international effort in setting a super-norm through the formulation of the Hyogo Framework of Action in 2005 that is a concerted effort of both state delegates and non-state actors initiatives. The introduction of such norm also requires a sufficient number of signatories both in the case of Hyogo Framework of Action and ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. The following paragraphs explain the MDG norm emergence process in detail.

According to Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, the evolution of the MDGs can be traced back to the poverty eradication advocacy of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)'s executive director, Jim Grant. Also involved in this process were such norm entrepreneurs as Nafis Sidik of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), James Wolfensohn of the World Bank, Adrienne Germain of the International Women's Health Coalition (IWHC), Ann Pettifor of Jubilee 2000,

Martin Khor of Third World Network, and individuals from countries such as France, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and many others (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, pp. 20–22).

As mentioned before, the norm of global poverty eradication was only a "minor idea" in the 1990s, being overshadowed by the bigger issue of development that was being advocated by international organisations and networks of activists and scholars. Fukuda-Parr and Hulme also give credit to domestic politics norm entrepreneurs such as the Development Minister of the United Kingdom (then Clare Shot), the Netherlands (then Evelyn Herfkens), Norway (then Hilde Johnson) and Germany (then Wieczorek-Zeul) (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 22). Through both international and domestic advocacy, the world was introduced to the new concept of IDGs. We can see that, during the norm emergence phase, the actors, motivations, and mechanisms/platforms were diverse. This dissertation reflects the process to be similar with the creation of networks advocating better disaster management cooperation throughout the world particularly after the Indian Ocean earthquakes and tsunami, the establishment of expert panels and working groups on disaster management in ASEAN prior to the formulation of AADMER in 2005. Meanwhile previously in the 1970s, few countries in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and the Philippines established their own national disaster management office. Hence, regional efforts were not adequately bolstered prior to the Hyogo Framework of Action.

The MDG idea achieved its tipping point due to the engagement of the UN, particularly when Secretary-General Kofi Annan sought to make his mark (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 22). Annan chose to support the formulation of a comprehensive international development agenda. As such, actors gave the previous idea a more presentable new look, giving the IDGs a more quantitative and simpler concept (the MDGs) in 1999. The strategy was effective because it

included a shorter list with only eight goals, which could be presented simply and be remembered easily (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 23). The tipping point was reached when the UN successfully bridged NGOs with the IMF, World Bank, and—through a series of negotiations (persuasions)—the 189 UN delegates (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 24). This culminated in the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in September 2000 and the publication of the MDGs in September 2001 (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 25). The UN needed to bridge NGOs with international institutions because of different ideological stances among them. NGOs mostly disagreed with the dominant market economy mechanism. Therefore, to achieve a tipping point, the UN focused more on people and measurable ends rather a means of achievement (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 25). Different ideological stances are also prevalent in ASEAN case in which certain member countries were still adamant with their national interest in rejecting foreign influence through democratization in the aftermath of major natural disasters. However, ASEAN could assert assurance that the regional organization will broker the interests of member countries throughout the implementation of AADMER. Since ASEAN could demonstrate this expected role in Aceh 2004 and Myanmar 2008, member countries were convinced to support regional disaster management cooperation.

The norm cascade stage involves the adoption of a norm by states and international organisations. In the case of the MDGs, most state governments adopted the idea at the same time, in September 2001. Nevertheless, there was a dynamic within their respective support. Examples may be taken from the dynamics of US domestic politics; Bill Clinton's administration was regarded as supportive of the concept, while George W. Bush's administration was perceived as rather hostile towards the MDGs (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 25). Although the MDG concept

had been quantified and simplified to enable a consensus, other dynamics emerged from the criticism of various NGOs regarding the democratic deficit of MDGs. These organisations argued that the MDGs lacked elements of democracy in their formulation and omitted reproductive service for all; governance, human rights, and democracy; gender empowerment; youth employment; and time-bound targets. This pressure forced the UN to make several corrections to the MDGs in 2005, although not all requests were accommodated (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, pp. 26–28). The democratic gap in the creation of new super-norm is essentially the hindrance for public acceptance, and this dissertation argues that such tendency is also prevalent in ASEAN case in which many initiatives were led by member countries leadership. In the case of AADMER, the leaderships in Indonesia and Singapore, also ASEAN bureaucrats were the spearheads on the negotiation.

Over time, the MDGs achieved the stage of norm institutionalisation. This can be proven, for example, through state leaders' presentations of their MDG programmes, e.g. the presentations of the Prime Ministers of China and India at the 2010 UN General Assembly (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 28). This means that state leaders felt obliged to comply with newly internalised norms, and thus became habituated with these norms. Support for the MDG concept, by this point, came not only from states but also from schools, local governments, NGOs, etc. (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, pp. 28–29). This dissertation finds it is rational for the state leaders to behave accordingly to the new international norm as it could boost their legitimacy within domestic politics and international relations as shown by ASEAN member states leaders supportive gesture towards AADMER.

Fukuda-Parr and Hulme endorse Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle as a valuable tool for understanding the evolution of complex international super-norms (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 29). Using the norm life cycle method, we can recognise the ideological battles within the formulation of new international norms. However, according to Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, there are also limitations to this method. It cannot be used to understand why the norm life cycle moves relatively rapidly from the emergence phase through internalisation but is rather slow in its implementation. Nonetheless, for this dissertation, two lessons learned may be drawn as follows;

a. The Strategy to Achieve a Tipping Point

Fukuda-Parr and Hume's work contributes an understanding of a strategy for achieving a tipping point, namely the transformation of broad issues into simple ideas. This process can be done by reframing wide-reaching issues as simpler quantification of goals. Similarly, featuring fewer goals makes presentation friendlier and easier to remember. Also, in the negotiation process, utilising common principles in achieving quantified goals is preferable to justifying specific means is a better mechanism for goal achievement. However, this simplification is also a weakness; during the norm cascade process, the dynamics of domestic politics and NGOs may result in support/lack of support for specific elements or criticism of omissions. This extracted idea should be useful for comparing the approaches used by the international community, and later by ASEAN, to achieve a tipping point in international/regional disaster management. Reaching a tipping point by simplifying concepts and discounting debate does not mean ensuring dynamic support or hostility during the norm cascade stage.

b. The Introduction of the "Super-Norm" Concept

Fukuda-Parr and Hume also analyse how the MDG norm is projected today, expanding the framework by introducing the concept of "super-norm". A super-norm is a set of interrelated norms comprehensively collected in an operational concept (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011, p. 18). This is different from the argument used by Kathryn Sikkink when she discussed human rights as a norm, Fukuda-Parr and Hulme view the MDGs as a super-norm. Similarly, it is more likely that international/regional disaster management cooperation (including in ASEAN) best qualifies as a super-norm instead of a single norm. This could help assuage the debates resulting from the different perspectives of sociologists and international relations scientists.

The second report discussed here was Birgit Locher (2003). Although it features the processes of norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm institutionalisation, it applies a wider time range in explaining norm emergence. Locher distinguishes between universal and regional processes. The universal process of the anti-human trafficking norm could be traced to the introduction of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children in 1921 and reached its tipping point during the first decades of the 20th century with the ratification of anti-trafficking norms. Locher uses the adoption of a norm by a minimum of one-third of all states as her benchmark. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children was signed by 46 countries, more than two-thirds of all states at the time (Locher, 2003, p. 12). Locher argues that the norm then entered the norm cascade phase following the ratification of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others between 1949 and 1951 (Locher, 2003, p. 13). This

dissertation will adopt Locher's method in determining the tipping point as it is measurable and feasible to trace the number of signatories of both the Hyogo Framework of Action in 2005.

In regional processes, Locher suggests that the anti-human trafficking norm was never dominant in European regional policy until the 1990s (Locher, 2003, p. 13). She argues that three important factors drove the success of the EU in internalising this norm: 1) the actors, 2) the effective frames to link the norm, and 3) political opportunity structures. Regional process in AADMER tipping point can also be traced back to the signing process in 2005.

First, regarding the actors, Locher argues that the role of the "velvet triangle" was decisive in driving woman politics in the EU. This velvet triangle consisted of femocrats and feminist politicians; academics and experts; and NGOs. Femocrats served in the high offices of the EU. This included Anita Gradin, the Commissioner of Justice and Home Affairs in 1995 who formed a strategic alliance with women ministers in Ireland (Nora Owen) and Germany (Herta Daubler-Gmehlin); this partnership ensured the introduction of anti-trafficking measures in the EU. Their work was followed in 1999 by Antonio Victorio of Portugal, who worked hand-in-hand with Commissioner of Social Affairs and Employment Anna Diamantopoulou. Meanwhile, feminist politicians served in the European Parliament and were typically members of the Women's Rights Committee; these included such important figures as Hedy d'Ancona, Maria Colombo-Svevo, Lissy Gröner, and Patsy Sörensen (Locher, 2003, p. 16). Meanwhile, an important organisational pressure group, in this case, was the European Network of Anti-Trafficking NGOs (EUNATW), which successfully linked the issue of trafficking with the need to protect human rights during its lobbying.

The success of the anti-trafficking norm is also linked to the effective strategy that linked it with four norms that had already been recognised in the EU, human rights/women's rights; anti-violence; gender equality; and anti-slavery. Feminist politicians and femocrats also linked the need for anti-trafficking measures with the sentiment of European identity, as related to European values (Locher, 2003, p. 20). In ASEAN, non-state actors involved in the implementation of regional disaster management cooperation since they are being engaged and institutionalized through the AADMER Partnership Group.

This success could not have been realised if the EU had not had participative and open-to-discourse regional governance in which femocrats, feminist politicians, academics and NGOs to engage with and lobby to EU Commissioners. The European Parliament also gave room for feminist politicians to endorse regional directives (Locher, 2003, p. 19). As such, the process started within the European Union around 1995 but was consolidated when the EU transformed itself into a deeper regionalism through a series of treaties that empowered the union and gradually reduced the sovereignty member states. In the case of ASEAN, the process of integration is accelerating due to the signing and adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007. Hence, regional disaster management cooperation has dedicated spot under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community pillar.

Locher's Contribution

From Locher's work, we can see that the norm life cycle can also be used to understand the extension of international norms into regionalism. The study of the anti-human trafficking norm in the EU is an attempt to empower Finnemore and Sikkink's theory to solve the puzzle of EU

policymaking. By learning from this example, it is reasonable for this framework also to be used to understand the extension of international disaster management cooperation in ASEAN. Second, as proposed by Locher, the extension of international norms into the regional level will only be possible if "political opportunity structures" are available as a result of deepening regional integration. In the case of ASEAN, regional disaster management cooperation could be linked to ASEAN's successful adaptation of the ASEAN Charter.

III.4. Stages in the Norm Life Cycle

The norm life cycle could be described as a tool for understanding the pattern of influence. It is divided into three stages, and between the first and second stage, there is a critical point that determines when state actors can start adopting norms. To differentiate each stage, Finnemore and Sikkink refer to actors, mechanisms, and motives, as these three variables could help us visualise changes in behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 1998, pp. 897-898). By differentiating the stages of the norm life cycle based on these three variables, we can determine whether actors behave by choice or by habit. As such, this section is designated to guide the analytical process that will be applied in this dissertation. Careful examination for the case of ASEAN is needed to avoid arbitrary data categorisation.

III.4.1. Norm Emergence

The first stage is highly characterised by the motive of persuasion. Norms may be identified as being in the first stage if norm entrepreneurs are working to persuade or influence a critical mass

of national leaders to adopt them (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). Critical mass is important to ensure that a norm can be embraced smoothly. Which agreement and how member countries arrived into conclusion and ratification is important to be noted in the case of ASEAN. To understand the norm emergence stage, it is thus necessary to track the genealogy of the idea. For this, there are two common elements that determine success; the norm entrepreneurs and/or the organisational platforms used to persuade.

a. Norm Entrepreneurs

Norm entrepreneurs are involved in advocating for what they perceive as desirable behaviour for the community. They introduce norms and influence people and decision-makers by create issues and dramatising them. This strategy is called "framing" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). One famous example of a norm entrepreneur is Henry Dunant of the Red Cross. Hence, this dissertation will trace prominent norm entrepreneurs formulating civil defence mechanism and disaster management initiatives in the global context.

b. Organisational Platforms

Norm entrepreneurs need some sort of organisation to help them spread and advocate their idea. Some types of the organisation focus on specific issues; take, for example, Greenpeace and Red Cross. However, the UN also has certain characteristics that make it able to play the same role. Finnemore and Sikkink write that the UN has specific bodies

that influence state leaders to promote certain specific ideas, such as the International Labour Organisation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). Hence, this dissertation will examine which UN body actively promoted international cooperation on disaster management as well as important other international organizations helping the endeavour to introduce and promote regional disaster management cooperation.

The Tipping Point

The tipping point is a mark of a norm having reached sufficient "critical mass", meaning that norm entrepreneurs have successfully persuaded state leaders to adopt a new norm. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, a norm must reach one-third of the number of states in contemporary international politics (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). Another way to measure this critical mass is by examining which important states adopt a new norm. The more powerful and influential the country adopting a new norm, the more likely it is to contribute to critical mass (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). The number of signatories of both international and ASEAN regional framework for disaster management cooperation will be recapped to determine the critical mass of both Hyogo Framework of Action and ASEAN Agreement of Disaster Management and Emergency Response.

III.4.2. Norm Cascade

If the first stage (norm emergence) involves norm entrepreneurs' attempts to persuade state leaders to embrace a new idea, the second stage (norm cascade) is characterised as a dynamic

imitation. In other words, during this phase state leaders are already convinced of a norm and try to influence other states to follow it (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). Cascading an idea means that a population is about ready to accept a new idea due to a combination of pressure to conform, to gain international legitimacy, and/or to promote self-esteem. Influenced by these factors, international leaders promote new ideas to their people and their counterparts. This dissertation will identify notable ASEAN state leaders that lead the initiative of introducing norm on disaster management cooperation and supporting its implementation in the region, either by facilitating the AHA Centre or developing supporting SASOP infrastructures domestically.

a. International or Regional Demonstration

One distinct characteristic of this stage is international or regional demonstration being more influential than domestic pressure. According to Kenneth Waltz, there are three mechanisms: *Emulation* of those who are successful, *Praise* of those who adopt the new norm, and *Ridicule* of those who reject the new norm in the international and regional political system (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Hence, it is important to show how the international community reacts to development in ASEAN. International community's scrutiny upon Myanmar's performance in addressing cyclone Nargis in 2008 helped shape the course of the ASEAN direction towards deeper cooperation in handling regional involvement in Myanmar.

b. States are Acknowledging their Identity as Part of the International Community

In order to ensure the successful socialisation of a new norm, states need to feel a sense of belonging in the international community. As such, peer pressure is involved. The effectiveness of this pressure is derived from how different states perceive their legitimacy,

esteem, and conformity. Legitimacy means that a system is believed to be better than another system, and therefore must be obeyed. Esteem works in this way: state leaders need other leaders to feel good about their country, but deep inside, they also need to feel good about themselves. Conformity plays a role as proof than a country is adopting a new norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). ASEAN leaders might get benefits for their legitimacy abroad and domestically if they could comply with the international norm promoted by Hyogo Framework of Action and AADMER. Hence, the needs to gain legitimacy, esteem, and conformity boosted the progress regionally.

III.4.3. Internalisation

Once a norm is already taken for granted, it has become internalised. People and actors with different interests are less likely to challenge the importance of the idea. State leaders are willing to obey agreements regarding this norm. As such, regional and international actors are bound by the necessity to comply. Sikkink and Finnemore note that the need to comply with a norm becomes almost automatic (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904). This behaviour, thus, becomes a "habit" through this final stage: internalisation. In ASEAN Case, this dissertation will examine whether disaster management cooperation has resulted in the formation of a reliable and sustainable operating arm (AHA Centre) and its standard operating procedures.

To determine whether a norm has become internalised, scholars examine its implementation by professionals. This is because professions may impose specific ethics and values upon those who are working in their respected professional fields, e.g. doctors with the value of prioritising life, economists with their economic or market values, and ecologists with their

environmental values (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 905). Because international and regional organisations are becoming professionalised nowadays, it is relevant to include them in this category. In the case of the AHA Centre, it is important for this dissertation to explain how the institution established a well-connected network of middle managers and leaders in national disaster management offices throughout ASEAN.

III.5. Analysis of ASEAN Disaster Management Cooperation Development Stages

An analysis is intended to categorise the data collected, leading to an understanding of the important actors, their roles, and their motives in the formulation of regional disaster management strategies in ASEAN. Actors range from individuals, state agencies, through regional bureaucracies, and come from both within and without Southeast Asia. For its analysis, this dissertation uses data collected from interviews conducted with representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat (Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division) and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) in Jakarta in July 2013, as well as a survey of the legal framework and documents provided by the ASEAN Secretariat. These documents present to us the institutional architecture of ASEAN's regional disaster management cooperation.

Damon P. Coppola argues that disaster management as having its roots in domestic civil defence but having developed into a global standard for tackling disasters (Coppola, 2011, p. 5). This work is relevant to historically track the emergence of the concept of international disaster management. A report provided by Lolita Bildan (2003), meanwhile, provides data on the actors responsible for the socialisation of disaster management in ASEAN, including both actors from

within ASEAN (institutions established by or affiliated with ASEAN) and without ASEAN (donors and dialogue partners). Socialisation programmes have been categorised as indicative of "persuasion efforts" undertaken to influence the outcome of regional policy. However, Bildan's report only encompasses the period before the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and Cyclone Nargis; in other words, it covers a period during which ASEAN had no legally binding document for disaster management. Previous research by Anik Yuniarti (2011), meanwhile, has focused on disaster management as part of efforts to establish the ASEAN Community in 2015. Meanwhile, an article from Yasuyuki Sawada and Fauziah Zen (2014) provides information on the progress ASEAN had made in disaster management by that point.

III.5.1 Emergence of International/Regional Disaster Management Norms

The emergence of the international/regional disaster management norm cannot be separated from the evolution of the domestic need to respond to and mitigate disasters. At the international level, the role of UNSIDR has been critical in creating a tipping point. Meanwhile, donors and dialogue partners have engaged with ASEAN to introduce the concept of regional disaster management.

a. Norm Entrepreneurs: States Involved in Wars

Damon P. Coppola mentions no specific individual as having the most important role in building the concept of international/regional disaster management. Instead, he suggests that states initially introduced the idea of civil defence. During this early period, the term "disaster

management" was not well known. He mentions that global standards and organised efforts to manage disasters (including preparedness, mitigation, and response) only emerged in the mid-twentieth century (Coppola, 2011, p. 4). This correlated with the institutionalised mechanism of civil defence following World War II.

Before the initial formulation period, disaster management was popularly unknown. People were initially most familiar with the concept of civil defence, an arrangement that was shaped importantly by governments' experiences with war. This type of development began following World War II.

In the early years, there was no comprehensive national disaster management authority as we know today. The existing system was reinforced with legal frameworks to support authority and budgeting during the 1950s and 1960s. According to Quarantelli (1995), civil defence units later evolved into comprehensive disaster management organisations (Coppola, 2011, p. 5). Take, for example, the evolution of Great Britain's Civil Defence Act of 1948 into the Disaster Management Agency. Similarly, the Canadian Civil Defence Organisation (established in 1948) is the root of Canada's Office of Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Emergency Preparedness (OCICEP). In the United States, meanwhile, the United States Federal Civil Defence Act of 1950 enabled the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In France, the French Ordinance of 1950 and the Civil Defence Decree of 1965 has become the basis for France's civil protection, while Algerian civil protection is rooted in the 1964 Decree on the Administrative Organisation of Civil Defence.

Nevertheless, Coppola notes another motive for the creation of disaster management agencies, particularly in the 1970s: the pressure of popular criticism of governments' disaster

management, for example in Peru (1970), Nicaragua (1972), and Guatemala (1976) (Coppola, 2011, p. 6). Apparently, the first attempt in Southeast Asia also happened in this decade. Sawada and Zen date the inception of disaster management in ASEAN to 1976 (Bildan, 2003; Sawada & Zen, 2014). Bildan's report also indicates that, among the earliest domestic disaster management bodies in Southeast Asia, are the Indonesian BAKORNAS PBP (founded 1979) and the Philippines' National Disaster Coordinating Council (founded 1978) (Bildan, 2003). We can say, thus, that these countries were part of the second wave of disaster management.

From Coppola's examination, we can conclude that, although disaster management agencies fall within the authority of national polity, there are two patterns in their emergence. The first wave came following World War II and was dominated by more developed nations such as the United States, France, and Great Britain. The second wave began in the 1970s and was dominated by developing countries such as Peru, Nicaragua, Indonesia, and the Philippines. This phenomenon indicates the process of "mirroring" of ideas from one country to another, particularly from developed countries to developing ones. In other words, as more countries established disaster management bodies, they learned and adopted best practices. From this interrelated learning process, global disaster management standards have been created.

Inside ASEAN, a group of disaster management experts was established in 1971. This group may be identified as a pioneer in the region, and as providing the driving force for the acknowledgement of disaster issues in the ASEAN Concord of 1976. This epistemic community was called the Experts Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM). Although no longer active today, this group served as a norm entrepreneur within the region. We can note that, between 1971 and the 2000s, the status of this group was not elevated drastically. With the support of foreign

actors such as the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office (ECHO), they successfully sustained efforts to mainstream the idea of institutionalising regional disaster management (Bildan, 2003). During its early years, the group created a non-binding document which later served as the basis for regional cooperation.

AEGDM made several attempts to elevate the status of disaster management cooperation in ASEAN. In their 11th Meeting in Chiang Rai, the group proposed elevation to the status of ASEAN Committee or Senior Official Meeting, with the obligation to report to the ASEAN Standing Committee or ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Sawada & Zen, 2014). However, acceleration of ASEAN cooperation on disaster management was not really achieved until after the successful operations demonstrated during the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 when ASEAN and the international community found a way to bridge cooperation.

Since the 1990s, more developed countries were involved in Southeast Asian efforts to strengthen disaster management norms. Based on previous research, ASEAN donors and dialogue partners continuously engaged with Southeast Asian countries to introduce best practices for disaster management. Similar to the case of the MDGs (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011) and anti-human trafficking in the EU (Locher, 2003), actors' motivations during the first stage of norm emergence varied. In the case of disaster management in ASEAN, two scopes of cooperation were involved: developing better domestic disaster management institutions and familiarising country-to-country cooperation on disaster management. The development of domestic disaster management agencies is important because otherwise, it is less likely that Southeast Asian countries could engage in international or regional cooperation. Listed by Bildan (2003, p. 13)

among the donors and dialogue partners engaged with Southeast Asian countries were the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO).

USAID's primary function is to achieve the goals of US foreign policy by providing economic, humanitarian, and development assistance to people from developing countries. In the case of ASEAN disaster management, USAID initiated the Asian Urban Disaster Mitigation Program in 1995. This programme has been responsible for a) engaging Cambodia by introducing Community-Based Flood Mitigation Preparedness; b) engaging Indonesia through an earthquake vulnerability reduction programme, c) engaging Lao PDR by establishing an urban fire and emergency management programme, d) engaging the Philippines by working on flood and typhoon mitigation, e) engaging Thailand in risk assessment and mitigation planning, and, f) engaging Vietnam through disaster-resistant housing best practices. Through its programmes, USAID has thus engaged with six Southeast Asian countries and socialised the idea of disaster management. Another important scheme implemented by USAID is the Extreme Climate Event Program. Initiated in 1999 and funded by the USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, this programme demonstrates the application of climate information in disaster management in three countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) through training and capacity building. Finally, USAID began funding the Program for the Enhancement of Emergency Response (PEER) in 1999, which is focused on building capacity in Indonesia and the Philippines (especially for urban search and rescue, medical response, and hospital preparedness) for emergency response (Bildan, 2003, p. 13).

Meanwhile, DANIDA started programmes for less developed countries in Southeast Asia in 2001. Through its Disaster Reduction Program for Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (DRP-

CLV), DANIDA focused on the development of short- and medium-term frameworks for community public awareness programmes in both Cambodia and Vietnam as well as the development of disaster awareness teaching materials for elementary schools in Lao PDR (Bildan, 2003, p. 13).

The EU has worked closely with Southeast Asia through ECHO, which its record indicates began in 1996. For example, ECHO actively introduced a regional programme called the Partnership for Disaster Reduction in Southeast Asia (PDR-SEA), which aims to train disaster management practitioners in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Philippines, and Vietnam (Bildan, 2003, p. 12). It has also facilitated capacity building activities to disseminate the concept of community-based disaster management. ECHO also assisted the oldest group of disaster management experts in the region, acknowledging AEGDM as the norm entrepreneurs inside ASEAN (Bildan, 2003, p. 11). As such, we can conclude that ECHO has sought to support ASEAN in building its own regional disaster management architecture.

b. Organisational Platforms: UNISDR, International and Regional Organisations

According to Coppola, several milestones have been reached at the international level regarding the evolution of international disaster management. One of the most important is the United Nations General Assembly's declaration of the 1990s as the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction" (IDNDR) in 1987. This programme, aimed to promote internationally coordinated efforts to reduce the losses caused by natural disasters, was supported through UN

Resolution 44/236,[46] which basically promoted better disaster management practices globally and encouraged national governments to improve their disaster management performance (Coppola, 2011, pp. 6–7).

The second milestone is the Yokohama Strategy as a global recognition of the need for disaster management (Coppola, 2011, pp. 7–9). The Yokohama Strategy was elaborated by UN member states at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in 1994. This conference was held to evaluate the progress of the IDNDR. The Yokohama Strategy included some important points[47] that we can use to understand the rise of international disaster management:

Point 4.

"The Yokohama Strategy acknowledges that the world is increasingly interdependent. All countries shall act in a new spirit of partnership to build a safer world based on common interests and a shared responsibility to save human lives, since natural disasters do not respect borders. Regional and international cooperation will significantly enhance our ability to achieve real progress in mitigating disasters through the transfer of technology and the sharing of information and joint disaster prevention and mitigation activities. Bilateral and multilateral assistance and financial resources should be mobilised to support these efforts."

[46] Please refer to UN resolution adopted on 85th plenary meeting 22 December 1989, 44/236. International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. Available online at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/549/95/IMG/NR054995.pdf?OpenElement, accessed on 29 August 2019.
[47] Please refer to the document titled "Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation." The document is the result of World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, 23-27 May 1994 in Yokohama, Japan. Available online at https://www.unisdr.org/files/8241_doc6841contenido1.pdf, accessed on 29 August 2019.

Yokohama Message No. 10.

"Nations should view the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World as a call to action, individually and in concert with other nations, to implement policies and goals reaffirmed in Yokohama, and to use the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction as a catalyst for change."

These two points may be seen as urging the promoting of further regional and international disaster management in recognition of the interdependence of the world, as well as urging better coordination to tackle disasters (which do not respect borders). To further sustain these efforts, IDNDR and the Yokohama Strategy were followed by the UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). Its main role is to guide the international community's disaster management endeavours (Coppola, 2011, p. 12).

In the early 2000s, international organisations launched several programmes in Southeast Asia, paralleling their efforts at the international level. Among those identified by Bildan (2003) are the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC), the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre – Regional Consultative Committee in Regional Cooperation in Disaster Management (ADPC-RCC), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) Typhoon Committee. Established in 1998, ARDC supports Southeast Asian countries in socialising and sharing information on disaster-reduction mechanisms (Bildan, 2003, p. 12). ADPC-RCC, established in 2000, focuses on providing capacity building to national disaster management organisations (NDMOs), including those in Southeast Asia (Bildan, 2003, p. 12). Meanwhile, since July 2001 the UN ESCAP Typhoon Committee has been assessing the

technology required for disaster mitigation and preparedness, serving as an information and education operator, and developing communication networks in Southeast Asia (Bildan, 2003, p. 12).

By complementing the efforts of international organisations, Southeast Asian regional bodies have also worked simultaneously on this issue. Take, for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ARF-ISMDR), which was established in 1993. Although initially, this forum was not active, during its fourth meeting (in May 2000) it agreed on the idea of socialisation and capacity building for better regional disaster management (Bildan, 2003, p. 12). As noted by Bildan (2003), ARF-ISMDR agreed to promote 1) information sharing on disasters and early warning, 2) mutual assistance for disaster preparedness and relief, 3) disaster management training and promotion of greater awareness in disaster preparedness and relief. The keyword for this programme is socialisation. At the sub-regional level, meanwhile, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has worked with Southeast Asian and Indo-Chinese countries for flood management and disaster mitigation strategies.

However, it must be noted that ASEAN has not only had success stories. ASEAN has also experienced failures, such as in its attempts to integrate haze pollution in its disaster management programmes. Although ASEAN regional cooperation on trans-boundary haze pollution began in 1995, there have been many political obstacles in this sector. Indonesia initially preferred discussing this matter sub-regionally with Malaysia and Singapore rather than dealing with it through ASEAN mechanisms. Over time, ASEAN established its own legal umbrella for haze pollution, but this was separate from AADMER. As this issue is separate from recent regional disaster management architecture, it will not be discussed in this dissertation.

c. The Tipping Point

The idea of international disaster management did not reach the tipping point until most countries recognised its importance. This dissertation argues that the most important event that could be defined as the tipping point for international disaster management is the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), designed following the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe from 28 to 22 January 2005. The HFA is an international effort to encourage national governments to strengthen the institutional basis for implementation and to integrate disaster risk management into sustainable development policy. The HFA has directly influenced ASEAN to pursue its own regional disaster management cooperation. It can be noted that the HFA is considered an international strategy for disaster management, and the ASEAN legal framework acknowledges the importance of this framework as the basis for Southeast Asian regional cooperation in disaster management;

> *"Recalling also the Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action set out by the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in January 2005, which, among other things, stresses the need to strengthen and when necessary develop co-ordinated regional approaches, and create or upgrade regional policies, operational mechanisms, plans and communication systems to prepare for and ensure rapid and effective disaster response in situations that exceed national coping capacities."* (ASEAN, 2012).

Coppola has shown the magnitude of this conference, noting that it included more than 4,000 participants; 168 government representatives (of 195 countries in the world in 2005); 78 specialised UN agencies; 562 journalists from 154 media corporations; and more than 40,000 visitors (Coppola, 2011, p. 13). As argued by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 901), to reach a tipping point, at least more than one-third of all countries should realise the importance of international/regional disaster management. From the number of countries involved in the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, we can conclude that 86.15% of states recognised the need for international disaster management. This means that the tipping point had been reached globally. Regionally, the tipping point came with the signing of the AADMER on 26 July 2005 in Vientianne, Laos, only six months after the signing of the HFA. AADMER was signed by all ASEAN member states, comprising all Southeast Asian countries except Timor-Leste.

III.5.2. Norm Cascade in Regional Cooperation on Disaster Management

During the norm cascade phase, states use socialisation and demonstration to influence other states; in this case, ASEAN states adopt the norm and build a feeling of belonging in the international community. During this stage, leaders who have already been convinced to follow new disaster management norms try to influence other leaders. This dissertation suggests that probable motives are: 1) to give pressure for conformity (ask member states to implement agreements), 2) to gain international legitimacy, and 3) to increase self-esteem as suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 904).

This dissertation identifies several actors has having been influential in promoting ASEAN regional disaster management cooperation. Among the strong supporters of this norm is Surin

Pitsuwan, who served as ASEAN Secretary-General between 2008 and 2012. His early time of service in Southeast Asia was marked by a major disaster in Myanmar. Assisted by Adelina Kamal and her team with the DMHA Division, Pitsuwan succeeded not only in bridging ASEAN and Myanmar in dealing with Cyclone Nargis but also proved that the ASEAN-led mechanism could prevail in the field (in terms of technical operations). According to Anik Yuniarti, Pitsuwan proudly claimed that AADMER was the fastest ASEAN Agreement to be negotiated and accepted by all of the member states, with the process taking only four months (Yuniarti, 2011, p. 25). This optimistic tone is interesting to be examined. The way that the ASEAN Secretary-General proudly claimed success in disaster management cooperation could be regarded as a way of gaining esteem and reputation. We also note that Pitsuwan proposed the idea of a more progressive ASEAN during his term as Thailand's Minister of Foreign Affairs. During his service, he proposed the ideas of "flexible engagement" in 1998 and "forward engagement" of 2003 to challenge traditional conceptions of the ASEAN Way (Katanyuu, 2006). "Flexible engagement" was a proposed idea for ASEAN to more blatantly criticising the unsavoury practice of democracy in Myanmar; this proposal was rejected by the other member states. However, Pitsuwan continued his efforts, unilaterally launching a policy of "forward engagement" in 2003. This policy was designated to pressure Myanmar to follow a roadmap to democracy. Under his leadership, ASEAN also achieved consensus in signing the ASEAN Charter and establishing the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights. From this background, it is clear that Pitsuwan believed in a more progressive ASEAN. His perspective shaped his style of leadership, which was open to the international community, endorsed open and frank discussion, and aimed to give ASEAN even more legitimacy.

Other motives are also claimed by states as actors. For example, during its time of chairmanship in 2011, Indonesia had the initiative to build a facility in West Java for ASEAN disaster response. This project was initiated by former Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono[48] during the ASEAN–Japan Special Meeting on 9 April 2011 (Yuniarti, 2011, p. 29). An interview with an AHA Centre representative indicated that the Indonesian government had also fully supported the November 2011 establishment of the AHA Centre in Jakarta. The Indonesian government provided facilities for the AHA Centre, integrating it with the savvy infrastructure of the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (*Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi/*BPPT). The development of the AHA Centre was supervised by the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Agung Laksono, and he routinely monitored the progress of the project. Indonesia's attempts may be seen as driven in part by the desire to gain legitimacy and esteem as one of the most influential ASEAN member states and reflects Indonesia's efforts to promote deeper ASEAN regionalism. Since its democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia—together with Thailand and the Philippines—has become more vocal in supporting a democratic ASEAN. For example, in Bali Concord II (2003), Indonesia, for the first time, introduced the term 'democratisation' in an ASEAN Document. Indonesia has also launched the Bali Democracy Forum to spread the idea of a more democratic regional sphere further.

ASEAN's success in cascading the regional disaster management norm cannot be separated with the mechanism of issue linkage. As a super-norm—to borrow a term from Fukuda-Par and Hulme (2011)—disaster management cooperation is linked with global shifts in such issues as

[48] The sixth president of the Republic of Indonesia, serving in office for two periods of administration from 2004 to 2014.

human rights, political openness, and democratisation. Deeper ASEAN regionalism has led to newly established bodies dealing with non-traditional issues, as exemplified by the establishment of the Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division, and the AHA Centre. At the operational level, disaster management and humanitarian assistance cannot be separated from the issue of political openness. Should ASEAN be unable to provide assurance to member states, joint operations cannot succeed. For example, if the degree of diplomatic trust among ASEAN member states is not high, it is less likely that the involvement of foreign military personnel will be welcomed.

Furthermore, ASEAN has initiated collaboration between civil and military actors in its disaster management and humanitarian assistance operations. This could help ASEAN countries redefine the purpose of their military forces. The challenge of proportionally repositioning the function of the military is urgent in several countries, including Thailand and Indonesia. In Thailand, at least 18 military coups d'états have been launched to date, indicating that the military has been constantly tempted to become involved in domestic politics. In the past, Indonesia has also had a similar problem with military-political involvement. Since the beginning of political reform in 1998, the military has been repositioned to make it more professional is by introducing international peace-building and other non-traditional operations. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the military's active involvement in politics as still prevalent due to General Prayudh Chan-O-Cha successful coup in 2014 and continue to rule Thailand as Prime Minister benefited from his party success in 2019 election. As such, the new mechanisms created by ASEAN gave governments a forum to exercise their interests. Cooperation in disaster management has led ASEAN to establish deeper regional mechanisms, such as the use of military assets for "joint operations other than war"

(Yuniarti, 2011, p. 16). Such views were discussed by the ministries of defence of ASEAN member states during a meeting in Vietnam on 7 October 2010, followed by further meetings in Jakarta in 2011. Similarly, a workshop on the use of ASEAN military assets and capacities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief was held with representatives of all member states' military forces by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia from 7 to 8 October 2010 (Yuniarti, 2011, p. 27).

As reported by Yuniarti, this workshop produced standard operational procedures for disaster response in ASEAN, with military personnel from ASEAN member states being allowed to contribute to disaster response, albeit with some limitations that could hinder operations (including different administration mechanisms for accepting foreign military assets within other countries' border and a requirement for further budgeting for establishing this mechanism). Most important to be highlighted is the willingness of ASEAN member states to nurture healthier civil-military relations. The presence of foreign military personnel should not be seen with an overreacting sensitivity, as it is for the sake of humanitarian operations (Yuniarti, 2011, p. 28).

This is important for political openness, as member states should no longer worry about foreign military involvement. They can refer to operations in Aceh following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, which have been identified as successful both by the Aceh Tsunami Digital Repository and by Syiah Kuala University. Other Indonesian responses to these operations have also been positive; for example, according to the Indonesian Institute of Science (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*/LIPI), aid from foreign military forces in Aceh gradually diminished ideological suspicion. The international community, as such, was no longer separated by ideology (Yuniarti, 2011, p. 29).

III.5.3. Internalisation of Regional Cooperation for Disaster Management

The final stage in the installation of new norms is the internalisation process, in this case, when states in Southeast Asia have no further obstacle to implementing disaster management cooperation. There are legally binding documents, and ASEAN member states willingly comply with these agreements. New ASEAN documents on disaster management (AADMER and SASOP) have enabled us to map the actors responsible for regional disaster management after the establishment of AHA Centre, the actors associated with ASEAN, and the actors collaborating with ASEAN (i.e. NGOs and donors). This means that the internalisation of regional disaster management in ASEAN could be examined from the assessment of its implementation.

ASEAN regional disaster management cooperation has become politically supported, as can be seen from state leaders' endorsement of ASEAN's establishment of two overseeing bodies: the COP and the ACDM. The first of these, the ASEAN Conference of Parties (COP), is comprised of member states' higher ministerial-level executive representatives who are responsible for disaster management and risk reduction in the state. COP's main task is to monitor and evaluate the implementation of AADMER (Article 21 of AADMER). Any policy produced by ASEAN be approved by the COP, which must consider any entailed political matters; as such, this institution is the highest decision-maker in ASEAN related to regional disaster management. Meanwhile, the main function of COP is to monitor the implementation of AADMER as a legally binding document. The motive, thus, is related to conformity and political compliance. Second, the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) comprises of representatives from member states' National Disaster Management Organisations (NDMO). All member states are expected to send

representatives from their national NDMOs to ACDM, which governs ASEAN cooperation on disaster management and disaster risk reduction. Important decisions regarding disaster management, such as regulations on the deployment of humanitarian assistance, should be discussed and approved by ACDM. The most important documents produced by ACDM are the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations and the AADMER Work Program 2010–2015. Both of these documents are related to the technicalities of humanitarian operations; as such, ACDM's motive is related to conformity with technical requirements.

The internalisation of ASEAN cooperation also can be noted in the exchange of NDMOs' works. NDMOs are the offices/bodies responsible for disaster management and risk reduction within the jurisdiction of member states, and although they may vary in terms of organisational structure, they may still work together within the framework that has been set by ASEAN. Therefore, although they are primarily domestic actors, under ASEAN mechanisms, they are also regional actors as they send representatives to ACDM and collaborate through the assistance of the AHA Centre during field deployments. Although they vary in form and legal frameworks (see Table 6), they have been working closely with each other to build their networks since November 2011.

Table 6. NDMOs and Related Ministerial Bodies in ASEAN Countries

Member States	National Disaster Management Organisation	Ministerial Body
Brunei Darussalam	National Disaster Management Centre	Ministry of Home Affairs
Cambodia	National Committee for Disaster Management	Cabinet Ministry Led by the Prime Minister
Indonesia	National Disaster Management Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*/BNPB)	Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare
Lao PDR	National Disaster Management Office	Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
Malaysia	National Security Council (*Majlis Keselamatan Negara*/MKN)	Prime Minister's Department
Myanmar	Relief and Resettlement Department	Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Settlement
Philippines	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and Administrator (NDRRMC)	Department of National Defence
Singapore	Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF)	Ministry of Home Affairs
Thailand	Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM)	Ministry of Interior
Vietnam	Department of Dyke Management, Flood, and Storm Control (DDMFSC) and the Standing Office of Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control (CCFSC)	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Source: Compiled from various sources and interviews

To help ASEAN member states implement fruitful cooperation, ASEAN has established two operating arms, namely the Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DHMA) Division and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster

Management (AHA Centre). First, the ASEAN Secretariat functions as a good office is facilitating dialogue and serves as the bureaucracy for implementing AADMER. Before the AHA Centre was established, the DMHA Division also handled field operations. There have since been incremental transfers of roles; for example, by mid-2013 tasks related to disaster response, operations, and capacity building had been transferred to the AHA Centre. The DMHA Division had also just transferred the administration of the ASEAN Disaster Risk Reduction Portal (DRR Portal) to the AHA Centre. Nevertheless, the DMHA Division still functioned as the custodian of disaster response funds and remained responsible for monitoring the progress of the implementation of the 2010–2015 work plan. As such, the DMHA Division has taken a bureaucratic role in monitoring conformity. Second, the AHA Centre is the operating arm of ASEAN cooperation in disaster management and risk reduction. Since its establishment in 2011, the AHA Centre has been involved in handling major natural disasters such as the Thai Floods of 2011–2012, Typhoon Bopha in December 2012 (Philippines), preparation for Cyclone Mahasen in May 2013 (Myanmar), the Bener Meuria Earthquake in July 2013 (Aceh, Indonesia), and Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013 (Philippines). The AHA Centre also handles a yearly regional exercise called the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Simulation Exercise (ARDEX), which offers member states and different actors a platform for collaborating in a simulation. ARDEX involves member states' NDMOs, search and rescue teams, and military personnel. All of these mechanisms have been developed by the AHA Centre to ensure the smoothness of regional cooperation and conformity by making it habitual and internalised.

Another important aspect is the involvement of the people in ASEAN regionalism. To endorse a more people-centred approach, ASEAN established the AADMER Partnership Group (APG), a consortium of international NGOs collaborating with ASEAN for the people-centred

implementation of AADMER. NGOs involved in this endeavour include Child Fund International, Oxfam, Save the Children, Mercy Malaysia, and Plan, with funding coming from the European Union Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office. This could help ASEAN promote activities for broader audiences in the region. According to the interview, the ASEAN Secretariat has been most welcome to this kind of progressive idea. Motives have ranged from socialisation, education, to the internalisation of the idea of regional disaster management.

III.6. Findings: ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Norm Life Cycle

Analysis has been able to answer the question of why there is a trend of regional organisations establishing disaster management cooperation: because there is strong global advocacy. Advocacy for establishing the super-norm of international/regional disaster management has successfully travelled from norm entrepreneurs to the international stage through introduction, socialisation, and persuasion, mainly by international organisations — the dominant mechanism in introducing and persuading state leaders. During the norm emergence stage, a top-down approach was used, with the UN serving as an organisational platform for norm entrepreneurs. The genealogy of the internalised idea can be traced back to UN resolutions which laid a basis for global cooperation. These resolutions, together with UNSIDR, were crucial in bringing the idea to a tipping point globally in 2005, as well as regionally in Southeast Asia (also in 2005). It means that advocacy during norm emergence was parallelly diffused in the international and regional level, as we can see in the following matrix (Table 7). It can also be concluded that, concerning the idea of regional/international disaster management, international organisations have taken a more pivotal role.

Table 7. ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Norm Life Cycle

*Tipping point in 2005 (Adaptation of HFA and AADMER)

	Stage 1 Norm Emergence 1987–2005	Stage 2 Norm Cascade 2005–2011	Stage 3 Internalisation 2011–present
Actors	<u>Norm entrepreneurs with organisational platforms</u> • UN, UNSIDR • ASEAN Institutions/ Affiliations; AEGDM, ARF-ISMDR, and MRC • Donors and Dialogue Partners; USAID, ECHO, DANIDA, ADPC-RCC, UN ESCAP, ADRC	<u>States, International organisations, networks</u> • The example of Indonesia and Singapore as an initiative of individual states to promote ASEAN regional disaster management; support for the establishment of the AHA Centre. • The initiative and strong leadership of Surin Pitsuwan as the then Secretary-General were beneficial for the cascading process.	<u>Law, professions, bureaucracy</u> • ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) as the legally binding document • ASEAN Bureaucracies: ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM); ASEAN Secretariat (DMHA Division); AHA Centre; • Civil Society - AADMER Partnership Group • Civil-Military collaboration by annual ARDEX Simulation

Motives	<u>Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment</u> • UN members acknowledge that the world is increasingly interdependent, and natural disasters do not respect borders; therefore, the idea is to nurture commitment for regional and international cooperation.	<u>Legitimacy, reputation, esteem</u> • ASEAN desire to build better mechanisms for disaster management and show them to the world	<u>Conformity</u> • The monitoring of AADMER implementation, • The Balanced Scorecard of Work Program 2010-2015; • The Implementation of SASOP or technical procedures for humanitarian operations.
Dominant Mechanism	<u>Persuasion</u> UN Resolutions • Declaration of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction in 1987 (Res. 42/169) • Publication of the Yokohama Strategy in 1994 • International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (Res. 54/219)	<u>Socialisation, institutionalisation, demonstration</u> • Hyogo Framework of Action (2005) • The ASEAN AADMER 2005 Most of the programmes during this stage were related to capacity building, sharing best principles, efforts to establish ASEAN institutions, and demonstrations led by donor states to show that new regional mechanisms could be implemented.	<u>Habit, institutionalisation</u> • Experiences of the AHA Centre involved in major natural disasters since 2011; the ARDEX annual regional simulation; the ASEAN Partnership Group efforts to introduce regional disaster management to wider audiences.

To summarise, regional disaster management cooperation in ASEAN could only become a success story because there were preconditions for success. The formula for success required three preconditions: 1) continuous assistance of the international community, 2) determined ASEAN leaders, and 3) proven regional mechanisms as a result of deepening ASEAN regional cooperation.

First, most of the funding and initiatives to socialise and demonstrate disaster management in ASEAN were supported by foreign actors. As such, we can sense the presence of strong international advocacy in the spreading of global normative shifts. The continuous engagement occurred between international organisations and dialogue partners as Southeast Asian states have established domestic national disaster management offices and improved regional disaster management cooperation since the 1990s. Donors were engaged and worked together with individual countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines as well as give assistance to the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management. The combination of assistance created better opportunities for future regional disaster management architecture. Some donors are still working with ASEAN in this sector today.

Second, there was strong leadership from both ASEAN bureaucrats and state leaders. As demonstrated in this chapter, the roles of then-Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan and Director of the DMHA Division Adelina Kamal were pivotal in determining the success of ASEAN operations in Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis in 2008. State leaders such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Agung Laksono were also important to showcase the political will to support the cause and indirectly convince other ASEAN member states to follow Indonesia's path in supporting regional disaster management cooperation.

Third, there is a proven mechanism for regional cooperation in disaster management in ASEAN. We cannot neglect the importance of the momentum that resulted from the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and Cyclone Nargis. The Indian Ocean tragedy was a major driver of both the HFA and AADMER in 2005. ASEAN's involvement in Aceh, where it assisted in the reconstruction and reconciliation process, was successful and showed that the regional organisation was capable of conducting field operations. Moreover, the Indonesian government was open to accepting the involvement and assistance of the international community. This showed other ASEAN member states that there was no reason for them to worry or be suspicious about the capabilities of ASEAN. Meanwhile, Cyclone Nargis was a milestone for AADMER being put into force in 2009. ASEAN successfully deployed humanitarian operations and facilitated cooperation between the Myanmar government and the international community. This success boosted ASEAN member states' confidence in developing further disaster management cooperation. Nevertheless, without the international dynamics of norms, which suggest the travelling of disaster management norms from entrepreneurs to the world to ASEAN, such a phenomenon cannot be clearly explained.

CHAPTER IV

TWO-LEVEL GAMES IN DEVELOPING ASEAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

For decades, decision making in ASEAN has been characterised as informal, loosely binding, and highly based on consensus. Scholars of Southeast Asian politics have called this decision-making process the "ASEAN Way". This condition, it is argued, has hindered progress in ASEAN because it has enabled member states to veto negotiations if their subjects are related to sensitive issues. Such a belief has dominated the way scholars analyse ASEAN for decades. Through this chapter, the author expresses disagreement with this belief based on recent developments in the region, particularly the development of a binding framework for ASEAN disaster management cooperation. It shows that progress in disaster management cooperation has not been achieved through the traditional mechanism of achieving consensus based on informal discussions between leaders. Previously, leaders in the region could informally discuss the establishment of such cooperation because there were strongmen ruling Southeast Asian nations. Conversely, decisions today are made through a series of sophisticated negotiations both at the regional level (when the ASEAN leaders offer their terms of negotiation) and at the domestic level (when leaders have to communicate with their constituents). Moreover, various non-state actors and the international community pressure ASEAN member states. These complex sets of negotiations have created a prisoner dilemma for member states. This chapter will utilise the logic of two-level games to reveal the current ASEAN negotiating pattern.

IV.1. Negotiation Processes in ASEAN

The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Responses (AADMER) was ratified and came into force in 2009, after a four-year-long process. AADMER has been called the fastest agreement to be negotiated[49] in ASEAN, although there were several issues that had to be addressed before its implementation.[50] This chapter argues that the experience negotiating AADMER marks a milestone for ASEAN. Drawing on this experience, the formalisation of ASEAN agreements in the 2000s has demonstrated a new pattern. Departing from the outdated consensus mechanism, the successful negotiation of AADMER indicated that ASEAN could actually transform into a reliable regional organisation with functional and binding agreements. This topic is interesting to be discussed since ASEAN has always been identified as a mere loose regional club.

Consultation and consensus have been the most prevailing mechanisms for establishing ASEAN regionalism for many decades. To reach a strong consensus within ASEAN is not an easy job. First of all, ASEAN member states can approve a consensus if all member states can enjoy the benefit of the negotiated agreement. Secondly, it is important to ensure that no member state experiences loss or under the impression that the agreement is harming its interest. There is a notable example of ASEAN failure in reaching consensus in 2016 when member states had a

[49] Negotiations took only four months of the originally planned year. See the Statement by Secretary General of ASEAN, "Mega Disasters: A Global 'Tipping Point' in Natural Disaster Policy, Planning, and Development", delivered at the Pacific Disaster Centre, Maui, Hawaii, 15–16 August 2016, available online at http://asean.org/?static_post=statement-by-secretary-general-of-asean-2. Accessed on 5 December 2016.
[50] For example, the problem of budgeting and the discussion of opening up borders for military personnel and equipment. This will be discussed later.

different opinion in dealing with the South China Sea. As a result, there were no joint-communique on July 2012 due to the veto by Cambodia (BBC, 2012).[51]

ASEAN bureaucrat and scholar, Severino, argues another important characteristic that shape ASEAN's decision-making process is informality. Started by series of diplomatic visit by the leaders, Bangkok Declaration's negotiation was a less formal process in 1967. The drafting of the Bangkok Declaration was relatively unknown to the global media (Severino, 2006). Unlike the European approach in their EU establishment, the ASEAN declaration did not demand a ratification process nor having legal binding instruments.

Among most circulated adagios, ASEAN bureaucrats are keen on saying; Southeast Asia is not Western Europe (Severino, 2006, p.4). Due to the historical experience of the European nations, they are more likely to rely on a more legal basis for any regional arrangement. Massive distrust among European nations emerged because of frequent wars throughout centuries. Hence, rational-legal formalities are important to bind the nations to work together. Meanwhile, ASEAN leaders understand that they manage newly established countries without the experience of having a war with each other. A loosely bound arrangement can serve Southeast Asian interest well. Compared to their counterparts in Europe, Southeast Asian countries experienced less conflictual relations. Less understanding among them can also bring mutual uncertainty in the region (Severino, 2006, pp. 5-6).

ASEAN leaders and bureaucrats also believe that Southeast Asia is very diverse in religions, ethnicities, cultures, and political beliefs. In term of religions, Islam is predominant in

[51] The Philippines accused that Cambodia is vetoing the mention of South China Sea dispute in ASEAN official statement due to its economic interest with China.

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. Buddhism is dominant in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Singapore. Catholicism is dominant in the Philippines and Timor Leste. Both Confucianism and Hinduism also exist in many places such as in mainland Southeast Asia and the famous Indonesian island of Bali. Severino stated that, in general, Southeast Asia is more diverse than Europe (Severino, 2006, p. 8).

With the many cultures living in Southeast Asia, some countries have their problem related to ethnonationalism movements within their border. The separatist aspirations have inflicted fear for territorial disintegration. Countries like Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, and Myanmar still have ethnonational movements.[52] Fear of disintegration shapes the foreign policy of those countries to be more responsive towards threats of interventions. This rational lead member states to limit the interventionist approach within the region. Non-intervention policy is instrumental in appeasing suspicions. ASEAN Way implies that all member countries should not interfere by supporting separatist movements in other ASEAN countries.

Throughout history, the tendency to use consensus and consultation fits the personalised foreign policy. The stong figures in Southeast Asian politics were influential, especially before the democratisation waves. Consensus, consultation, and personalised foreign policies might hinder the progress of regionalism for several decades. It can divert the function of regional organisation

[52] In Southern Thailand, ethnonationalist groups are continuing their struggle to gain independence in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. In The Philippines different groups such as MNLF and MILF are oprating in Mindanao. Twelve separatist movements are active in present-day Myanmar, including the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, Arakan Independence Alliance, Kachin National Organisation, and Karen National Union. Meanwhile in Indonesia, the Free Papua Movement and an advocacy group for the Republic of the Southern Moluccas are still advocating their causes within Indonesia and abroad.

in managing the disputes. ASEAN has failed to play an important role in mediating territorial disputes among member states.

The notable example of diverted territorial dispute management is the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan islands in 1994. During the time, strong opposition by the Malaysian side has hindered ASEAN to take the role of mediation. The fear of Indonesian intervention to the ASEAN process is the main factor for strong Malaysian objection. Indonesia had requested ASEAN to help resolve the case using the regional mechanism. However, Anwar Ibrahim, acting as the negotiator chief of Malaysia, refused the idea. According to Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia will get more benefits if the case were under the scrutiny of the International Court of Justice. Many believe that Indonesia could gain more benefit if the case were under ASEAN scrutiny due to Indonesia's influence (Severino, 2006, p.12).

Understanding Anwar Ibrahim's position, the then Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, reported back to President Suharto and asked him for a consultation. Ali Alatas surprised by the decision of President Suharto. Suharto decided to bring the case before the International Court of Justice. Ali Alatas stated that this decision is aiming to end the dispute by not burdening future Indonesian governments by territorial conflicts (Severino, 2006, p. 13). This lesson underlines the importance of a strong figure in ASEAN politics in the past. Strongman's[53] decisioncan eclipse the role of a regional organisation. Due to Suharto's policy, Indonesia and Malaysia both agree to bring the case to the International Court of Justice in May 1997.

[53] The term 'strongman ' is used to characterise the senior leaders who have led Southeast Asian authoritarian regimes, including Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Suharto in Indonesia, and Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore. For further detail, see Jessica L. Weeks. (2012). Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review, Vol. 106 No. 2.* p. 326–347.

In the era of strongmen leadership in Southeast Asia, the rational-legal approach in regionalism is hindered. The choice of consensus mechanism worked very well for authoritarian governments. In the past decades, authoritarian governments were reigning in Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand as military-dominated regimes; absolute monarchy in Brunei Darussalam; single-party in communist Vietnam and Laos; also pseudo-democracies like Malaysia, Singapore, and Cambodia.[54] By having consensus as a regional mechanism, they can customise the clause flexibly. A tailored arrangement can cover their interest.

The history of ASEAN enlargement supports the argument mentioned above. The idea of ASEAN membership expansion was very attractive for authoritarian countries. Socialist countries such as Vietnam and Lao got interested as they lost their eastern block trade benefits in the late 1990s. In Cambodia, a war-torn country, also need more regional support to gain legitimacy for its leader. Meanwhile, the military junta in Myanmar seek trade and security partners due to international isolation.

The interests of these countries fit the aspiration of the strongmen leader. One of the prominent strongman leader in the late 1990s was Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia. Mahathir Mohamad was the avid supporter of the ASEAN enlargement process. He proposed that ASEAN should include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, the CLMV (Areethamsirikul, 2008, p. 77). Mahathir Mohamad was gaining more legitimacy to rule Malaysia

[54] Similar view is also suggested by William Case (2002) that countries in Southeast Asia remains lacking in democracy. Singapore and Malaysia are considered as a semi-democracy, Thailand as an unconsolidated democracy, Indonesia as perpetuating pseudo-democracy, and the Philippines' low quality of democracy. See Case, W. (2002). Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less. London: Routledge. Meanwhile, Brunei can still be considered as implementing Royal Absolutism in its governance. Please refer to Naimah S. Talib. (2013). Brunei: Royal Absolutism and the Modern State. *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Issue 13*. pp. 1-8.

by his notable look east policy.[55] He was giving the emphasise to prioritise Malaysian foreign policy towards Asia. He also an adamant proponent of the expansion of ASEAN cooperation from a mere political group into a regionalism with reliable economic cooperations. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam received Mahatir Mohamad's idea very well. There were objections from the international community; one of the objections came from the United Kingdom protesting the inclusion of Myanmar. European Union vetoed the membership of Myanmar in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Responding to this, Mahathir Mohamad threatened of withdrawing ASEAN participation in ASEM (Than & Gates, 2001, p. 253).

International media responded the ASEAN membership enlargement differently. Generally, international media responded positively towards the inclusion of Vietnam in 1995, Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. However, Myanmar admission in 1997 received different reception. International media heavily criticised the decision to include Myanmar (Mydans, 1997).[56] The strong opposition of global media is targeting human rights violations and undemocratic practices of governance in Myanmar.

ASEAN was a regional organization that initially aimed to limit the spread of communism. ASEAN's move to accept Vietnam and Laos as new member states are a diverting policy. However, the dynamic of international politics made this policy possible. The founding father

[55] Mahathir Mohamad envisioned the Look East Policy to counter the western hegemony and promoted new direction of Malaysian economic development. He introduced Japanese works ethics and corporate governance in order to strengthen Malaysia's economic performance. The policy was intended to support the industrialisation of Malaysia by allowing the adaptation to Japanese technology and investment. After his inauguration as the prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad introduced Look East Policy in 1981. See Wendy A. Smith, "Japanese Cultural Images in Malaysia: Implications of the 'Look East'' Policy'" in Jomo Kwame Sundaram (ed.), *Japan and Malaysian Economic Development: In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*. London: Routledge, 1994.

[56] International meda such as The New York Times wrote that the inclusion of Myanmar into ASEAN was defying the United States' interests. The admission of a country led by a military junta was ignoring global concerns for human rights violations.

created ASEAN as an anti-communist regional bloc.[57] In the late 1990s, Vietnam remained a communist country politically. The economic reform of Doi Moi in 1986 was limited in the economic sector. Laos paved the same way by still practising communism with several reforms in the economic sector. Severino reported that the motive of the Vietnamese leaders was economic. Vietnam could ensure its economic stability if they join ASEAN. After the end of the cold war, the Soviet Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) can no longer support the trade arrangement between communist countries. At this point, Vietnam needs someone else to trade with (Severino, 2006, p. 54).

However, Severino also argues that Vietnamese identity still matters. If not joining ASEAN, Vietnam will further be isolated in loneliness. Its neighbours have different foreign policies. Vietnam is aware that China is still influential. However, Vietnam is losing its allies in the Soviet bloc. Joining ASEAN will contribute to the Vietnamese role within this new society of ASEAN. It is a good reason for the Vietnamese to retain their Southeast Asian identity (Severino, 2006, p. 54).

Mahathir Mohamad's role in the inclusion of Myanmar is influential. For ASEAN, accepting a country with a military junta in power can be troublesome. At that time, Mahathir Mohamad gave his guarantee that the process of Myanmar inclusion would not backfire. Mahathir Mohamad has his own motive. In the late 1990s, Mahathir Mohamad leaned toward opposition stance vis-à-vis the west by often criticise western values. Mahathir Mohamad believes that the inclusion of Myanmar will not worsen the democratization process in the region. He argues that

[57] Previously ASEAN had invited Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to join the regional organization. Nevertheless, the idea of these countries' membership was refused due to ensuring ASEAN's role as an anti-communist regionalism.

Myanmar inclusion can influence the military regime to rethink about directing the country into a democracy. A source from the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) confirmed this information that Malaysia proposed Myanmar to join ASEAN in hoping that the democratisation process could start. Hence, it is undeniable that Mahathir Mohamad was the strongest promoter for Myanmar inclusion in ASEAN (Areethamsirikul, 2008, p. 78).

In the other side of the story, Myanmar hopes to get more benefits from the ASEAN Way. Consensus and consultation are better mechanisms for the authoritarian military junta. The non-interference policy could help them gain more opportunity to rule the country without foreign distractions. Severino reported that the military junta in Myanmar was comfortable with the ASEAN Way. Prime Minister Khin Nyunt praised ASEAN's informality, consensus and consultation mechanism (Severino, 2006, p. 56). Myanmar's military junta could also gain more legitimacy by joining ASEAN. Internationally, the military junta could transmit a message that they got Southeast Asian countries recognitions (Severino, 2006, p. 56). This kind of recognition can benefit Myanmar to capitalise it into legitimacy to rule (Franck, 1988, p. 711).[58] The strongest opposition to Myanmar admission came from the EU. Responding to the EU, Mahathir Mohamad decided to counter the European critics firmly. Mahathir Mohamad continues his support to Myanmar's active contributions in ASEAN even after the admission case is settled (Areethamsirikul, 2008, p. 78).[59]

[58] It is argued that the international community resembles a club membership that impose commonalities, such as having shared goals and reciprocal recognition.
[59] In 2001, western media criticised Mahathir Mohamad for still being supportive towards Myanmar military junta when they refused to release Aung San Suu Kyi in 2001.

Nowadays, Southeast Asia is no longer the playground for the strongmen. Hun Sen is still ruling Cambodia as a long-serving prime minister. However, democratic transitions in many countries limit new strongman to emerge. The example is in the Philippines where Rodrigo Duterte can not run for another term of the presidency due to constitutional constraint. There is no Suharto nor Lee Kwan Yew anymore, while Mahathir Mohamad's power is limited. There are two notable consequences of the absent of strongmen in Southeast Asia. First, there will be room for the domestic politics of member states to develop a more democratic decision-making process. Secondly, the absence of political strongmen can create space for further ASEAN enhancement. The younger generation of leaders will have opportunities to innovate new approach for deeper regional integration.

The cases of Sipadan and Ligitan dispute and the ASEAN enlargement are illustrations of how ASEAN consensus and consultation mechanism was applied and also give us an argument of how these characteristics are suitable and appealing for authoritarian regimes. This dissertation argues that Mahathir Mohamad's role as a strongman can be very influential in ASEAN enlargement process. Not only Mahathir, Lee Kwan Yew and Suharto did also contributive towards the admission of Myanmar. The New York Times reported that global concern to prevent the admission of Myanmar in June 1997 was unable to stop the process. Mahathir Mohamad, Lee Kwan Yew, and Suharto publically countered international community negative responses (Mydans, 1997).

The decline of Southeast Asian strongmen's rule started by the wave of democratisations. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 has changed the political situation dramatically. After a series of mass demonstrations for political and economic reform, Suharto resigned in 1998 after ruling

Indonesia for 32 years. In Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad faced similar demands of political and economic reform. Former political ally, Anwar Ibrahim led the protest to start a reform era. The accusation for economic mismanagement led the public to demand for Mahathir Mohamad to step down in 1998 (Mohamad, 2003, p. 152). The resignation did not happen since the authority jailed Anwar Ibrahim for corruption and accused sodomy case.

Mahathir ultimately decided to announce his resignation in June 2002. His speech before the UMNO general assembly marked his end to serve as Malaysia's longest-serving prime minister in 2003. Mahathir Mohamad's resignation triggers instability in Malaysia's domestic politics. Since the Asian financial crisis, UMNO experienced a gradual decline. In the 1999 general election, the party lost its faithful Malay supporters to Parti Keadilan (Justice Party) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) (Roberts, 2002). Although this election still resulted in a UMNO victory, this shift stirred internal friction and stimulated the rise of a leader with a more religious backing, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. By Mahathir Mohamad's resignation, the era of ASEAN strongmen rules came to an end.[60]

This dissertation suggests that scholars studying ASEAN should not rely merely on the once-dominant narrative of informality and consensus. ASEAN officially stated the prominence of democracy in a press release following the Bali Concord II in 2003.[61] The inclusion of the word

[60] Mahathir Mohamad was considered as the last strongman to rule in Southeast Asia. Ferdinand Marcos was toppled by people power in 1986, Lee Kuan Yew resigned from premiership in 1990, and Suharto was resigned after series of people protest in 1998. Mahathir Mohamad is now once again serving as the Prime Minister of Malaysia since 2018. It is reported that he planned to lead transitional power to the de facto opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim.

[61] This is mentioned in a press statement released by the chair of the 9th ASEAN summit and the 7th ASEAN Plus 3 summit on 7 October 2003. Please refer to point 25, *"The leaders welcome the recent positive development in Myanmar and the Government's pledge to bring about a transition to democracy through dialogue and reconciliation. The roadmap, as outlined by the Prime Minister of Myanmar, that would involve all strata of Myanmar society is a pragmatic approach and deserves understanding and support. The leaders also agree that sanctions are not helpful in promoting peace and stability essential for democracy to take root."*

democracy was the very first time of ASEAN to include in a formal document. This statement was about Myanmar's planned transition to democracy. It was a distinctive development because ASEAN decided to acknowledge and support the continuing transition while concurrently articulating the belief that the international community policy of sanctioning to Myanmar did not help establish democracy. Reflecting Bali Concord II development, a scholar like Yuzawa argues that the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community[62] was a manifestation of ASEAN member states' rising interest in accommodating democracy (Yuzawa, 2013, p. 241). Rizal Sukma shares a matching perspective while stating that it is noteworthy to see ASEAN accommodating democracy as a legitimate terminus for the association. However, Sukma believes that ASEAN is aware of imposing democracy in the whole of Southeast Asia might not be possible (Sukma, 2009, p. 136).

The progress can still be possible through an incremental approach. Hence, ASEAN introduced the ASEAN Charter in 2008. The signing and ratification of the document entail ASEAN to impose the clausal of ASEAN minus X.[63] ASEAN minus X is a legal passage for implementing an ASEAN policy without obliging all states to agree with. Any member state that does not with the arrangement can postpone its involvement. Meanwhile, the rest can continue the arrangement. This policy can re-shape the design of ASEAN future cooperation. At present, there

[62] ASEAN Security Council was later renamed the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) as stated in latest ASEAN documents.

[63] The clausal of ASEAN minus X is stated in the Article 21(2) of the ASEAN Charter, "In the implementation of economic commitments, a formula for flexible participation, including the ASEAN minus X formula, may be applied where there is a consensus to do so."

are more than 300 agreements in ASEAN that need be ratified by member states' parliaments (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012) and it must be promptly addressed for the sake of regional progress.[64]

Among many agreements negotiated by ASEAN, one example examined in this dissertation is the development of ASEAN regional disaster management cooperation, which has proven the most successful negotiated agreement in contemporary Southeast Asia. First, Southeast Asia is prone to natural disasters. Second, international norms facilitating disaster management cooperation are linked with humanitarianism and political openness. ASEAN has recognised the importance of the disaster management cooperation norm (Rum, 2016); as such, through this study, we can also examine to what extent cooperation has reshaped the international relations and domestic politics of Southeast Asian nations. This shows that, although governments have agreed upon fixed clauses, it is necessary for parliaments to support agreements (through ratification) fully.[65] This contradicts the examples provided by Severino regarding how the strongmen operated. Furthermore, this study is relevant because the agreement on disaster management cooperation was developed in a situation in which Southeast Asian countries were experiencing both international and domestic pressure to perform better in tackling natural disasters. Said pressure forced governments to show their commitment to performing better by relaxing some political control.

[64] Please refer to the Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements and Ratification. As per October 2012, there were 367 signed agreements requiring an instrument of ratification.
[65] In ASEAN, the ratification process is one instrument for implementing agreements. To be fully implemented, an agreement must be approved by parliament. As of October 2012, there were 367 agreements that had yet to be ratified. For detail, refer to Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements and Ratification available online at www.asean.org

This chapter aims to prove that the ASEAN Way is no longer the dominant mechanism by examining the case of cooperation on regional disaster management through a constructivist approach, using two-level games and game theory analysis.

IV.1.1. Towards the Transformation of the ASEAN Way

This chapter aims to provide two contributions to ASEAN studies. First, it refines the outdated way of analysing ASEAN. Most scholars have believed in the importance of the ASEAN Way as the sole mechanism for building ASEAN regionalism. This belief has become a dominant narrative through the works of scholars such as Amitav Acharya, Rodolfo C. Severino, and Hiro Katsumata. This study challenges this idea of the ASEAN Way, noting that earlier scholars were using historical and empirical facts gathered in previous decades and thus how international relations scholars examine contemporary ASEAN must be revised. Many changes have happened in this decade alone. As such, this dissertation provides a revitalised way of analysing ASEAN.

Furthermore, my previous work has shown that even the creation of ASEAN disaster management cooperation itself was heavily supported by external factors (Rum, 2016). As the main argument of this work, ASEAN regional disaster management cooperation has not merely been the product of the executive body of ASEAN governments but has also been determined by member states' parliaments and domestic constituencies. Furthermore, cooperation can be used by member states to communicate with their international counterparts.

Second, this dissertation provides a tool for predicting the trajectory of ASEAN regionalism. The process of generating regional agreements in ASEAN has become more

predictable, and there has been an improvement in the degree of formalisation within the association. This trend shows that the principles within ASEAN are not static. The norms and identity of ASEAN are dynamic, and we can predict its direction. Regionalism will move forward, as it fulfils member states' craving for legitimacy and compliance and its decisions are based on a sense of justice and in accordance with universal values.

Much literature on ASEAN has stressed the significance of the ASEAN Way. However, the ways scholars understand the ASEAN Way are polarised. The first group of scholars see the ASEAN Way as a display of regional culture and identity that has a constructive effect on cohesiveness and Southeast Asian regionalism. The second group, meanwhile, see the ASEAN Way as a unique Southeast Asian political culture that has hindered the progress of regionalism. Finally, a group of scholars see ASEAN as having a dynamic regionalism that could transmute its values into a progressive drive.

In the first group, there are scholars like Acharya (1997; 1998), Severino (2006), Askandar, Bercovitch, and Oishi (2002), Narine (1997), Almonte (1997), and Kivimaki (2011) that see the ASEAN Way as a notable impetus for cohesiveness. Acharya claims that multilateralism in ASEAN is a manifestation of identity-building in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 1997). Hence, the ASEAN Way is the most prevailing mechanism as long as ASEAN member states can maintain a firm identity (Acharya, 1998). Former ASEAN Secretary-General turn scholar, Severino, underlines the prominence of ASEAN's historical advance through the lens of his personal experiences leading the Secretariat. In his period of service, Severino observed how informality, consultation, and consensus demonstrated as pivotal factors in determining interaction in ASEAN high-level negotiations (Severino, 2006). Askandar, Bercovitch, and Oishi argued that ASEAN has

established its method of conflict management by utilising conflict-avoidance and applying self-restraint. ASEAN member states work to avoid conflict from intensifying and prioritise harmonious relations among member states instead of solving problems directly (Askandar, Bercovitch, and Oishi, 2002). Narine argues that relatively small Southeast Asian states developed the ASEAN Way to navigate potential conflict between them. Conflict potentials has obliged them to act cautiously and learn to accommodate the neighbouring countries (Narine, 1997). Almonte stated that the ASEAN Way is a proven method to guarantee security in East Asia through the Asian Regional Forum. The principles of ASEAN Way is expedient tools for post-Cold War regional stability. Furthermore, great powers in Asia do not feel threatened by the values promoted through the ASEAN Way (Almonte, 1997). A comparable argument is presented by Kivimaki, who suggests that the approach to stabilise security in East Asia is similar to the ASEAN Way formula. Kivimaki argues that the ASEAN Way is a positive impetus for the East Asian peace and stability (Kivimaki, 2011).

The literature review above displays that most works on the ASEAN Way has leaned identity and cultural contexts have shaped the principles of informality, consensus, consultation and non-interference in the region. Hence, this dissertation classifies this group of scholars as the proponents of ASEAN Way.

The second group of scholars believe that the ASEAN Way can hinder further progress of regionalism. Katsumata claims that Southeast Asian political structure and culture has not transformed adequately, and this has perpetuated the firm application of the ASEAN Way (Katsumata, 2003). Laurence Henry, meanwhile, writes that ASEAN and the EU have different approaches in regionalism. The EU utilises a concept of community integration, which is the

opposite of the values of the ASEAN Way. Henry argues that integration is the ultimate goal as well as main instrument of the EU; meanwhile in contrast, ASEAN continues to prioritise member states' sovereignty (Henry, 2007). Cockerham argues that, although ASEAN has developed some legal framework, it is still low degree in transparency and has limited delegation. In general, ASEAN member states are prioritising to safeguard their national interest over deepening regional integration (Cockerham, 2010). Meanwhile, Moller is one of the most vigorous critics to the ASEAN Way. As early as the 1990s, when Cambodia and Myanmar were about to join ASEAN, Moller cautioned that the both countries' domestic situations will affect the economies, security, and international reputations of other ASEAN member states. He urged that, with the inclusion of countries with fragmented politics (like Cambodia) or military totalitarian (like Myanmar), the ASEAN Way should be reformed if the organisation wants to maintain its relevance and its reputation (Moller, 1998).

Several scholars support the idea that the ASEAN Way and Southeast Asian regional identity is dynamic. As a group, they oppose the idea—presented both by proponents and sceptics—that identity is static. They believe in transformative progress, as is happening today within ASEAN. The political transformation since the late 20th century has brought diverse perspectives in the form of younger leaders and diplomats who are more adept to universal values.[66]

This dissertation refers to such scholars as transformationalists. These include, for example, Radtke, who believes that the expansion of ASEAN to embrace Myanmar could also mean creating a means for norm entrepreneurs to engage in discussion with ASEAN regarding human rights and

[66] The "universal values" are the values that have been accepted by the majority actors in world politics, such as democracy, human rights, liberalism, free trade, rule of law, gender equality, private property, environmental protection, minority rights, etc.

democracy. These discussions may, in the long term, contribute to the construction of an ASEAN regional identity that pays greater consideration to human rights protection and the implementation of democratic principles (Radtke, 2014).

Haacke, meanwhile, argues that ASEAN is actually changing, as demonstrated by the introduction of the concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced interaction. Flexible engagement is a contesting principle that allows ASEAN member states to discuss frankly the domestic politics of other member states, particularly if the aforementioned situation might affect regional interests or affect other ASEAN member states. Enhanced interaction does mean applying diplomatic pressure to a particular member state's domestic politics with a very cautious approach. ASEAN member states have used this method, for example, in the imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. At that time, B.J. Habibie of Indonesia, Chuan Lek Pai of Thailnd, and Joseph Estrada of Malaysia engaged Kuala Lumpur through their own respective channels and personal ties, thereby influencing Mahathir and safeguarding Anwar's rights (Haacke, 1999).

Based on the survey above, provided below is a map of scholars' understandings of the ASEAN Way (Table 8).

Table 8. Different Scholars' Perspectives on the ASEAN Way

Proponents	Sceptics	Transformationalists
Amitav Acharya (1997, 1998) Shaun Narine (1997) Jose T. Almonte (1997) Kamarulzaman Askandar, Jacob Bercovitch, and Mikio Oishi (2002) Rodolfo C. Severino (2006) Timo Kivimaki (2011)	Kay Moller (1998) Hiro Katsumata (2003) Laurence Henry (2007) Geoffrey B. Cockerham (2010) David Capie (2012)	Jurgen Haacke (1999) Alex Bellamy and Catherine Drummon (2011) Risal Sukma (2012) Kerstin Radtke (2014)

Source: Compiled by the author

By reflecting on this map, this study may be categorised as part of the third group. As shown by previous research done by the author, the dynamics of international norms have enabled ASEAN to adapt in its institutionalisation of disaster management cooperation (Rum, 2016). This study will further enrich the discourse of progressive ASEAN regionalism.

IV.1.2. Two-Level Games in ASEAN

In order to challenge the dominant narrative, this dissertation will show that ASEAN has developed some sort of legal-formal mechanism to achieve and implement an agreement. First, most ASEAN agreements today require ratification; this is the most important part of our discussion. Second, most ASEAN member states have regular elections, which can help us find an indicator of domestic politics. To explain the link between domestic politics and the implementation of an ASEAN agreement, the author utilises the two-level game theory developed by Robert D. Putnam. This work has been heavily influenced by Putnam's "Diplomacy and

Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", published in Volume 3, Issue 43, of the *Journal of International Organisation* (1988).

How might the two-level game theory challenge the dominant belief? First, by utilising two-level game theory, we can show that ASEAN has developed some deeper mechanisms for formalising regional architecture. Two-level game theory can underscore that the domestic politics of negotiating states are not monolithic. For an agreement to be implemented, there should be solid support from the domestic constituencies of each member state; they will not always say yes. By using this approach, this dissertation distances itself from the belief that ASEAN and its activities are merely shaped by the personalities of state leaders.

Putnam has sought to explain the entanglement of domestic and international politics. Previously, there had been no clear explanation of how domestic and international politics influence each other. Rather, dominant perspectives such as realism tended to see international politics as a matter of strong states versus weak states. Arguments were very political, almost neglecting, as they tended to forget the heterogeneous nature of contending nations. Realism held that stronger states would eventually win in international negotiations with weaker opposing states (Putnam, 1988, p. 432). Another school, the purists, believed that either domestic causes would determine international effects and/or international causes would determine domestic effects (Putnam, 1988, p. 430). Putnam strongly opposes both views. According to Putnam, without domestic support, international negotiation cannot be successful, no matter how intellectually and persuasively well-crafted. At the same time, international politics affect policy shifts within domestic politics.

Putnam's conclusion was based on his study of the Bonn Summit conference of 1978, which was undertaken in an effort to tackle the global financial crisis caused by the oil shock of 1973. The complexity of interests involved, however, made this summit really interesting. Various states negotiated a global reflation,[67] with the most important players being the United States, Germany and Japan. The remaining players were international organisations and weaker states. Although their interests conflicted, as a result of negotiations "all parties went back home happier than when they arrived" (Putnam, 1988, p. 428).

Here are the conflicting interests that were negotiated.[68] The United States government's original (default) stance was supporting the idea of cutting taxes and increasing the money supply. Weaker states and the OECD were happy with the proposal. Meanwhile, the German and Japanese original (default) stance prioritised tight economic policy. These countries firmly believed that prudent economies like theirs should not be required to pay for others' reckless economic management.

Putnam does not aim to determine what is the best or most rational economic solution for the world. He does, however, explain how countries are able to produce terms for accepting negotiations. The keys to success are determined by the negotiators' willingness to recognise domestic demands. Actually, Jimmy Carter, Helmut Schmidt, and Takeo Fukuda and their officers proposed something 'creative' (Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games, 1988, p. 453). They would not dare propose terms of negotiation such as those done in

[67] Reflation ss a fiscal or monetary policy designed to expand a country's output and curb the effects of deflation. Reflation policies can include reducing taxes, changing the money supply, and lowering interest rates. See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reflation.asp, accessed on 6 December 2016.
[68] Conflicting negotiated arrangements are summarized in Robert Putnam. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two Level Games. Journal of International Organization Number 43, Volume 3. P. 428.

Bonn if they had to do so domestically; such terms would be protested by their domestic political actors. Powerful minorities within these three governments, thus, were actually planning to make international demands so that they could argue with their domestic opponents. In other words, they would be able to change domestic politics only with a legitimate international understanding. Reflecting on this lesson, negotiation in humanitarian aids for responding disasters in ASEAN requires an out-of-the-box solution for domestic politics. Good performance on delivering aids and reconstructing Aceh in 2004-2005 will be a selling point for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla's administration. It was appealing for the domestic public, generally in Indonesia, and especially in Aceh because it creates space for the people to put aside prolonged secessionist conflicts. In Myanmar, the administration's ability to relief affected areas will help boost their legitimacy before the fragmented people.

This negotiation also had an effect on the domestic politics of the three negotiating countries. In the United States, international negotiators frequently asked foreign governments to persuade key domestic actors to reduce oil imports. The American Congress was comfortable with controlled oil prices, as enjoyed under the Nixon and Ford administrations. In Germany, the winds of change were initiated by economic expansionists within the Schmidt government. In 1978, Schmidt, the Ministry of Economics, expansionist elements of the Social Democratic Party, and trade unions agreed that more domestic stimuli were preferred. However, the Ministry of Finance, Free Democratic Party (part of a coalition), and the Bundesbank (including the business and banking community) strongly opposed the idea, making Schmidt reluctant. Meanwhile in Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Economic Planning Agency, and expansionist LDP politicians were also in favour of economic expansion and planned to persuade

the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 1988, p. 429). Without international pressure, it would be almost impossible to oppose the principles of MOF.

Based on the performance of negotiators and their interplay with their domestic constituents, the following points were produced by the Bonn Summit (Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 1988, p. 428):

1. Jimmy Carter pledged to decontrol domestic oil prices by the end of 1980. He also was willing to fight inflation.
2. Helmut Schmidt promised to give additional economic stimulus equivalent to one per cent of Germany's GNP.
3. Takeo Fukuda agreed to boost Japan's economic growth to seven per cent a year. He also was willing to increase imports and restrain exports.

From this study of the Bonn Summit, at least two main things that this dissertation can adopt. First, in two-level game theory, there is no *ceteris paribus* or fixed condition in either domestic or international politics. The two levels of negotiations closely influence each other as a win-set. Second, the success story above involved progressive actors within their respective government cliques. Such powerful minorities can set a new course for negotiations and use international pressure to influence the opposition of the majority. External pressures both for Indonesia in 2004 and Myanmar in 2008 could boost the possibility rate of negotiated disaster relief and humanitarian actions.

IV.1.3. Operationalising Two-Level Game Theory in an ASEAN Context

In two-level game theory, states should be seen as consisting of plural entities. Therefore, defining states' rationality must refer to the inter-subjective relations between different actors within them (Putnam 1988, 434). In ASEAN, several governments have transformed into more pluralistic forms, such as Indonesia; Myanmar is newly democratised, although the role of the military is still dominant; the Philippines has a multiparty system; meanwhile, although Singapore and Malaysia each have a dominant political party, both countries have regular elections. These countries vary in the process through which they ratify ASEAN agreements; Indonesia, for example, relies on its House of Representative, while the Philippines refers to the Senate.

The two-level game theory consists of two different stages of negotiation. Level I is the negotiation between state representatives in formulating ASEAN agreements, while Level II is the negotiation between individual states and their constituents to see how domestic politics view specific agreements. For example, the ratification of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 showed how the Philippine and Indonesian parliaments demanded that the protection of human rights be effectively promoted, rather than mere lip service.[69]

As part of two-level game theory, Putnam developed a framework called a win-set. A "win-set" basically, is the way an actor attains maximum gain in both arenas of negotiation. Imagine there are two tables of negotiations. A clever player will try to spot a move on one table than can

[69] For example, in Indonesia persons opposing the ratification of the ASEAN Charter criticised the charter as being symbolic and lacking any direct effect on democratisation in countries like Myanmar. See the report by the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, available online at http://www.aseanhrmech.org/news/indonesia-ratifies-asean-charter.html, accessed on 10 March 2017.

trigger a realignment from the other table (Putnam, 1988, p. 434). The win-set means the range of outcome that each party will accept. Imagine that X is the win-set for country A and Y is the win-set for country B. In a zero-sum game, the picture would be like this; Ymax means country A won everything, while Xmax is the opposite.

Figure 4. The Spectrum of Zero-Sum Game Win-Set

Meanwhile, a win-set in a two-level game approach can be illustrated as follows:

Figure 5. The Spectrum of Negotiated Win-Set



In two-level game negotiation, Ymax and Xmax are impossible. The only possible agreement is Ymin and Xmin, which are the minimum requirements for domestic ratification in both state A and state B. The area between Ymin and Xmin is ratifiable. If A seeks to pressure the acceptance of Y2, it is still possible and considered a win if B has no objection. However, if A asks for more and attempts to reach Y3, negotiation will most likely end in a deadlock. In the case of ASEAN, as long as member states feel that a new agreement protects their interests, they are more likely to approve an agreement.

One might ask how to define the win-set. For Level I, the win-set is gaining a majority among the constituents back home. A larger win-set makes Level I agreements more likely to succeed, as it means a larger range of offers that enables both sides to gain (rather than lose) more. Such gains must be overlapping/intersecting. For example, in the case of the Malvinas/Falkland negotiation, achievements in Level I were minimal, and as such Level II resulted in rejection. Negotiators at Level I must promise something that is clear, and that can definitely be implemented. When negotiators promise something they cannot deliver at Level II, there is a risk of voluntary defection (bailing/escaping/cheating) because leaders seek to save face in front of their constituents. Meanwhile, risk of involuntary defection (inevitable escape) is greater with smaller win-sets (here is where game theories can possibly be applied, e.g. in the prisoner dilemma and chicken games). Regular meetings can also help avoid defection (Putnam, 1988, p. 439). If there is an annual forum for negotiations, negotiators at Level I can balance the win-set by renegotiating the achieved tentative agreements in both levels. For example, WTO negotiations are held in rounds so that negotiators can rearrange their terms. Similarly, regional organisations such as the EU or ASEAN have annual meetings. In ASEAN, where regional agreements/frameworks are lacking, regional ministerial meetings are held annually to reduce the temptation for defection. The best solution for difficult negotiations is having frequent meetings.

The relative size of Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of joint gains from Level I. A smaller win-set in Level II will give leverage/advantage to the negotiator at Level I, who can pressure the opposing negotiator by achieving tentative agreements while guaranteeing that these terms will be rejected at home. The difficulties of gaining ratification through the United States Congress, for example, are often used by American negotiators (Putnam, 1988, p. 440).

Calculating the win-set should measure the preferences at Level II. The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power and constituents at this level. Several conditions determine the win-set at Level II. The lower the cost of 'no agreement' to domestic political actors, the smaller the win set. Usually, political powers within a state are sceptical of negotiations. In the case of regionalism, if there are isolationist elements within a country, regional arrangements are less likely to be progressive. A smaller win-set means a higher risk of an involuntary defective move. The characteristics of domestic issues, similarly, will produce different situations for negotiators. The more homogenous the issues, the more constituents feel the same way, the more negotiators can win at Level-I and the greater the chance of ratification. Meanwhile, heterogeneous opinions in domestic politics could lead to more complicated but interesting situations because governments that are internally divided are more likely to be able to reach an international deal than governments committed to a single policy. This is because negotiators can always find easy alliances within Level II, no matter their stance (Putnam, 1988, p. 445). In heterogeneous conditions, the issues being negotiated will affect more than one group within society, and as such will face different reactions. For example, during the Bonn Summit, there were many different groups and views within the United States. One group preferred oil, while other preferred jobs. Those who preferred economic growth could be persuaded to support Carter's proposal, who brokered support by promising that growth abroad (in Germany and Japan) would create jobs in the United States. As such, negotiation is best described using a political indifference curve, as follows: taking A1 and A2 as the minimum requirements to satisfy parties within the domestic politics of the United States, A1 and A2 should always balance each other. The same thing happens in the domestic politics of the negotiating counterpart, whereas B1 and B2 will have to be balanced. The key to success is the broker's ability to make trade-offs.

Figure 6. The Curve of Negotiation Issues



Source: Putnam, 1988, p. 447

This dissertation suggests the existence of interfering factors such as backlash from other local political actors, such as military factions or hawkish political parties. Negotiators should worry about polarisation in international negotiation. Polarisation may draw dissenting opinions from groups that are usually silent. If an issue cannot be managed well, pressure groups might reduce the flexibility of negotiations. This is why we sometimes witness some secret negotiations (governments deciding to limit public awareness) as we learn from five secret GoI – GAM talks in 2004.

The size of a win-set depends on the level of the political institution. For example, under the constitution of the United States, only 34 (of 100) senators are needed to veto ratification. As such, there are many chances that a good agreement may not be adopted. In the case of ASEAN,

monarchic and semi-democratic countries such as Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam have larger win-sets than liberal democracies such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. This explains the longer time needed for the Indonesian and Philippine governments to negotiate the ratification of the ASEAN Charter. The larger the autonomy of central decision-makers at Level II, the larger the win-set (this is also true in the case of independent Central Bank/Federal Reserve from domestic politics to ease their way into international monetary negotiation). Multi-layered ratification can happen if a regional organization such as ASEAN has to negotiate with another regional organisation like the EU. In such a case, multi-layered negotiations are necessary both within the EU council or ASEAN Summit and within the domestic politics of each member states.

The size of a win-set also depends on the strategies of Level I negotiators. The larger the win-set, the easier for a negotiator to achieve agreement. At the same time, however, the larger a win-set, the more difficult it is for a negotiator to pressure his counterpart. This provides a tactical dilemma: mass support will sometimes help negotiators, but may also have a boomerang effect when people remain firm in their beliefs. When this happens, negotiators, themselves have no more flexibility. Conventional compensations, meanwhile, is a method used by negotiating parties to show goodwill.[70] In two-level game theory, compensations can be calculated not based on its

[70] This dissertation argues that when negotiating parties face difficulty in reaching best alternative to a negotiated agreement, the negotiators might need to see an alternative settlement outside the negotiating term. In this section, this dissertation calls it as "compensations," as to indicate benefits/side-payments offered to other upset parties within domestic politics. To ensure successful negotiation, the negotiators in level I could persuade the government to provide supports for the marginalized actors. In Aceh case, the negotiators in Helsinki should acknowledge the significance of other combatant leaders like Muzakir Manaf or Irwandi Yusuf, while Indonesian government should consolidate factions in the House of Representatives and succeed in consolidating 73.3% of support by 2004.

amount, but the effectiveness of the compensations in creating supporting coalitions within a government.

IV.1.4. Analysis of Two-Level Games in ASEAN Disaster Management Cooperation

Two studies have utilised two-level game theory to analyse ASEAN. The first is an article by David Camroux titled "Interregionalism or Merely a Fourth-Level Game? An Examination of the EU–ASEAN Relationship" (2009), while the second is Yi-hung Chiou's "A Two-level Games Analysis of AFTA Agreements: What Caused ASEAN States to Move towards Economic Integration?" (2010). These two works have influenced the design of this study.

Camroux argues that the EU–ASEAN relationship is nothing more than the fourth level in international relations bargaining. He says that interregionalism, as a concept, was originally a product of the EU's policy to promote values such as civilian power, tranquil power, and normative power to impose these normative values around the world (Camroux, 2010, p. 56). It is understandable that the EU's pressure on ASEAN related to issues of human rights and democratisation are part of its milieu goal of not only projecting its values worldwide but also meet the demands of European public opinions. Examining recent issues on EU–ASEAN relations, his work attempts to promote an approach to better link domestic politics, regional organisations' political positions, and how they are projected through interregionalism.

As noted by Camroux, in May 2009, a total of 70 million euros had been allocated by the EU to support ASEAN's regional integration efforts. With this kind of financial support, the EU model was hailed as the best reference for regionalism elsewhere. This is in accordance with the

direction set by Javier Solana, the architect behind the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, who predicted that inter-regional dialogue would be the future of international politics.[71] Also, the EU believes that a more peaceful world can be achieved if states learn how to settle their conflicts peacefully. A vast body of literature shows that the EU model has been highly referenced for adoption, especially by ASEAN (Camroux, 2010, p. 59). ASEAN can be seen as the most important market for regionalism model export. This deep connection between the two regions can be traced back to 1973 when the European Economic Community and ASEAN signed the first inter-regional agreement in the world. Furthermore, the unique relations between the EU and ASEAN could be described as a model for interregionalism itself (Camroux, 2010, p. 60).

Meanwhile, Chiou's work explains that, although ASEAN member states have huge gaps in their levels of economic development, they were able to overcome their political-economic differences and implement the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). Seeking to understand how member states were able to reach this agreement, despite strong opposing opinions within their domestic politics, Chiou applies two-level game theory (Chiou, 2010, p. 6). In 1977, there was an attempt to establish the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) to promote intra-ASEAN trade, but it was not successful. Indonesian technocrats, such as Marie Elka Pangestu, believe that this failure was mostly caused by governments' resistance to opening their domestic markets (Chiou, 2010, p. 7). A scholar like Baghwati (1995), proposes that the creation of EU and NAFTA forced ASEAN member states to consider their own free trade area as the Uruguay Round

[71] David Camroux argues that in today's international politics, many negotiations are done by regional organizations. This is what he called as four-level game, in which negotiation happens in four-folds; inter-regional level, intra-regional level, international level and domestic level (Camroux, Interregionalism or Merely a Fourth-Level Game? An Examination of the EU-ASEAN Relationship , 2010, p. 57)

remained deadlocked amidst growing concern for developing countries' protectionism.[72] Another scholar like Summers (1991) explains that regional organizations economy (including ASEAN) has been becoming more complementary.[73] Meanwhile, the third group of scholars such as Severino (2007) and Bowls (1997) argument has argued that strong leadership drives and the end of the Cold War shifted ASEAN's trajectory from mere politics into economics.[74] Chiou argues that these factors are not sufficient in and of themselves to explain the success of AFTA (Chiou, 2010, p. 7). Differing from the elite approach suggested by Pangestu, Chiou believes that the success of AFTA came from internal domestic opinions that boosted the legitimacy of its establishment (Chiou, 2010, p. 14). As such, Chiou proposes that two-level game theory can best explain the situation.

Chiou's attempt is feasible, although AFTA did not require any ratification (as common in ASEAN agreements today). However, to measure the acceptance of AFTA in different countries' domestic politics, Chiou used election results to indicate the strength of governments during that time. Five governments were assessed: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (Chiou, 2010, p. 17). In Indonesia, the Functional Group (*Golongan Karya*/Golkar) was very strong, winning 73% of votes in the 1987 election and 68% of votes in the 1992 election. In Malaysia, the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) won 70.6% of seats in the 1990 election and 84% of seats in the 1995 election. In Singapore, the People's Action Party (PAP) won

[72] See Trotignon, J. (2009). Are the New Trading Blocs Building or Stumbling Blocks? A Gravity Model Using Panel Data. Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique (GATE) Working Paper No. 09-33. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1553735, accessed 30 August 2019.
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] We can conclude from assessments reported in Severino, R. (2007). ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration. *Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 3,* p. 407 and Bowles, P. (1997). ASEAN, AFTA and the "New Regionalism." *Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2,* p. 220.

95% of seats in the 1991 election. Thailand was under a military junta after February 1991 coup and had to wait until 1995 for a new civilian government to be established. Meanwhile, the Philippines had a relatively unstable government, which won only 23.6% of votes in the 1992 presidential election, but Fidel Ramos was willing to support AFTA; later, in 1998, Joseph Estrada had a relatively handy win with 40% votes (Chiou, 2010, p. 30). There is an indication, thus, that the support of strong governments informed progress in AFTA negotiations. For example, the eagerness of Goh Chok Tong for AFTA to make the region more attractive for trade and investment in the face of competition from both EU and NAFTA was likely to be supported by his constituents (Chiou, 2010, p. 22). Basically, most of the important countries in ASEAN[75] had a strong win-set at home that enabled them to support AFTA fully. The governments' high approval rates during elections might reflect how, in its early formulation, AFTA received strong supporters who were not concerned with imposing decisions upon their respective constituents.

IV.2. Two-Level Game Analysis of ASEAN Disaster Management Cooperation

This analysis will be, in accordance with two-level game theory, divided into two levels. The level I of analysis examines the initial stage of negotiation in understanding how member states come to a consensus. Meanwhile, Level II illustrates the link between negotiating parties and their domestic constituencies. In this case, available data on election results and documented reasoning at the parliamentary level is analysed.

[75] Barring the tumultuous domestic politics of Thailand, which shows an anomaly in two-level game analysis arising from the continuous presence of different military juntas and minimum supporting data on stable governments that gained legitimacy from fair elections.

IV.2.1. Level I – The Initial Process of Negotiation

Previous research has shown that the development of ASEAN disaster management cooperation has been highly influenced by dominant universal values that have travelled through the life cycle of international norms (Rum, 2016). This suggests that international communities, along with ASEAN bureaucrats, have been the dominant actors in internalising the concept. However, the normative formation of ASEAN disaster management cooperation would never have been internalised without political agreement between ASEAN member states. This leads to another question: how did ASEAN member states consolidate their political support for a regional disaster management regime? This question can be answered using the two-level game analysis.

To achieve political consensus on this issue, ASEAN was involved in a series of political negotiations that started in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (26 December 2004). Initial response to the tsunami in ASEAN was the signing of the Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Prevention in the Aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami, which was adopted at the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on 6 January 2005. This indicated that Indonesia was open to the possibility of creating a regional mechanism, providing a starting point for political consensus.

An important question to be asked is when did the two-level games start? This can be traced to the aftermath of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, and wherein ASEAN agreed to start negotiating a new regional architecture that would later be called the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). When did the two-level games end? Negotiations ended on 24 December 2009, when the agreement finally came into force, meaning

that all ASEAN members had ratified it (the Philippines was the last member state to ratify the agreement, on 14 September 2009).

What about the win-sets? For ASEAN Bureaucrats, the maximum gain was the introduction of the responsibility to protect value, as admitted by Surin Pitsuwan in 2008.[76] Meanwhile, ASEAN member states sought the creation of a collective buffer against international pressure. International pressure often comes to drive ASEAN into political openness; as such, ASEAN member states decided to absorb this pressure through ASEAN to ensure they can manage pressure from the international community. First, ASEAN serving as a buffer benefited member states because it gave them time to explain changes and incoming political openness to their domestic coalition members. Second, ASEAN serving as a buffer benefited member states because it allowed them to control or minimise the effects of political openness on their sovereignty. The stance of negotiators at Level I, thus, was to secure national interests.

In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, one of the most notable goals of ASEAN bureaucrats and member states' diplomats was to secure ASEAN's credibility in tacking regional problem. This was demonstrated by the initiative of Singapore. In 2004, when the disaster struck, ASEAN exhibited a lack of response and coordination. In the days after the disaster, ASEAN had yet to launch collective efforts; meanwhile, various international agencies had already deployed to support national governments and local communities. The United States, for example, had already established a core group for relief efforts. In response to the lack of immediate action, Singapore was the first country to call an emergency ASEAN summit in response to the crisis

[76] In a 2008 speech, Surin Pitsuwan identified the fast reaction of the ASEAN Secretariat to Cyclone Nargis as being driven by the responsibility to protect.

(Huxley 2005, in Floristella 2015, 19). Pressure also came from a group of ASEAN affiliates. After the tsunami struck Aceh and southern Thailand, where was ASEAN? This question triggered a change in how ASEAN designed its cooperation, moving from the old modalities of informality and lose coordination into more rigorous and legally binding mechanisms (Floristella, 2015, p. 20). There was pressure to negotiate a more formal mechanism, both from the government of Singapore and from entities affiliated with ASEAN. There was a spectrum of negotiations in the early development of disaster management mechanisms.

To pinpoint interregional pressure, Florestella argued that similarities in ASEAN's disaster management mechanism to the EU's model could indicate some EU assistance. Based on her analysis, there are more commonalities between ASEAN model of regional disaster management with the European civil Protection Mechanism compared with ASEAN and other regionalism like South Asian Regional Cooperation and Central American model or cooperation (Floristella, 2015). She further explains that she needs to find a practical solution for the lack of regional coordination; ASEAN tried to observe and emulate available models get. Although the European External Action Service has confirmed that the EU had no direct influence on the formulation of AADMER, Floristella recorded ASEAN as having invited the EU to assist in drafting the agreement; however, at that time, the EU was not in a condition to give assistance (Floristella, 2015, p. 20). She later concluded that the creation of ASEAN's regional disaster management framework was rooted not only in internal pressure but also external influences—most importantly from the European Union. We can confirm that ECHO has continued to support ASEAN since the 1990s, although its activities have mostly been related to community empowerment and risk reduction projects (Rum, 2016).

The combination of securing ASEAN's credibility and interregional pressure from the EU shaped the win-set for establishing AADMER as early as 2005. It is reported that there were indeed rushed negotiations to formulate AADMER by the ASEAN Commission on Disaster Management (ACDM), which underscored that the ASEAN agreement must have political significance for humanitarian reasons. The spectrum of negotiations can be illustrated below:

Figure 7. The Spectrum of Two-Level Games in ASEAN Disaster Management Negotiation



Explanation:

- Position B belongs to ASEAN member states, particularly disaster-affected countries.
- Position A belongs to Singapore as the initiator of the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami, ASEAN Bureaucrats, ASEAN Entities, ACDM, and pressure from the international community, e.g. interregional pressure from the EU.
- X_2 is the willingness of ASEAN member states to compromise national sovereignty in order to support the processes necessary to engage in disaster management and emergency response operations in their territory, including to allow the deployment of military personnel and equipment.

- Y_2 is the willingness of ASEAN bureaucrats to facilitate the request of member states to deploy rapid assessment team and humanitarian assistance at approved sites. This includes adherence to the principle of non-interference.
- Ymax and Xmax refer to initial position of consecutively assertive international community's stance for humanitarian actions and reserved disaster-affected countries' position. Should the parties stay at these initial positions, there will be negotiation deadlock.

Considering that negotiations for AADMER took only four months[77] (Xinhua 2009 in Floristella 2015), involved parties had to achieve a consensus on how to balance their demands and sovereignty. This spectrum of negotiation enabled ASEAN bureaucrats to pressure other ASEAN member states who were not in compliance. Such pressure was demonstrated at the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. The Myanmar government's reluctance forced the foreign ministers of ASEAN to once again hold an emergency meeting on 8 May 2008 in Singapore. Surin Pitsuwan and the foreign ministers of ASEAN member states gave three options to Foreign Minister Nyan Win of Myanmar (Chalermpalanupap, Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis Is ASEAN's Responsibility, 2016):

1. To tackle the humanitarian crisis alone, with the risk of facing scrutiny and criticism from the international community should Myanmar fail to perform,
2. To agree to open all the channels to work with the UN and international community,

[77] Historically, AADMER was the most quickly negotiated agreement in ASEAN.

3. To invite ASEAN to work together with the international community in coping with the humanitarian crisis.

Negotiators from Myanmar consulted with the leaders of the military junta in Nay Phi Taw, and Nyan Win informed the forum that the military junta was willing to work together with ASEAN and the international community (Chalermpalanupap, Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis Is ASEAN's Responsibility, 2016). This success shows the existence of effective pressure in ASEAN's politics of disaster. Soon a tri-partite group was established as a concerted effort between ASEAN, the government of Myanmar, and the United Nations (UN).

Myanmar's willingness to finally approve ASEAN mediation was partly influenced by the continuous engagement of interregionalism, or—to borrow Camroux's term—the four-level game of EU–ASEAN relations (Camroux, Interregionalism or Merely a Fourth-Level Game? An Examination of the EU-ASEAN Relationship , 2010, p. 57). The EU, under the direction of the French president, also pressured ASEAN. Further pressure came through the voices of British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, was the first officer to visit Yangoon to offer aid and provide assistance. The European Parliament, as the guardian of European values, gave support based on the moral ground. This multifaceted political pressure is what may be called multilevel and innovative governance (Camroux, 2010, p. 59).

One can also consider the Indonesian government's success inviting both ASEAN and the EU to deal with conflict resolution in Aceh following the natural disaster. The lesson learned from Aceh was to improve cooperation among the international community (including ASEAN) in

tackling humanitarian crises. In such cases, the government of the troubled country would gain two benefits. The first benefit is increased international standing and regional reputation; the second is the ability to consolidate power domestically by being recognised as having made great achievements in handling natural disasters and/or humanitarian crises. This served as a rationale for AADMER's negotiating parties.

Indonesian Case: Level-II Dynamics as Main Determinant

In the case of Indonesia, the success of the recovery process in Aceh relied on the government's ability to calibrate domestic and international politics. However, learning from Aceh peace talks, this dissertation suggests that level II is determining Level-I's success if it is conducted under the condition of functioning democracy and concerted response to a natural disaster (i.e. Aceh earthquakes and tsunami in 2004). At the Level-I, both parties, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*/GAM) successfully directed new trajectory for the peace talks and developed best alternatives to a negotiated agreement. Meanwhile, at Level-II, the composition of parliament was important in determining the success of peace talks as can be seen during the negotiation of peace talks in Aceh.

The conflict in Aceh was rooted in the early phases of Indonesia's struggle for independence when Aceh's politicians and people supported the creation of an Islamic state in newly independent Indonesia (Aspinal 2007 in Hyndmann 2011). However, Indonesia was designed as a secular state. In response, a rebellion movement was started by Daud Bereu'eh in affiliation with the Islamic State–Indonesian Islamic Military (*Darul Islam – Tentara Islam Indonesia*). These roots were extended further following the creation of the Free Aceh Movement in 1976, which was motivated

primarily to challenge the central government's control of Aceh's natural resource. Conflict over natural gas and oil began in Aceh in 1971, when huge reserves were discovered in Lhoksukon and Lhoksumawe. Hasan Tiro, the CEO of an energy corporation called Doral International, sought to get the concession, which was ultimately granted by the Suharto government to a joint venture of Pertamina and ExxonMobil. This was interpreted as an injustice by the central government, which had favoured a foreign company over Acehnese economic interests. GAM was thus founded in 1976 to seek Acehnese independence. The conflict was escalated by the confiscation of land to build refinery stations. At the time, the central government sent 5,000 military personnel to protect ExxonMobil's operations (Hyndman, 2011). Throughout the 1980s, GAM received funding from the Acehnese diaspora as well as training from the Libyan regime. In 1989/1989, it intensified its attacks; the Indonesian military soon launched counterinsurgency operations, which lasted until 2005.

At the level I, there was a major changing of the approach of both parties' stance in the period of 5 years. The 2000 peace talk series, both GoI and GAM were strictly holding their initial position. GoI's position is to demand the dissolution of GAM for special autonomy and national unity (hence Xmax in negotiation spectrum). In the other side, GAM believed that the only solution for peace is to grant Aceh its independence (hence Ymax in negotiation spectrum). To contrast the win-set, in Helsinki peace talks of 2004-2005, both parties shifted negotiating strategy to extend their spectrum of negotiated terms. The GoI was no longer fixing its position to the obliteration of GAM, but acknowledge GAM's role as negotiating counterpart and offer amnesty for former combatants (Hence X_2). In the other side, GAM was no longer fixing its position to demand complete independence from Jakarta, but rather tolerating special autonomy in proposed Nangroe

Aceh Darussalam scheme (Hence Y_2). The intersection of interests in-between X_1 and Y_1 were enabling the negotiators to create space for both parties to balance the win-set and finally arrived at the agreement.

At level II, dynamics in domestic politics created both hindrance and opportunities. Prior to 2004, there were more hindrances than what GoI could enjoy in 2004. In 2000, without strong parliamentary support, peace talks between the GoI and GAM were impossible. Negotiation requires equal positions, but during the humanitarian pause, domestic actors such as Akbar Tanjung from the Functional Groups Party (Golkar), Muhaimin Iskandar of the National Awakening Party (PKB), and scientists from the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) warned against acknowledging GAM as an international actor. Traumatised by experiences with the East Timor referendum, the Department of Defence also voiced similar concerns: equally positioning the GoI and GAM would most likely invite the international community's intervention (Aspinal & Crouch, 2003, p.3).

Lessons were also learned in 2002 when peace negotiations under the mediation of the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) failed. The HDC was backed by the international community, including the United States, the EU, Japan, and the World Bank. This process offers an example of failed two-level games in Southeast Asia. In this case, failure may be attributed to the fact that, domestically, the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P), Golkar, and military member of parliaments—representing more than 60% of seats—supported giving no concessions. The military, as an institution, still had economic interests; in the security business, conflict is a source of income. Similarly, the military did not want to lose the money it received from protecting oil companies and natural gas operations in Aceh (Aspinal & Crouch, 2003, p. 3).

The group of MPs who had no tolerance for separatism were called the hawkish (ICG, 2003, p. 4). They felt that peace in Aceh could only be obtained through the obliteration of GAM. GAM, meanwhile, was also dominated by hawkish elements who believed that peace would only be established if Aceh finally gained its independence. Indonesia had been relatively weakened by multidimensional crises since 1997, and GAM maintained its stance because leaders believed that the Indonesian government would collapse—as with the Soviet Union—sooner or later (Aspinal & Crouch, 2003, p. 4).

Uncoordinated domestic measures taken by both security forces and GAM led to the sabotaging of peace talks. Facing a deadlock, the HDC invited talks between the GoI and GAM in Tokyo on 17 May 2002. However, before these talks, Indonesian forces arrested five people who had served as GAM negotiators during a preliminary negotiation at Kuala Tripa Hotel, Aceh. These people were about to advise the GAM delegation to the Tokyo talks. As a result, the talks were postponed until the Indonesian police released their captives, as demanded by GAM. Meanwhile, GAM refused to sign a declaration that it would end its armed struggle and abandon its demands for independence. GAM rejected the dissolution of GAM and refused to sign the agreement. The following day, President Megawati Sukarnoputri announced a military emergency and deployed 30,000 military personnel and 12,000 police (Aspinal & Crouch, 2003, p. 45).

Before the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, negotiators—reflecting their own organisational (domestic) opinions—found it difficult to entertain a win-win solution. Negotiations faced a deadlock, as both parties brought uncompromised demands from the domestic level. After the earthquake and tsunami, the newly elected Indonesian government held a stronger position within parliament through a multiparty coalition led by the Democratic Party, Golkar Party, and

the National Mandate Party (PAN). Such a coalition could effectively maintain domestic support for the government's foreign policy. The peace agreement, brokered by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, occurred in a refined situation, wherein Indonesia was open to input from the international community. EU and ASEAN observers were sent to monitor the disarmament and the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. The successful negotiation of peace in Aceh following the disaster might prove the theory that strong domestic consolidation can ease negotiations.

Within Aceh, there was also support for the winning ruling positions. Successful peace talks mean successful elections. The most distinct characteristic of the Aceh peace agreement was the appointment of new government leaders from GAM. As the result of Helsinki talk, former GAM combatants are able to compete in local elections. In December 2006, a former GAM leader won the gubernatorial election in Aceh. Similarly, provincial elections in 2009 resulted in the victory of Irwandi Yusuf and his faction. Finally, in 2012, Abdullah Zaini, a prominent GAM leader, and his deputy Muzakir Manaf, a former member of GAM's armed forces, were elected in 2012 with a comfortable majority (55.9%).

Consolidated democracy in Indonesia resulted in a positive outcome in the peace negotiations of Aceh. An interesting study done by Hyndman contrasted the domestic situations in Aceh and Sri Lanka, which resulted in two different results (Hyndman, 2011, p. 23). Aceh and Sri Lanka had similar conditions. Both hosted long-lasting rebellions and had been stricken by natural disaster. The Aceh rebellion had begun in 1976, while the Tamil Tigers had fought since 1983; as such, the ethnonational conflicts in both regions had lasted for decades. However, the tsunami in Sri Lanka was followed by renewed fighting, which ended the cease-fire agreement signed in 2002 and resulted in a brutal crackdown in May 2009. Meanwhile, since its August 2005 peace

agreement, Aceh has gained greater autonomy from the central government. Impressively, the peace agreement in Aceh was reached only after 8 months after the tsunami. This finding shows that concerted efforts to response major natural disaster under a functioning consolidating democracy such as Indonesian domestic politics in 2004 provide dynamics within internal politics that can create space for negotiations in the parliament. Thus, Level II becomes more determinant in influencing the process of Level I negotiation.

The Indonesian 2005 success story is failed to replicate In Sri Lanka due to the lack of democratic consolidation within Sri Lanka's domestic politics. In Sri Lanka, the conflict was characterised by competing for nationalism between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) separatist movement and the Government of Sri Lanka. Instead of providing an impetus for a peace process, the earthquake and tsunami created more problems because of unconsolidated domestic politics. The Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS) was established involving the government, LTTE, and Muslim political parties; however, PTOMS was problematic because Sinhalese nationalists had a strong objection to LTTE's position. Similar to GAM in 2002, LTTE was regarded as a terrorist organisation (and thus having no equal position with any government entity). Donor funds were also restricted, not to be controlled by outside agencies such as the World Bank. Domestic opinions suggested that PTOMS, as a governmental organisation, could not legally work without constitutional changes; this pressure further crippled operations. By exacerbating the situation, the treatment of tsunami victims inside the disaster zone was discriminatory because the government provided preferential treatment based on political affiliation (Hyndman, 2011, p. 28).

The two-level game of peace talks in Sri Lanka failed when domestic politics pretty much supported anti-PTOMS opinions. This is proven by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa's ascension to the presidency in 2005, following high nationalist sentiments. Selling an anti-foreign involvement and anti-PTOMS platform, he won 50.29% of votes, receiving huge support from Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a far-right party. Violence was increased in Sri Lanka as the government committed itself to obliterate rebel forces. In 2008, Sri Lanka officially ended the 2002 ceasefire agreement in order to strike a final blow against the LLTE. This forced the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission states to leave the country. During the war, the government bombard civilian settlements, hospitals, and humanitarian operation camps, while LTTE rebels used civilians as their shields. They forbade civilians from leaving the conflict zone and shot anyone seen leaving. The death toll following this conflict was higher than that of the tsunami, reaching 30,000 civilians killed.

Myanmar Case: Level I Dynamics as Main Determinant

By comparing the Indonesian case, this dissertation utilizes Myanmar experience to show variety in two-level game determining factors. In the case of Myanmar, this dissertation argues that Level-I of international negotiation and pressures played a significant role in directing the course of responding to major natural disasters (i.e. Myanmar cyclone Nargis in 2008). Level-II during 1990-2008 was considerably homogenous since the military junta imposed strict control in political plurality and public discourse. Thus, this dissertation concludes that in responding disaster within an authoritarian regime, Level-I is rather more reliable in changing the course of policy rather than

hoping domestic political actors at Level-II to take the initiatives of reform due to political repression.

At the Level-I, Myanmar is no stranger to international scrutiny. The EU, for example, has pressured the country since a military junta came to power following the dissolution of the 1990 Burmese election, which resulted in a landslide win for the National League for Democracy, which received 49% of the popular vote and 80% of parliamentary seats. In 1991, the European Council officially implemented diplomatic sanctions and a military embargo on Myanmar and suspended development aid. In 1997, the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) was cancelled due to European protests over the admission of Myanmar to ASEAN. The European Community (EC) responded by extending sanctions on Myanmar for another six months. As a result, Myanmar's membership in ASEAN did not automatically result in ASEM membership.

In the 1990s, European pressure on ASEAN could be easily deflected because ASEAN's member countries were economically strong. The EU had to endure these countries' unmoving stance in defining their own versions of human rights, such as those declared in Bangkok in 1995. However, this situation changed in 1997, following the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN member countries started to question their own members' ability to provide their own solutions for their problems (Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 68). The legitimacy of good governance without democracy crumbled into pieces when the Indonesian government was toppled by student movements. On the other hand, learning from the Indonesian case, the State Peace and Development Council of Myanmar could no longer believe that a strong military presence could perpetuate control. The only way for the Council to smoothly run the government would be to relax its position and start negotiating with its European partners. Also noteworthy is the importance of the European

parliament in pressuring a pan-European consensus. For example, in 1990 the European Parliament granted Aung San Suu Kyi the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Elements of Burmese diaspora in the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries helped Myanmar remain in the spotlight of European media. Furthermore, strong political pressure on Burma was possible because the EU suffered no economic losses doing, particularly compared to China, which has more investments in Myanmar (Camroux, 2010, p. 64).

On the other hand, the EU responded positively to the willingness of Myanmar and Indonesia to engage in developing democracy. After 1998, the EU relaxed its pressure and started negotiating democratisation at the expense of toning down its criticism of Myanmar. Tensions increased after the Myanmar junta reinstated the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2003, which led to EU to pressure ASEAN to include human rights and democracy as dialogue issues. As a result of continuous pressure, the 2003 ASEAN Concord in Bali mentioned democracy and political development for the first time in ASEAN history (Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 70).

Ultimately, ASEAN would only allow Myanmar to become ASEAN Chairman only if it began democratisation and released Aung San Suu Kyi. The Malaysian delegation stated that Myanmar would be expelled from ASEAN if the junta refused to release Aung San Suu Kyi and 1,400 other political prisoners (Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 69). Although this situation was not comfortable for Myanmar, it had no option other than comply with pressure to set a plan for democratisation.

Related to Myanmar's position in ASEAN, international pressure effectively changed ASEAN leaders' mind in 2006. Analysts may identify the reason as being retaliation against Myanmar's boycott on ASEAN's 2002 meeting with UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari.

Similarly, Myanmar gave up its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006. ASEAN's reason for cancelling Myanmar's chairmanship was to avoid a boycott from western countries as foreign ministers could join forces to respond to tsunamis and other major natural disasters (*New York Times*, 2005). The US and EU gave the ultimatum that it would be impossible for Myanmar to lead ASEAN if the military junta did not move the nation into democracy and release opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi (*New York Times*, 2005). Chairmanship, thus, was given to the Philippines. The solution of removing Myanmar as chairman of ASEAN was first voiced during the ARF meeting in Lao PDR. Condoleezza Rice, then the Secretary of State of the United States, did not attend; she sent her deputy to the meeting in order to signal that the west was serious about its threat. Alexander Downer, then the Australian foreign minister, shared the same view; he said that, instead of leading ASEAN, Myanmar should focus on domestic reform.

From the point of view of American foreign policy, having Myanmar helming ASEAN would hinder the United States in dealing with other ASEAN member states on particular issues. Meanwhile, from the EU perspective, the Maastricht Treaty shaped foreign policy to be more inclusive, meaning that it was the interest of the EU to share its values in such sectors as human rights, democracy, and environmental issues, all of which were included in the European Security Strategy (2003). Because of the inclusive character of its values, the EU perceived itself as having a moral obligation to intervene in ASEAN and pressure Myanmar, even as—as scholars such as Rocher have argued—doing so has damaged its relations with ASEAN (Rocher, 2012, p. 176).

The EU has a sanction mechanism for dealing with rogue countries under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and reinforced by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The EU's sanctions on Myanmar was

a measure to respond to the junta's behaviour, which did not comply with international law. Sanctions against Myanmar were considered a bargaining tool (Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 63). How could sanctions be considered a bargaining tool? According to Balossi-Restelli, European sanctions were implemented over a long period of time and could be renewed for several years. In order to communicate its sanctions against Myanmar, the EU utilised the ASEAN–European Meeting as its forum. The EU needed to maintain its important presence in Southeast Asia to ensure its own economic and security interests, particularly those related to arm-control, nuclear non-proliferation, and sea lanes. Another interest was improving the international reputation of the EU. This is specifically stated in the European Commission Strategic Paper for Burma/Myanmar 2007–2013, which sought to reintegrate Myanmar into the international community and ensure that Myanmar could benefit from its integration into ASEAN (Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 72).

Experiences with the Aceh Tsunami in 2004 forced ASEAN member states to initiate cooperation and launch the agenda of reforming political openness. Better disaster management requires better coordination between states and reduced suspicions between them. This situation led to the need to make domestic politics more stable. Given the need for deeper ASEAN regionalism, Myanmar could jeopardise this situation if, as chairman of ASEAN, it vetoed some important agendas. As such, it was the interest of the international community to cancel Myanmar's chairmanship. Internally in ASEAN, this position was supported by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Indonesia, for example, had an interest in securing international aid to continue recovery efforts in Aceh, and thus favour Myanmar's willingness to withdraw and give the chairmanship to the Philippines. ASEAN decided that Myanmar could only resume its chairmanship if it could prove that the junta was complying with the road map of democracy. From

this case, we can officially conclude that ASEAN has actually discarded its traditional definition of the ASEAN Way. Factually, there was already a decline in the non-interference mechanism, as demonstrated in 2006. The use of rewards and punishments in dealing with Myanmar, combined with peer pressure, was an effective way of ensuring that disaster cooperation was well-formalised in ASEAN.

By rewarding Myanmar, ASEAN member states gave it the green light to join ASEM in August 2004. Supporters of Myanmar's inclusion in ASEM included Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. According to these three states, Myanmar's participation in ASEM was necessary to make ASEAN more inclusive. More importantly, it was important to keep Myanmar engaged; if Myanmar were isolated, China would take the opportunity to tighten its relations with the country. A bigger Chinese influence was not preferable to Indonesia and Vietnam, as traditional regional rivals. This motivated Phan Van Khai, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, to negotiate with Myanmar's Prime Minister General Khin Nyut (Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 70).

The European Council, together with ASEAN, launched a joint statement to pressure Myanmar to release political prisoners while utilising the domestic turmoil of the 2007 Saffron revolution.[78] All of this criticism was targeted at the last strongman in Southeast Asia, General Than Shwe.

[78] The Saffron revolution is a series of street protests led by monks on August–September 2007. The biggest uprising since 1988, it gained its name because the monks' robes were coloured red like saffron. These protests were triggered by the military junta's decision to cut oil subsidies, leading to a 500% increase in fuel prices and affecting the price of all daily necessities. This affected the poor people the most. The monks, traditionally associated with the lower classes, were involved in the protests. Facing harsh responses from the military, the monks led street demonstrations against the military junta's failure to respect their demands. This led to nationwide protests, with 100,000 monks taking to the streets in September 2007. The military junta responded with a crackdown on 52 monasteries, detaining 6,000 people involved in the protests, including 1,400 monks. Civil society organisations estimate that 200 people were killed, including Kenji Nagai, a Japanese reporter shot on the streets of Yangon (Burma Campaign UK, n.d.).

ASEAN member states' intervention was launched bilaterally. For example, Senior Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong threatened to stop investment in Myanmar because the country's inability to reform its political situation could hamper Singapore's business in that country. The Philippine Senate, meanwhile, pledged to support efforts to end the junta's oppression of its people.

In negotiating ASEAN's involvement in responding to Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar also lost the support of China. Why did China, a traditional ally of Myanmar, not protect the military junta and let it be influenced by ASEAN and the EU? First, China did not want to harm its interests in other ASEAN member states. Second, it was convinced that the Myanmar junta could not provide domestic stability. China needed its investments to be safe, and its borders with Myanmar secure. The harsh actions of the Myanmar junta have not been able to pacify the struggle of the ethnic minorities in its northern areas. The golden triangle in this region was liable to produce much opium, and this was not good for China (with which it shares a border). At the international level, China needed reassurance from the international community that it was conforming with universal values as it needed to improve its reputation before the Beijing Olympics (2008). China did not want to sabotage its ambitious foreign policy to support a failing junta. As such, China was convinced to retreat and let ASEAN direct Myanmar's future (*The Economist*, 2007).

IV.2.2. Level II – Response of the Domestic Politics

In democracies, ratification has proven to be a lengthy process in many countries. There are differences in the level of democratisation in ASEAN member states; indeed, the government situation is so diverse that we can describe ASEAN as world governing models in miniature. There

are absolute monarchies like Brunei, pseudo-democracies like Malaysia and Singapore, communist countries like Vietnam and Lao PDR, military juntas like Myanmar, turbulent democracies like Thailand, and consolidating democracies like Indonesia and the Philippines. The level of democratisation in these countries affects to what extent an agreement can be scrutinised by parliament and domestic constituents. Less democratic states usually experience faster ratification, while more democratic systems may experience much disagreement and protest/support both within and without parliament.

By measuring the link between domestic politics and the ratification of AADMER, this study utilises Chiou's approach to examine the strength of government parties or coalitions in each state (Chiou, 2010). To Chiou's approach, this dissertation adds the time needed for member states' respective ratification processes to determine the correlation between the ratification process and the government's ability to convince its constituencies. The main interest for those who supported the ratification of AADMER is the need to establish a concerted regional effort to cope with disaster. This practical mechanism became more compelling in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar proved an important impetus for hastening the ratification of AADMER in several countries.

Reviewing member states' political systems, the success of the AADMER ratification depended on domestic politics of member countries. Countries such as Brunei Darussalam, Laos PDR, Vietnam, and Myanmar tend to have simpler debate due to homogenous ideological principles and political affiliation in the parliament. Meanwhile, countries like Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines have more deliberative tendency on the debates. The last ASEAN member to ratify the AADMER was the Philippines, which officially announced its

ratification of AADMER on 14 February 2009 through the Fourteenth Congress Senate Resolution Number 1347.

Table 9 below provides a timeframe of AADMER ratification. The ratification time of each member state will be compared with the strength of the member state's governments in parliament to determine the discrepancy between the consolidation of domestic politics and the success of AADMER ratification. The data shows that the fastest ratifying country is the least democratic country, while the latest ratifying country is among the most stable democracies in Southeast Asia. In alphabetic order, the ratification dates of AADMER in ASEAN's member states are as follows.

Table 9. AADMER Ratification Completion

* AADMER was signed on 26 July 2005

Member State	Ratification Date
1. Brunei Darussalam	10 August 2009
2. Cambodia	11 March 2008
3. Lao PDR	16 July 2008
4. Indonesia	5 March 2007
5. Malaysia	21 July 2006
6. Myanmar	7 November 2006
7. Philippines	14 February 2009
8. Singapore	12 December 2008
9. Thailand	21 November 2005
10. Vietnam	10 October 2007

Source: modified from the ASCC – ASEAN Treaties / Agreements and Ratifications, the online document provided by the ASEAN Secretariat http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/documents/ASCC-ASEAN-Agreements-and-treaties-090930.pdf.

Based on the data collected, this dissertation suggests that ratification processes are different in each country, and it can be categorized into three types. The first type is for countries with authoritarian characteristics, such as communist parties, military juntas, and absolute

monarchies; included in this groups are countries with no election (Brunei Darussalam), military juntas (Myanmar), and communism (Lao PDR and Vietnam). The second group of countries are those categorised as pseudo-democracies with single-party domination, including Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The final group is composed of countries with consolidating democracies, including Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

In the first group of states, the ratification process had no major challenge because of the dominant government's power. This type of political system is well suited to the old practice of the ASEAN Way, wherein government interests cannot be challenged.

Member States	**Ratification Date**	**Government Strength in Parliament/ Election Results**	**Political System**
Brunei Darussalam	10 August 2009	Signed by Mohamed Bolkiah. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is in charge of major political decisions. As an absolute monarch, the Royal family is in control over the executive, judicative and legislative bodies. With no election since 1965, it is unlikely to for the parliament to challenge the government’s policy.	Absolute monarchy
Lao PDR	16 July 2008	Signed under Prime Minister Bounnhang Vorachit of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and Ratified under Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. With 98.26% of seats belong to the Lao People’s Revolutionary	Communism

		Party from 2006 General election, the ratification process is considered as smooth.	
Myanmar	7 November 2006	Under the leadership of Gen. Than Shwe and Gen. Soe Win, the military junta rules without contenders since the country had no election since 1990 until the ratification process.	Military junta
Vietnam	10 October 2007	Incumbent Government Secretary-General of Communist Party Ngon Duc Manh. Signed under Prime Minister Phan Van Khai of the Communist Party. Ratified under Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung of the Communist Party. With 99.79% of seats belong to the Communist Party based on the 2007 general election it is unlikely to have a challenge for government's policy.	Communism

Source: compiled from various sources (www.ipu.org; tnvn.gov.vn)

Similarly, countries in the second type during the ratification process were under the incumbent government in both signatory and ratification process. The government of countries in this group are characterized by dominating opinions on domestic politics. There are opposition groups; however, their political influence is constrained by the ruling party's domination. In pseudo-democracies such as Singapore and Malaysia, the government underlined the importance of good governance over democracy. The practice of suppressing opposition powers is imminent, and as such opposition parties are often silenced.

Member States	Ratification Date	Government Strength in Parliament/ Election Results	Political System
Cambodia	11 March 2008	The incumbent government of Prime Minister Hun Sen with Parliament Majority of 47.3% General Election 2003. Having challenged its legitimacy by the opposition forces, however, Hun Sen successfully consolidated its power.	Pseudo-democracy
Malaysia	21 July 2006	Incumbent Government of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. With Barisan Nasional dominated parliamentary of majority 63.85% won in 2014 general election.	Pseudo-democracy
Singapore	12 December 2008	Incumbent Government Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. With People's Action Party dominated parliamentary majority, 66.6% resulted from 2006 general election.	Pseudo-democracy

Source: Compiled from various sources (www.necelect.gov.kh; www.iseas.edu.sg; www.eld.gov.sg)

Countries in the third group, meanwhile, while being pluralistic democracies, were successfully able to secure support for the government through coalitions in parliament. In the case of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's party won only three seats in 2007 senate election. However, she successfully gathered supports from her allies in the KAMPI (*Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipin*o/ Partner of the Free Filipino), Independent parliament members, and centre-left parties to obtain a majority of fifteen seats. The same thing happened in Indonesia when Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono's Democratic Party was only able to gain 7.45% of the popular votes (57 seats in the House of Representative). He later secured the support of seven other parties in parliament to control 73.3% of the seats in the House of Representatives (410 seats). In Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra had a landslide win (65.21%), making everything easier for his party's lawmakers to initiate talks in parliament.

Member States	**Ratification Date**	**Government Strength in Parliament/ Election Results**	**Political System**
Indonesia	5 March 2007	Incumbent Government President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Secure Parliamentary Coalition of Eight Parties, 73.3% (PD, Golkar, PPP, PAN, PKB, PKS, PBB, PKPI) General Election 2004	Pluralistic democracy
Thailand	21 November 2005	Incumbent Government Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra Parliament Majority with 60.7% of seats General Election February 2005	Pluralistic democracy
The Philippines	14 February 2009	Incumbent Government President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Senate Majority 65.21% Senate Election 2007	Pluralistic democracy

Source: www.nationmultimedia.com/election2005; www.senate.gov.ph; www.namfrel.com.ph; www.kpu.go.id

In the case of ratification, Indonesia had the most difficulty with ratification owing to the sensitivity of national territorial sovereignty. The first issue is that some of the nationalist faction, both in the military and in parliament, voiced concern that the agreement might lead to the opening of Indonesian air territory to military aircraft and Indonesian seas to military ships bringing aid (Floristella 2015, 21).

The second issue hindering the ratification process is budgeting (Floristella 2015, 21). Determining how much money a state should allocate for establishing cooperation has proven challenging, as mentioned by one of BNPB officer (Floristella 2015, p. 21). Bellamy and Beeson argue that the occurrence of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar created momentum for progress, as on the eve of the disaster ASEAN was unable to launch a fast and coordinated response (Bellamy and Beeson 2010 in Floristella 2015, p. 22).

The third issue is ASEAN's reluctance to share information and logistics. This is related to the need to include the detail of territorial defence. For example, the military territorial command remains a key characteristic of Indonesian defence doctrine. This doctrine, called Universal People's Defence (*Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*/Hankamrata) requires the military to forge bonds between military and civilian structures.[79] Allowing foreign military personnel to participate in regional humanitarian cooperation may conflict with national defence in general.

[79] As such, for every civilian government structure, there should also be a military structure of equal standing. For example, every province should host a regional military command (*Komando Daerah Militer/*Kodam), every district should host a district military command (*Komando Distrik Militer/*Kodim), every sub-district should host a resort military command (*Komando Resor Militer/*Korem), and every village should host a rayon military command (*Komando Rayon Militer/*Koramil). One division can encompass one or several provinces, such as Brawijaya Division in East Java, Diponegoro Division in Central Java, and Bukit Barisan Division in several Sumatran provinces; these regional military commands represent two thirds of Indonesia's total military personnel. Indonesian defence doctrine relies on territorial military commands. As such, the country is divided into several military areas, each of which knows the details of the terrain and logistic lines.

Conservative stance will refuse to offer an opportunity to foreign forces to map and understand Indonesia's geographic and strategic terrain. In a time of war, this could provide potential enemies with better information on the terrain and thus ease invasion. Naturally, the Indonesian military does not want this to happen.

In the case of the Philippines, AADMER was signed under Macapagal–Aroyo's Christian Democratic (Lakas-CMD) administration. However, the ratification process took four years, with three hearing sessions in the Philippines congress. Some politicians with backgrounds in social activism led the drive promoting AADMER; one of these was a former member of Aroyo's cabinet. Aroyo's cabinet needed to get support from the congressional majority in order to ratify the agreement. In order to do so, it needed to utilise allies in the Majority Bloc because Lakas-CMD, although dominating the house of representatives, only held four seats in the senate. This is one example of the pluralism of the Philippines' multiparty system.

The sponsor for the ratification process in the Philippine Congress was Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, a senior politician from the People's Reform Party—a centre-left party which was actually a minor party in Congress, holding only one seat in the senate. However, in the political configuration of congress, Santiago is affiliated with the Majority Bloc. Santiago proposed supporting AADMER without amendment. This endorsement was also supported by Senator Richard Gordon (independent), a former member of Aroyo's cabinet who was affiliated with the Majority Bloc; Gordon was also the chairman of the Philippine Red Cross. By checking and balancing ratification endorsement, interpellation questions were asked by Senator Aquilino P. Pimentel, Jr., the congressional minority leader, from Philippines Democratic Party – People's Power (*Pilipino Demokratiko Pilipino – Lakan ang Bayan*/PDB-Laban). From this political

configuration, it can be said that Aroyo's administration worked closely with the promoters of AADMER in the Philippine congress, most of whom were politicians with backgrounds in social activism. Major parties gave centre-left politicians spots to improve their reputations in return for maintaining good relations with the administration. This topic of disaster management also involved a couple of senators from the Liberal Party, including future president Benigno S. Aquino III.

On the day of ratification, 18 senators favoured AADMER, with none opposing its ratification. Authored by Senator Santiago, Committee Report for Foreign Relations Number 610, dated 8 September 2009, is considered an important document for convincing the majority of senators in congress. It mentions the importance of AADMER as a tool for providing ASEAN with a comprehensive framework to substantially reduce the social, economic, and environmental effects of disasters; mitigate the number of casualties; and (through concerted national efforts) intensify regional and international cooperation. As for the conclusion of ratification processes in all member states, the proposed AADMER faced no objections by all parliaments in ASEAN member states and needed no amendments.

IV.3. Strong Influence of Domestic Politics on ASEAN Two-Level Games

From the three groups identified above, we can conclude that one unique aspect of ASEAN's mechanism is its ability to accommodate a different range of political cultures, running the gamut from absolute monarchies to plural democracies. The improved principle of the ASEAN Way is compatible not only with the old culture but also anticipates the future. When Southeast

Asia finally moved towards progressive democratisation, ASEAN's regionalism was already ready to facilitate a more vibrant two-level game model.

Two-level game theory can prove that ASEAN regionalism offers a new approach for negotiating agreements. This means that ASEAN has transformed from a club of nations that relied heavily on individual personalities into a modern regional organisation that depends on negotiation and communication process. The case of negotiating AADMER shows that, although the agreement took only four months to draft and sign, domestic political communications took another four years. Several important questions were raised in domestic politics. First was the problem of domestic security; allowing foreign military personnel to enter and learn logistic lines during humanitarian assistance operations was considered risky because foreign forces could gain territorial intelligence. Second, several member states had internal domestic problems related to separatist movements; as such, security concerns were, therefore, important to note. For example, in the Indonesian parliament, one main question was related to the entry of foreign military aircraft, ships, and vessels. Third, there were budgeting issues, as ASEAN had no significant contributions. Establishing coordination on disaster management would drain the financial resources of ASEAN member states. Indonesia, in particular, had demonstrated its interest in hosting the ASEAN Centre for Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), and therefore it was important for the government to communicate and negotiate its intention with parliament, which had the authority to allocate funds.

Learning from the ratification process, we can also see that two-level game theory can be useful to understand the political constellation and power balance within parliament. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, which had the lengthiest ratification times, the balance of power

between political parties was fragmented. Both countries have a multiparty structure, with no dominant majority. As such, the government parties of these countries need to form a strong coalition to overcome instability from the oppositions. In Indonesia, the Democratic Party had securely maintained a coalition with other major parties such as Golkar. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's initiative to become the backbone of ASEAN's regional mechanism was in-line with the passions of his first vice president, Jusuf Kalla, who later became the leader of the Indonesian Red Cross after the end of his term. Meanwhile, Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Agung Laksono—at the time, an influential Golkar figure—also took an important step to secure the development of AHA Centre as the and as the influential figure of Golkar Party. The government's strong coalition guaranteed the ratification process. Meanwhile, in the Philippine Congress, no political party had a good number of seats, thereby forcing them to establish blocs. Arroyo's government relied on its allies in Congress to initiate the ratification process. Approaching former cabinet members and senators who were close to social movements (such as Senator Miriam Defensor and Senator Richard Gordon) guaranteed the success of AADMER's ratification in the Philippines. In exchange, these senators would give legitimate support to ensure the survival of the government.

Approaching ASEAN using a two-level game model (or Camroux's variant, the four-level game model) is a relevant method for understanding how ASEAN member states are sometimes trapped in situations where they must negotiate with foreign powers. In the case of ASEAN disaster management, we have seen that both Indonesia and Myanmar were under the scrutiny of the international community. There are also some more important cases, such as in the traditional area of security.

ASEAN member states could use the intertwining effect of two-level games both to win foreign support to strengthen ASEAN solidarity and win domestic public support, as demonstrated by President Joko Widodo in Natuna in the South China Sea where territorial claims of China and Indonesia are conflicting.[80] Dealing with the problem of the South China Sea, China pressured ASEAN into negotiating the problem separately while negotiating at the ASEAN–China Special Meeting in Yuxi, Kumning (2016). Using its bargaining power in the economic sector, China wooed Lao PDR and Cambodia into supporting its claim that the South China Sea was its traditional fishing grounds. On the other hand, ASEAN member states such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam had exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea. As such, if China were to negotiate with ASEAN as a group, ASEAN would surely have a stronger position and could develop a single policy and statement to challenge China's claim. However, the last summit coordinated by China and Singapore proved non-beneficial, as ASEAN could not come up with a single statement. Apparently, Cambodia and Lao PDR refused to support ASEAN. ASEAN's negotiating coordinator, Singapore, failed to solidify a single voice in the South China Sea dispute.

ASEAN's failure to achieve a single policy related to the South China Sea dispute was not a new phenomenon. ASEAN had previously failed in 2012 when Cambodia blocked the negotiation during a meeting in Pnom Penh. This obstruction was significant, as Cambodia was the chairman of ASEAN at the time. As a means of damage control, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty

[80] President Joko Widodo sent fierce diplomatic signal to China by holding a cabinet meeting on the warship KRI Imam Bonjol sailing nearby Natuna Island. Attended the meeting were Coordinating Minister Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Minister of Maritime and Fishery Susi Pudjiastuti, Minister of Energy and Minerals Resources Sudirman Said, Armed Force Commander, and National Police Head. President Joko Widodo asserted that Indonesia have to show its deterrence to response China's claim over Northern Natuna Ocean in South China Sea as its traditional fishing ground. Please refer to CNN Indonesia, 23 June 2016 (Kusumadewi, 2016) available online at https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160623091859-20-140309/rapat-di-atas-kapal-perang-di-natuna-jokowi-gertak-china.

Natalegawa launched shuttle diplomacy to broker a 6-point consensus[81] to replace a failed joint communique.

In 2016, the Lao PDR acted as chairman and seemingly blocked another joint communique. Many experts had predicted this move, noting that the Lao PDR had no interest in the South China Sea due to being a landlocked country; however, it did have a significant interest in gaining economic investment from China. China needed to pressure ASEAN over this matter because the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was expected to release its verdict in the Philippines' case against China soon. In 2016, China asked ASEAN not to issue any joint statements regarding the PCA verdict, a request that offended some ASEAN representatives. In exchange, China provided a 10-point consensus, which merely reiterated the general principle of protecting the status quo—thereby giving China an advantage over the South China Sea. The Lao PDR delegation showed disinterest in a joint ASEAN communique, a situation presumably generated by Chinese pressure (Parameswaran P. , 2016).

In this case, China challenged ASEAN's centrality and solidarity. In response, Indonesia signalled a firm approach to safeguarding its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around Natuna Island. President Joko Widodo sailed to the waters of Natuna and showed himself aboard the warship KRI Imam Bonjol, inspecting its weaponry and ability to secure Indonesia's outer oceans. The nine-

[81] Marty Natalegawa, the then Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, brokered the proposed 6 principles to re-solidify ASEAN disarray. In the period of 18-19 July 2012, he visited Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Singapore to influence other ASEAN member states to agree in these following principles: 1). The full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), 2). Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, 3). The early conclusion of a COC, 4). Full respect of the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, 5). Continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties, and 6). Peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. For the detail of the shuttle diplomacy processes on ASEAN and the South China Sea, please refer to report by the National Bureau of Asian Research (Thayer, 2013) available online at https://www.nbr.org/publication/new-commitment-to-a-code-of-conduct-in-the-south-china-sea/.

dash claims of China intersected with Indonesian interests in Natuna. It has been reported that the Indonesian navy captured Chinese fishing ships; the Chinese navy sought to stop these activities, leading to tension between the two forces (Parameswaran P. , 2016).

In the future, ASEAN will most likely continue to deal with such situations, as member states will always face problems with external forces. In the case of disaster management cooperation, ASEAN member states are able to use valuable information from their previous experiences. Myanmar, for example, followed the open gestures of its Indonesian counterparts when dealing with international pressures. Indonesia proved that, by cooperating with the international community, it could securely negotiate both its interest in securing national integrity and protecting the people affected by natural disasters. At the same time, the international community was able to achieve its goals of preserving regional stability and delivering humanitarian assistance. As a result, humanitarian operations in Aceh were successful in both peacebuilding and post-disaster recovery. This success story is valuable, in that it was used by Myanmar to position itself.

The fact that Indonesia has maintained a good relationship with Myanmar is also evidence of how Myanmar has emulated Indonesia's decisions. Myanmar learned how to transform its military junta from a dictatorship into a democracy by witnessing how the Indonesian military transformed itself after the collapse of the Suharto Regime. The Indonesian military maintains good relations with the Myanmar military, and frequent visits were done by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during his tenure. This gesture likely benefited Myanmar, as the country had a role model for securing the survival of its regime while also accommodating elements of democracy without losing its most prized treasure: Myanmar's territorial integrity. It thus learned from

Indonesia's success and transformed it into another success story following Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Myanmar was not only able to provide the international community with a way to deliver humanitarian assistance, but also to ensure that the road map to democracy was safely implemented. Moreover, Myanmar experienced a democratic rebound after the National League of Democracy won the 2015 election, with Aung San Suu Kyi becoming the *de facto* leader of the country. Many changes have been initiated since the country was willing to open up and negotiate democracy following Cyclone Nargis in 2008.

CHAPTER V

INTERNALISING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN ASEAN REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT

V.1. The Responsibility to Protect in World Politics

As a regional political bloc, ASEAN is infamous for its adherence to the principles of non-interference and its use of a consensus mechanism in decision-making. For supporters, these principles are identified as the prevailing nostrum for regional unification, given that ASEAN is now more than fifty years old. On the other hand, critics identify these principles as hindering ASEAN in overcoming such essential problems as transnational crimes, environmental degradation, and—most notably—human rights.

Elsewhere, the most advanced regional organisation, namely the European Union (EU), has institutionalised a norm that ensures all member states have a unified stance in protecting human rights. First, according to the Copenhagen criteria[82], no European country may be enrolled in the EU if human rights violations still occur. Second, if there are serious human rights violations within or without the EU, all member countries have the responsibility to stop them. Common security

[82] Copenhagen criteria is named after the Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council meeting on 21-22 June 1993 to set the standard for EU new memberships. There are three criteria that a new member has to fulfill in order to join the EU, namely political criteria (stable democracy, rule of law, human rights and protection to minorities), economic criteria (capacity to cope with competitive economy and functioning market economy), and administrative criteria (ability to implement the enrollment process and to perform membership obligations). These criteria are then stated in Copenhagen Declaration of June 1993 as a legally binding EU document. Please refer to the text of the document, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf.

and foreign policy in the EU has enabled member states to adhere to a newly formulated norm on humanitarian intervention, one widely known as the responsibility to protect (R2P).

However, during its formulation, understandings of R2P were quite dynamic; this has been revised and toned down over time. When it was first introduced in 2001, R2P emphasised military intervention in crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide, environmental problems, and natural disasters. Meanwhile, since 2009, the international community has witnessed a shift in the R2P norm, focusing more on "prevention" than "direct intervention" (Alexandra, 2012).

In the European case, the most striking implementation of R2P is the EU's intervention in Libya in March 2011. Following the Arab Spring in Tunisia, intense protests demanding a regime change in Libya happened between February and August 2011. Muammar Gaddafi's regime announced that it would hunt down people who fought for regime change. Gaddafi's administration was believed to have committed crimes against humanity by killings civilians. Considering these developments, the EU sanctioned the Gaddafi regime by implementing a no-fly zone and launching surgical airstrikes against military targets. NATO forces, with the aid of countries such as Sweden, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, participated in these strikes. The French air force hit Libyan army vehicles and tanks, working in conjunction with the British air force to ensure air superiority. EU member states such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Sweden also enforced a no-fly zone over Libya. This intervention turned the tides of war in Libya and enabled rebels to depose Gaddafi in October 2011.

In the aftermath of the Libyan crisis, despite dissenting opinions from the Arab League[83] and British lawmakers such as Emily Thornberry[84], scholar like Pattison argued that regionalism such as that in the EU could help protect Libyan people from state atrocities and fail to act to state atrocity is morally wrong (Pattison, 2011, p. 276). Through regionalism, institutionalising the R2P norm is plausible. Reflecting on the contemporary issues in Southeast Asia, it is interesting to see how different actors within ASEAN have perceived R2P. Several cases in the region need such assessment; take, for example, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 (and the government's inability to protect victims); the Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State, Myanmar, in 2017–2018; extra-judicial measures in the Philippines in 2016–2017, and the prolonged rule of the Thai military junta since 2014.

In 2008, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan stated that he supported R2P in the case of ASEAN involvement in settling tensions between the Myanmar junta and the international community over Cyclone Nargis. At the moment, the Rohingya people in Myanmar are not given citizenship. Despite having lived in Myanmar territory for centuries, Rohingya people in Myanmar have been deemed as illegal immigrants. Since the early 1990s, the lack of protection of Rohingya civil liberty and human rights has forced about 400,000 Rohingyas to leave the country. Unfortunately, Myanmar's neighbour, Bangladesh, has been reluctant to welcome refugees. Indonesia, particularly Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, engaged Myanmar

[83] On March 2011, Arab League's secretary general, Amr Moussa expressed that the intention of Arab League in approving no-fly-zone over Libya was to prevent Moammar Gaddafi's air force in bombing Libyan civilians, and not to bless US and EU airstrikes. Hence, Arab League was reconsidering its support to the intervention. Please refer to the Wahington Post report published on 20 March 2011, available online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-league-condemns-broad-bombing-campaign-in-libya/2011/03/20/AB1pSg1_story.html?noredirect=on.

[84] As reported by the New York Times in 14 September 2016, British Lawmakers particularly from opposition labor party consider David Cameron took major mistake in intervening Libya. Please refer to the report at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/world/europe/britain-libya-intervention.html.

actively through 2017. Such application of direct pressure is considered unusual within the context of ASEAN.

Considering the traditional mechanisms in ASEAN—consultation, consensus, and non-interference—the active diplomacy of Pitsuwan and Marsudi might help us understand the inception of R2P. However, the extent to which the R2P norm has influenced ASEAN regional cooperation in disaster management is understudied. As such, further examination is needed to assess the level of R2P incorporation in the region. This chapter aims to answer this question through a Southeast Asian perspective by mapping the opinions and stances of (1) state leaders, (2) ASEAN bureaucrats, and (3) scholars in the region. As such, it aims to answer the question of how different actors in ASEAN have utilised regional disaster management cooperation to incorporate the R2P norm in ASEAN.

V.2. Current R2P Studies in ASEAN

Under the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document on the Responsibility to Protect, should a sovereign state failed to protect its people from atrocities, various UN bodies and international community members (including regional organisations) should take necessary and appropriate measures (Bellamy & Drummon, 2011, p. 183). This proposition could be the basis of ASEAN's adoption of the R2P norm. However, debate and dissenting opinions have emerged from different actors within the region. Apparently, member states have taken careful measures to avoid expressing frank positions. Unlike Surin Pitsuwan and the Indonesian government—represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi—never officially announced R2P as the basis of its policy towards Myanmar in 2017–2018. Nonetheless, the actions of the Indonesian foreign

ministry reflected the eagerness to implement this principle, albeit in the form of restricted criticism. Other ASEAN leaders might as well have the same strategy, but not proposing R2P directly. This is possible due to the character of ASEAN regionalism, which emphasises harmony, consultation, and consensus. More vocal actors, such as Fidel Valdez Ramos of the Philippines, might openly promote the norm, but subtler leaders such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono might deliver their messages in riddles. This is an interesting development, and its examination can lead to striking findings.

This section will utilise position mapping as its main method. The mapping of various actors' positions on R2P in ASEAN will be traced through existing reports and research. In the case of the Indonesian position, this can be determined based on discussions with Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi in December 2017. There are three categories of international relations scholars' views focusing on R2P in ASEAN as categorized by Yukiko Nishikawa: the sceptics, the incrementalists, and the accommodationists (Nishikawa, 2018).

There exists literature supporting each position. Sceptics are those who do not believe that R2P can be realised in Southeast Asia due to its cultural and political context (Capie, 2012). Capie argues that the region has not internalised the norm, as can be proven through two points: first, the primary proponents of this norm are ASEAN outsiders; second, ASEAN member states only accept R2P agendas that benefit them and discard the rest (Capie, 2012). Incrementalists, meanwhile, believe that ASEAN member states may gradually adopt R2P, albeit more slowly than expected. It is also necessary to contextualise the R2P concept in Southeast Asian localities in order to be accepted. Kraft believes that R2P mainstreaming in Southeast Asia needs a methodological shift to succeed (Kraft, 2012). Meanwhile, accommodationists argue that ASEAN member states will

most likely consider the importance of sovereignty cautiously, while at the same time reconciling the principles of human rights (Bellamy & Drummon, 2011). Alexandra supports the idea that democratisation in Southeast Asia provides opportunities to apply R2P core principles in ASEAN (Alexandra, 2012).

Yukiko Nishikawa developed another approach that pinpoints the inherent limitation of R2P. In the case of the Rohingyas, their contested citizenships may result in the unintended consequence of being left unprotected by the governments (Nishikawa, 2018). However, Nishikawa argues that in recent time, Southeast Asian countries developed a more caring society in protecting the people against states' atrocities. Hence, to conclude that ASEAN member states are refusing to protect their people is a premature generalisation (Nishikawa, 2018).

In order to explain ASEAN's behaviour as a regional bloc, this study borrows Mohtar Mas'oed's levels of analysis. According to Mas'oed, every unit of analysis and explanation consists of five levels: individual level, group of individuals level, state level, group of states level, and international level (Mas'oed, 1990, pp. 40–42). Mas'oed suggests that an international scholar might use various combinations of units of analysis and explanation. Explaining ASEAN, in which the unit of analysis would be at the group of states level, does not necessarily need to involve regionalism. Instead, he proposes three different approaches: 1. A correlationist explanation, requiring the same level at both analysis and explanation; 2. An inductionist explanation, requiring a higher level unit of explanation (for example, explaining an inquiry into state behaviour through the international situations and systems that force the state to behave as such); and 3. A reductionist explanation, requiring a lower unit of explanation (for instance, explaining state behaviour through the psychology or political calculations of its leader) (Mas'oed, 1990, p. 38). Can be seen on

Graphic 6 below, utilizing the mapping methods offered above, this study uses a reductionist approach in explaining the behaviour of ASEAN (a group of states[85] as the level of analysis) through the exercise of persuasion by various political actors in Southeast Asia (individual unit as the level of explanation).

Figure 8. Correlation between Unit of Analysis and Unit of Explanation in the study of ASEAN and R2P



How is a reductionist approach justifiable in this research? The key lies in the use of Finnemore and Sikkink's method of assessing whether a new international norm has been internalised. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that, in the internalisation process, the dominant actors

[85] Based on Mas'oed unit of analysis typology, ASEAN as a regional organization is considered as group of states. Hence, the level of analysis is in the multilateral of regional stage of analysis (Mas'oed, 1990, p. 38).

advocating a norm are bureaucrats, lawyers, and professionals, who seek to achieve conformity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898).

The use of R2P and its correlation with disaster management cooperation in ASEAN is understudied. Discourse over this principled tends to be muted; as we witnessed at the 2016 ASEAN retreat, R2P is pragmatically used but officially unspoken. As such, to study various actors' positions will greatly benefit the prediction of ASEAN's future trajectories. This research will focus on Indonesia's position, as it remains one of the most important and influential of ASEAN's member states.

By analysing the debate of R2P in ASEAN, this dissertation will also contribute to future research into ASEAN regionalism and evolving international norms. Third, this study will enrich the literature on the Indonesian administration's foreign policy legacy, as we have seen shifts from time to time.

V.3. Analysis of R2P Inception in ASEAN

The R2P concept was preceded by the formulation of an idea called "sovereignty as responsibility", developed by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen in the 1990s (Bellamy & Drummon, 2011, p. 182). At the time, Deng was the UN Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, while Cohen was a senior fellow at the Brooking Institution. They argued that every sovereign state should be responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. If a state cannot do so, then it should invite and welcome the assistance of the international community. States in trouble have two options. First, as mentioned before, they can work hand-in-hand with

foreign countries and donors to solve their problem. Second, they can reject the involvement of external powers or obstruct efforts. The latter option would be regarded as sacrificing sovereign legitimacy. The first implementation of this concept was the involvement of NATO in Kosovo, in which UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan identified the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" as the motive behind the intervention.

Over time, a debate emerged over the contradiction between the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty. More countries believed that the protection of their self-determination was very important, even as they recognised fundamental human rights. The Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993[86] shows that Asian countries, particularly, were willing to uphold human rights under the condition that cultural contexts be respected; for instance, governments sought to run their countries in a multiverse of cultures, as many Asian countries perceived their societies as families and the government as an authoritative "father". The implementation of sovereignty as responsibility, thus, was challenged by stern cultural interpretations of sovereignty.

An attempt to improve the concept was undertaken by Professor Gareth John Evans of the Australian National University, who was then the chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by the Canadian government. Evans' basic premise argues that violence and massacres of the innocent people cannot be universally ignored, while the state's sovereignty is not a license to kill (Evans, 2008, p. 11). ICISS came up with the

[86] This declaration is adopted by the Asian States delegations attended the meeting at Bangkok on 29 March-2 April 1993 to prepare their position for the World Conference on Human rights as mandated by the General Assembly resolution 46/116 of 17 December 1991. Please refer to the declaration text available online at https://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/688605/bangkok-eng.pdf.

concept of R2P and its technicalities, addressing guidelines for such questions as "When to intervene?", "What is the code of conduct?" and "How to use the Veto?" (Bellamy & Drummon, 2011, p. 183). These guidelines were submitted to the 2005 World Summit, and it was agreed that the intervention applied to war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.

The main obstacle in the internalisation of R2P in ASEAN has been the principle of non-interference. Based on its historical development, ASEAN has traditionally been characterised by an emphasis on harmony over a conflictual or competitive approach. Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino argues that ASEAN member states' aspiration to uphold the non-interference principle is influenced by the awareness that Southeast Asian countries are prone to domestic conflict. Most Southeast Asian countries are still struggling with their unfinished national building, rooted in their inheritance of fragmented societies (Severino, 2006). This unfinished nation-building has resulted in ethnonationalism and secession sentiments, spawning from Aceh and West Papua in Indonesia[87], Mindanao in the Philippines[88], and Southern Thailand's provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.[89] This made Southeast Asian countries mistrust the intervention of foreign powers, a conservative belief that firmly gripped ASEAN for about 40 years.

Momentum for change came with the democratisation of Indonesia following 1998 and the occurrence of several major natural disasters. ASEAN's role in bridging the international community and Indonesia in responding to the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004 offered a

[87] Papua is located in the eastern part of Indonesian archipelago. Chauvel and Bhakti suggest that central government authority in Papua is challenged mainy by the Free Papua Organization (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004, p. 4)
[88] The conflict in Mindanao has deep historical roots involving the struggle of the Moro people (refusing of being identified as Filipinos) for war of independence against the Spanish, the American, and the Philippines central government (Buendia, 2006, p. 147).
[89] 76% of population Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani are inheriting Kingdom of Pattani culture and Islamic faith. Prolonged conflicts in Southern Thailand is rooted on historical and socio-cultural background of Muslim Malay insurgencies against ruling Buddhist dominated Kingdom of Thailand (Croissant, 2007, p. 2).

means for more open and frank interactions between member states and eventually became the momentum for a new international norm on disaster management (Rum, 2016). This ultimately created a plausible environment for the inducement of the ASEAN Charter.

To what extent has the ASEAN Charter helped create the environment for change? Under the Charter, the basic principles remain the same: non-interference, consultation, and consensus. This is reflected in Articles 23, 26, and 27, which allow ASEAN to offer mediation and relay unsolved disputes to the ASEAN Summit.[90] The leaders of ASEAN states remain the supreme overseeing body for monitoring compliance. As such, the veto of a member state's head of government would be enough to postpone or cancel an issue's being discussed in the summit.

Nevertheless, the ASEAN Charter does allow member states to express concern over dire situations in other countries through the concept of enhanced interaction, a result of a dynamic compromise between conservatives and reformists such as de facto Malaysian opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim, and Surin Pitsuwan. According to Article 14, ASEAN has the mandate to ensure the development of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR);

[90] Article 23. Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation

1. Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation in order to resolve the dispute within an agreed time limit.
2. Parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation.

Article 26. Unresolved Disputes

When a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of the preceding provisions of this Chapter, this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, for its decision.

Article 27. Compliance

1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other designated ASEAN body, shall monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit.
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision.

Please refer to the ASEAN Charter, available online at https://asean.org/storage/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.

however, its role is still limited, and ASEAN member countries rejected Indonesia's proposal to enable AICHR to dispatch human rights investigators and collect reports on member states' domestic situations.

As an international norm, R2P has been generally accepted by most countries in the world (Alexandra, 2012, p. 55). This norm was endorsed through the 2005 UN World Summit and incorporated in UN Security Council Resolution No. 1674. Borrowing Sikkink and Finnemore's terminology, we can conclude that R2P is in the cascade phase, in which the majority of the world states have agreed on the basic propositions of the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). There has been debate concerning the justifiability of the R2P concept, as most state leaders see sovereignty as sacred. As such, proponents around the world have discarded the initial idea of the "responsibility to intervene" and adopted the down-toned term "responsibility to protect." Alexandra argues that, although leaders from different cultures might now recognise the importance of R2P, its implementation must be justified with the existence of "intolerable violence" (Alexandra, 2012, p. 52).

While the majority of world leaders have agreed with the enactment of UN Security Council Resolution no. 1674 on R2P (2005), this has not been the case in ASEAN (Belammy & Beeson, 2010). Until it was revealed by Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, the intention to incorporate R2P in ASEAN was not known by the international community.

V.3.1. ASEAN Bureaucrats as R2P Proponents

Former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan has undoubtedly been the strongest proponent of R2P internalisation in ASEAN. His remarkable speech at the October 2008 ASEM Summit, which responded to ASEAN's involvement in Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis, is considered to have assertively advocated for R2P implementation in the region. Pitsuwan frankly told the public that what he had imposed in Myanmar was an action based on R2P considerations; he even mentioned that the principle of non-interference could be obstructive to humanitarian response.[91] Furthermore, he argued that it is the responsibility of the international community to provide assistance and support to people in need. His speech and intervention in Myanmar may be identified as an entry point for R2P in ASEAN regionalism.

In 2014, Surin Pitsuwan once again took a pivotal role in the development of a working framework in ASEAN when he led a high-level advisory panel on R2P in Southeast Asia. This panel strategically devised tools to internalise R2P by playing two-level games. Regionally, ASEAN should create new functions for its already established infrastructure, i.e. early warning and the capacity to investigate potential threats to humanity, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Domestically, ASEAN member countries should be convinced to ratify all of the international conventions related to human rights and humanitarianism.

Changes to the R2P concept in 2009 helped Surin Pitsuwan introduce its implementation. As initially proposed in 2001, R2P drew the antagonism of state leaders who held an absolute

[91] Surin Pitsuwan's speech, as retrieved from the ASEAN Secretariat: "... Responsibility to Protect or human security doctrine or the principle of non-interference - all these were elements that can both be helpful and at the same time obstructive or restrictive to our humanitarian response. That is a challenge for diplomacy."

stance on sovereignty. Regime survival is a major motive for governments, who seek to safeguard their administrations from foreign intervention. The criticism of the international community is often regarded as a delegitimising action. The new formulation of R2P emphasised each government's role in protecting its people. The international community also has the responsibility to provide support based on the consent of each respective government. If a government fails to protect its population, the international community—under the authorisation of the UN—should take measures to assure the protection of threatened people (Alexandra, 2012, p. 52).

Another thing that should be taken into consideration is that ASEAN bureaucrats found it easier to use toned-down terminologies. They considered such terms as "humanitarian aid" and "humanitarian assistance" as more applicable to ASEAN than "R2P" or "humanitarian intervention". The word "intervention" was deemed harmful for state leaders, either because theirs were authoritarian regimes, or they needed to address domestic pressures to defend their sovereignty carefully. For example, the operating arm for disaster response in the region is called the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre). This proves that R2P installation is possible with toned-down terminology. Meanwhile, forcefully using the term R2P as the basis for ASEAN involvement in dealing with international assistance might be understood wrongfully. Even today, many people still misunderstand R2P as unilateral intervention, use of military force, and service to major countries' interest in gaining more power. ASEAN member countries, thus, have tended to be afraid of R2P being misused to justify unilateral intervention.

As such, ASEAN bureaucrats have been careful not to show their true intention for incorporation. In 2009, following Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN Director Secretary for Security and Politic Termsak Charlermpalanupap argued for the need to reiterate non-interference, consultation,

and consensus, to maintain conformity. Saving face is still regarded as important in order to invite troubled countries into a regional engagement.

V.3.2. Academic Proponents of R2P in ASEAN

Other than ASEAN bureaucrats, several international scholars such as Noel Morada, a Filipino Scholar at the University of Queensland, argues that R2P should be seen as complementary to the ASEAN Charter because it will strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. Morada argues that many people have a mistaken impression of R2P. In Southeast Asia, R2P has been considered detrimental to the sovereignty of the state. Modara argues that this is not correct; R2P is important for sovereignty because its implementation will help governments gain more credibility (*Myanmar Times*, 2017).

In Thailand, Kraisoraphong (2012) argues that the enthusiasm in campaigning for R2P is originating for the academic institutions. One of the most progressive institutions in introducing R2P in Thailand is the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Chulalongkorn University (Kraisoraphong, 2012, p. 6). Another research institution undergoing a thorough examination of R2P is the International Affairs Committee to the Senate (Kraisoraphong, 2012, p. 6). Academic works have been published in Thai to provide general knowledge on R2P by Thai scholar like Chaiyanam (2009). Kraisoraphong finds that the book is designed for ordinary readers by giving highlights R2P basic principles and debates on its implementation such as whether it is justified or not to launch a humanitarian intervention in cases like Myanmar Cyclone Nargis (Kraisoraphong, 2012, p. 6).

Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law at Universitas Indonesia, has taken a firmer stance when responding to clashes between the Rohingya and Myanmar security forces on 25 August 2017, arguing that the Myanmar security forces were involved in ethnic cleansing (Juwana, 2017). According to Juwana, the Myanmar government lacked the capacity to control its security people in the field. Reports showed that security personnel had responded to social disturbances with violent assaults. Provoked by misleading news and prejudices, security forces committed atrocities against the Rohingya. Weak ASEAN responses to these atrocities were caused by the prolonged debate over whether the ASEAN Charter tolerates foreign intervention (Juwana, 2017).

In his attempt to explain the logic of R2P, Juwana argues for humanitarian intervention using the analogy of a family. If within a family, a husband is violent towards his wife or children, according to Southeast Asian customs, it is the neighbours' responsibility to file a police report (Juwana, 2017). Moreover, he argued that the international community has agreed upon R2P since the signing of the 2005 UN document. He strongly recommends that ASEAN implement the norm, giving Myanmar an ultimatum to punish its security forces for their atrocities or face ASEAN intervention. Juwana proposes a warning of economic sanctions as the first step, which would likely result in similar actions from countries such as the United States, Japan, and the EU member states.

V.3.3. State Leaders as Proponent of R2P in ASEAN

At the international level, a strategic shift has been experienced by decision-makers in the United Nations. It is important to note that several scholars have covered the dynamics of R2P formulation. The initial R2P concept, as developed in 2001, emphasised the use of military

deployment to intervene in other countries where humanitarian crimes are committed. This concept was proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was established to help answer then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's question about what the international community should do to respond to crimes against humanity in Rwanda and Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ICISS responded by formulating justifications and conditions for military intervention, not only including crimes against humanity but also natural disasters and environmental problems (Alexandra, 2012, p. 52). Among the twelve senior leaders involved was Fidel Valdez Ramos, who had served as President of the Philippines from 1992 to 1998. This shows that a Southeast Asian leader could also provide such firm support for the principle, even as it demonstrates gaps in Southeast Asian cultures' adherence to democratic principles.

In the 2005 document discussing the voting process in the UN, 75 of 93 participating countries supported R2P. This number shows the division within the international community, in which many countries—about 19.35% of the total population (ICRtoP, 2009)[92]—still opposed the use of the concept. The strongest proponent of R2P in its early stages were African countries, which were increasingly concerned with crimes against humanity in the continent (Alexandra, 2012, p. 52). Meanwhile, most ASEAN countries cast their support for R2P, but under the condition that its implementation should be under scrutiny to avoid the political influence of powerful countries. The actual mood of Southeast Asian countries was indeed less welcoming to R2P. Indonesia considered one of the most advanced democracies in ASEAN, has shown some concern for human rights but

[92] Please refer to the General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect and Informal Interactive Dialogue document. Provided by the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) on July 2009 available online at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2493-generalassembly-debate-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-informal-interactivedialogue-.

experienced rejection on several occasions. For example, while designing the ASEAN Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission, Indonesia's proposal to provide the commission with the ability to investigate alleged human rights violations through fact-finding activities was vetoed by other ASEAN member states. In the case of R2P, ASEAN member states preferred voting for support, as they understand that the UN outcome document for R2P would have no immediate legal power. This makes sense since ASEAN countries were already familiar with navigating non-legally binding agreements at the regional level.

The moment when then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon issued a report on R2P implementation marks a crucial moment in the organisation's monitoring of countries' compliance with the newly installed norm. This is because, as suggested by Sikkink and Finnemore, when a new norm finally passes its tipping point, there will be subtle rejections by dissatisfied countries (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898).

In a discussion forum with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi on 16 December 2017, organised by the Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Marsudi stated that the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has never formally used such a concept. However, the position of President Joko Widodo's administration was to provide aid to the Rohingya and protect their rights in Rakhine State (Kapoor, 2017). This is in accordance with the proposition of R2P, which promotes protecting people regardless of national borders in cases of crime against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.

In Malaysia, the leader who has adhered closely to the need to implement R2P is the current *de facto* leader of Pakatan Harapan (a coalition of parties that won the 2018 Malaysian General Election), Anwar Ibrahim. In 1997, he proposed a firmer stance on democratisation in the region,

and through his concept of "constructive engagement" he urged ASEAN to develop a mechanism for member states to intervene in promoting human security through economic, human rights, and education programmes (The Asia-Pacific Center for Responsibility to Protect, 2009, p. 33). When Ibrahim was detained by Mahathir Mohamad in 1998, Indonesia and the Philippines made an attempt to pressure the Malaysian government as a gesture that may conflict with the principle of non-interference in ASEAN. Presidents B.J. Habibie of Indonesia and Joseph Estrada of the Philippines criticised Mahathir for jailing Anwar Ibrahim. Malaysia retaliated by stressing ASEAN member states should not concern themselves with Malaysian domestic politics, threatened to block the employment of Indonesian and Filipino workers, and indicated an intention to support Malay or Bangsa Moro insurgencies in the southern Philippines (Bellamy & Drummon, 2011, p. 187). Importantly, this last threat was actually in violation of the principle of non-interference.

V.4. Lessons from ASEAN

Through assessment of actors' positions and stances, we can draw some conclusions. First, although it was approved at the 2005 UN World Summit by 73 countries, R2P has not reached the tipping point in ASEAN. Although Southeast Asian countries signed to approve the outcome document, most did so because it does not have effective compliance mechanisms. At the meantime, they blocked the advancement of the norm within the region. This reluctant, or rather two-faced stance, was taken to ensure their reputation internationally and ensure their regime survival domestically. However, this multi-faceted diplomatic position reflects the plural political systems within the countries of Southeast Asia. Fragmented opinions and dissenting positions from

scholars, leaders, and bureaucrats—in Indonesia, for example—show that a certain degree of political openness has enabled different voices to battle for primacy.

Second, this study has shown that Sikkink and Finnemore's assessment of the dynamics of international norms must be enriched through a discussion of what happens when a norm has reached its tipping point. In this research, we found that tipping points in international forums may not necessarily be well-reflected at the regional level. There will be subtle rejections and half-willed intentions from countries, hoping to maintain the status quo or at least prolong the internalisation process, as the implementation of R2P in ASEAN will have an effect on domestic politics. In this situation, both ASEAN bureaucrats and leaders will tone-down or encode their support for R2P.

Third, the tipping point measurement needs to be revisited. Apparently, more than one-third of total member states must commit to the new norm in order to bring R2P to its tipping point in ASEAN (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 898). However, political change in Thailand and the Philippines might have impacted the calculated number. In the inclusion of the norm in functional cooperation, such as regional disaster management or the Rohingya case, only Indonesia has been on board.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has sought to answer several questions. Why has ASEAN successfully formulated regional disaster management and emergency response mechanism? How have the political exercises of competing actors, ranging from the domestic level to the regional level, after disasters contributed to enhancing ASEAN regionalism? If contributions are positive, what is the pre-condition for success? If they are negative, what are the factors that limit progress? In this section, therefore, the dissertation concludes that all of these questions are positively addressed.

In answering the question of why ASEAN has successfully formulated a regional disaster management and emergency response mechanism, Chapter II, Chapter III, Chapter IV, and Chapter V of the dissertation has highlighted the following factors: 1) ASEAN's transformation into a full-fledged regional organisation, driving the development of a proven regional mechanism as a result of deepening ASEAN regional cooperation, 2) the internalisation of the regional disaster management cooperation, including responsibility to protect (R2P) norms, 3) continuous support from international dialogue partners and donors, 4) determined leaderships in ASEAN, and 5) political change/democratisation of certain key member states, which has enabled ASEAN to have more open and frank discussions. Hence, we can conclude that the occurrence of major natural disasters does not in and of itself guarantee the creation of a successful regional mechanism; positive pre-conditions are the decisive factors for a successful regional arrangement.

VI.1 ASEAN Transformation is Being Undertaken at Moderate Speed

ASEAN is in the process of transforming into a full-fledged regional organisation and developed a proven regional mechanism as a result of deepening regional cooperation. Chapter II has highlighted the importance of the status of ASEAN as a fully-fledged regional organisation following the ratification of the ASEAN Charter in 2008. This means that ASEAN has a legitimate standing that enables member states to follow regional mechanisms. The ASEAN Charter also lays specific foundations and principles so that every decision in the organisation can have a sense of justice. Through ASEAN's involvement in mediating peace in Aceh and delivering aid to Myanmar, member states have learned that the regional organisation is reliable and justified.

It has been examined in Chapter III that there must be a proven regional cooperation mechanism before member states are willing to cooperate. The momentum provided by major natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004 and Cyclone Nargis in 2008 would have failed if ASEAN had not responded in the first place. As shown by the case of Sri Lanka examined in Chapter IV, the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami would not have contributed to regional developments if political actors were unwilling to sit down and talk. ASEAN, unlike Sri Lanka, was able to use the momentum of the disaster as a tipping point for the signing of the HFA and AADMER in 2005. ASEAN's experience assisting the Government of Indonesia and the European Union in building peace in Aceh gave it proof of its organisational capacity to conduct field operations and engage in aid delivery and reconstruction. As such, assurance mechanisms developed steadily, and the governments of member states also became willing to accept the assistance of the international community. This case showed Myanmar, and other

ASEAN member states that it was not necessary for them to be unreasonably suspicious of the intentions of the international community.

These pre-conditions were also demonstrated in the case of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The Myanmar government reached the point where it was able to negotiate with the international community, under the condition that ASEAN plays a supporting and supervisory role. The successful response to Cyclone Nargis provided the momentum for AADMER being put into force in 2009. Under the limitations imposed by the Myanmar Government, ASEAN successfully humanitarian aids and became a good office for the Myanmar government and the international community under the Tri-Partite Group Arrangement. This success gave another example of success and boosted ASEAN member states' confidence in engaging in deeper disaster management cooperation.

VI.2 The Internalisation of Norms in Regional Disaster Management Cooperation

Without the international dynamics of norms that suggest the travelling of the disaster management norm from its entrepreneurs to the international stage, and then its internalisation in ASEAN, such a phenomenon could not be successfully manifested. Chapter III and Chapter V have highlighted the importance of the internalisation of international norms in regional disaster management efforts. Using the norm life cycle tracing method suggested by Sikkink and Finnemore, this dissertation has proven that regional disaster management cooperation norm has reached its tipping point globally and become internalised in ASEAN. Chapter III has also underscored the importance of ASEAN's international dialogue partners and donors in promoting the norm. Continuous

support from developed countries has helped ASEAN build the foundation for cooperation since the 1990s. Chapter V has highlighted the inception of the responsibility to protect in ASEAN, even as formal acceptance has struggled. This international norm has triggered discourse on member states' foreign policy. Indonesia, for example, is now pursuing a firmer foreign policy towards Myanmar in order to help introduce R2P in ASEAN.

The pre-condition for this phenomenon is ASEAN's willingness to interact as a regional organisation with continuous and strong global advocacy. Without such openness, norm inception is less likely. Advocacy paved the way for the norm supporting regional disaster management to be successfully transmitted from norm entrepreneurs to the international stage. ASEAN's success, thus, has depended on its ability to acknowledge the role of the international community in introducing, socialising, and persuading the norm.

From their acceptance of the ASEAN Charter, it is evident that member states are aware of the importance of ASEAN's position as part of a global society. As a regional organisation, ASEAN should also be able to adopt universal values. ASEAN must be able to adapt the dominant method of disaster management cooperation by harmonising its agenda with that of the UN as an organisational platform for entrepreneurs. Acknowledgement of this norm took only a short time. Internationally, the disaster management cooperation norm reached the tipping point in 2005; this was soon followed by the tipping point in ASEAN, also in 2005. This indicates that the pre-condition for success was formed at the international level and later cascaded into the regional level.

VI.3 Continuous Support from International Dialogue Partners and Donors

The significant funds and initiatives for introducing disaster management cooperation in ASEAN were supported by international dialogue partners and donors. As such, we can conclude that the presence of strong international advocacy is important in the regional spreading of norms. In the case of ASEAN, since the 1990s international organisations and dialogue partners have been continuously engaged in assisting Southeast Asian states in establishing both domestic national disaster management offices and regional disaster management cooperation. Donors have engaged and worked together at two layers of cooperation. The first layer involves individual countries, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, while the second layer involves the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management. This multi-layered assistance has created a stronger foundation for regional disaster management in ASEAN. Until today, international donors such as JAIF and the European Union have continued to work with the AHA Centre.

VI.4 Determined Leaderships in ASEAN

Strong leadership, both from ASEAN bureaucrats and state leaders, is important to pave the way for successful regional arrangement. As demonstrated in this study, the roles of former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan and DMHA Division Director Adelina Kamal were decisive in the success of ASEAN operations following Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. Meanwhile, state leaders such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Lee Hsien Loong, Jusuf Kalla, George Yeo and Agung Laksono were also important in offering political support for the cause and persuasively convincing other ASEAN member states to support regional disaster management cooperation.

VI.5 Effect of Domestic Political Changes on ASEAN

Political change/democratisation in certain key member states have enabled ASEAN to have more open and frank discussions. Chapter IV has highlighted the changing condition of ASEAN member states' domestic politics, which has enabled negotiations over regional disaster management cooperation to take place in two arenas: regional level and domestic level. Using Robert Putnam's two-level game theory, this dissertation has proven that open and frank discussions in ASEAN have become possible because of democratisation and political openness in certain key member states. Democratic discourse and debate in parliament has become possible and helped redefine the so-called ASEAN Way.

Consisting of member states with different political cultures and levels of democracy, ASEAN has uniquely used mechanisms that can accommodate a range of regimes, running the gamut from absolute monarchies such as Brunei to plural democracies such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The principle of the ASEAN Way has proven to be dynamic. It is compatible not only with the old cultures of strongmen such as Suharto, Mahathir, and Lee Kwan Yew but also with younger future leaders. Over the past decade, as Southeast Asia has moved towards democratisation, ASEAN's regionalism has developed to use a more vibrant two-level game model that requires some degree of political openness.

The use of two-level game theory can prove that ASEAN regionalism offers a new approach for negotiating agreements. Open and frank discussions can now occur

domestically in several countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. This is evident not only in the case of debate over the ratification of the ASEAN Charter; fierce debate also took place regarding the ratification of AADMER. This can also indicate that ASEAN has moved from being a mere "club" that relies on leaders' personalities into a more modernised regional organisation that relies not only on negotiations among member states but also within domestic constituencies.

This being said, we can see that there is an opportunity for the domestic politics of ASEAN member states to influence and reshape regionalism and most importantly redefine the ASEAN Way. A deeper study of the link between domestic politics and regionalism is thus highly recommended.

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