

The Evolving Conception of Climate Change:  
The Growth of Climate Justice and the Role of Transnational ENGO Networks  
(気候変動概念の進展：気候正義の台頭と国際環境 NGO ネットワークの役割)

GACH, Evan Tyler

Doctor of Environmental Studies  
Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Nagoya University  
(名古屋大学大学院環境学研究科 博士 (環境学))

2020



## Abstract

Scholarship in the field of environmental studies has examined how NGOs' framing of certain climate issues has evolved over time, but no study has comprehensively compared NGOs' and states' promotion of multiple climate justice principles in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Additionally, research on international norms has paid relatively little attention to how actors become norm entrepreneurs, and what factors influence an actor undertaking norm entrepreneurship.

Adopting the frameworks of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) Norm Life Cycle and Benford and Snow's (2000) theory of collective action frames, this study investigates the role played by NGOs in the promotion of climate justice in UNFCCC climate negotiations. A mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, including content analysis and semi-structured expert interviews, was utilized to examine the adoption of climate justice by both UNFCCC member states and Climate Action Network International (CAN), the largest environmental NGO presence in the UNFCCC.

In the post-Copenhagen era of climate negotiations, climate justice has progressively become fundamental to states' conceptualization of climate change in the UNFCCC, emerging first in framings utilized by developing states before gradually becoming adopted in the rhetoric of developed countries. Nine principles of climate justice were identified in this research, and six of them increasingly appeared in the rhetoric of states and were institutionalized in the Paris Agreement, demonstrating that the norm has advanced to Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle. The remaining three climate justice principles saw no institutionalization or increase in adoption, with the principle of historical responsibility showing the only decreasing trend over the time period analyzed.

The same six climate justice principles also increased in the framings utilized by CAN, demonstrating that both states' and NGOs' conception of climate change has evolved to increasingly emphasize climate justice. Additionally, many principles have become internalized by NGOs, indicating that climate justice has advanced further as a norm among NGOs compared to states. However, although previous studies often emphasize NGOs as norm entrepreneurs, CAN's shift to climate justice framings did not begin until after the changes had first occurred in the rhetoric of state actors. This highlights CAN's unique role in the UNFCCC not as a norm entrepreneur, but as an actor that uses its advocacy to support state positions and issues that align with its own values and priorities.

Constraining CAN's ability to promote climate justice as a norm entrepreneur were two internal characteristics of the network: its identity as an insider that cooperates with state actors in the UNFCCC system to achieve its goals, and its consensus-based decision-making procedures. With its ability to take the lead as a norm entrepreneur limited, CAN has instead built its advocacy strategies around these constraints. In comparison, due to its more flexible organizational structure and its identity as an actor that challenges dominant institutions, the Climate Justice Now! network was able to publicly advocate for climate justice much earlier than CAN.

## Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance, feedback, and support of my supervising professor Ko Nomura and sub-supervisor Yoshiko Naiki. Professors Yoshihiro Akabuchi, Yoko Masuzawa, Yukari Takamura, and Takahiro Yamada also substantially contributed to the planning, development, and improvement of this research and dissertation.

Special thanks are due to Inesaf Benzaki and Vinicius Douglas Yamanaka, who kindly assisted me with the translation and analysis of non-English documents throughout this study.

I cannot express enough gratitude to all of the people who so graciously offered their time and allowed an unknown researcher on the other side of the world to interview them and include their thoughts and words in his dissertation. Their trust, kindness, and patience were extremely appreciated throughout our correspondence and interviews. This would not have been possible without their contributions and input.

Not only was I honored to receive a scholarship from the Rotary Yoneyama Memorial Foundation, but it was also instrumental in giving me the freedom to dedicate so much time to conducting this research. In particular, the kindness of Toyota Rotary Club and Counselor Masanori Sugiura will not be forgotten.

I am also appreciative of my elder classmates Michiko Kamo and Noriko Umikawa for their help in navigating the myriad procedures involved in successfully making it through a PhD program, and to all of my fellow classmates for their time and companionship.

Finally, I am endlessly grateful to my parents for their unwavering encouragement; to my two brothers for setting the bar and giving me the motivation to reach high; to the Kondo family and Masaru Miyamoto for their selfless support; and to all of my friends for their continued love and patience throughout this endeavor.

## List of Abbreviations

ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Spanish: <i>Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América</i> )
CAN	Climate Action Network (International)
CBDR-RC	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CER	Certified Emission Reduction
CIEL	Center for International Environmental Law
CJN	Climate Justice Now!
COP	Conference of the Parties
DCJ	Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice
EIT	Economy in Transition
ENGO	Environmental Non-governmental Organization
FoE	Friends of the Earth
HRNGO	Human Rights Non-governmental Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPO	Indigenous Peoples Organizations (Constituency)
LCIPP	Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform
LDC	Least-developed Country
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

# Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Background and Overview .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Context .....	1
1.2	Actors: The UNFCCC and CAN International.....	3
	The UNFCCC.....	4
	CAN International .....	7
1.3	Climate Justice .....	12
	Environmental Justice .....	12
	Climate Change: The Environmental Frame and the Climate Justice Frame .....	14
1.4	Research Question, Key Concepts, Contributions, and Methodology .....	17
	Research Question.....	17
	Key Concepts: International Norms, Norm Entrepreneurs, and NGO Networks.....	18
	Academic Contributions.....	23
	Methodology .....	26
<b>2</b>	<b>Applied Theory and Methods.....</b>	<b>28</b>
2.1	International Norms: The Life Cycle of Climate Justice.....	28
	The Norm Life Cycle .....	28
	Principles of Climate Justice .....	33
2.2	Transnational NGO Networks as Norm Entrepreneurs: The Framing Perspective .....	36
	Transnational NGOs and the Influence of Organizational Characteristics.....	36
	Framing Theory.....	40
2.3	Methods.....	44
	Content Analysis: UNFCCC Member COP Statements.....	44
	Content Analysis: CAN International's ECO Newsletter.....	46
	Semi-Structured Expert Interviews .....	49
2.4	Chapter Summary.....	53
<b>3</b>	<b>States: The Post-Copenhagen Evolution of Climate Justice in the UNFCCC .....</b>	<b>56</b>
3.1	Climate Justice in the UNFCCC: Overall Trends.....	56
3.2	Analysis of Institutionalized Climate Justice Principles .....	61
	Rawlsian Justice .....	63
	Human Rights.....	66
	Social Inequality.....	70
	Loss and Damage .....	73
	Contextual Vulnerability .....	76

Indigenous Rights.....	78
3.3 Analysis of Non-institutionalized Climate Justice Principles .....	80
Historical Responsibility .....	81
Other Issues: Criticism of Market Mechanisms and Global Systems .....	83
3.4 Conclusions: The Growth of Climate Justice .....	84
<b>4 NGOs: CAN International’s Climate Justice Norm Promotion.....</b>	<b>87</b>
4.1 Climate Justice in <i>ECO</i> : Overall Trends .....	89
4.2 Climate Justice Principles Present in CAN’s Framing.....	95
Rawlsian Justice .....	96
Loss and Damage .....	98
Human Rights.....	101
Social Inequality.....	105
Contextual Vulnerability .....	108
Indigenous Rights.....	109
4.3 Climate Justice Principles Absent from CAN’s Framing.....	112
Historical Responsibility .....	112
Other Issues: Criticism of Market Mechanisms and Global Systems .....	114
4.4 Conclusions: CAN International’s Role in Climate Justice Advocacy .....	117
<b>5 Constraints on CAN International’s Climate Justice Norm Entrepreneurship .....</b>	<b>119</b>
5.1 Identity as a UNFCCC “Reformist” .....	121
UNFCCC Member State Delegates as CAN’s Target Audience .....	123
“Winnable” Issues and Pragmatic Messaging to Influence Framing Targets .....	127
Appropriate Framings Among Target Actors .....	129
5.2 Consensus-based Decision Making.....	132
CAN Member Makeup.....	135
Influence within CAN .....	140
Supporter Bases as Members’ Target Audiences.....	143
5.3 Conclusions: Internal Network Characteristics and Audience Effects .....	148
<b>6 Research Summary, Limitations, and Opportunities for Future Studies.....</b>	<b>151</b>
6.1 Summary of Results and Analysis .....	151
6.2 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities.....	155
Research Limitations .....	155
Future Research Opportunities .....	157
<b>Appendix A: Analyzed Climate Justice Texts .....</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>Appendix B: Interview Questions .....</b>	<b>162</b>
<b>Appendix C: UNFCCC Member State COP Statement Data .....</b>	<b>166</b>

<b>Appendix D: <i>ECO</i> Newsletter Data.....</b>	<b>171</b>
<b>Appendix E: CAN International Membership Data .....</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>References .....</b>	<b>175</b>



# 1 Background and Overview

## 1.1 Context

Reducing current levels of greenhouse gas emissions is necessary to effectively address climate change, yet emission reductions are not being pursued at the pace necessary to prevent its most severe impacts. Even achieving current emission goals and limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial times will not prevent irreversible damage across the planet (Global Carbon Project, 2018; United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2019). Indeed, the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters must address the question of how to limit their emissions. Meanwhile, vulnerable communities, nations, and regions are forced to prepare to adapt to a warming world that threatens their security, culture, and for some, their very existence.

Adapting to climate change will require significant behavioral, infrastructural and systemic changes throughout society in response to the observed and predicted impacts to livelihoods, food security, access to water, economic stability and human health and safety (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2018). As the world acts to minimize the impacts of climate change while implementing the changes necessary to adapt to it, conceptions of human rights and social justice will be at the core of the decisions and actions undertaken.

Issues of justice and human rights have always played a role in global environmental governance,<sup>1</sup> maintaining a constant presence throughout climate change negotiations ever since the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992. It was at

---

<sup>1</sup> The Stockholm Declaration of 1972, the first comprehensive multilateral treaty addressing human effects on the environment, states that “[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations” (United Nations, 1972, Principle 1).

this conference that representatives of 172 nations gathered together to tackle the problem of climate change under one united effort that would lead to the current global climate change regime.

Despite a vision of nations from diverse circumstances recognizing the importance of placing the needs of the planet above their own interests, issues arose from the very beginning when it came to agreeing upon a socially-shared understanding of fairness. Questions left unanswered included who is most responsible for past and present climate change, who will sustain the greatest damage under a warming planet, and who should be expected to take on the daunting and costly responsibility to address it – or what Roberts and Parks (2006, p. 7) call the “triple inequality” of responsibility, vulnerability, and mitigation. These discrepancies have maintained a consistent presence throughout global climate change negotiations ever since.

However, in order to establish effective rules and mechanisms to achieve sufficient emission reductions and transfer of finance and technology for adaptation, negotiating states must come to a shared understanding of what problems to address, the necessary solutions, and the most effective approach to implementing those solutions. These conceptions will dictate the direction and outcome of the negotiations, and ultimately the solutions the world has chosen to pursue.

The importance of this became markedly clear at the negotiations that took place at the UNFCCC’s 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen, Denmark from December 7-19, 2009. The objective of the conference was to deliver a new comprehensive multilateral agreement to mitigate and adapt to global climate change. However, in the end, no consensus was reached, with issues of global justice and fairness between developed and developing countries emerging as the center of disagreements.<sup>2</sup> The failure to produce a legally-binding outcome perceived as fair by UNFCCC members led many of them to question the efficacy of the UNFCCC process and left civil society organizations divided over how to best engage with negotiations in the future.

Coinciding with these events was the breakthrough moment for the concept of climate justice through the rhetoric and actions of developing country delegates and

---

<sup>2</sup> Black, 2010; Garman, 2009; Rapp et al., 2010; Vidal, 2009; Vidal et al., 2009.

non-governmental organizations (NGOs),<sup>3</sup> sending reverberations that have influenced the direction of climate negotiations and the behavior of environmental NGOs (ENGOS) ever since. COP 15 stands as a landmark event for the climate justice movement, marking a significant turning point in the perspectives brought to climate negotiations by both states and civil society.

Civil society organizations have participated in international climate negotiations from the very beginning (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 7.6). Despite this, civil society's relatively minor direct impact on reducing global emissions compared to that of government actors or the private sector has manifested in a smaller role in the UNFCCC process. However, although NGOs have had relatively little direct influence over the outcome of negotiations, they have had some success in influencing the framing of issues in the UNFCCC (Betsill, 2002; Rietig, 2011).

This research analyzes the role of civil society in the formation of the shared conceptions that guide the direction of UNFCCC negotiations and texts, focusing on the post-Copenhagen era of negotiations and the lead-up to the Paris Agreement. To achieve this, the study examines the evolution of the global conception of climate change alongside the decisions and actions of ENGO networks, focusing particularly on Climate Action Network International (CAN International, or CAN).

## **1.2 Actors: The UNFCCC and CAN International**

Before discussing the theoretical framework of this study, it is necessary to first outline the two subjects of research: UNFCCC member states and CAN International. The following section summarizes the background and history of the UNFCCC, along with the structure of commitments and principles agreed to by its signatories. Following this is a review of the history and structure of CAN, the most active and prolific international ENGO network participating in UNFCCC conferences.

---

<sup>3</sup> ALBA Countries, 2009; Angus, 2009; Chatterton et al., 2012; McGregor, 2011; White, 2009.

## The UNFCCC

As the preeminent multilateral environmental treaty to address global climate change, the UNFCCC remains the principal framework and forum for negotiating global mitigation and adaptation targets, national commitments, and implementation mechanisms to achieve emissions reductions and for the transfer of finance and technology. Ratified at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (often referred to as the Rio Summit or Earth Summit) in June of 1992, the UNFCCC is currently signed by 197 state parties (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2019d).

Article 2 of the Convention outlines its objective:

To achieve...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system...within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner (UN, 1992).

To accomplish this, the Convention calls for countries to develop and publish national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, implement national and regional emissions mitigation measures, address climate change in relevant domestic policies, and sustainably manage carbon sinks. Additionally, developed countries (also commonly referred to as “Annex I” nations<sup>4</sup>) are expected to take the lead by implementing “equitable and appropriate” plans for reducing and reporting emissions and by providing financial assistance and transfer of technology to developing countries to aid in both mitigation and adaptation to climate change. (UN, 1992, Article 4).

---

<sup>4</sup> Listed in Annex I of the Convention, these countries include both countries who were at the time members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as countries classified as “economies in transition” (EIT), former Eastern and Central European republics of the Soviet Union that were in the process of transitioning to a market economy (UNFCCC, n.d.c).

The responsibilities of member states are guided by five underlying principles: i) commitments will be formulated and implemented by nations “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC), with developed countries taking the lead; ii) the needs and circumstances of developing country parties especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change should be given “full consideration”; iii) mitigation actions should be “comprehensive” and guided by the precautionary principle;<sup>5</sup> iv) all countries “have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development”; and v) parties “should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development” for all countries, especially developing nations (UN, 1992, Article 3). Throughout the history of the UNFCCC, these principles have often been the root of serious disagreement between developed and developing countries, arising around negotiations on various issues, mechanisms, policies, and wordings of UNFCCC texts.<sup>6</sup>

Formal negotiations on the development and implementation of obligations take place annually at the Conference of the Parties (COP). COP sessions, along with annual meetings of the subsidiary bodies, are organized and facilitated by the UNFCCC Secretariat, led by the Executive Secretary. Procedural aspects of the COP meetings are overseen and managed by the Bureau of the COP headed by the President of the Bureau, usually a high-ranking official of the party hosting that year’s COP session (UNFCCC, 2019a).

In setting the guidelines for the COP, Article 7 of the UNFCCC allows for non-state participants to attend meetings as observers. The vast majority of the more than 2,000 admitted observer organizations also belong to one of nine constituencies,

---

<sup>5</sup> Kriebel et al. (2001), summarizing a 1998 consensus statement by Tickner and Raffensperger (1999), define the precautionary principle as “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”

<sup>6</sup> These disagreements occurred in climate negotiations even before the Rio Summit and have been documented extensively in academic literature (Bodansky, 2001; Breidenich et al., 1998; Parks & Roberts, 2006; Ramakrishna, 2000; Vogler, 2016)

groups of organizations with broadly-connected interests and perspectives. Constituencies have direct channels of communication with the Secretariat through focal points, who are responsible for providing logistical support to members, convening constituency meetings, exchanging information with the Secretariat, making official statements in the conference plenary, and organizing meetings with officials (UNFCCC, n.d.b).

Initially, only two constituencies were established: environmental NGOs (ENGO), and business and industry NGOs (BINGO). Both of these constituencies have historically maintained a strong presence throughout COP sessions and still make up two of the three largest constituency groups today (Cabr , 2011; Hanegraff, 2015).

**Table 1.1. UNFCCC Non-governmental Organization Constituencies**

Constituency	Abbreviation	Number of Constituents (2019)
Business and industry NGOs	BINGO	299
Environmental NGOs	ENGO	916 (170 CAN-affiliated, 24 Climate Justice Now! [CJN]-affiliated)
Farmers and agricultural NGOs	Farmers	22
Indigenous peoples organizations	IPO	59
Local government and municipal authorities	LGMA	38
Research and independent NGOs	RINGO	557
Trade union NGOs	TUNGO	13
Women and gender constituency	WGC	34
Youth NGOs	YOUNGO	73

*Source:* UNFCCC, n.d.a

The first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) was held in 1995, where it was determined that the commitments of developed nations were inadequate to meet the objectives of the Convention. This resulted in the Berlin Mandate, which called for stronger commitments from Annex I countries and for work to begin on a protocol or other legal instrument to be completed by 1997 (UNFCCC, 1995).

The Kyoto Protocol, the first legally-binding global treaty on climate change, was adopted at COP 3 on December 11, 1997,<sup>7</sup> its rules for implementation established in the Marrakech Accords at COP 7 in 2001. Sharing the objectives and principles of the Convention, it classified countries as Annex I (those with legally-binding commitments) and non-Annex I (those without). Obligations vary for each individual party according to the principle of CBDR-RC, with Annex I countries committing to an average 5% reduction compared to 1990 levels within the first commitment period of 2008-2012. (UNFCCC, 2011).

The adoption of the Bali Action Plan at COP 13 in 2007 set in motion plans for a post-Kyoto framework to go into effect after the end of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period in 2012, with a new treaty expected to be produced at 2009's COP 15 in Copenhagen (UNFCCC 2008, Decision 1/CP.13). However, COP 15 negotiations famously encountered numerous disputes and setbacks, resulting in a contentious, non-binding Copenhagen Accord and forcing a new phase of negotiations that would not produce a legally-binding treaty until the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015.

## **CAN International**

As the largest and most active network of ENGOs participating in the UNFCCC process, CAN International stands out as the most prominent network of environmental organizations representing civil society at the COP summits. It also serves as the focal point for the ENGO constituency, ensuring that its member organizations constitute the core of the ENGO voice throughout UNFCCC negotiations.

Founded in 1989 by 63 NGOs from 22 countries,<sup>8</sup> CAN has grown to include

---

<sup>7</sup> While 192 parties would eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol, notable exceptions include the United States, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases at the time, and Canada, who withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 (UNFCCC, 2019c).

<sup>8</sup> Initially these organizations were from Northern (industrialized) countries – specifically CAN Europe, US CAN, and CAN UK – but developing world representation existed in the early stages of the international network with members from Brazil, the Philippines, and India (CAN, 2014).

ten regional network nodes and ten additional national networks of over 1,300 member organizations from 124 countries (Climate Action Network [CAN], 2019). In its early days, CAN staff reached out to NGOs in underrepresented countries and regions. Presently, new members are generally not actively recruited – rather, organizations usually approach a regional or national CAN network through their own initiative and request to join (Duwe, 2001; Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019).

A mainstay at negotiation meetings since the pre-Rio Summit Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee sessions, CAN seeks to influence UNFCCC negotiations by coordinating its members and providing a focused and coherent voice for civil society ENGOs. Its current charter, adopted in December 2012, states that the network's mission is to “support and empower civil society organizations to influence the design and development of an effective global strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and ensure its implementation at international, national, and local levels in the promotion of equity and sustainable development” (CAN, 2012).

This is achieved through its primary activities of information sharing, capacity building, lobbying on common positions, coordination of media messages, coordination of research efforts, cooperation with other NGO groupings, and mobilization of public support and awareness. Additional activities during UNFCCC negotiations include i) access to the conference site and official documents; ii) attendance and observation of plenary sessions and other formal meetings; iii) participation in workshops and other complimentary informal meetings; iv) plenary statements and interventions during debate; v) written submissions; vi) face-to-face lobbying of delegates; and vii) dissemination of positions and technical information through distribution of documents. To organize these activities, CAN's various methods of communication include regular meetings, coordination through national and regional nodes, conference calls, and regular consultation with members through mailing lists.

CAN's approach to engaging in climate negotiations has historically been characterized by a relatively moderate stance on many issues compared to more radical environmental groups. Preferring insider tactics based on cooperation and persuasion rather than protest and contention, CAN and its members have constantly fought for representation and participatory power in UNFCCC processes throughout the history of



global climate change negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2008, p. 40; Ciple et al., 2015, p. 168).

The degree to which NGOs are able to participate in the UNFCCC process is determined by the UNFCCC Secretariat, leaving CAN with very little power to directly influence state delegates – and therefore the content of UNFCCC texts and decisions (Depledge, 2013, pp. 216-230; Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004, p. 59). As one noteworthy example, CAN was completely excluded from key moments in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol and denied access to closed-door sessions where much of the negotiations took place (Betsill, 2002, p. 54). Opportunities for participation have remained low for ENGOs, even as the UNFCCC Secretariat has made efforts to cater to other non-state actors by enhancing their role within the UNFCCC (Bäckstrand et al., 2017; Dombrowski, 2010; Hale, 2016).

CAN as a network is completely member-driven; official positions usually begin as proposals by working groups before being circulated throughout CAN via email lists and adopted through member consensus (CAN, 2012; Hadden, 2015, pp. 99-100). If any significant disagreements remain on an issue and a consensus cannot be reached, then an official position is not adopted. Phrased another way, policy positions of CAN are decided by the consensus of the members who choose to, and are able to, participate in the decision-making process.

Within CAN are a number of issue-focused working groups that perform research, develop policy recommendations, and conduct advocacy work in promoting CAN's policies related to their issue.<sup>9</sup> Membership and participation in these working groups is on a purely voluntary basis. Therefore, a working group's level of activity is dependent on the relevancy of its target issue at that particular time, as well as the presence of enough people willing to dedicate their efforts to continue the operation of that group.

Due to this, the number of participants and output of a working group is constantly evolving as different issues in UNFCCC negotiations change priority and more or fewer people are compelled to engage in those issues. It is not uncommon for a

---

<sup>9</sup> Currently, there are 18 active working groups in CAN. See Table 1.2 for a list of working groups and their issues of focus.

working group to become dormant as other issues gain prominence and urgency in negotiations, only to later reactivate as the issue returns to relevance and CAN members choose to again focus their efforts in response. Because of its member-driven structure in developing and implementing strategy, CAN's working group system has been described as "an internal marketplace of ideas" (Holtz, interview by author, 15/02/2019).

The most active members of CAN International have historically been large ENGOs from Northern (developed) countries, such as Greenpeace or the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Often referred to as the "big globals," these organizations have broad institutional reach in international policy processes and share a close relationship with CAN International and the CAN nodes most active in the UNFCCC process (CAN Europe, in particular). This has resulted in a decision-making process disproportionately influenced by a small number of Northern organizations, even to the extent of enabling *de facto* veto power in the decision-making process.<sup>10</sup>

Differences in the priorities, advocated policies, and recommended approaches of member organizations from developed and developing countries have been the source of disagreements and internal friction within CAN throughout its history. This famously led to many climate justice-focused members in 2007 organizing Climate Justice Now! (CJN), a new NGO network aligned more closely to their interests (Duwe, 2001; Matsumoto, 2010; Newell, 2000, pp. 138-139). In a network made up of such a diverse membership of organizations, these differences still remain to this day, but as with any NGO network, CAN's membership, priorities, and advocacy approaches continue to evolve and change over time.

---

<sup>10</sup> Hadden (2015, p. 100) states that since 100% consensus is not possible in such a broad network, "consensus" generally means that 95% or more organizations approve of a proposal. However, this is also contingent on the approval of large Northern NGOs, which are able to essentially strike down proposals they do not approve of.

**Table 1.2. CAN International Active Working Groups**

<b>Working Group</b>	<b>Issues of Focus</b>
Adaptation and Loss and Damage	Negotiation streams and mechanisms related to adaptation and loss and damage
Agenda 2030	Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals
Agriculture	Food security, land use, and emissions reductions related to agriculture
Bunkers	Reducing emissions in the aviation and international shipping sectors
Comms	Media outreach and coordinating communications across the network at global, regional and national levels
Energy	Transition to renewable energy, fossil fuel supply and production
Finance	Facilitating finance from developed countries for mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries
Flexible Mechanisms	Carbon markets, Kyoto market mechanisms
G20	Promoting sustainable development in G20 policies
Global Stocktake	Inputs, outputs and modalities of the Global Stocktake and the Facilitated Dialogue in 2018
Long-Term Strategies and Climate Action Initiatives	Long-term strategies for decarbonization and climate-resilient development
Mitigation	Global, regional, and national emission reductions
NGO Participation	Inclusion of NGOs and local stakeholders and transparency in UNFCCC negotiations
Science Policy	Science, geoengineering, 1.5°C and the Second Periodical Review of the Convention
Short Lived Climate Pollutants	Phasing out of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and other short-lived climate pollutants
Sinks	Carbon sinks, REDD+ and Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)
Technology	Transfer and proliferation of climate technologies
Transparency	Accuracy in Measurement, Reporting, and Verification of Climate Change Mitigation (MRV)

*Source: CAN, n.d.*

## 1.3 Climate Justice

### Environmental Justice

To clarify the meaning of climate justice, it is necessary to trace its development from the concept of *environmental justice*. Developed through the lens of the social and political history of the United States and the experiences of its minority communities, environmental justice's early conceptualizations have remained a strong part of how it is defined. Bryant (1995) points out that environmental justice deals with much more than the natural environment; the desired outcome is ultimately a living environment that promotes and encourages human security, psychological stability and meaningful cultural representation:

Environmental justice...refers to those cultural norms and values, rules, regulations, behaviors, policies, and decisions to support sustainable communities, where people can interact with confidence that their environment is safe, nurturing, and productive. Environmental justice is served when people can realize their highest potential, without experiencing the "isms." These are communities where both cultural and biological diversity are respected and highly revered and where distributed justice prevails. (Bryant, 1995, p. 5).

A prevalent conception of justice featured in both environmental justice movements and academic literature on the topic is John Rawls' Two Principles of Justice.<sup>11</sup> Notably, while Rawls recognizes that all people are entitled to certain rights and liberties, he emphasizes that any distribution of burdens or benefits should be carried out with the goal of aiding the least advantaged in society, thus drawing a

---

<sup>11</sup> "First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." (Rawls, 2009, p. 266).

distinction between equity and a purely equal distribution.

Environmental justice has expanded over the years to include a diverse range of countries, issue areas and political contexts. Often, local environmental justice issues are directly or indirectly connected to the same international economic and political systems, processes, and institutions that are responsible for the growth of global environmental issues. Due to this, over time the concept has broadened from local and regional contexts to include global issues (Agyeman, 2013; Mehta et al., 2014; Newell, 2005, p. 71; Schlosberg 2004, p. 534, Sikor and Newell 2014, pp. 151-152; Walker, 2009).

The concept of global environmental justice has extended to the issue of climate change, leading to the development of climate justice. A common thread in the conceptualizations of global environmental justice is the focus on the negative impacts felt in the Global South (developing countries) as a result of the Global North (developed countries) imposing its will through international agreements, regimes, and institutions – including through those with environmental protection as their main objective (Anand 2004, p. 15; Martin, 2013; Okereke, 2006, pp. 726-7).

Like the idea of justice itself, the concept of climate justice is pliable enough to hold various meanings depending on the setting in which it is being used and the actor using it (Martin, 2013, p. 102; Okereke, 2010, p. 471). However, climate justice as it exists today has largely been defined by how it applies to issues related to the procedure and governance (i.e., negotiations and agreements) of the UNFCCC and the broad social movement in response (Jamison, 2010, pp. 818-9)

Schlosberg and Collins (2014) expand on the various conceptions of climate justice, pointing out that a gap exists between its academic articulations and the practical concerns of the climate justice movement. The academic stream of climate justice is described as largely disconnected from the pragmatic climate justice issues discussed in UNFCCC negotiations. Instead, it is “an attempt at applied philosophy” focusing on various conceptions of justice and equity and how they relate to global climate policy.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> For theoretical articulations of climate justice, see: Adger, 2001; Anand, 2004, p. 54; Barrett, 2012; Bulkeley et al., 2013; Ciple et al., 2015; Fritze & Wiseman, 2009; Ikeme, 2003; Moss,

While the focus of scholars has largely been on how to define the “justice” in climate justice, climate justice as a movement stems from people’s experiences with injustice and lack of fair treatment (Okereke, 2010, p. 463-4). The climate justice movement is characterized by a prioritization of the politics – rather than the science – of climate change. This perspective is often also accompanied by a skeptical view of the role of international institutions and processes in addressing it (Bond, 2013; Bond and Dorsey, 2010; Hadden, 2015, p. 122). The objectives of the climate justice movement can broadly be described as “moving to a post-carbon energy system, paying for the ecological and social damage of climate change, and protecting the voice and sovereignty of the most vulnerable” (Schlosberg and Collins 2014).

Due to the diversity of these struggles and experiences, it is difficult to group together so many unique voices and movements into one global “climate justice” movement; a wide range of organizations are “overlapping, interacting, competing, and differentially placed and resourced” with their own localized and contextual interpretations of climate justice (Routledge, 2011, p. 385). “Ideas of fairness and equity are highly dependent on contexts of history and place” and differ based on variances in individual experiences and cultural backgrounds, generational tensions, and intellectual disagreements (Jamison, 2010, p. 818).

With this in mind, this research attempts to derive common principles observed across a range of climate justice groups that can be applied to the wider global movement to identify and define a “climate justice frame.”

### **Climate Change: The Environmental Frame and the Climate Justice Frame**

Much has been written about the conceptualization of climate change by various actors in UNFCCC negotiations through their construction of *frames* – “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Goffman, 1974, p.

21).<sup>13</sup> Vogler (2016, pp. 13-30) discusses that the one constant in the framing of climate change throughout UNFCCC negotiations is a focus on science and the environment, despite its actual underlying causes being more closely related to international processes such as the globalization of markets, consumption patterns, energy use, and global business.

Similarly, Adger et al. (2001) analyze two main discourses that appear in discussions of a number of global environmental issues, climate change included. In the global environmental management discourse, environmental problems can be addressed through global institutions and technological solutions. Competing with it is the populist discourse, which advocates for ground-up local solutions that prioritize minimizing the impacts on communities through enhancing civil society's procedural power.

Della Porta and Parks (2014) take a comparable approach to analyzing the framings used by NGOs, separating the post-Copenhagen civil society climate movement into the "climate change stream" (in which CAN is included) and the "climate justice stream." The fundamental divide between the two is based on each stream's framing of climate change as it relates to capitalism: the climate justice stream attributes the root causes of climate change to global capitalism, while the climate change stream seeks to work within the current capitalist system to find solutions.

Studies by Allan and Hadden (2017) and Kuchler (2017) also use various issues as indicators to show the shift from a "science frame" based on ecological modernization to a human rights-focused "justice frame" by NGOs. Nicholson and Chong (2011) elaborate on ENGOs' post-Copenhagen adoption of a framing emphasizing human rights rather than science to "convert climate change from a dry and amorphous scientific problem into a tangible and actionable humanistic problem" (p. 131).

This research incorporates the ideas and conclusions of these studies to conceive of an evolutionary path of how climate change is expanding from an *environmental frame* to a *climate justice frame*. The environmental frame refers to the perspective commonly held at the beginning of UNFCCC negotiations, as well as the perspective

---

<sup>13</sup> Studies on climate change framings include: Anshelm & Hultman, 2015; Audet, 2012; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2007, 2016; Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014.

initially held by CAN that led to internal tensions between member organizations. It is characterized by the following perspectives: i) climate change is primarily an environmental issue, with scientific solutions; ii) it is a global problem, with all countries, peoples, and environments impacted, and thus with a common responsibility to solve the issue; iii) it can be successfully addressed without modifying current global political and economic power structures; and iv) mitigation should be of greatest focus, with market-based mechanisms playing an important role.

As an expansion of the environmental frame, the climate justice frame does not completely discard these assumptions. However, it differs significantly from the environmental frame with the following notions: i) climate change is not only an environmental issue, but also fundamentally one of human rights, with social causes and solutions; ii) framing it as a “global” issue where everybody is impacted is a mischaracterization of the problem, as all countries and peoples are not equally vulnerable to climate change, and their capacity to respond also differs dramatically; iii) those historically responsible for climate change are obligated to take the appropriate amount of responsibility in addressing it; iv) successfully addressing climate change requires a reevaluation of global political and economic systems; and v) adaptation and compensation for those most vulnerable to climate change are emphasized in addition to mitigation efforts.

A shift from the environmental frame to the climate justice frame is the result of the growth of climate justice as an international norm. In the context of norms, “frames provide a singular interpretation of a particular situation and then indicate appropriate behavior for that context” (Payne, 2001, p. 39). Successful norms are the result of effective framing campaigns by the actors seeking to advance them (Barnett, 1999). Often, these “frame articulators” are NGOs, as their relative lack of direct or causative power in international politics compared to states leaves persuasion as their strongest method of influence and framing as their primary persuasive device (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Khagram, et al., 2002, p. 11). One could therefore expect CAN, as the largest NGO presence in the UNFCCC, to likely be a contributor to the growth of climate justice.



## 1.4 Research Question, Key Concepts, Contributions, and Methodology

### Research Question

The research performed and discussed throughout this dissertation is guided by one primary research question:

*What role did NGOs play from the perspective of norm entrepreneurship in the emergence and promotion of climate justice in the post-Copenhagen era of climate negotiations?*

To answer this question, this research analyzes the case of CAN International, the largest and most prominent ENGO network representing civil society in the UNFCCC, and investigates the factors facilitating and constraining its ability to act as a norm entrepreneur in the UNFCCC.

The main research question can be broken into three sub-questions:

1. *How has climate justice progressed as a norm in the UNFCCC?*

This sub-question is answered in Chapter 3 by analyzing the rhetoric of UNFCCC member states and the content of the Paris Agreement using the Norm Life Cycle as a theoretical framework.

2. *Was CAN's role in the promotion of climate justice that of a norm entrepreneur?*

As NGOs are often assumed to be norm entrepreneurs in international politics, this sub-question is answered in Chapter 4 by comparing CAN's adoption of climate justice principles to that of state actors.

3. *Why did CAN play that role, and what were the factors behind it?*

This sub-question is answered in Chapter 5 by analyzing expert interview data using the theoretical framework of collective action frames. Addressing this question highlights the significance of internal characteristics of NGO networks in aiding or constraining norm entrepreneurship.

### **Key Concepts: International Norms, Norm Entrepreneurs, and NGO Networks**

Before detailing the academic contributions and methodology of this study, it is first necessary to define some of the key concepts that are used throughout this dissertation. Three principal concepts are outlined and discussed in this section: international norms, norm entrepreneurs, and NGO networks.

This research uses a perspective grounded in international norms to evaluate how the conception of climate change held by both states and ENGO networks has evolved in regard to climate justice. Katzenstein (1966, p. 5) characterizes norms as mechanisms “to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.” In other words, norms are “the sense of ought...how an actor should behave” (Florini 1996, p. 364). Raymond (1997, p. 128) provides a more comprehensive definition, conceptualizing them as “generalized standards of conduct that delineate the scope of a state’s entitlements, the extent of its obligations, and the range of its jurisdiction” – what a state is permitted to do, what it is expected to do, and what it has the ability to do. International norms can manifest as standard behaviors, legitimate behavioral claims, or shared understandings and meanings across states.<sup>14</sup>

Norms do not prescribe specific policy options or stipulate explicit rules for what an actor should do. Instead, they provide a general vision suggesting a direction in which policies and agreements should be formulated: “Norms do not necessarily

---

<sup>14</sup> March and Olsen (1998, p. 951) speak of a “logic of appropriateness” in the behavior of actors in the international order, in which actions are seen as based on rules and obligations rather than interests. “Appropriate action” is both action consistent with established identities of actors, as well as action that is considered virtuous in a particular setting or context.

identify actual behaviour; rather they identify notions of what appropriate behaviour ought to be” (Bernstein, 2000).<sup>15</sup> The influence of norms in the context of an international regime is not necessarily a causative one; as loosely-defined constitutive rules, norms merely “prestructure the domains of action within which regulative rules take effect” (Ruggie, 1998, p.33).<sup>16</sup> A norm may be used as justification for behavior, or as the basis for condemnation if behavior falls outside of its accepted boundaries (Axelrod, 1986; Goertz & Diehl, 1992). Thus, norms are the connecting mechanism between ideas and behavior; they are not rigidly enforced as concrete rules, but rather the source of their influence comes from their power to shape actions and identities (Florini, 1996, p. 365).

International norms are constantly evolving over time, but this evolution is not often linear. Many factors can lead to a norm developing in a multitude of directions (and even reverse trajectory), such as the level of similarity of contesting norms (which themselves are also “in process”), internal debates over competing meanings of a norm, its conceptual compatibility with prevailing norms, and influences from the external normative environment (Florini, 1996, p. 374; Krook and True, 2012, pp. 104-106).

Norms are never completely finished products, nor are they a state to be achieved. Rather, they are ever-moving, fluid processes continually being shaped and reshaped. This constant state of transition results in a mutually-constitutive relationship between norms and their environment, where the content and acceptance of norms are highly dependent on their external conditions but are also responsible in part for

---

<sup>15</sup> What is considered “appropriate” can vary depending on the issue area or social context. Because norms are constructed through social processes within a certain setting, the meaning of a norm becomes open to differing interpretations if the setting is changed (Wiener, 2009, p. 177).

<sup>16</sup> Some scholars assert that norms are limited to acting as soft constraints on the behavior of states, while others claim that they offer a clearer explanatory role for states’ behavior. However, they stop short of assigning norms a causative role – norms provide reasons for action, but are not causes of action. Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, p. 767) state that norms may “guide,” “inspire,” “rationalize,” “justify,” or “express mutual expectations” about behavior. But, “they do not effect cause in the sense that a bullet through the heart causes death or an uncontrolled surge in the money supply causes price inflation.”

constructing those conditions. Simultaneously guiding actors' behavior and being shaped by the course of history, the "rules, norms, institutions, and identities that drive human action...coevolve with the worlds in which they act" – norms are both "premises of politics and products of it." (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 958).

Before a norm is accepted by a critical mass of state actors in a global regime, it must first be introduced and promoted by what Sunstein (1997) calls *norm entrepreneurs*. Norm entrepreneurs are those who advocate for a norm in its earliest stages, attempting to advance a norm by persuading state actors to adopt it. They are critical agents for the emergence and growth of a norm, as they "call attention to issues or even 'create' issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 896-897).<sup>17</sup> Academic scholarship often emphasizes the role of non-state actors as norm entrepreneurs, but a state or intergovernmental organization can also assume this role, and multiple norm entrepreneurs can be active in the promotion of a single norm (Ingebritsen, 2002; Kneebone, 2016).

Due to the nature of norms as intangible guiding ideas of appropriateness rather than concrete rules or policies, the framing of a norm is essential to how it is perceived and accepted. Therefore, the construction of frames acts as norm entrepreneurs' primary advocacy tool in their promotion of a norm. Frames are used by various actors as their

---

<sup>17</sup> Other fields of scholarship use terms and concepts similar to "norm entrepreneur." Norm entrepreneurs advocate for certain ideas and principles to be adopted and serve as standards and boundaries of appropriate behavior within a particular setting. Their aim is not only the institutionalization of these ideas, but also their internalization (being "taken for granted") amongst actors in that setting. This differs from the concept of the *policy entrepreneur* discussed by Mintrom and Vergari (1996) and Kingdon (2001), which emphasizes those who push for their specific favored policies and solutions during politically opportune policy windows in the policymaking process. Similarly, Dolowitz and Marsh's (2000) research on agents of policy transfer focuses particularly on the actors that carry knowledge about policies, political arrangements and institutions into the development of those in another time or place. In addition, the concept of the *political entrepreneur* predominantly emphasizes individuals – for example, the people who considerably impact the direction or flow of politics (Schneider & Teske, 1992), or those who responsible for forming transnational networks to further their organizational objectives (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

fundamental persuasive mechanism, as they “deploy frames to fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems” (Barnett, 1999, p. 25). They are utilized to advocate for a universal cognitive perspective intended to promote how a problem is defined, how it fits into our understandings of the world, and how it can be addressed in a way compatible with those understandings:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe... (Entman 1993, p. 52).

By strategically constructing and promoting salient frames, the objective of norm entrepreneurs is to convince a critical number of states to adopt a norm, advancing it to the point of institutionalization in a treaty or agreement. Particularly strong frames may even contribute to the eventual internalization of the norm by states, becoming a new principle that guides what is and is not appropriate in the development of future agreements.

Norm promotion can occur on many levels – international, regional, domestic, or local. However, analyzing the processes behind the development of multiple climate justice principles throughout the multitude of countries participating in climate negotiations is beyond the scope of a single study. This research examines climate justice as one aspect of the global conception of climate change, an issue with causes that transcend national borders and solutions that are negotiated multilaterally. Specifically, it explores the norm promotion activities of transnational NGO networks on the international level. As the primary global forum for states to collectively formulate and negotiate comprehensive climate action, UNFCCC COP conferences were chosen as the setting to most accurately analyze on the international level the role of justice norms as they relate to climate change.

The selected subject for analysis of the promotion of climate justice as a norm is CAN International, the largest and most active grouping of ENGOS in the UNFCCC

setting. Eccleston (2008) classifies CAN as a *network* in his comparison of NGO collaboration styles. A network has a coordinating secretariat that emphasizes information sharing, with less specific tasks and campaigns between members than *coalitions* (which are based on single-event joint campaigns) or *alliances* (in which close, long-term collaboration between trusted members is based on shared values). Furthermore, unlike the other two classifications, membership in a network does not impede or compromise independent campaigns undertaken by member organizations. While some international NGOs such as WWF and Greenpeace International – both members of CAN – can in some ways be interpreted as networks, a more accurate classification is closer to that of alliances, due to stricter and more involved coordination by the secretariat and stronger relationships between members based on more specific common ideals.

While it is not the only ENGO network involved in UNFCCC negotiations, CAN was chosen as the representative network due to its unparalleled size, the diversity of member organizations, and its level of participation and influence in the UNFCCC process. Additionally, CAN serves as the focal point for the ENGO constituency<sup>18</sup>, broadly representing ENGOs in official interactions with the UNFCCC Secretariat. Since it was not possible in the scope of this research to look at every NGO network involved in UNFCCC negotiations, CAN stands out as the clear target of inquiry when examining transnational ENGO networks participating in the UNFCCC process.

In the analysis of the promotion of climate justice, CAN is compared to the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ), a networking of NGOs established in 2007 specifically to promote climate justice in the UNFCCC.<sup>19</sup> Although DCJ shares many of its member organizations with CAN, its formation was motivated by frustration among some CAN members after unsuccessfully lobbying within the network to

---

<sup>18</sup> The ENGO constituency also currently shares half of its speaking time during plenary interventions with CJN.

<sup>19</sup> Although it is still referred to as CJN in UNFCCC interactions, as of 2012 it formally operates as a network called the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ). The details of this distinction and the importance of the internal structure of CAN and DCJ in their promotion of climate justice are discussed further in Chapter 5.

officially incorporate climate justice principles into its positions and framings. Thus, DCJ serves as a useful comparison when examining why CAN was unable to emerge as the leading norm entrepreneur of climate justice, and how internal characteristics of CAN and DCJ played a role in their promotion of climate justice.

## **Academic Contributions**

The research presented in this dissertation makes three principal academic contributions. First, it contributes to the existing environmental studies literature by clarifying the issues that define climate justice and their role in the UNFCCC's conception of climate change, deepening the academic understanding and theoretical articulations of climate justice.

Schlosberg and Collins (2014) point out that a significant gap exists between the academic stream of climate justice theory and the objectives and priorities of the climate justice movement. The focus of academic scholarship on climate justice has been largely skewed to discussion of differing theories of justice and how they relate to equitable burden sharing and the responsibilities of states – who is responsible for climate change, how global greenhouse gas emission reductions should be divided, and how much compensation should be given to vulnerable countries through adaptation finance, technology transfer, and development assistance (Adger, 2001; Barrett, 2012; Ikeme, 2003; Moss, 2009; Okereke, 2010; Page, 2013; Pottier et al., 2017; Roberts & Parks, 2007).

However, no study has attempted to link the academic and practical streams by comprehensively analyzing the progress of individual principles of climate justice in the global conception of climate change. As climate justice increasingly becomes a part of how global actors understand climate change, it will become necessary to know what concrete issues climate justice encapsulates in order for scholars to effectively research climate change as a problem and how to approach it (Okereke, 2008, p. 29; Parks & Roberts, 2010).

Second, this dissertation contributes to the study of international environmental NGOs by examining their political influence through issue framing. These frames are

the foundation of how climate change is conceptualized as a problem and what approaches state actors agree upon to address it. By examining the norm promotion of CAN, the preeminent representative of NGOs in the UNFCCC, this research clarifies the role of one of the major actors in global climate negotiations and the influence of the factors that guide an actor's strategic construction of frames outlined in Benford and Snow's (2000) theory of collective action frames.

Previous studies have analyzed the framing power of NGOs in the UNFCCC and determined that they have been able to indirectly influence the framing of issues in the agenda-setting phases of negotiations (Betsill 2002, 2008; Hadden, 2015, pp. 152-4; Newell, 2000, pp. 137-8; Rietig, 2011). However, what has been left unexplained is *why* NGOs have chosen their frames to promote, and what factors facilitated or constrained their framing processes.

Scholarship examining the framing utilized in the UNFCCC setting by ENGOs has provided a foundation for the research undertaken in this study to expand upon. Matsumoto (2010) investigates the relationship between the makeup of CAN's member organizations and the shift in its framing of climate change prior to COP 15. This study asserts that the influence on CAN from large, Northern international cooperation NGOs such as Oxfam and Christian Aid added humanitarian issues to CAN's environmentally-focused framing. These organizations were able to do this by reframing typically Southern issues into Northern ones in order to prompt the reconception of climate adaptation into an important issue for developed countries. Kuchler (2017) demonstrates that ENGOs gradually utilized more of a climate justice framing from 1997 to 2015 in its rhetoric regarding the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) while drifting away from previous frames of green governmentality and ecological modernization. Similarly, Allan and Hadden (2017) focus on the issue of loss and damage in their study of CAN's shift from a "scientific frame" to a "justice frame" in the years approaching the Paris Agreement. By comparing the number of articles in CAN's *ECO* newsletter that used scientific evidence to support positions to the number of articles that referenced "justice," "equity," or "fairness," evidence is provided showing an increase in justice framing alongside a decrease in scientific frames.

While previous scholarship has explored the evolution of the framing of certain



issues by NGOs, this research contributes to the understanding of the factors in Benford and Snow's (2000) theory of collective action frames that facilitate or constrain an actor's strategic framing processes. By clarifying the role of NGOs in framing the conception of climate change in the UNFCCC and elucidating the factors that influenced their framing strategies regarding multiple climate justice principles, this study deepens the understanding of the UNFCCC process and the place of NGOs in it.

The third contribution of this dissertation is made to the study of international norms by deepening the understanding of how an actor becomes a norm entrepreneur and why other actors fail to become one. Norm entrepreneurs are the primary actors responsible for promoting a norm in the earliest stage its life cycle, where they attempt to persuade a critical mass of states to adopt new norms. The shape and content of a new norm is highly dependent on who is promoting it, and this particular configuration and framing of a norm determines whether or not it successfully resonates with state actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Understanding the internal characteristics of an actor that facilitates or constrains it in becoming a norm entrepreneur contributes to the knowledge of how international norms emerge and helps illustrate a more complete picture of the Norm Life Cycle.

Although existing research discusses strategic frame construction as the primary tool available to norm entrepreneurs in their promotion of norms, studies that analyze the conditions influencing a norm entrepreneur's strategic framing decisions largely concentrate on factors external to the actor. Some studies discuss the influence of global culture and normative moods on how actors frame international norms in their promotion activities (Finnemore, 1996b; Nadelmann, 1990; Parks & Roberts, 2010; Wiener, 2009), while others highlight regional culture in analyzing how norm entrepreneurs in different geographical regions develop their framings to maximize resonance (Acharya, 2004; Kneebone, 2016).

Scholars such as Barnett (1999), Carpenter (2005, 2007), Price (1998), and Wexler (2003) examine the cultural values of the political or legal setting in which a norm entrepreneur operates and how they were utilized in the framing strategies of norm entrepreneurs. Additionally, Adachi (2013) and Payne (2001) provide examples of norm entrepreneurs' strategic frame development being constrained by the preexisting

institutions and power structures relevant to a norm's issue area, highlighting the limitations on a norm entrepreneur's frame construction imposed by powerful "norm protectors."

These studies, however, pay relatively little attention to why the actors they analyze were able to take the lead as norm entrepreneurs, and how internal organizational characteristics of those actors may have played a role in facilitating their norm entrepreneurship. Who promotes a norm ultimately determines the shape of that norm, and thus knowing what kinds of actors are able to become norm entrepreneurs is important in fully understanding where norms come from and how they develop.

## **Methodology**

The research in this study utilizes a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to obtain a full picture of CAN's place in the evolution of the conception of climate change.<sup>20</sup> Before analyzing the empirical case, the framing of climate change was conceptualized as evolving from an *environmental* frame to one that over time has incorporated in its conception aspects of the *climate justice* frame. As original research for this dissertation, multiple documents and statements from civil society climate justice groups and multilateral climate justice state summits were qualitatively analyzed for emphasized issues. These issues were then cross-referenced, and the climate justice norm was categorized into nine "climate justice principles" to be analyzed separately.

Three stages of research were conducted in this study. In the first stage, the text of the Paris Agreement and the official UNFCCC decision to adopt it were compared to the Kyoto Protocol and analyzed for any statements, guidelines, or mechanisms incorporating any of the nine climate justice principles. From the perspective of international norms, this serves as evidence of institutionalization of these principles, which thus acts as a theoretical basis to assess their normative strength. A quantitative content analysis on the presence of climate justice principles in UNFCCC member

---

<sup>20</sup> Research methods for each of these steps are explained in further detail in Section 2.3.

statements was then conducted to examine any trends over time in the strength of climate justice in the UNFCCC. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 3.

Second, a similar analysis for the presence of the nine climate justice principles was performed on *ECO*, CAN's public newsletter. The results of the analyses on both states and CAN were plotted over time, isolated in different ways, and compared with each other in order to gain a more comprehensive picture of overall trends and patterns. This empirical data is vital to gain a clearer understanding of the relevance of how climate change has been framed by different actors over time, which climate justice principles were promoted by which actors, and who was first responsible for promoting these norms through their framings. The results and conclusions of this analysis are discussed in Chapter 4.

Finally, to answer why CAN was unable to emerge as the leading norm entrepreneur for climate justice, the characteristics of the network itself were explored. This was done quantitatively, through the analysis of member lists to examine changes in its organizational makeup over time, and qualitatively, through a series of semi-structured expert interviews with CAN officials and other relevant individuals to better understand CAN's role as norm entrepreneurs and the factors that aided and constrained its promotion of climate justice. This analysis makes up Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

Together, the research performed in each of these steps provides the data necessary to answer the three research sub-questions and clarify how climate justice has developed as a norm in the UNFCCC (Chapter 3), the role of CAN in promoting it (Chapter 4), and the factors influencing CAN's adoption of this role (Chapter 5).<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Any data presented in figures or tables without a referenced source are the results of the original research and analysis of the author of this dissertation.

## **2 Applied Theory and Methods**

Along with covering previous academic work relevant to this research, this chapter details the theoretical concepts and framework guiding the analysis presented in subsequent chapters and outlines the methods utilized in this research.

It begins by reviewing the evolution of international norms with particular reference to the Norm Life Cycle, the fundamental theoretical framework adopted in this research. Particular focus is given to the role non-state actors play in the introduction, development and diffusion of norms. The individual principles making up the concept of climate justice are then clarified in order to evaluate their status among states and NGOs in the following two chapters, respectively.

The next section discusses the use of collective action frames by NGOs and transnational NGO networks as their principal strategy to promote norms and attempt to influence state behavior. The processes involved in strategic frame construction are aided and constrained by a number of factors, which this research analyzes in the case of CAN's promotion of climate justice in the UNFCCC.

Finally, the methods utilized in this study are detailed in order to outline how the research for this dissertation was conducted to accurately answer the three research sub-questions in the following chapters.

### **2.1 International Norms: The Life Cycle of Climate Justice**

#### **The Norm Life Cycle**

To assess the role of climate justice in the UNFCCC's shared conception of global climate change, this research utilizes Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) "Norm Life Cycle" as its principal framework for analysis. The Norm Life Cycle illustrates the processes required for an idea to develop into an internationally-accepted standard for

behavior, and can be used as a basis of analysis to evaluate the extent to which a norm is accepted in a particular setting.<sup>22</sup> This framework is applied in Chapter 3 to analyze the adoption of climate justice by state actors and used in Chapter 4 as a basis to compare its adoption by states and NGOs.

Norms become dominant through a three-stage process: *Norm Emergence*, *Norm Cascade*, and *Internalization* of the norm. Each of these stages contains its own unique characteristics and identifiable criterion (Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1 The Norm Life Cycle**

	<i>Stage 1</i> <i>Norm Emergence</i>	<i>Stage 2</i> <i>Norm Cascade</i>	<i>Stage 3</i> <i>Internalization</i>
<i>Actors</i>	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
<i>Motives</i>	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
<i>Dominant Mechanisms</i>	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

*Source:* Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998

Shared meanings, identities, and definitions of problems are not born in a vacuum; they are developed over time through interactions between states and non-state actors. Global issues create opportunities for cooperation, which then prompt further

---

<sup>22</sup> It is necessary to point out that, despite describing the same phenomenon, the term “norm” is used in two different ways in academic literature depending on the author using it. Some authors speak of “normative ideas” growing into norms, where a norm is the final state of an idea that has become universally adopted and internalized by actors – until then, it is only an idea. Others use the term “norm” to describe any idea that has the possibility to grow into a dominant norm or competes for influence with preexisting norms. These norms can then be described as weak or strong, depending on their influence on behavior or relationship to competing norms. This research adopts the latter definition based on the conception of norms as incomplete processes rather than the rationalist perspective of them as “things” that exist.

contact as general familiarity and shared identities are developed. Through continued and repeated interaction between actors, dominant meanings and common definitions of problems gain traction and develop, which then shape actors' conception of appropriate behavior in attempts to solve the issue (March & Olsen, 1998, pp. 963-4).

The first stage, Norm Emergence, is where the norm first takes shape, and is promoted by actors with an organizational platform and agenda compatible with that norm. These norm entrepreneurs use an organizational platform (an NGO, for example) to attempt to persuade states and other relevant actors to adopt the norm they are advocating for. This platform and its values, priorities, and issue agendas may also influence how the norm is shaped or what form of it is promoted.<sup>23</sup> A norm entrepreneur is not defined by the success of the norm they are promoting, but rather by their advocacy for the norm in its earliest stages (Sunstein, 1997, p. 35).

Norm entrepreneurs are vital in dictating the shape and direction of a norm during its formative stages; through the strategic framing of issues, they can determine how the public comes to understand a problem and ultimately what configuration the norm will take by creating interpretations of those issues through their choice of language that "names, interprets, and dramatizes them" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). The manner in which a norm is discussed is important in determining both its shape and evolutionary path, and evidence of the existence of a norm can be recognized empirically through the rhetoric and repeated speech acts of relevant actors. (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 13; Finnemore, 1996a, pp. 23-4; Krook & True, 2012, p. 105). This idea guides the approach taken in this study to evaluate the progression of climate justice in UNFCCC negotiations by analyzing the rhetoric of state and non-state actors.

At this stage, norm entrepreneurs are motivated largely by altruistic values, personal empathy, and ideational commitment to specific issues. Although they do also act in their own interests, their understanding of these interests often undergoes a

---

<sup>23</sup> Keck and Sikkink (1998, pp. 6-8) use the term *campaigns* to describe "sets of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse principled network...develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal" as they seek to develop a "common frame of meaning." *Noncampaigns*, on the other hand, are the issues that they set aside and deliberately refrain from promoting.

process of redefinition in order to harmonize with these values and ideas. These “moral entrepreneurs” – “committed individuals who happen to be in the right place at the right time to instill their beliefs in larger global social structures” – also explain why certain norms are able to grow in prominence at particular times (Finnemore, 1996a, pp. 137-9).

It is important to note that new norms do not form in a vacuum; they must compete with established norms, and thus an already-existing “logic of appropriateness” that states are bound to. Therefore, although state actors can push these boundaries to some extent, they must act deliberately and cautiously when interacting with other states. However, as outsiders, NGOs are less constrained in utilizing more audacious and contentious methods to promote norms. Such tactics can often be more effective, as the promotion of a new norm over an existing dominant one is a direct challenge to that logic of appropriateness (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 897-8).

Due to the relative weakness of norms at this stage, persuasion, rather than coercion is the dominant mechanism for spreading the norm as it is emerging. For one, NGOs do not possess coercive power over states. Additionally, when a state actor advocates for a norm, that actor is limited by its desire to maintain a good relationship with and be respected by other states. Persuasion is imperative to convince actors that what is currently believed to be appropriate is, in fact, not; the goal of norm entrepreneurs is not to force states to adhere to certain standards of behavior, but rather to convince them to reconceive what those standards are.

Between Stage 1 and Stage 2 is a tipping point, where a norm is adopted by a “critical mass” of states. After this threshold is reached, more states begin adopting the new norm at a faster pace as they are increasingly influenced by international pressure. Often accompanying Norm Cascade is some form of institutionalization of the norm, usually by a formal set of international rules enacted through a treaty or international organization. States apply and respond to pressure to conform as it relates to their identity in international society, and therefore the dominant mechanism of a norm cascade is socialization, where actors use social pressure to spread the norm. This usually arises in the form of incentives and sanctions in the case of states, or praise and shame in the case of NGOs.

There is no exact quantitative baseline for the number of states that must adopt a norm for it to reach its tipping point. Finnemore and Sikkink cautiously put this number at roughly one-third of total states in the system, while Khagram et al. (2002, p. 15) more specifically define the tipping point as requiring between one-quarter to one-third of actors to accept the new norm. Additionally, depending on the particular issue and the organizations and rule-making institutions involved, *which* states adopt this norm can also be very important; some states are more powerful in the international system than others, and likewise some are more integral to addressing certain issue areas. These states, referred to as “critical states,” are more influential in (and in some cases, crucial to) the progression of a norm.<sup>24</sup>

In the final stage of the Norm Life Cycle, Internalization, the norm is adopted to a high enough degree where the norm becomes so accepted and ingrained in international society that it is “taken for granted” as an uncontroversial notion. The norm then comes to be taken as the dominant conception; contesting the norm is no longer resisting a new or reconceptualized social standard, but rather a contestation of the status quo. Because the appropriate action is now to follow the norm without questioning it, it can be difficult to identify it as a norm unless it is seriously challenged by a new competing idea. While state actors’ acceptance of a norm in Stage 2 is often preceded or followed by some form of institutionalization to indicate collective agreement, Stage 3 is characterized by uncompelled state action; states willingly reform their laws and behavior, both internationally and domestically, to correspond with the values of a norm.

Conceptualizing norms as progressing through these stages serves as a useful and informative method to assess the status and strength of an international norm. Therefore, the Norm Life Cycle is utilized as the foundation of the analytical approach taken in this research to examine the evolution of climate justice and its associated norms.

---

<sup>24</sup> A similar idea is presented in Bob’s (2005, pp. 18-20) “gatekeeper theory,” which asserts that a new norm cannot be easily spread unless gatekeepers in that issue area adopt and embrace the norm.



## Principles of Climate Justice

For this study, the climate justice norm was conceptualized as being constituted primarily by nine principles, outlined in Table 2.2. These principles, conceived of by the author as original research for this dissertation, were derived through cross-referencing and analyzing the advocated issues, beliefs, and framings shared by climate justice organizations and states engaging in multilateral climate justice conferences. Research was conducted through content analysis of relevant statements, declarations, and agreements by both states and civil society organizations, listed in Appendix A.

It was determined that the most useful articulations of climate justice to use for this study were those of the NGOs and state-led global summits whose purpose and objectives are grounded in climate justice. This is in line with Schlosberg (2013, p. 50), who states “theory can, and should, actually learn from the language, demands, and action of movements...the engagement with what is articulated on the ground is of crucial value to our understanding and development of the concepts we study.” Climate justice has become an often-used term in the field of climate change, but the term can hold various meanings depending on the actor using it and the setting in which it is being used. As active participants in grassroots climate justice movements, the actors listed in Appendix A very clearly detail the issues and principles included in their conceptions.

**Table 2.2 Principles of Climate Justice**

		Principle	Description
Equity-based	1	Rawlsian Justice	A conception of justice congruent with Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice.
	2	Social Inequality	The role of climate change and its policy responses in intensifying existing social inequalities, including those related to gender, race/ethnicity, and social class.

Rights-based	3	Human Rights	Connecting the causes, impacts, and responses to climate change to issues of human rights.
	4	Indigenous Rights	The impact of climate change on cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and the rights of indigenous communities.
Responsibility-based	5	Historical Responsibility	Tying greenhouse gas emission reduction responsibilities to historical emissions; often referred to as “climate debt”
	6	Loss and Damage	The provision of compensation to affected countries for loss and damage incurred from climate change impacts.
	7	Contextual Vulnerability	Emphasizing differences between countries, regions, and communities in regard to adaptation capacity and vulnerability to climate change’s effects, highlighting the need for adaptation assistance from developed countries. <sup>25</sup>
Anti-neoliberalist	8	Criticism of Market-based Solutions	Criticism of “false-solutions”: market- and technology-based responses to climate change that do not address its underlying causes.
	9	Criticism of Global Systems	Linking the problems associated with climate change to global systems and practices such as globalization, trade liberalization, international debt, and global capitalism.

---

Schlosberg and Collins (2014) highlight the gap between the theory-focused

---

<sup>25</sup> The implications of framing climate change as a global issue is discussed in-depth by Smith (2007), who argues that a global construction of climate change is exploited as a mechanism to universalize environmental threats and shift responsibilities (and blame) from developed countries to developing ones.

academic conceptions of climate justice and the pragmatic issues emphasized by the climate justice movement's UNFCCC-centered activities. Despite this disconnect, however, three general academic approaches are discussed as overlapping with the interests and objectives of climate justice advocates. The climate justice principles derived for this research fit within these approaches and clarify concrete issues to connect the academic and practical streams.

These approaches can be described as an equity-based approach (Rawlsian conception of justice, social inequality), a rights-based approach (human rights, indigenous rights), and a responsibility-based approach (historical responsibility, loss and damage, contextual vulnerability<sup>26</sup>). In addition to these three academic approaches, Schlosberg and Collins assert that an element of the climate justice movement's conception of climate justice that sets it apart from others is critique of global economic practices as both the primary cause of climate change and as an ineffective and unjust instrument to solve it. Therefore, an anti-neoliberalist approach (criticism of market-based solutions, and criticism of global systems such as capitalism and free trade) is added.

While previous research by Allen and Hadden (2017) and Kuchler (2017) have focused on tracing the development of single issues in negotiations ("loss and damage" and "human rights," respectively) to represent a shift towards a climate justice frame, no study has comprehensively analyzed climate justice by determining the principles it is constituted of. This research evaluates the development of multiple climate justice issues in order to assess what specific issues make up the current conception of climate justice. Analyzing the presence of these issues in the framings of various actors and the text of the Paris Agreement can then provide an indication of what climate justice issues play a role in the global conception of climate change.

---

<sup>26</sup> Contextual Vulnerability is included as a principle of the responsibility-based approach due to its underlying emphasis on the responsibility of developed countries to provide adaptation assistance to the world's most vulnerable countries and regions.

## **2.2 Transnational NGO Networks as Norm Entrepreneurs: The Framing Perspective**

### **Transnational NGOs and the Influence of Organizational Characteristics**

Transnational ENGO networks can play an active role as norm entrepreneurs in global environmental politics, attempting to exert influence in the agenda setting, policy development, and implementation stages of regime formation.<sup>27</sup> Despite often large variances between members in a transnational NGO network,<sup>28</sup> these networks form around issues where NGOs and their members believe that networking will be more effective in achieving their goals. These are usually issues that cannot be resolved effectively through only domestic channels and in which international conferences create spaces and opportunities for developing and strengthening network connections (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 12; Lövbrand et al., 2017).

Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 33) describe transnational civil society itself as an “arena of struggle, a fragmented and contested area.” NGO networks are motivated primarily by shared principled ideas and values, but, like international norms themselves, are also conflict-ridden and constantly evolving. Many studies have documented the differences in conceptions, values, and priorities between Northern and Southern NGOs in ENGO networks.<sup>29</sup>

NGO networks are products of a particular moment in time but permeable over an extended time period, as new member organizations join and compete for influence within the network. Additionally, influential members go through internal shifts of their own as they reevaluate their priorities, agendas and tactics. The characteristics of an

---

<sup>27</sup> See: Arts, 1998; Betsill, 2006, pp. 180-182; Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 201; Raustiala, 2001, p. 103.

<sup>28</sup> NGOs vary in structure, culture, ideology and preferred strategies and priorities, and there is often conflict between them as they compete for influence within a network (Chatterjee & Finger, 1994; Jordan & Van Tuijl, 2000; Princen & Finger, 1994, pp. 7-9).

<sup>29</sup> See: Betsill, 2002; Ciple et al., 2015, p. 30; Conca, 1995; Duwe, 2001; Hadden, 2015; Matsumoto, 2010; Newell, 2000; Roberts & Parks, 2006.

NGO network and a network's member organizations are mutually constitutive and influence each other in the network's decision-making and strategy-development processes: members influence the shape and behavior of the network, while the configuration of the network also empowers and constrains its members (Ohanyan, 2015, pp. 94-5).

The internal characteristics of an NGO network can often play a role in shaping its policy stances, advocacy strategies, and political tactics. One such example is the impact of an NGO network's organizational identity on its political strategies. Distinguishing between lobbying ("engaging with those one wishes to influence") and campaigning ("vilifying and mobilizing support against a target"), Yanacopulos (2005, p. 103) asserts that every NGO network faces the question of how closely to cooperate and work within the system it is attempting to influence. Individual NGOs see themselves as either "reformists" working within the system to change it, or "revolutionaries" working to radically change the system from the outside or even replace it entirely. Eventually, a network of NGOs will have to decide on its own identity, and with this decision often comes conflict among the members within the network.

The ideologies and missions of network members are also relevant to the impact of organizational identity on its norm advocacy strategies. Similarities between organizations are what drive NGOs to collaborate, but conflict arises within a network when ideological differences become pronounced over prioritized issues or strategies (Murdie & Davis, 2011). ENGO networks in particular are susceptible to this internal conflict, as the organizations within them are often extremely varied. ENGOs are likely to seek opportunities for transnational collaboration, but also bring with them a diverse range of ideologies and priorities (Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002, pp. 529-30).

The organizational structure and decision-making procedures of a network additionally impact its political strategies and behavior. Wapner (1996) illustrates how the strategies of Greenpeace, WWF, and Friends of the Earth are shaped in part by their different styles of decision-making between regional offices and each organization's executive board. Balanced decision-making processes are necessary to maintain sustainable long-term coalitions of NGOs, but differences in capacity between NGOs

can limit their participation in a network and unintentionally amplify some members' voices over others (Fox, 2010; Murdie & Davis, 2011).

Structural features of a network can make them vulnerable to division, as strong leadership by some members may instigate conflict if joint decision-making is valued as fundamental to its development of strategies and activities (Nelson, 1997). Additionally, as networks promote conditions for uniformity among its members, organizations in a network with a diverse membership base may grow dissatisfied as they find their autonomy and agency constrained (Ohanyan, 2012, p. 379).

However, although such internal divisions and conflicts are common in NGO networks and its member organizations, this does not necessarily imply that they will be less effective in their promotion of norms. Proactive engagement and efforts to reconcile these differences can result in stronger network coherency, closer collaboration between members, and more potent advocacy (Matsumoto 2010, p. 204; Sikkink, 2002, p. 309).

In contrast to local environmental issues, which must be addressed within their respective cultural, political, and social institutions, global issues such as climate change particularly benefit from transnational NGO engagement. When addressing environmental issues on the international level, ENGOs are less restricted by these domestic contexts, transcending national constraints by reaching out globally to a wide range of both state and non-state actors and promoting universally-applicable environmental norms (Wapner, 1995, pp. 314-5; Princen, 1994, p. 36).

Unlike states, NGOs possess no coercive power in their relationships with other political actors, so they must rely on soft power – persuasion and communicative power – as their primary method of influence (Drezner, 2007, p. 71). The global response to climate change is defined by the multilateral treaties resulting from UNFCCC negotiations, a process driven by relations between state actors. This has meant that, in this particular institutional setting, ENGOs have generally been regarded as relatively weak actors; the degree of their influence is largely dependent on the willingness of governments to accept them as legitimate actors and open the policy process to their participation (Downie, 2014a, p. 174; Khagram et al., 2002, p. 11).

However, although transnational ENGOs do attempt to directly pressure states into adopting particular policies and practices, much of their power comes from their

instrumental role in shaping ideas about the environment through the promotion and spread of norms.<sup>30</sup> Generally unable to directly affect regulatory outcomes, transnational ENGOs and networks intentionally politicize environmental issues in order to set or change the tone of debate around an issue by defining the problem and its causes, advocating for specific solutions, and motivating action (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 30, 161; Princen et al., 1995, p. 47). They utilize the logic of appropriateness to influence the normative discourse around a particular issue, defining the parameters of the problem and designating certain policy decisions as taboo while others as worthy of praise.<sup>31</sup> States “are not static entities with given interests...they are constructed and motivated by cultural frames of reference,” and NGOs are agents in the construction of those frames (Wapner, 2002, p. 49).

From the perspective of long-term change, the role of NGOs in shaping and promoting norms may be more politically significant than more direct forms of political engagement. Therefore, strategic formulation and propagation of issue frames has become an indispensable tool for transnational NGO networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 17; Khagram et al., 2002, pp. 12-3; Wapner, 2002). The conception of an environmental issue defines the terms and conditions under which it is discussed and negotiated, and thus also the approach and methods utilized by states to address the problem (Hajer, 1995, p. 53; Stone, 1989, p. 282).

This makes strategic frame construction a particularly useful tool for norm entrepreneurs in the early stages of Norm Emergence, and thus issue framing becomes their primary objective in the first stage of the Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). For norm entrepreneurs, frames are the “basic building blocks for the construction of broadly resonant norms,” with language as the fundamental instrument for strengthening and legitimizing them (Payne, 2001, pp. 39-44). NGOs construct and apply these frames “at the individual, organizational, corporate, governmental, and interstate levels” to “shift the governing ideas that animate societies, whether

---

<sup>30</sup> See: Ahmed & Potter, 2006, p. 219; Betsill, 2006, p. 180; Sikkink, 2002, pp. 303-4.

<sup>31</sup> Transnational ENGOs “[shape] ideas about the environment and establish boundaries within which states must formulate their responses” (Finger, 1994, p. 60). Also see: Humphreys, 2004; Jasanoff, 1997; and Williams & Ford, 1999.

institutionalized within government or not, and count on this to reverberate throughout various institutions and collectivities” (Wapner, 1995, pp. 322-3).

Issue framing has been one of CAN’s most powerful tools in influencing the direction of UNFCCC negotiations. Betsill (2002, 2008) determined that, while CAN’s advocated positions were not explicitly reflected in the final text of the Kyoto Protocol, it did have moderate influence on the negotiation process through issue framing in the agenda-setting phase. Similarly, Rietig (2011) assessed CAN’s impact on the Copenhagen Accord, concluding that although CAN had no discernable direct influence on the behavior of state delegates or outcome of the treaty, the network did have some noticeable influence on the framing of issues.<sup>32</sup>

## **Framing Theory**

Finnemore and Sikkink emphasize the strategic construction and dissemination of frames as the primary advocacy tool of norm entrepreneurs, and thus Benford and Snow’s theory of collective action frames is utilized in Chapter 5, and to a lesser degree in Chapter 4, as a supplemental theory to analyze CAN’s promotion of norms through their framing processes.

Collective action frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” and “perform an interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects of the ‘world out there’ but in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow & Benford, 1988). In contrast to the more specific organizational frames, *master frames* like environmental and climate justice are collective action frames that are “broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility, and cultural resonance” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619).

---

<sup>32</sup> For additional studies on the impact of CAN’s framing in the agenda-setting phase of UNFCCC negotiations, see: Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004; Downie 2014a, 2014b; Newell, 2000.



The construction of frames involves three main framing tasks: *diagnostic framing* (identifying the problem and attributing its cause and blame), *prognostic framing* (proposed solutions or the strategies to develop solutions to the problem), and *motivational framing* (creating rationale for action through vocabularies of urgency, severity, efficacy and propriety). Injustice frames are a common form diagnostic framing and are an essential part of the climate justice frame, as the concept of climate justice is still not yet strongly defined amongst all actors in the UNFCCC.

In the implementation of these framing tasks, four processes guide the strategic development of frames: i) *frame bridging* - the linking of a frame to other ideological compatible frames;<sup>33</sup> ii) *frame amplification* - the “idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs”<sup>34</sup>; iii) *frame extension* - the expansion of an actor’s interests to include issues important to the target audience of their frame; and iv) *frame transformation* - the creation of new understandings of currently-held ideas and beliefs (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). Through these framing processes, meaning is “negotiated, contested, modified, articulated, and rearticulated” (Benford, 1997, p. 410).

Chapter 5, in its examination of the constraints on an actor’s norm entrepreneurship through its framing processes, is especially concerned with what

---

<sup>33</sup> This is conceptually similar to “norm grafting,” a term coined by Price (1998) to describe the strategic connection of an emerging norm to already-accepted ideas, cultural values, or taboos in order to increase its salience and promote its spread. Carpenter (2007, pp. 103-4) points out that in the process of norm emergence, the promotion of new intersubjective understandings and moral standards is most likely to succeed if they can be compatibly framed and connected with existing moral standards and taboos. This is also emphasized by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 908), who claim that “activists work hard to frame their issues in ways that make persuasive connections between existing norms and emergent norms,” because “the relationship of new normative claims to existing norms may also influence the likeliness of their influence.” For additional examples of norm grafting by transnational NGO networks, see: Adachi, 2013; Barnett, 1999, p. 27; Carpenter, 2005 and; Klotz, 1996, p. 31.

<sup>34</sup> Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 204) also state that “new ideas are more likely to be influential if they fit well with existing ideas and ideologies in a particular historical setting. Since networks are carriers of new ideas, they must find ways to frame them to resonate or fit with the larger belief systems and real life contexts within which the debates occur.”

factors impact the strategic frame construction of actors. Benford and Snow (2000) classify three primary constraints on framing processes arising from the socio-cultural context in which they are ingrained.

The first is political opportunity structure, defined by Kriesi (1996, p. 160) as “three broad sets of properties: the formal institutional structure of a political system, its informal procedures and prevailing strategies with regard to challengers, and the configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers.” Benford and Snow refer to McAdam et al.’s (1996) articulation of the relationship between an actor’s construction of frames and changes in the institutional structure, rules, and informal relations of a political system external to that actor.

In addition to restrictions due to the political and institutional setting, the cultural context in which the actors and issues exist also constrains an actor’s generation of frames. Benford and Snow draw on Swidler’s (1986) concept of culture as a “tool kit” of established beliefs, understandings, meanings, ideologies, and values. Actors strategically draw from these when attempting to create new understandings or reshape old ones.<sup>35</sup> These cultural tools are used as “ingredients” in the formation of frames, as well as playing a role in how frames are understood and internalized.

The final constraining factor discussed by Benford and Snow is “audience effects,” the assertion that an actor strategically shapes a frame based on the particular interests, values, beliefs and knowledge of its target audience in order to maximize the frame’s salience.<sup>36</sup> When an actor changes the audience it targets its frames to, it in turn must modify its frames to fit within the boundaries of what is considered acceptable by that audience and better align with what it perceives as important. Furthermore, any

---

<sup>35</sup> More broadly, Florini (1996) refers to this overall cultural context as the “normative environment,” while Okereke (2008) calls it the “moral temper” of the world.

<sup>36</sup> Benford and Snow contend that the resonance of a frame is based on *credibility* (logical consistency of the frame, its empirical verifiability, and the credibility of the actors constructing and applying the frame) and *salience*, which comes from its centrality (importance of the frame to the lives of the target audience), experiential commensurability (how relatable the frame is to the targets), and narrative fidelity (the greater cultural relevance of the frame).

internal changes within the target audience must also be met with appropriate modifications to the frames aimed at them.

As this dissertation explores the role of CAN in promoting climate justice, examining the factors influencing its framing processes can clarify the reasons behind CAN's role in advancing norms in the UNFCCC. Based on Benford and Snow's theory, one would expect that these three external factors each have an impact in constraining CAN's incorporation of climate justice into its framing of climate change. More concretely, this could be hypothesized as: i) CAN relying on the institutional structure, rules, and relationships of the UNFCCC for the opportunities to promote climate justice (political opportunity structure); ii) constructing its frames based on global cultural temperament regarding climate change and social justice (cultural opportunities and constraints); and iii) developing framing strategies to appeal directly to specific actors in the UNFCCC setting (audience effects).

Norms that advance further in their life cycles are the result of successful framing campaigns by actors seeking to advance them (Payne, 2001). As they face constraints on their construction of frames, disputes often occur within movements and individual organizations over how to maximize frame resonance. This is of particular importance to the study of CAN, a network with a history of tensions arising from disagreements among its diverse makeup of organizations with a wide range of individual goals and perspectives.

In light of previous NGO studies that have illustrated the influence of an NGO network's internal characteristics such as organizational identity, network structure, and member makeup on its political stances and advocacy strategies, it can be hypothesized that the internal characteristics of an NGO network significantly influence a network's ability to emerge as a norm entrepreneur. Therefore, in its examination of Benford and Snow's three categories of constraining factors on CAN's strategic frame construction, this study additionally explores the internal characteristics of an NGO network and how they may also be significant factors in constraining its ability to take on the role of a norm entrepreneur.

## 2.3 Methods

### Content Analysis: UNFCCC Member COP Statements

To examine the norms promoted by UNFCCC member states, official statements at the annual COP meetings of the UNFCCC were analyzed for the presence of the nine climate justice principles derived in this research. These statements included those from both individual countries and from groups of states advocating for common goals.<sup>37</sup>

All 1,265 available public statements from 2009 to 2017 (COP 15 to COP 23) were manually reviewed in full by the author, with two other researchers providing assistance translating and analyzing any Spanish, French, Portuguese, and Arabic speeches without English translations provided.<sup>38</sup> While many statements were available digitally from the UNFCCC website, these public archives were not complete, so additional statements were obtained by request from the UNFCCC Records Management office. In some cases, paper statements were not archived, and only audio or video recordings of the speeches were available. These were analyzed no differently from the paper documents – the presence of climate justice principles was evaluated by listening instead of reading.

To test for an overall trend in the adoption and reproduction of the language associated with climate justice for all countries, the first analysis performed was to

---

<sup>37</sup> A number of political coalitions have formed, dissolved, and shifted throughout UNFCCC negotiations depending on changing narrative positions and windows of political opportunity (Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2015). A few notable examples include: *the Umbrella Group*, consisting of the Annex I countries Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States; *G77 and China*, made up of non-Annex I nations; the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS); and *the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)*, a group of socialist and social democratic Latin American states.

<sup>38</sup> Some UNFCCC statements over the years were provided without English translations. Researchers Inesaf Benzaki and Vinicius Douglas Yamanaka Paes kindly provided assistance by translating and, with close consultation, analyzing the documents in Spanish, French, Portuguese and Arabic.

calculate how many of the nine principles appeared in each statement. This was then averaged for all of the statements in each year, giving every year a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 9. To look at how emphases on different aspects of climate justice may have changed over time, every principle was individually tested for and separated into three categories for each statement: 0 (no presence), 1 (singular, brief mention), or 2 (stronger emphasis or multiple mentions).<sup>39</sup> The scoring methods were applied equally to all countries' statements.

The results were also divided between Annex I and non-Annex I nations, and these were further broken down by emphasis for each climate justice principle (separating scores of 1 and 2). Differences such as binding commitments, national development goals, vulnerability to climate change, and adaptation capacity all may impact which aspects of the climate justice framing are embraced in a country's message, and thus results were separated by country type and emphasis in order to clarify differences in how states adopted aspects of climate justice into their public discourse in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, as the countries with binding reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries have proven to show the strongest negotiating power in climate agreements, and thus analyzing their trends can give some indication of which aspects of the climate justice framing are being adopted by the UNFCCC's "critical states."

---

<sup>39</sup> As an example, Vanuatu's statement from COP 23 was assigned a score of 1 in the category of *Human Rights* for the line "Vanuatu embraces the vision of global climate action that actively promotes human rights, gender equality and sustainable development for all Parties", the only mention of human rights in the statement. In contrast, it was assigned a 2 in the category of *Loss & Damage* for multiple, more elaborate mentions: "Within the current convention processes we must see significant action towards implementing Article 8 on Loss & Damage"; "COP 23 must make an immediate and strong decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) that raises the profile of loss and damage within the convention, with new and additional finance to help developing nations cope with unavoidable economic and non-economic losses of climate change"; and additional brief mentions of "loss & damage actions." (Tabimasmas, 2017).

## Content Analysis: CAN International's ECO Newsletter

The text selected for the analysis of CAN was the most consistent and representative outlet for communicating their chosen frames: its *ECO* newsletter, in which all 2,129 articles (408 issues) from 2001 to 2017 were manually examined in full by the author for the presence of the nine climate justice principles. The reason for extending the analysis to before 2009 (when the analysis for UNFCCC member statements begins) is that the data was readily available and much less time-consuming to analyze than UNFCCC statements, which were exclusively only available in audio or video before 2010. It was simply beyond the time or resources available to one researcher to manually analyze that much audio and video data, but newsletter issues fit within this scope.

The data for the years before 2009 was largely used to search for any trends or anomalies to provide context to the 2009-2017 data that was directly compared with that of the UNFCCC member statements. Because *ECO* articles are much shorter and more issue-specific compared to a national COP statement, a scoring system based on emphasis (i.e. the 0-1-2 system used for no mention, single mention, and multiple mentions/emphasis utilized for UNFCCC statements) was judged to be not useful in the case of *ECO* article analysis. Therefore, a simplified scoring system of 1 (present) or 0 (not present) for each climate justice principle was used for every article.

*ECO* is issued in paper and digital formats daily during UNFCCC conferences, with some exceptions and occasional special issues published at other points in the year. Because of this, the number of *ECO* issues varies for each year, as well as the number of articles and length of each issue.<sup>40</sup> Due to these deviations, the scores were averaged to provide a comparable number from year to year.

Both the average number of climate justice mentions *per article* and average number *per issue* (using the totals for all articles in an issue) for every year were evaluated to compensate for any possible irregularities due to these variations. However,

---

<sup>40</sup> *ECO* issues are anywhere between one and four pages, depending on the number of articles submitted, the length of those articles, and the theme of the issue based on the events of the conference that day.

when the results were compared, the two evaluation methods provided remarkably similar trends and patterns, and no anomalies or irregularities were found between the two. For consistency, in this dissertation all numbers and figures related to mentions of climate justice in *ECO* refer to the average number of mentions *per issue*. These averages were then examined for each year in order to view their changes over time and better compare them to the data from UNFCCC member statements.

Along with the empirical content analysis of *ECO*, additional qualitative analysis was applied to CAN's annual policy documents in order to provide additional context to the trends observed in *ECO*. These documents specify the network's official consensus policy positions, objectives, and political stances for a given year. While analyzing *ECO* yields the most significant and detailed data regarding CAN's adoption of climate justice principles, cross-referencing changes in policy positions or emphasized issues in CAN's policy documents can produce a richer and more complete picture of how the network has engaged with climate justice over time.

Additionally, official CAN member lists were analyzed to observe if CAN's trends in its framings promoted in *ECO* are also reflected in changes in its member makeup. CAN is not a single entity with absolute power to make decisions or a network completely governed from the top down, but rather makes consensus decisions based on the priorities and goals of its members.

Analysis of CAN member organizations was performed according to two principal categories of member organizations. The first is the type of organization, divided into i) environmental NGOs; ii) human rights / social justice / international aid and development organizations; iii) NGOs focused specifically on environmental justice or climate justice; and iv) other non-environmental NGOs, the majority being think tanks or labor organizations.

The ratio of these different types of organizations in CAN was compared for each year from 2011 to 2017,<sup>41</sup> and comparisons were also made between the ratio of

---

<sup>41</sup> Upon contacting CAN International, these were the only years in which official member lists had been recorded and were available. Although the years do not go back as far as COP 15 (and therefore cannot be directly compared against the data collected through content analysis of *ECO*), the 7 years of member lists still grant enough data to provide a clear view of any recent

ENGOs and all other non-environmental organizations. Additionally, the ratio of member organizations added from 2011 to 2017 was also calculated. Because CAN does not have an unlimited capacity to add member organizations (and certainly does not desire to expel one type of organization in favor of another type), it is important to examine what types of organizations have been added over this period in order to get a clearer image of how CAN is evolving.

The second characteristic of member organizations analyzed is their geographical origin – whether they are from a developed or developing country. This approach immediately raises issues, as there is no globally-accepted definition of “developed” and “developing.” Additionally, the terms “North” and “South,” often used as shorthand in both international negotiations and academic discussions, are obviously much too reductive to categorize countries for the purposes of research.

Therefore, a variety of development indexes were utilized to compare with each other and attempt to offset any irregularities that may occur due to one particular source’s method of classification.<sup>42</sup> Overall, four of these were utilized in data analysis to compare with each other: the latest versions (as of December 2017) of i) the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ *World Economic Situation and Prospects* report; ii) the International Monetary Fund’s *World Economic Outlook* report; iii) the UNFCCC’s classifications for Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 nations; and iv) the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) *Human Development Report*.

Like the organization type, these were calculated for all CAN members in each year from 2011 to 2017, and both the overall makeup of CAN and the change in added organizations from these years was analyzed. However, results were strikingly similar across all four sources, and the same trends were observed in each data set. Because of this, the UNDP data was chosen to be used in the graphs and analysis performed in this dissertation, as it is the closest to the average between the four and thus can be considered representative of the overall data.

---

changes and trends in the makeup of CAN’s member organizations.

<sup>42</sup> For example, how emerging economies or economies in transition are categorized.



## Semi-Structured Expert Interviews

All of the data collected and analyzed in the previous steps was gathered to formulate questions to be asked in semi-structured expert interviews with CAN officials, working group leaders and coordinators, and members of some of CAN's most active member NGOs. These interviews were a key aspect in this research to gain a richer and deeper understanding of how CAN's internal characteristics and framing processes affected its role in promoting climate justice in the post-Copenhagen era of UNFCCC climate negotiations.

Conducting interviews with CAN officials and representatives of member organizations provides background and context to the data collected through content analysis and allows one to answer *why* the data looks the way it does. Similarly, although looking at the changes in the types of organizations constituting CAN's membership is useful in determining the strength of climate justice representation within the network, it does not provide insight into *why* these changes happened, or whether they are the result of CAN's deliberate strategies.

Two separate sets of interview questions (listed in Appendix B) were created for interview subjects representing CAN and for those from organizations who did not speak on behalf of CAN. Due to the diversity of expertise and experiences of the interview subjects, it was decided that semi-structured interviews would be the most beneficial method to obtain the most useful information for this research. Giving each interviewee general guiding questions would keep their answers relevant to the research, but allowing them to speak about their individual areas of expertise and personal observations (and asking pertinent follow-up questions) would ensure that each interview produced rich and useful data.

As general starting points, the questions focused on the status of climate justice in the conception of climate change in UNFCCC negotiations and the experiences of the interviewee. Questions concerning changes to the strategies, culture and structure of their organization and what influenced these changes were also asked and followed-up on based on the interviewee's answers. The influence of external and internal political factors was also covered, focusing on any developments within the UNFCCC or global changes that could have impacted conceptions and strategies in the lead-up to the Paris

Agreement, as well as residual effects of the failure of COP 15 on NGOs.

Nearly all of the starting questions for CAN representatives and individuals representing other organizations were the same; the majority of the deviation came in the follow-up questions to their answers and subsequent discussions. There were, however, a few differences between the two sets of questions. Many of the interview subjects not representing CAN still had varying degrees of experience and relationships with the network, so these interviewees were asked about their relationship with CAN, how that relationship has changed over time, and what changes they have witnessed in CAN as member organizations or by working alongside the network. On the other hand, CAN was asked questions about the makeup of their member organizations and the reasons behind changes, as well as the influence of the “transnational climate justice movement” on the network.<sup>43</sup>

Interview subjects were chosen due to their relevance to the research – particularly how close they were to CAN, how much experience they had in UNFCCC negotiations, and their knowledge of and experience with the issue of climate justice. While a more robust study exploring the reasons behind normative shift among all actors participating in UNFCCC conferences would necessitate a wider variety of interviewees representing state governments, other non-government constituencies, and the UNFCCC Secretariat, the scope and focus of this research on the internal characteristics and processes of CAN and DCJ required a focused pool of interview subjects that were able to thoroughly discuss these and provide first-hand knowledge and insight from their personal experiences.

Those interviewed were initially contacted through email, and interviews with additional experts were obtained based on recommendations from those initially contacted. Overall, nine people were interviewed, each with extensive experience working in or alongside CAN at UNFCCC conferences. These individuals, listed in Table 2.3, include the focal points for the UNFCCC ENGO and CJN constituencies,

---

<sup>43</sup> Because many organizations and individuals interviewed considered themselves part of the climate justice movement, this question was only asked to interviewees representing CAN, which was distinct from the climate justice movement that gained prominence at COP 15 in Copenhagen.

current and former directors of CAN national nodes, the facilitator of the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group, and leaders of climate justice programs in prominent organizations within CAN, among others.

Depending on each interviewee's availability, interviews lasted anywhere between one and four hours, with additional follow-up questions and clarifications conducted through phone or email. Due to interviewees being based in a wide range of countries, interviews were conducted in-person, over video conferencing, or over the phone. They were then manually transcribed, cross-referenced and analyzed by the author for common themes and conclusions relevant to this research, with follow-up emails sent for clarification when necessary.<sup>44</sup>

The conclusions from the interviews and their implications on the research questions of this study are discussed in their corresponding sections in Chapters 3 (the evolution of climate justice in the UNFCCC's global conception of climate change), 4 (CAN's role in promoting climate justice), and 5 (why CAN played this role, and what factors influenced its promotion of climate justice).

---

<sup>44</sup> Interviewees were contacted during the writing of this dissertation to confirm that they approve of all statements attributed directly to them.

**Table 2.3 Interview Subjects**

<b>Interview Subject</b>	<b>Current Affiliation and Position</b>	<b>Past Affiliations</b>	<b>Date Interviewed</b>
Naomi Ages	Greenpeace USA (Head of Climate Liability and Climate Justice Project) [at the time of interview – now former]		December 17, 2018
Rachel Kennerley	Friends of the Earth England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (International Climate Campaigner)	Environment Agency (Development and Flood Risk Officer)	December 20, 2018
Lina Dabbagh	CAN International (Head of Political Advocacy), Focal Point for UNFCCC ENGO Constituency	WWF, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, & Energy	January 11, 2019
Stephen Leonard	Climate Justice Programme (President)	CAN Australia, Center for International Forestry Research (Senior Policy Analyst), Independent Consultant and Lawyer	January 24, 2019
Catherine Abreu	CAN-Rac Canada (Executive Director)	Ecology Action Center (Head), Atlantic Canada Sustainable Energy Coalition (Coordinator)	January 24, 2019
Hans Verolme	Climate Advisors Network (Senior Strategic Advisor)	British Embassy to the US (Senior Advisor on Energy and Environment Issues), WWF (Global Director of Climate and Energy), CAN International Political Coordination Group (Co-founder), Independent Advisor	January 28, 2019

Sébastien Duyck	Center for International Environmental Law (Senior Attorney, Climate & Energy Program), Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group (Facilitator), CAN International NGO Participation Working Group (Coordinator), University of Lapland (Researcher)	Consultant – Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice, Heinrich Boell Foundation, Carbon Market Watch, Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security Research Programme	February 5, 2019
Christian Holz	Climate Equity Reference Project (Senior Research Associate), CAN International (Board of Directors), CAN-Rac Canada (Board of Directors), Carleton University (Postdoctoral Researcher)	CAN-Rac Canada (Executive Director), CAN Equity Working Group, CAN Global Stocktake Working Group,	February 15, 2019
Nathan Thanki	Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (Co-coordinator), Focal Point for the UNFCCC Climate Justice Now! Constituency	Focal Point for the UNFCCC Youth Constituency	April 2, 2019

---

## 2.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has detailed the theoretical framework and methods applied to the research and analysis presented in this dissertation. In seeking to clarify what climate justice principles are included in the shared conception of climate change among both state actors and NGOs, this study utilizes Finnemore and Sikkink's Norm Life Cycle as the primary analytical tool in evaluating the status of climate justice in UNFCCC negotiations.

Norm entrepreneurs are the predominant actors in Norm Emergence, the first

stage of the Norm Life Cycle. They introduce, promote, and advance new norms, using the strategic construction of frames as their primary method of influence. In the case of successful norm entrepreneurship, a “critical mass” of states will adopt the norm, advancing it into Stage 2, Norm Cascade. This is often accompanied by institutionalization of the norm, and states will from now on act as the primary actors in pushing the norm into its final stage, Internalization, where adherence to the norm is taken for granted as “appropriate” behavior by all actors within that setting.

This research analyzes the progression of climate justice as an international norm, conceptualizing it as consisting of nine principles: i) Rawlsian justice, ii) climate impacts on social inequality, iii) human rights, iv) rights of indigenous peoples, v) historical responsibility, vi) compensation for loss and damage, vii) contextual vulnerability to climate change, viii) criticism of market mechanisms, and ix) criticism of global systems.

Transnational NGO networks often act as norm entrepreneurs in global environmental issues, with strategic frame construction acting as their primary tool in the first stage of the Norm Life Cycle. Most of NGOs’ influential power in environmental politics comes from their role in shaping ideas about the environment, as ENGOs and their networks politicize environmental issues in order to set or change the tone of debate. They do this by constructing and spreading frames that define the problem and its causes, advocate for specific solutions, and motivate actors to behave in a certain way.

Therefore, in investigating the constraints encountered by CAN to promote climate justice in the post-Copenhagen era of UNFCCC negotiations, this study utilizes Benford and Snow’s theory of collective action frames as a supplemental theory in its analysis. Specifically, it makes use of the three constraints theorized to impact an actor’s framing processes: political opportunity structure, cultural opportunities and constraints, and audience effects. This provides the foundation to examine the factors that prevent a network from emerging as a norm entrepreneur through its use of frames.

The research carried out in this study utilizes a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods to gather data relevant to the analysis of climate justice in the UNFCCC and CAN’s role in promoting it. Content analysis was applied to UNFCCC

member statements and CAN's *ECO* newsletter to assess the presence of climate justice in the conception of climate change held by states and NGOs, respectively. Additionally, network analysis of CAN member lists was performed to clarify the types of organizations making up CAN's member base and how its member makeup has evolved alongside its framing of climate change.

To provide context to the analyzed empirical data, a series of semi-structured interviews was also conducted with CAN officials, staff of CAN member organizations, and other civil society climate justice advocates with extensive experience working with CAN. Analyzing this data using the theoretical frameworks outlined in this chapter provides the tools necessary to approach the questions of how the presence of climate justice in conception of climate change has evolved in the UNFCCC, what CAN's role was in promoting climate justice, and why it played that role.

### **3 States: The Post-Copenhagen Evolution of Climate Justice in the UNFCCC**

In order to discuss CAN's role in the promotion of climate justice, it is first necessary to establish the place of climate justice in the conception of climate change held by the member states of the UNFCCC. By determining how state support for various climate justice principles has changed over the years, one can form a clearer picture of the normative environment in which CAN and its member organizations operate.


To assess how some climate justice principles have progressed in the UNFCCC, the text of the most recent global climate change treaty, the Paris Agreement, is analyzed to demonstrate states' institutionalization of norms. This institutionalization is a sign that a norm has progressed to Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle, Norm Cascade.

Additionally, the content of official COP statements of UNFCCC member states is analyzed to examine the presence of climate justice framings in speeches from the years 2009 to 2017. Qualitative data from interviews is applied to provide context to the empirical data and illustrate a fuller picture of how the global conception of climate change in the UNFCCC has been moving towards a justice frame since COP 15 in Copenhagen.

#### **3.1 Climate Justice in the UNFCCC: Overall Trends**

As illustrated in Figure 3.1, there was an overall increase in the average number of climate justice principles appearing in statements of both Annex I and non-Annex I nations, and only slightly lower the following year when the Paris Agreement was signed. Afterwards, there was a fairly significant drop in 2016 followed by a small rebound in 2017, but despite this drop off, the 2017 average is still notably higher than that of 2009.





**Figure 3.1 Average Number of Climate Justice Principles Mentioned per COP Statement.**

*(1s = brief mentions, 2s = multiple mentions / stronger emphasis)*

Non-Annex I countries have consistently used climate justice-related language to a significantly higher degree than Annex I countries, with nearly twice the average number in 2009. A notable increase can still be seen from 2009 to 2014 and only a very slight drop off in the following year. Scores of 1 and 2 exhibit very similar trends,<sup>45</sup> and every year shows a higher proportion of scores of 2, suggesting that non-Annex I countries will more often actively emphasize climate justice issues in their messages to other nations' delegates. Like the overall trend, there is a decrease in non-Annex I countries' use of climate justice language from 2014 to 2017. While it is still relatively high in 2017, one can clearly see that this framing was used more aggressively in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement compared to after its signing.

Use of climate justice framings by Annex I countries shows a similar trend, but with some notable differences. Overall, the average number of climate justice principles

<sup>45</sup> See Section 2.3 for an explanation of the scoring system utilized in the content analysis of UNFCCC member statements.

mentioned in Annex I countries' statements more than doubled from 2009 to 2015. This increase seems to follow those of non-Annex I nations but is behind by one year. This suggests that Annex I countries were consistently slower in adopting climate justice framings and to some degree were altering their rhetoric to be more congruent with the narratives promoted by non-Annex I countries. Viewing the data of scores of 1 and 2 separately reveals a more detailed picture; while the number of scores of 2 is low, the relative increase is significant. In contrast, the number of scores of 1 assigned for each year is considerably higher, yet the increase is not as dramatic.


Climate justice mentions by Annex I countries peaked in 2015, one year later than non-Annex I countries. This highlights the effectiveness of the climate justice framing in negotiations; by this time, the language of climate justice had taken on its own discursive power. The use of mostly brief, singular mentions by Annex I countries in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement may be dismissed by some as more symbolic than meaningful. However, the significant rise in scores of 2 indicates that they are increasingly taking some climate justice issues seriously enough to emphasize in their rhetoric.

With this in mind, if one is to assess international norms as defined by Katzenstein ("collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors"), then it can be argued that even a rise in scores of 1 is evidence that these principles of climate justice are increasingly expected as a part of the overall conception of climate change. As time goes on, fruitful negotiations between states (and therefore a meaningful agreement) cannot proceed unless climate justice is a prominent frame throughout these processes.

Looking at the overall adoption of the climate justice frame only gives limited information, however. Examining which climate justice principles have been utilized by UNFCCC member states and gained prominence over the years can further clarify the shape and direction in which the conception of climate change is moving, and which climate justice principles are advancing through the Norm Life Cycle.

Out of the nine identified climate justice principles, five showed a notable positive trend in UNFCCC COP statements from 2009. These were: i) issues of justice and equality; ii) loss and damage; iii) gender, racial, and social equality; iv) human rights; and v) emphasis on differences in vulnerability and capacities for adaptation.

Historical responsibility was the only principle that exhibited a negative trend over the period of time observed, with indigenous rights showing a relatively modest increase and the other two principles with few overall mentions and no major increase or decrease (Figure 3.2).



**Figure 3.2 Average Mentions of Climate Justice Principles in UNFCCC Member Statements.**

Apart from the overall increase in climate justice mentions over time, the most recognizable overall trend is the notable drop in mentions by both Annex I and non-Annex I countries in the years following the drafting of the Paris Agreement in 2015. While the presence of climate justice language in COP statements has recovered to some degree in 2017, the previous year's decrease still stands out as significant enough to investigate further.

This decrease can be explained as part of a recurring cycle throughout UNFCCC negotiations. Frameworks such as the Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Accord, and Paris Agreement are conceptual in nature; their objective is to define the problem, agree upon common objectives, and map out a conceptual pathway toward realizing

solutions. Once this is determined, the negotiations take a technical turn, as they then focus on the operationalization of these solutions using the tools, resources, and policy instruments available.

The language utilized by states thus changes in conjunction with the shifting purpose of negotiations. The broad concepts have been agreed upon, and more conceptual language becomes less relevant compared to concrete policy proposals as negotiators focus on the technical details of the treaty. Accordingly, states' rhetoric exhibits a corresponding conceptualization-operationalization cycle, reflecting the move away from the conceptual toward the technical until the next major legislative opportunity:

In a way it's sort of a natural cycle. Because when you get up to a negotiation like Copenhagen or Paris, you're talking about first principles, and quite obviously issues of human rights and climate justice are first principle issues...After Paris people thought "Okay, we've got an ambitious high-level agreement," and then we needed to start worrying about implementing it...But then the rulebook is about as boring as it gets...But of course that is because it is sort of two steps removed from the first principle question, and it doesn't mean it's irrelevant...I assume that many of the issues that are in the Paris Agreement, particularly some of the first principle issues, will again be put on the table by the various experts and NGOs and countries that represent those interests. So the whole thing comes full circle. And that is of course the big frustration of doing UN negotiations: it goes around in circles. I mean, it may be ever-widening circles, and there *is* progress, but there's also a lot of going back over the same ground. (Verolme, interview by author, 28/01/2019)

These observations were common among those interviewed, with no one expressing surprise that the speech data reflected this trend. Many emphasized that this just means an increase in the relevance of climate justice among UNFCCC member states is not going to look purely linear on a graph – that despite these drops in mentions after "big COP moments," climate justice continues to play an increasingly greater role in the UNFCCC and states' shared conception of climate change.

This notion is also observable in the collected data. Even with the significant

drop of climate justice mentions in 2016, climate justice principles are markedly more prevalent than in 2009, despite the shift in focus of negotiations to develop the technical rulebook for implementing the Paris Agreement.

The increase of climate justice rhetoric after the Copenhagen Accord is pointed out as an exception precisely because the treaty was a failure, and also because those failures were strongly tied to a neglect of climate justice principles in both its content and its procedures. In 2010, there was no agreed-upon framework on which to base technical implementation negotiations. Rather, negotiations were regarded as a resetting of the process and a return to the first conceptual steps in developing what would become the next framework in 2015.

Additionally, climate justice advocates interviewed pointed out that once the framework treaties were established and the focus of the negotiations shifted towards implementation, attempts to return to the discussion of broad, conceptual goals – climate justice issues especially – were met with resistance from the Umbrella Group countries. A narrative of urgency was pushed by developed nations to encourage smooth operationalization of the treaty, and discussions of climate justice were derided by Northern states as distractions that would send negotiations off-track or create unnecessary firewalls that would delay practical action.<sup>46</sup>

### **3.2 Analysis of Institutionalized Climate Justice Principles**

To determine the strength of climate justice as a norm in the UNFCCC, it is best to look at its level of institutionalization – in this case, any language or mechanisms in the Paris Agreement corresponding to the principles emphasized in the climate justice framing. Like the Kyoto Protocol before it, the Paris Agreement has been criticized for having few concrete commitments and utilizing overly vague language, considered by many as a win for the largest emitters while being least fair to the least developed countries (Dimitrov, 2016, pp. 7-8; Mayer, 2016, pp. 110, 116). However, from the perspective of international norms, the explicit presence of climate justice principles in

---

<sup>46</sup> Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018; Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018

the framework text acts as evidence of their normative progression and discursive strength in climate negotiations. This institutionalization shows that a greater emphasis has been placed on climate justice in the global conception of climate change since the Kyoto Protocol and indicates that it will remain an important fixture in climate negotiations to come.

The presence of climate justice principles in the Paris Agreement points to signs of the institutionalization of a norm that has entered Stage 2 (Norm Cascade) of the Norm Life Cycle. This institutionalization is also supported by the signing of the agreement by the major greenhouse gas emitters, whose cooperation is necessary to give the agreement legitimacy and make it an effective approach to addressing climate change. Additionally, based on the following arguments, three other criteria are met to confidently claim some climate justice principles have progressed to into the second stage of the Norm Life Cycle.

The first is that states are now the primary actors in advancing the climate justice framing in international climate negotiations. During a period of limited NGO access and participation in UNFCCC negotiations, an increase in climate justice mentions can be seen in UNFCCC member statements (and, as is discussed in Chapter 4, these increases occurred earlier than in CAN's public communications). Not only has climate justice been supported by a critical mass of states through both their rhetoric and their signing of the Paris Agreement, but it has also been adopted by the critical states of the UNFCCC: Annex I countries.

Second, legitimacy and esteem, rather than altruism or empathy, are now the motivating factors in its spread. Because the norm's tipping point has been reached and a critical mass of states has endorsed it both in their promoted conception of climate change and in its institutionalization in a treaty text, what is considered "proper" behavior for UNFCCC member states has been redefined. Adopting these norms is now motivated by a sense of obligation as a state actor to adhere to the rules and conceptions of appropriateness of a treaty text agreed to by nearly every country in the world.

Although much of the language related to climate justice principles in the Paris Agreement was left vague and without concrete mechanisms to operationalize them, the inclusion of these principles after years of negotiations indicates that the concepts

themselves are discursively powerful. While there will certainly be disagreements around the application of these concepts, once they are formalized in text, it will be necessary for member states to address them in future negotiations. Doing this will be considered by other states as properly adhering to the principles of the legally-binding agreement, rather than as a voluntary act of altruism or empathy.

Third, the dominant mechanism behind these climate justice principles has moved beyond persuasion of Annex I countries by non-Annex I countries and civil society to that of socialization, increasingly encompassing all countries involved in UNFCCC negotiations. Once a country has entered into an international agreement, behavior that follows the principles of that agreement is considered appropriate, and thus behavior that deviates from it is inappropriate and open to diplomatic criticism and censure.

Unfortunately, the language of the Paris Agreement may not be strong enough to apply material punishments or incentives to states in response to how they comply with its rules. However, any praise or ridicule directed at a state by UNFCCC members and non-government organizations will no longer adopt only a moral tone – behavior will now will be judged against the principles of the Paris Agreement accepted by all states that signed it.

Overall, six climate justice principles were institutionalized in the Paris Agreement: i) inclusion of the words “climate justice” in the text; ii) human rights; iii) gender equality and empowerment of women; iv) a mechanism for loss and damage; v) a greater emphasis on the contextual impacts of climate change and differing vulnerabilities of regions, peoples, and communities; and vi) indigenous rights.

## **Rawlsian Justice**

Language in UNFCCC statements specifically mentioning or referring to justice, equality, equity, and fairness was used as an indicator of the role of justice in defining the problem of climate change and constructing its solutions. Overall, a steady increase can be observed from 2009 to 2014. Mentions dropped sharply in 2016 after the Paris Agreement was signed and the focus of negotiations shifted to technical

discussion around the mechanisms, modalities, and procedures for implementation.

For non-Annex I nations, mentions were made by more than 30% of countries in every year analyzed, with scores of 1 and 2 roughly following the same trend (Figure 3.2).<sup>47</sup> Annex I countries, the critical states of the UNFCCC, employed justice-based language at a rate consistently lower than non-Annex I countries, with scores of 2 notably low (under 10% of countries every year); however, scores of 1 show a sharp spike in 2014, where justice was mentioned by over 50% of Annex I countries.<sup>48</sup>

With the term “climate justice” in the Preamble, the concept of justice was also institutionalized in the Paris Agreement. This was the first explicit use of the term in a multilateral agreement, emphasizing “...the importance for some of the concept of ‘climate justice’, when taking action to address climate change” (UNFCCC, 2016b, *Preamble* Paragraph 13). Importantly, the agreement does not clarify what “some of the concept” specifically refers to or how it relates to or influences domestic climate policies. However, the fact that the term “climate justice” makes an appearance in the Paris Agreement is evidence that it is becoming a fundamental part of how climate change is being framed in UNFCCC negotiations, and its institutionalization indicates a move to the second stage of the Norm Life Cycle.

All interviewees noted that discussion of justice had always been a part of negotiations to some degree, usually raised by developing countries. However, the lack of attention given to justice-related concerns is often thought to be the root of the failure of the Copenhagen Accord. The world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters – including the few who orchestrated the Copenhagen Accord behind closed doors without the input of the majority of countries – were heavily invested in not repeating the failures of COP 15. They viewed Paris as even more of a “now or never moment” than Copenhagen, and so the UNFCCC’s critical states entered COP 21 negotiations much more proactively to find solutions and compromises between states.<sup>49</sup> By 2015, the words “climate justice”

---

<sup>47</sup> One small exception was a slight increase in 2s from 2014 to 2015, indicating a push to emphasize the justice frame in the final negotiations of the Paris Agreement.

<sup>48</sup> Data for all climate justice principles divided by Annex I/non-Annex I nations and scores of 1 and 2 is listed in Appendix C.

<sup>49</sup> Verolme, interview by author, 28/01/2019



had become normalized in climate negotiations; heads of state of developed countries such as Barack Obama (United States) and David Cameron (United Kingdom) had included it in their COP speeches.

However, there had been nothing in the UNFCCC that connected the term to concrete policies or practical actions. Using the phrase “climate justice” gave developed countries a way to communicate that they were acknowledging the point of view of developing countries while avoiding supporting more thoroughly-defined principles such as common but differentiated responsibilities, historical responsibility, or liability. The absence of a specific definition of climate justice or any concrete obligations indicates that its inclusion in the Paris Agreement has few practical implications and is not supported by critical states beyond a vague endorsement of the concept.

Because the language is completely non-binding and not operationalized, many climate justice advocates interviewed did not even view this inclusion as a tangible victory, asserting that that this wording is essentially as weak and watered-down as it could be and still be included. The deliberately-chosen wording of “some of the concept” of climate justice not only gives states room to deny any claim of injustice, but also essentially serves as an indirect admission that no agreement was actually reached regarding the inclusion of climate justice. Fundamentally, the wording implies that not all signatories are comfortable including climate justice – and therefore all of the issues and principles it may encompass – as a core component of a climate treaty.

On the other hand, while it may not have been a concrete victory in the eyes of climate justice advocates, to many it still represents a significant discursive victory. The motives and intentions behind countries supporting the inclusion of climate justice are less important than the fact that the concept is powerful enough for the UNFCCC’s critical states to adopt it as a part of their discourse; it has become a key aspect of the global conception of climate change.

One ENGO interviewee highlighted the significance in its inclusion as a “discursive hook” – language that, once institutionalized, can be referred to and called upon in the future to advocate for stronger, more defined, and operational climate justice mechanisms:

It was a symbolic phrase. It's important that it's there, but without any kind of operation behind it, it could have been any phrase. So we talk about these things as “hooks” in the Paris Agreement - if it's in there, then you can use it. So it's important to get it...because then we have all these things to say, “You're actually not doing enough...it's what [the Paris Agreement] says.” So having a phrase like climate justice is the hook. And it's also important just because people know what the Paris Agreement is, people can say this is big... they knew it was the global compact on climate change. It has that level of importance, and you have the word climate justice in there, it does mean something and it does give us something to organize around. (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018)

Despite the disappointment regarding the lack of detailed operationalization of climate justice in the rules and procedures of the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC participants interviewed all agreed that from a discursive standpoint, justice has grown to become normalized as a major component of the way climate change is framed and discussed in the UNFCCC. As one interviewee said, “On the ground, it's taken as a given...it's permeating up through every part of the discussion of climate change.” (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018).

## **Human Rights**

Explicit mentions of human rights when discussing the impacts of climate change and its response also saw an observable positive trend since 2009. Overall, mentions of human rights steadily increased from 2009 to 2015 before dropping the following years (Figure 3.2). The number of statements with scores of 2 peaked in 2014, while scores of 1 saw their peak one year later. Proportions were fairly even but slightly favored scores of 1 every year. This is likely because the term “human rights” is already defined in the UN through numerous instruments and treaties, and thus mentioning the phrase itself carries its own amount of precedence and inherent meaning.

Human rights mentions were already consistent to some degree in non-Annex I statements, but a notable increase can be observed from 2013-2015. Even more significant is that the percentage of Annex I nations mentioning the issue remained

under 10% every year (and often at or near 0%) until a dramatic increase from 2014-2015. This indicates that Annex I nations were to some degree prepared to include mentions of human rights in the Paris Agreement entering into the 2015 negotiations.

A recognition that the issue of climate change and the response to it are tied to human rights can also be found in the Preamble of the Paris Agreement.<sup>50</sup> Savaresi (2016), paraphrasing Knox (2013), points out that this is the first multilateral environmental treaty with explicit mentions of human rights. Initial discussions around human rights in the Paris Agreement included three options: no inclusion, inclusion in the Preamble, or inclusion in the operative text (most likely Article 2 or Article 3). Delegates eventually decided it would be placed in the Preamble, as this was “already perceived as a compromise” between the other two options (Duyck, interview by author, 05/02/2019).

As a further sign that climate change as a human rights issue has entered Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle, legitimacy and reputation have become the motive to adopt the norm. Once the concept of fundamental human rights is institutionalized in an international regime, it is highly unlikely that it will be removed in the future, securing discussion of human rights as a necessary part of UNFCCC mechanisms, policies, and negotiations to come. Despite the conception and specific definition of human rights differing from state to state,<sup>51</sup> no country desires to be labelled as arguing against human rights.

The institutionalization of human rights in the Paris Agreement does not create or impose new obligations, nor does it attempt to formulate a new universal definition of human rights to be used in the context of the UNFCCC. Rather, it establishes a solid link between climate change and every country’s “respective obligations on human rights,” which are specific instruments they are parties to.

The connection to the “respective obligations” of states makes it stronger on

---

<sup>50</sup> “Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights...” (UNFCCC, 2016b, *Preamble*, Paragraph 11)

<sup>51</sup> As one example, Saudi Arabian delegates strongly resisted specific mentions of rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQ) individuals.

the level of practical policy compared to the more conceptual victory of climate justice. Although nations have disagreements over what human rights to recognize and how to recognize them, every single one already has made the sovereign decision to recognize them in some way. Now that those linkages are officially acknowledged, it not only establishes a strong basis for human rights in future climate negotiations, but it also compels climate change civil servants to consider their country's human rights obligations when developing national climate policy:

Our point was always that the last thing we want as human rights advocates is for the UNFCCC to define what are human rights obligations. Because the diplomats are not well equipped, and we'll end up with something that's way weaker than what we already have. What we want is just an acknowledgement of the linkages with an existing framework, and that existing framework applies differently between countries. Every single party to the UNFCCC has ratified at least three human rights legally-binding human rights instruments...But they might not recognize all the same...The key was to speak it about the existing human rights frameworks as they applied differently to different states, not to try to create a universal principle that applied universally in the same way....What we need to do is to tell climate change civil servants that we need to look at this body of obligations...we can't expect them to look at this human rights convention unless there is a direct route in the document they have in front of them. (Duyck, interview by author, 05/02/2019)

The term is well-enough defined to include a multitude of specific definitions, rights, and policies to make its inclusion meaningful, but general enough that it is applicable to every UNFCCC member state. Every country has adopted multiple binding human rights instruments, and although they may not all be signatories to the same agreements, they have all in some way acknowledged the importance of maintaining and protecting human rights.

This similarly explains why the inclusion of human rights was so widely pushed by civil society: it is a concept that was easy for any organization to rally behind, and one that is broad enough to be applied to any climate NGO's area of focus and mission. This resulted in what was described as a "massive push" by NGOs across eight

UNFCCC constituencies,<sup>52</sup> whose issues were bundled as part of a “human rights package” by the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) but advocated for individually by each constituency and their respective member organizations.<sup>53</sup>

Together, the respective surges in 2014 and 2015 by non-Annex I and Annex I nations coincided with this initiative. CIEL’s coordination of eight UNFCCC civil society constituencies developed a uniform framing based on human rights that was adopted by all participating constituencies and organizations. Campaigning across movements using one unified voice and message gave discursive salience to the issue of human rights in the Paris Agreement negotiations, as it now bore direct connections with the specific issues advocated for by the respective civil society constituencies.

Facilitating the rise in mentions of human rights in the post-Copenhagen era of UNFCCC negotiations was increased attention toward the human rights impacts of climate change from other parts of the UN. This includes, but is not limited to: a 2014 focus report on human rights and climate change from the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and subsequent letter urging the inclusion of human rights in the Paris Accord;<sup>54</sup> work from UNEP connecting climate change and human rights that culminated in a comprehensive 2015 report;<sup>55</sup> and the inclusion of Climate Action as one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals alongside other goals directly related to human rights.<sup>56</sup>

Advancements in research have also played a role in strengthening the

---

<sup>52</sup> At the time of COP 21, these constituencies were: women and gender, human rights, just transition, food security, ecosystem integrity, indigenous rights, intergenerational equity, and ENGOs.

<sup>53</sup> The specifics of the civil society push for human rights in the Paris Agreement, the decisions and strategies behind it, and its significance in NGO agenda setting is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>54</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014a, 2014b

<sup>55</sup> UNEP, 2015

<sup>56</sup> These goals include: No Poverty, Zero Hunger, Good Health and Well-being, Quality Education, Gender Equality, Clean Water and Sanitation, Decent Work and Economic Growth, Reducing Inequality, and Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

connections and evidence for the impacts of climate change on the rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups. Climate scientists that were once hesitant to speak about human rights in fear of appearing to be politicizing a scientific issue have become more comfortable in making explicit connections as the scientific research more resolutely points to them. One notable recent example of this is the IPCC's *Global Warming of 1.5°C* report, which dedicates an entire chapter to “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities” and very strongly connects any rise in global temperature to substantial impacts on poverty, inequality, and human well-being (IPCC, 2018).

One expert pointed out that a similar occurrence was witnessed in the early stages of climate negotiations. Before scientific research had firmly established the precise impacts climate change would have on the survival of various species, it was mostly framed as an issue of global atmospheric science. Researchers were hesitant to talk confidently about its connections to biodiversity, but as the science advanced, the scientific community grew increasingly outspoken regarding these connections, and the discourse around climate change shifted along with it. Thus, the evolution of climate change from a scientific issue to an issue of justice had a stepping stone in between – the conception of the problem evolved from one of “science, to polar bears, to people” (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018).

## **Social Inequality**

The third issue with a notable increase in UNFCCC member statements is the impact of climate change on existing inequalities of gender, race, and socioeconomic class. Overall, mentions of this rose from 2009 to 2014, with the proportion of scores of 1 and 2 nearly equal (Figure 3.2). While the percentage of non-Annex I countries mentioning this issue in their statements was already somewhat high in 2009, it peaked in 2014 before decreasing in the following years.

In contrast, mentions by Annex I countries steadily increased over time. Analysis of the speeches shows that gender equality was the issue most discussed by Annex I countries, while a higher percentage of non-Annex I countries utilized framings

based on economic or social class. Along with the conceptualization-operationalization pattern of UNFCCC negotiations, the inclusion of language in the text of the Paris Agreement that directly addresses these inequalities is partially responsible for the decrease in mentions after 2015, especially those with scores of 2.

The Preamble of the Agreement, as well as that of the decision to adopt it, state that “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider...gender equality [and] empowerment of women” (UNFCCC, 2016b, *Preamble*, Paragraph 7; UNFCCC, 2016a, *Preamble*, Paragraph 11). Special mention is made in the operationalized text as well; in addition to mentions of gender-responsive approaches to adaptation and capacity building, all nations are called upon to follow a “country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems” (UNFCCC, 2016b, *Article 7* Paragraph 5).

Gender equality was responsible for the majority of the increase since 2009. The issue of gender equality, with its long precedence in UNFCCC negotiations, was one of the issues promoted as part of CIEL’s human rights package. However, the connections between climate change impacts and gender had gained enough momentum in the UNFCCC to lead to the establishment of the Women and Gender constituency in 2009, whose efforts were emphasized by interviewees as most vital:

The gender constituency were doing their own work. And I think it helped the gender constituency’s work in the UNFCCC through the work on gender that was happening in the Green Climate Fund around the same time. There was a very strong push that was happening in in the Green Climate Fund to be putting in place a work plan and policies around gender in the GCF. So that sort of them gave them multiple different platforms, and the Green Climate Fund gave them a lot of access to negotiators, because you've got a much smaller space and you've got much more access to speak with people – there are also heads of delegations and high-level people in the negotiating delegations...I think it was sort of complementarity between the Gender Constituency and the Human Rights Working Group. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

Discussion of gender equality and empowerment of women have a long and well-established precedence in UN negotiations and treaties, and so the concept of gender balance was relatively familiar and uncontroversial for most countries.<sup>57</sup> This momentum has only grown over the years, contributing to a normative environment that is receptive to gender issues: “Gender is a very established framing and approach [and] is a very powerful framing within the UNFCCC...they're an established constituency, an established group of people, and established framing within in the UNFCCC” (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018).

A major source of momentum for gender equality in the UNFCCC came at the Doha COP conference in 2012, in which a coinciding increase in mentions can be observed in Figure 3.2. Here, the Women and Gender constituency advocated for an official UNFCCC decision calling for gender equality and empowerment of women throughout UNFCCC processes, mechanisms, and institutions. What resulted was Decision 23/CP.18, “Promoting gender balance and improving the participation of women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in bodies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol” (UNFCCC, 2012a).

This decision was perceived by many as an indicator that international gender norms were salient in the UNFCCC setting and that gender issues were “winnable.” The passage of this decision was seen as revealing an opportunity to continue pushing for the inclusion of gender issues in the Paris Agreement, acting as a catalyst for increased engagement in the lead-up to Paris by any individuals with an interest in promoting gender equality, including civil society advocates, state negotiators, policy advisors, and Secretariat members:

The Preamble speaks about gender equality, while actually in the negotiations, gender equality

---

<sup>57</sup> There is a history of resistance to the concept of “gender equality” by some countries’ delegations, and so it is more common to find phrases like “gender balance” and “empowerment of women.” As one example, 2012’s Decision 23/CP.18 original draft title as proposed by the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation was changed from “Promoting gender equality and improving the participation of women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in bodies established pursuant to the Convention of the Kyoto Protocol” to “Promoting gender balance...” (UNFCCC, 2012a; UNFCCC, 2012b)



is normally a red line for many countries. So you need to speak about gender responsiveness, gender-informed policies, gender balance, but never gender equality. And there in the Paris Agreement, you actually had it, in a legally binding text...There was enough momentum to secure this stronger wording than you'd normally have in those political decisions. (Duyck, interview by author, 05/02/2019)

## **Loss and Damage**

Mentions of loss and damage also saw a significant increase in UNFCCC member statements. Unique to this issue in comparison with the others is how early it peaked; countries mentioning it increased dramatically in 2013, the majority of mentions being scores of 2 (Figure 3.2). This can be explained through concrete policy outcomes: the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) and its Executive Committee, which were negotiated at COP 19 in 2013 to address the issue through finance, capacity-building, and the sharing of information and technology (UNFCCC, 2014).

Particularly noteworthy about the issue of loss and damage is that its mentions come almost entirely from non-Annex I nations. In comparison, mentions by Annex I nations peaked at less than 11% of countries in 2013. Furthermore, in 2013 every mention of loss and damage by an Annex I nation received a score of 1, while non-Annex I nations delivered more than twice as many statements with scores of 2 than 1. This data suggests that historically, loss and damage has been an issue almost exclusively pushed by developing countries.

Loss and damage was institutionalized in the Paris Agreement through the inclusion of Article 8, which recognizes the concept as vital in tackling climate change and officially institutes the WIM as a part of the UNFCCC's approach to addressing its impacts.<sup>58</sup> Although the specific details of how the WIM will function have yet to be determined, its establishment in 2013 and formal institutionalization in the Paris Agreement stand as an example of its growing relevance in the UNFCCC.

---

<sup>58</sup> See: UNFCCC, 2016b, *Article 8*, Paragraph 1

While it may not at first glance appear to have the support of the critical states necessary for legitimacy as an international norm, the fact that it has resulted in concrete policies that have been agreed to by Annex I countries (both the establishment of the WIM and its incorporation in the Paris Agreement) provides strong evidence for the inclusion of loss and damage in the shared conception of climate change and for its progress into Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle.

To explain the severe gap between Annex I and non-Annex I nations' mentions of loss and damage, interviewees with experience working on the issue emphasized that loss and damage in particular has been a very contentious issue and has seen significant pushback over the years from developed countries, in particular the Umbrella Group and oil-producing nations. This is due to the fact that the issue is directly connected to liability and compensation, so progress on a loss and damage mechanism reinforces the responsibilities and obligations of high-emitting countries to provide compensation to impacted nations.

Efforts to include a loss and damage mechanism in the Paris Agreement were largely driven by the least-developed countries (LDCs), especially the small island developing states (SIDS). By the time of COP 21, the issue of loss and damage came into negotiations with very strong state support:

The LDC group were very strong on this issue, but the loss and damage issue had very strong government support in terms of the group of countries, G77 and China... so you had basically most of the world in terms of countries pushing for this before we got to Paris. In terms of the work that civil society had to do, they didn't have to really push to get the countries to take it up as an issue, because it already was. But the civil society positioning around loss and damage was really more about trying to keep it in there, trying to make sure it wasn't sort of backsliding, supporting positions being taken by LDCs and SIDS, and criticizing and pushing back on the US, or Australia, or any other country trying to kick it out of the text. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

This brings to light the major deficiency in how loss and damage is incorporated into the Paris Agreement. The text for the decision to adopt the Paris

Agreement states that Article 8 “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” (UNFCCC, 2016a, Paragraph 51). From the beginning, the fundamental concept of loss and damage has been centered on the provision of compensation to impacted countries on the basis of liability. Removing liability and compensation from loss and damage is not simply a weakening of the mechanism – it is a complete dismantling of the entire purpose of the concept.

While its inclusion in the Paris Agreement establishes both discursive and procedural hooks to build on in future negotiations, all interview subjects agreed that the removal of compensation and liability in the Paris Agreement was a step back after the victory of the establishment of the WIM. Many asserted that it was allowed by Northern countries in its weakened state not just as a compromise, but also as a deliberate tactic to slow the momentum of an issue with significant support and constrain its progress in future negotiations by leaving the WIM stalled in its early information gathering phase:

In my experience what happens with loss and damage is that it's consistently sidelined in negotiations, because bigger countries and the UNFCCC Secretariat itself was able to say “Oh but we dealt with that, we have the Warsaw Mechanism”... The Warsaw Mechanism, underfunded and undermanaged and doesn't really have a mandate to do the things that you need to address the equity issues common to loss and damage. But it also just happens that...everybody thinks it's going to be the time that loss and damage gets addressed, and then inevitably the developed countries push through and quiet the less developed ones through various means. Whether it's political pressure, or whether it's promises of finance that don't actually materialize. (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018)

Because of the continued resistance to loss and damage throughout UNFCCC negotiations, the language used by both developed and developing nations has changed to some degree in order to make progress on the issue. As negotiations have moved towards the operationalization of the Paris Agreement, vulnerable countries have shifted their rhetoric to center on issues of finance, since “finance” does not imply liability or obligation as “loss and damage” does. This framing may see less contention from the

developed countries that are working to avoid responsibility, as they implement their own framing strategies by attempting to weaken the issue of loss and damage into a more general discussion around adaptation.<sup>59</sup>

## **Contextual Vulnerability**

The previous four aspects of climate justice are those that saw significant increases in mentions from 2009. However, one more issue should be included in the shared conception of climate justice in UNFCCC negotiations: the idea of climate change as a contextual problem in which some countries, regions, and groups are significantly more vulnerable than others.

Unlike the previous four issues though, its inclusion in UNFCCC member statements has been consistently high since 2009. For non-Annex I countries, speeches with a score of 2 often outnumber those with 1 at a ratio of 3:1, underscoring just how much this issue is emphasized by developing countries. Additionally, the proportion of scores of 1 and 2 in Annex I speeches has changed from almost entirely scores of 1 in 2009 to a nearly equal proportion of 1 and 2 in 2017. This indicates that there is not only a considerable number of critical states including the issue in their framing of climate change, but that they are also increasingly emphasizing it.

Supporting this evidence, there was a strong consensus among all interviewees that in recent years the general “global” framing of climate change has gradually given way to a narrative based on a variety of localized impacts and substantial differences in vulnerability to them. Reasons for this include increased engagement by local and regional NGOs on climate issues with their respective national governments, as well as the previously mentioned efforts by Annex I nations to reframe loss and damage as adaptation in order to avoid discussions of legal liability and compensation.

However, the explanation most cited for the rise in emphasis from Annex I nations is the combination of climate change impacts being increasingly felt by countries throughout the world, regardless of their level of development. Along with

---

<sup>59</sup> Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018

more severe and frequent extreme weather events, scientific research has also improved to more confidently connect them to the warming climate:

I think it's based on more research and more understanding of actually what it will look like. So even in the last few years, I think we've gone from relatively generic statements about “more extreme weather,” “more intense hurricanes,” etc., and now we can point to things like Typhoon Haiyan, we can point to Hurricane Harvey, we can point to [hurricanes] in the Caribbean. There are 1) more examples, and 2) better understood climate science around...you know, here the heat wave we had in Europe, in the UK, very quickly within two weeks climate scientists had come back and said, "That was twice as likely to happen because of climate change." And so I think that relationship between an impact that you can show in a local context, even if it is local in Haiti or local on the south coast of the UK, feels more tangible...more and more research is coming out all the time about those impacts. (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018)

The Paris Agreement makes abundant mention of unequal vulnerability to climate-related impacts, suggesting a transition towards a less global and more contextual conception of climate change. Examples of this include the Preamble's recognition of “the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”; acknowledgement that developing economies will be “most affected by the impacts of response measures” in Article 4, Paragraph 15; Article 7's clarification that, despite adaptation being a global goal, the importance of taking into account “the urgent and immediate needs” of the most vulnerable countries (and continues to specify “vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems”); and the prioritization of assistance to the most vulnerable countries, including least developed countries and small island states in Paragraph 4 of Article 9 and the first paragraph of Article 11 (UNFCCC, 2016b).

Additionally, a greater emphasis is placed on the issue of adaptation in the Paris Agreement compared with the Kyoto Protocol, with Article 7 dedicated entirely to outlining the adaptation goals and strategies of the agreement, as well as numerous

other mentions throughout the text. By the time of the Paris Agreement, this language had become normalized and already taken for granted as part of the framing of climate change as a problem. This provided ENGOs a frame already with momentum that they could put their weight behind and promote in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement:

Because of the growth of things like the Climate Vulnerable Forum and the grouping of states, AOSIS and small island developing states, I think that language went through the negotiators and the blocs. These countries were grouping themselves together because they were so disproportionately impacted and disproportionately vulnerable. I know civil society was able to lift up the concerns and the points of those particular negotiating blocs, [but] I certainly think they would have done it themselves with or without civil society, because that's the reality for those negotiators and for those countries. They were there saying in Paris, it *is* an existential threat for them and is an issue that means life or death and the continued existence of those states. And that's not messaging that civil society came up with, but it's certainly a message that we were able to amplify and deliver beyond what was happening in negotiations themselves. (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018)

## **Indigenous Rights**

Mentions of indigenous rights, cultural preservation, and the importance of traditional knowledge did show an overall small increase over time, but generally these issues were only sparsely mentioned in COP statements and did not exhibit significant growth over the time period analyzed. This was due to the fact that only countries with indigenous populations paid considerable attention to the issue (and where those populations have adequate domestic political influence or procedural power).

Additionally, this issue was particularly characterized by its successes resulting from behind-the-scenes work of the Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPO) constituency. While there was not a complete absence of inclusions in UNFCCC member COP statements, speeches mentioning indigenous rights rarely exceeded 10% in the years examined. It was considered a secondary issue by many delegates, with most of its discussion relegated to separate workstream meetings and informal talks

with indigenous organizations.

Despite this, indigenous rights stands out due to the fact that it was not only institutionalized in the Paris Agreement, but is the climate justice issue viewed by many as the most substantive inclusion. While the Kyoto Protocol made no explicit mention of these rights, the Paris Agreement and the decision to adopt it include five separate mentions throughout.<sup>60</sup> These inclusions connect indigenous rights with both the impacts of climate change and the global response to it, acknowledging for the first time the rights of indigenous communities, as well as the importance of their local and traditional systems of knowledge in developing adaptation strategies.

The most notable action in the Paris Agreement in regard to indigenous peoples is the establishment of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP), which provides indigenous peoples with an official voice in developing UNFCCC policy and mechanisms. The Platform focuses on three tasks: the exchange of traditional knowledge and experience of indigenous communities, increasing the engagement of indigenous peoples in UNFCCC processes, and integrating the interests, knowledge and input of local communities and indigenous peoples in the development of national climate change policies and actions (UNFCCC, 2019b).

Although civil society environmental organizations have stood in solidarity with indigenous peoples to support the protection of their rights in the UNFCCC's policies and processes, ENGOs attributed these successes solely to the efforts put forth by the IPO constituency:

The indigenous peoples caucus, they go about doing things their own way...But yeah, this was very much the indigenous groups that achieved this themselves. They work closely with a lot of countries, so they work a lot on what they want to add in the UNFCCC at the national level with the governments. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

One expert pointed out that indigenous rights have more than 25 years of

---

<sup>60</sup> UNFCCC, 2016a, *Adoption of the Paris Agreement* (two mentions); UNFCCC, 2016a, *V. Non-Party Stakeholders*, Paragraph 135; UNFCCC, 2016b, *Preamble*; UNFCCC, 2016b, *Article 7*, Paragraph 5

precedence in UNFCCC negotiations, and the Paris Agreement provided an opportunity to use that foundation to achieve tangible benefits. This facilitated strong support by both developing and developed countries in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, including the Canadian delegation, which had shifted its political priorities to better support its indigenous communities after the election of a new prime minister:

For sure I would never give credit for that to anyone but the indigenous peoples within the IP caucus, but also just communities around the world... they worked so hard to land the platform. But in terms of countries who were true allies to the IP caucus and pushed really hard alongside them? Canada hosted all of the informal sessions on the platform in the last couple of years, and Nicaragua was helpful, although there were some political challenges on the ground for them...so Canada, with this new administration, started accrediting indigenous representatives on its official delegation...I think that helped ensure that indigenous communities in Canada were really leading the charge on the operationalization of the platform along with Canadian negotiators. (Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

### **3.3 Analysis of Non-institutionalized Climate Justice Principles**

The remaining three climate justice principles – historical responsibility, criticism of market-based climate change solutions, and criticism of global capitalist and neoliberal systems – did not show any noticeable increases over the time period analyzed, and generally were only sparsely mentioned in COP statements.

Additionally, these principles were not institutionalized in the Paris Agreement. The concept of historical responsibility was largely replaced by the system of voluntary nationally-determined contributions (NDCs), market mechanisms will still play a role in the UNFCCC's climate efforts, and criticisms of global systems are either reframed or left out of negotiations altogether in order to facilitate constructive dialogue among the state actors that actively participate in those systems.



## Historical Responsibility

The only decreasing trend observed regarding climate justice principles in UNFCCC member state speeches is the frequency of mentions of historical responsibility. Especially notable is the percentage of non-Annex I speeches with scores of 2, which declined from 13.1% in 2010 to 2.9% in 2017 (Figure 3.2). Much more than other climate justice principles, a discernable drop to sub-2009 levels can be seen after the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015 due to the move from the Kyoto Protocol's system of mandatory emission reductions for Annex I nations to the Paris Agreement's system of voluntary NDCs for all countries.

The bottom-up NDC system, advocated for in UNFCCC negotiations by many of the world's largest emitters (and thus those who bear the responsibility for global climate change), represents a significant shift from the Kyoto Protocol's top-down Annex system. Every signatory to the Paris Agreement, regardless of its level of development, is now required to formulate a national strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The amount to reduce and the timeline to reduce it are determined by the state government itself, shifting each country's emissions reductions from an obligation to a voluntary basis.

Despite contextual vulnerability as a key aspect of the UNFCCC's shared conception of climate change, many see the NDC system and resulting wane in discussion of historical responsibility as a move away from justice principles and a return to the global narrative of climate change present in the environmental framing that often ignores variances in vulnerabilities, adaptation capacities, and responsibilities:

I feel also in a way with Paris, there's been a lot of talk about ... "we are all on the same boat, we all have to do our best, there's no developed / developing countries anymore..." And in a way, I think that undermines a little this greater justice issue... in the past we used to have Annexes, there might be a lot of reasons to criticize them...but there might have been good reasons to have Annexes in the first place. (Duyck, interview by author, 05/02/2019)

The normative environment and power dynamics of UNFCCC negotiations also played a major role in influencing this shift. Ignoring CBDR-RC as a foundational

concept of the Convention, any attempt to progress on issues of historical responsibility is met with strong resistance from the highest-emitting countries seeking to limit discussion on issues regarding their liability. Rather than give historical responsibility legitimacy as an opposing position, Annex I countries have instead attempted to undermine it by framing historical responsibility as an extreme position that impairs the efficiency of what would otherwise be forward-looking negotiations.

As a result, raising the issue in UNFCCC negotiations has become increasingly taboo, and any attribution of blame – even toward those bearing clear responsibility, such as the fossil fuel industry – has become frowned upon during negotiations. It is now considered unconstructive and against the spirit of cooperation to raise the issue of historical responsibility in negotiations:

I think there was an effort by the countries that would have been historically responsible to seed this narrative that it wasn't a productive conversation, that it was backward-looking, we needed to move forward, we were coming together for this Paris Agreement and if we got bogged down in historic responsibility it would create animosity, and we wouldn't be able to get to a place where we have a plan for going forward. I think that's pretty disingenuous by developed countries to make that argument, but that's how power dynamics work. (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018)

Along with this resistance from developed states, the greater frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and establishment of the WIM has led developing countries to reframe their concerns and proposals in language that better fits the negotiating agenda and benefits their negotiating position. The result is a reshaping of historical responsibility into issues of loss and damage or finance:

There's more potential to get more out of the loss and damage discussions than there would be around just continuing to insert the words historical responsibilities into everything...I think that maybe the countries that would be focused on pushing the historical responsibility points are probably comfortable at the moment with emphasis on loss and damage to be essentially taking a different road to get to the same place. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

Another reason for the drop in mentions of historical responsibility is due to the volatility of the Annex categorization itself. Cleanly dividing an increasingly complex system into those who are responsible for climate change and those who are not has proven to be substantially difficult.<sup>61</sup> It is widely acknowledged that the international system of states has gradually fragmented into a spectrum of conditionality; many lines have become blurred as countries have progressed in their development and the global economic system has evolved. As nations around the world continue to develop, determining which countries are obligated to address climate change based on historical emissions of greenhouse gases will only become more complicated:

The other thing with historical responsibility is that it's sort of caught up in this differentiation and Annex 1 and Annex 2 Kyoto Protocol...you have countries like Indonesia, or Brazil, or Turkey...I mean, huge amounts of emissions coming out of these countries. And so where do you draw the line with historical responsibilities as time wears on? Historical responsibility becomes the responsibility of new countries. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

### **Other Issues: Criticism of Market Mechanisms and Global Systems**

The final two climate justice principles – criticism of market mechanisms and other “false solutions” in addressing climate change and a broader criticism of international systems such as global capitalism, free trade, and neoliberal governance – both appeared in less than 10% of COP statements almost every year.

These critiques are rare in COP statements simply because the framework of the UNFCCC and its treaties are fundamentally built on a market-focused approach to

---

<sup>61</sup> As an example, China is the current leader in global greenhouse gas emissions, contributing 29.12% of annual emissions in 2016. However, they are only responsible for 12.22 % of cumulative emissions (Ritchie & Roser, 2018). Under the Kyoto Protocol, China is classified as a non-Annex I country and therefore is not bound to any emission reduction obligations as other major emitters are.

preventing climate change. While many states hold criticisms of the UNFCCC's market mechanisms, it is not viewed as constructive to castigate them in a setting where countries are making major efforts to reach consensus. The majority will not be convinced to abandon these mechanisms and change course to a new conceptual approach, and proposals for more practical changes to them is better reserved for their respective workstream negotiations where they can be discussed in greater detail by experts.

Delegates and heads of state likewise understand that the UNFCCC is simply not the appropriate forum for criticism of dominant global economic and political systems. Airing such grievances will do nothing but hinder negotiations in a setting where nations are making an effort to find common ground and reach a consensus on numerous issues to address climate change. The majority of states are willing participants in these systems and have no reason to criticize them as a part of their platform, let alone at negotiations focused on cooperating to reach an agreement in order to prevent global climate change.

Therefore, as has been observed in the data, one would expect this topic to appear very infrequently in the rhetoric of UNFCCC member states. Although Hugo Chavez's speech at COP 15 showed that media attention and public support could be garnered when public attitudes align with opposition to UNFCCC decisions, overall such criticisms have greatly been frowned upon by UNFCCC member states as wasteful distractions and obstacles to productive negotiations. Instead, these criticisms are essentially reframed as topics such as global behavioral and consumption changes, sustainable development, and promotion of localized systems and processes in order to lead to more constructive dialogues in negotiations.

### **3.4 Conclusions: The Growth of Climate Justice**

This chapter has presented evidence demonstrating that the conception of climate change among states has been evolving from a problem viewed as largely scientific, environmental, and global to one that is more congruent with the principles of climate justice. Climate change is now fundamentally an issue of justice that is

interwoven with human rights, impacts some populations and regions more than others, exacerbates existing social inequalities, and in which loss and damage to countries with lower adaptive capacity must be addressed. There were two main findings in this chapter:

The first finding is that the expanded influence of climate justice in the conception of climate change can be observed through the institutionalization of six climate justice principles in the Paris Agreement, which pays markedly more attention to climate justice issues compared to the Kyoto Protocol. These six principles are: i) a Rawlsian conception of justice; ii) climate change as a human rights issue; iii) the exacerbation of existing gender, racial, social, and economic inequalities by climate change; iv) compensation for loss and damage to those most impacted v) climate change's differing impacts on and vulnerabilities of various countries, regions, and communities; and vi) the rights of indigenous peoples and preservation of traditional cultures.

The principles of historical responsibility, criticism of market mechanisms, and criticism of global systems, however, were not included in the Paris Agreement, as they conflicted with the interests of many of the states needed to successfully negotiate and ratify the treaty.

Institutionalization of these six principles indicates that they have entered the second stage (Norm Cascade) of the Norm Life Cycle. Adherence to these climate justice principles will no longer be discussed as only altruistic or morally-sound behavior, but rather behavior that is expected of any signatory of the Paris Agreement – evidence of the growth of climate justice as a norm. Although the language could certainly be stronger and the details of the policies more specific, the presence of climate justice principles in the Paris Agreement is significant for expanding the role climate justice will play in subsequent negotiations. From now on, these principles will act as discursive and procedural hooks for actors to frame future negotiations and call for their clarification and operationalization.

Other factors that indicate many climate justice principles have progressed into Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle include: i) the signing of the agreement by the “critical states” needed to make it an effective approach to address climate change, ii) states

functioning as the primary actors in advancing the climate justice frame in negotiations, iii) legitimacy and esteem becoming the motivating factors in the adoption of these principles, and iv) socialization now acting as the dominant mechanism in their growth in the UNFCCC.

The same six climate justice principles that were included in the Paris Agreement have also played an increasingly large role in states' framing of climate change. Likewise, mentions of the three climate justice principles not institutionalized in the Paris Agreement – historical responsibility, criticism of market mechanisms, and criticism of global systems – did not significantly appear in the rhetoric of states, as they considered discussion of these principles to be impediments to productive negotiations.

Second, the increased utilization of climate justice framings in COP statements by UNFCCC member states occurred much earlier in the rhetoric of non-Annex I countries. Although developing countries had long been advocating for a number of climate justice issues, Annex I states only integrated climate justice framings in their own speeches much later as negotiations for the Paris Agreement approached. However, the eventual adoption of these norms by these critical states of the UNFCCC further supports the notion that they have progressed into Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle.

The increased incorporation of climate justice in the rhetoric of Annex I countries was facilitated by the UNFCCC's negotiation cycle. The development of framework treaties emphasizes first reaching agreement on its broad conceptual objectives, and thus the negotiation of the Paris Agreement created an opportunity for the interests of Annex I and non-Annex I states to align as they sought to ratify a new climate treaty after the failure of Copenhagen.

## 4 NGOs: CAN International's Climate Justice Norm Promotion

In the years approaching COP 15, CAN found itself facing growing discord within the network. One of CAN's biggest challenges has always been setting a cohesive agenda that is also inclusive of the wide range of perspectives, cultures, histories, political stances, and priorities of its member organizations. Over time, internal conflicts grew between the larger Northern ENGOs that emphasized the environmental framing of climate change and Southern NGOs that prioritized justice-focused solutions.

Disagreements over what policy positions CAN should officially adopt and advocate for were becoming increasingly irreconcilable. Issues such as the adoption of market mechanisms, geoengineering and the role of land use in responding to climate change had revealed major ideological differences between members within CAN. As a result, a significant number of member organizations – many of them small, originating from developing countries, and with agendas emphasizing justice – felt increasingly disenfranchised within CAN, while the larger Northern ENGOs that held influence in CAN seemed unaware or dismissive of the severity of their concerns. (Duwe, 2001; Matsumoto, 2010).

Eventually, at COP 13 in 2007, these tensions reached a boiling point. By the end of the conference, 20 groups had issued a press release launching a new NGO network: Climate Justice Now! (Climate Justice Now!, 2007). While many organizations remained in CAN while also participating in these networks, some NGOs prioritizing climate justice disengaged from CAN completely in favor of CJN, most notably Friends of the Earth International (FoE).

The split occurred not only within CAN International, but also within the UNFCCC; the ENGO UNFCCC constituency was partitioned between CAN and CJN, each given equal privileges as afforded to non-government constituencies by the UNFCCC. Although the relationship between the two networks has tempered over time,<sup>62</sup> the tensions that caused the split lingered for years afterwards, hindering formal

---

<sup>62</sup> Further discussion of the complementary roles of the two networks in the UNFCCC space

coordination between organizations and resulting in an overall less cohesive international network of climate NGOs (Bond, 2013; Hadden, 2015).

The scale and number of contentious action seen at COP 15 was unprecedented.<sup>63</sup> COP 15 had become a global rallying moment for civil society action, with an unprecedented number of non-environmental NGOs active in social justice movements reframing their messages to incorporate climate change and gathering in Copenhagen. Here they participated in marches, demonstrations and media events, even organizing an alternative summit nearby named Klimaforum to provide a platform for less mainstream civil society voices advocating for a more just climate deal (Hadden, 2014; White, 2009). In response to protests, the UNFCCC Secretariat suspended NGO observer registration the second week of the conference and severely limited the number of participants allowed to enter the conference hall (CAN, 2009; Fisher, 2010).

While ENGOs in CAN had been extremely optimistic in the run-up to COP 15, the summit ended with a Copenhagen Accord that had been drafted without the input of civil society. Along with this came a realization by CAN that the collaborative, insider approach to UNFCCC negotiations they had insisted on pursuing for decades had been largely ineffective (Bond & Dorsey, 2010; Dimitrov, 2016). Many ENGOs left the conference feeling antagonized by the UNFCCC Secretariat and powerless in the UNFCCC process, and less relevant in the wake of the breakthrough of climate justice. This ushered in an era of relative disengagement of civil society in UNFCCC negotiations in subsequent years, forcing CAN to re-evaluate the effectiveness of their strategies as they fought for a greater role in the UNFCCC process.<sup>64</sup>

---

can be found in Chapter 5.

<sup>63</sup> For example: the first Wednesday of the summit saw a noisy demonstration inside the conference center in support of Tuvalu; common spaces throughout the city housed numerous protests, street theatre, and interventions; confrontations with police included the use of tear gas, pepper spray and police dogs, raids on convergence spaces, and “pre-emptive” mass arrests of peaceful demonstrators; and numerous marches in protest of the solutions being proposed by states were held, the largest comprised of an estimated 100,000 demonstrators (Chatterton et al., 2012; McGregor, 2011; Reitan & Gibson, 2012)

<sup>64</sup> Allan & Hadden 2017, pp. 610-2; Backstrand et al., 2017; Ciplet et al., 2015, pp. 172-5; Hadden, 2015, pp. 151-5



In light of this self-reflection, this chapter applies both quantitative and qualitative data to examine CAN International's role in promoting climate justice in the UNFCCC's post-Copenhagen era. CAN's *ECO* newsletter, the network's principal platform for communicating its priority issues, policy positions, and political stances is analyzed for the nine identified climate justice principles and compared to the UNFCCC COP member statements examined in Chapter 3.


Analyzing the prevalence of climate justice framings used by CAN over time provides clarity regarding how the adoption of climate justice principles has progressed among NGOs. Furthermore, comparing these results to the trends observed in states presents an approach to answer whether CAN was norm entrepreneurs or instead followed the momentum of UNFCCC negotiations in its advocacy of climate justice. Interview data is additionally utilized in order to provide context to CAN's adoption and promotion of climate justice in the post-Copenhagen era.

#### **4.1 Climate Justice in *ECO*: Overall Trends**

When examining the average number of mentions of all nine climate justice principles in *ECO*, a relatively static and consistently low number of mentions was observed from 2001 to 2012. There is then a noticeable increase in the use of climate justice language from 2013 – six years after CJN was formed to promote climate justice principles in the UNFCCC – and peaking in 2015, in which the average number is more than twice that of 2012. Just as in the case of UNFCCC member states, this number has decreased somewhat since then, but it still remains significantly higher in 2017 compared to 2012.<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>65</sup> Full data for the mention of all climate justice principles in *ECO* is listed in Appendix D.



**Figure 4.1** Average Mentions of Climate Justice Principles per *ECO* Newsletter Issue

Looking at Figure 4.2, similar trends regarding the utilization of climate justice framing from 2009 can be observed between UNFCCC member states in their official COP statements and CAN in their *ECO* newsletter, with two important distinctions. The first is that climate justice issues were adopted much sooner by states. A significant increase begins after the COP 15 conference in Copenhagen in 2009, which would continue through 2014. In comparison, CAN's mentions in *ECO* would not begin to increase until after 2012. The second difference is that while both states and CAN saw a dramatic increase in the use of climate justice language in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, mentions by states spiked and peaked in 2014, one year earlier than CAN.

While norm entrepreneurs proactively advocate for states to adopt a norm, for CAN this is instead a reactive process. Rather than guiding the positions and framings of the state delegates involved in post-Copenhagen UNFCCC negotiations, CAN was embracing the discursive trends occurring in negotiations. This allowed them to adopt the climate justice issues gaining the most momentum in order to use their platform to give further visibility to these issues, with the goal of maximizing the chances of seeing them

successfully incorporated into the Paris Agreement.

This evidence indicates that CAN was not a norm entrepreneur for climate justice; although CAN advocated for climate justice before it had been adopted by a critical mass of states or institutionalized, climate justice did not increase in CAN's framing until after it had been embraced as a larger part of states' rhetoric. In light of Sunstein's definition, if one were to consider any actor promoting a norm prior to Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle as a norm entrepreneur, the actors responsible for introducing and advocating for a norm in its earliest stages could be thought of as "proactive norm entrepreneurs," and actors who adopt a norm with increasing momentum among states as "reactive norm entrepreneurs."

However, because CAN's advocacy for climate justice followed states' utilization of climate justice in their own framings, it is more accurate to characterize CAN's role in climate justice promotion as distinctly not as that of a norm entrepreneur. An actor aiming to advocate for a norm in Stage 1 of the Norm Life Cycle may not adopt it until after norm entrepreneurs have already taken significant action to promote it, instead choosing to use its resources and tools available to support norms they predict have high enough resonance and potential to progress.

Although climate justice had been given attention by many ENGOs since the beginning of climate negotiations, it was largely relegated to a secondary issue within mainstream ENGOs behind less contentious environmental and scientific issues. Some interviewees with experience in CAN meetings were left with the impression that, pre-Copenhagen, discussion of climate justice issues in official forums<sup>66</sup> was allowed primarily as a way to appease member organizations that were known to stall meetings to attempt to push issues of justice to the front of the agenda. However, throughout CAN the more traditional environmental agendas of the "big global" ENGOs always stood as the primary focus of the network's agenda, strategies, and framings.


In the post-Copenhagen era, however, climate justice has taken on an increasingly prominent role in the agendas and framings utilized by ENGOs. The empirical data of the content analysis of the *ECO* newsletter and the experiences of CAN

---

<sup>66</sup> This includes agenda-setting and strategy-planning meetings, mailing lists, and working group meetings.

and NGO staff interviewed support the conclusion that, in addition to UNFCCC member states, climate justice has significantly grown to become a fundamental part of how CAN and its members frame climate change:

I think there has been a real paradigm shift over the course of the last decade, and particularly in the last five years in the climate movement internationally...I think it's fair to say that that's something that's not only happening in the large organizations, but there's also something happening at the community level and organizations that work on climate. (Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019)



**Figure 4.2 Average Climate Justice Mentions by UNFCCC Member States and CAN<sup>67</sup>**

<sup>67</sup> The purpose of the figures in this chapter directly comparing climate justice mentions by CAN and UNFCCC member states is to examine the trends in their framing over the years 2009-2017. Because the texts analyzed and average number of mentions are annual statements (states) and newsletter issues with multiple articles (CAN), the number of climate justice mentions should not be compared between the two – only the trends over time.

CAN's adjustment of its framing processes in order to stay relevant to the UNFCCC agenda continued after Paris' COP 21 conference. Similar to what was observed in the rhetoric of states, CAN's overall use of climate justice-related language saw a significant decrease in 2016 after the Paris Agreement was negotiated and drafted. The explanation for this lies in the same conceptualization-operationalization pattern of negotiations responsible for the decrease in climate justice mentions in UNFCCC member states' COP statements.

In the lead-up to Paris, CAN developed strategies and focused much of its effort on advocating for big, conceptual issues to be included in the Paris Agreement such as limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees and compensation for loss and damage. Once the framework for the Paris Agreement was finalized and ratified, ENGOs then had to shift focus, with the promotion of conceptual issues giving way to increased engagement by technical working groups on the implementation of the concepts in the Paris Agreement:

Once you have something like the Paris Agreement in place...the focus of an organization or network like CAN shifts to implementation, and you perhaps see a shift from articulating and emphasizing the values and principles upon which an agreement like the Paris Agreement needs to be based, toward lining the technical details and policy prescriptions of how the Paris Agreement needs to operate. (Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

The cycle of the UNFCCC negotiation process is reflected in the response by NGOs as they shift their emphasis to more technical prognostic framings once a conceptual framework treaty is established and the broader issues are institutionalized. A new phase of repositioning and strategizing begins, and states and NGOs begin to develop their campaigns for the next major point of contention in negotiations.

Additionally, NGOs also require time to analyze how the behavior and negotiating positions of parties change after adopting a major treaty like the Paris Agreement. From this analysis, they will devise new framing campaigns, decide to whom

they should be targeted, and develop strategies to operationalize them. This is then reflected in their rhetoric and results in a smaller emphasis on conceptual issues like climate justice:

Everyone was working up to Paris, and no one knew what we were going to get in Paris, and so no one could really do much in terms of planning for post-Paris. So 2016 was very much a year of reflection, and inward looking...everyone was repositioning, everyone was waiting to see where the negotiations were going to go. It was a huge “what next?” moment...So it goes into this whole new process, and you have to then start analyzing the submissions that are coming from countries, you need to be listening in the negotiations to the positioning of the countries. Then you're able to start to work out the direction of the negotiations, and start to work out which countries are raising what issues, what needs to be brought in, and which countries you need to be advocating certain things to. And then you start to build your campaign up over the next year or two. And so that's why you'll see that sort of drop and then a gradual re-emergence of things moving up to now. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

Also partially responsible for the drop in climate justice rhetoric in *ECO* is the internalization of climate justice by CAN and its members. If many of the nine climate justice principles are increasingly taken as a given by NGOs when discussing climate change, many campaigners then perceive it as less necessary to develop framings that explicitly promote them:

I think for me, [climate justice] actually is so much embedded now in people's thinking, that sometimes I don't think it's necessary to mention it anymore. I mean, it's basically if you have internalized something so much, I think that is part of the reason why they also get mentioned less, because it's a given, right? And it's not because it has less importance, but rather because it's so obvious. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

Despite developing states being the actors responsible for its initial introduction and promotion, the internalization of climate justice by NGOs indicates that these norms have progressed even further among NGOs than in states. Chapter 3

concluded that many climate justice principles meet the criteria for Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle, but internalization is the distinguishing characteristic of Stage 3.

In the case of CAN, this indicates that a network that had once been split in two over the issue of climate justice has increasingly reconciled those differences by moving in the direction of conceptual and political coherence. What was once a contentious issue within the network is now becoming internalized and taken as a given among its members.

## 4.2 Climate Justice Principles Present in CAN's Framing

Based on the results of the content analysis conducted on CAN's *ECO* newsletter, the makeup of the conception of climate justice held by CAN in the post-Copenhagen era is consistent with that of the UNFCCC member states: one that includes justice framings, emphasizes the importance of addressing loss and damage, is deeply connected to issues of human rights, impacts existing social inequalities, and highlights variances in vulnerability among different regions and populations.




Figure 4.3 Average Mentions of Climate Justice Principles in *ECO* Newsletter Issues

## Rawlsian Justice

Mentions of justice and corresponding terminology (e.g. equality, equity, and fairness) in line with Rawls' conception of justice saw one of the largest increases from 2009 to 2017 of all the climate justice principles. The average number of mentions of these terms per *ECO* issue has more than quadrupled since 2009 and remains well over one mention per issue in 2017 (Figure 4.4).

Furthermore, despite the post-Paris drop in discussion of conceptual issues corresponding with the greater focus on technical implementation and repositioning of NGO campaigns, explicit mentions of justice have essentially completely rebounded by 2017. This gives credence to the idea that CAN has found a framing in climate justice that the network is comfortable with and dedicated to pursuing beyond the negotiations for the Paris Agreement.


Although to some degree this is a deliberate strategy by CAN, in the end CAN's strategies are an amalgamation of the positions of its members. While large Northern ENGOs are known to exert more influence in the network simply due to higher resources, capacity, and connections that afford them a greater presence and allow them to participate more, the positions, rhetoric, strategies, and campaigns of major international ENGOs is often indicative of growing trends in the civil society climate space. Therefore, to a large degree, the use of justice-related rhetoric is believed to be the result of an overall shift in the climate space. Instead of a top-down strategy from CAN International, this evolution bubbled up from grassroots NGOs to "big global" ENGOs, and then eventually to CAN as a network.

No single reason is completely responsible for this shift, but an often-cited explanation by those working in and with CAN stresses the importance of individuals. A new generation of climate activists more receptive to climate justice perspectives began occupying important positions in ENGOs, and over time they were able to influence their policy positions, activism tactics, and overall organizational agendas:



You can probably pin [the shift toward climate justice in CAN] down to individuals...So if [an influential organization's] relative positioning shifts because of an individual staff change, then that could even have a ripple effect on CAN. And if similar things happen at the same time in multiple organizations? (Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019).

Along with mainstreaming the concept of climate justice, Copenhagen's failure inspired countless young activists who felt that the current UNFCCC process was not tackling the problem of climate change with the seriousness and urgency it deserved. Compared to the previous generation, this new wave of activists was comprised of a much more diverse group of ethnic backgrounds, genders, regions, and academic fields. They represented a younger generation that had already begun to feel the effects of climate change, coming into the civil society climate space with a people-centric perspective of the problem due to a closer personal connection to climate change's impacts.



**Figure 4.4** Average Mentions of Rawlsian Justice and Adjacent Language by CAN (per *ECO* Issue) and UNFCCC Member States

At the same time, acknowledging the severity of the ideological differences between CAN's members, many of the large international ENGOs – as well as CAN International itself – began various forms of outreach programs and collaboration strategies to facilitate communication with regional branches working locally on the ground level. Climate justice was not only fundamental to the perspective adopted by these local activists in their advocacy, but also a major part of their framing of climate change. Although many of these outreach efforts proved to be unsuccessful, they are noteworthy in that they exposed mainstream ENGOs to climate justice perspectives and provided opportunities for climate justice voices to penetrate institutional and ideological barriers they had constantly faced in a “big global” dominated network and civil society climate space:


[CAN] was always perceived, and I think rightly so, as a rather white, male, Northern-dominated organization...and [now] CAN is no longer perceived...as just a Northern environmental organization. It is perceived as a global network which is very diverse...it is not the CAN it was ten years ago. And that has been a very conscious effort, and I think a successful one. (Verolme, interview by author, 28/01/2019).

Many of the factors that facilitated the increase of states' climate justice rhetoric discussed in Chapter 3 also played a role in CAN and its members' adoption of justice-based framings. Such factors include: the mainstreaming of justice rhetoric through mentions in the COP statements of developed countries; increased participation of non-environmental NGOs in the UNFCCC, particularly those from human rights, international aid, and global justice fields and the resulting relationships, conversations, and collaborations; and advances in academic research that further strengthened the linkages between the impacts of climate change and social justice.

## **Loss and Damage**

Compensation for loss and damage also showed a considerable increase of mentions in CAN's *ECO* newsletter post-Copenhagen. Unlike the trend observed in the

rhetoric of developing countries – which peaked in 2013 in the push to establish the WIM – mentions by CAN gradually increased until 2015, when CAN advocated for the inclusion of loss and damage provisions in the Paris Agreement (Figure 4.5). After the expected drop in mentions in 2016, loss and damage rebounded the following year, proving that it is an issue that ENGOs have meaningfully included in their agenda and will continue pursuing in future climate negotiations.



**Figure 4.5** Average Mentions of Loss and Damage by CAN (per *ECO* Issue) and UNFCCC Member States

One reason for the increase is the emergence of language in the 2012 negotiations at COP 18 in Doha for the establishment of what would become the WIM the following year. Civil society organizations, which had become disengaged from the climate negotiation process since their disenfranchisement in Copenhagen, were now given a focused issue and concrete proposal to rally behind in the lead-up to the next climate agreement. This sparked a surge in CAN’s emphasis on the topic and also led to an increase in collaboration with the climate justice groups they once competed with for influence in the UNFCCC (Allan & Hadden, 2017).

Interviews with CAN officials confirmed what can be inferred from the graphs: this was an issue led first and foremost by developing parties (especially Small Island Developing States and the least-developed countries). NGOs later adopted loss and damage into their framing strategies as a campaign to support them. It was seen as an issue that was important to the most vulnerable states, could be supported by a wide range of NGOs, and was perceived to be an achievable goal in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement after the victory in establishing the WIM in 2013:

[Loss and damage] is an important issue and perceived as one of the big fights that you can win in the UNFCCC on equity and justice. I think that is one of the key underlying things and why people actually engage in loss and damage issues quite prominently...I think it was perceived as one of the issues where we can really support some of the most vulnerable countries in their demand for more justice and equality in the regime. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

Since COP 18 in Doha, loss and damage has been pushed for by civil society ENGOs more than any other climate justice issue. It served as a point of alignment between climate justice NGOs and more traditional ENGOs, encouraging information-sharing and cooperation between organizations and networks that had split over differing priorities and political stances and been largely divided in the post-Copenhagen era.

Additionally, a significant amount of credit was given to the role of individuals within CAN and its member organizations, particularly those who made loss and damage their priority and were responsible for pushing the issue to the forefront of CAN's agenda and framing. Especially relevant is how these individuals were able to utilize CAN's resources, channels for communication, and networking opportunities to their advantage.<sup>68</sup>

This was a recurring point in interviews with current and former CAN officials: individuals with enough motivation and knowledge of how to best use CAN's assets to their advantage were able to bring attention to their prioritized issues and stances, which could often accelerate support for that issue among members. However, this factor can


---

<sup>68</sup> Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019; Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019

also constrain the influence of some members, as those without knowledge of CAN's processes sometimes encountered difficulty in generating momentum within the network for their issues of focus.

## **Human Rights**

Human rights is another climate justice principle with an observable increase in emphasis throughout *ECO* issues over time. Unlike justice or loss and damage, however, human rights was only sparsely mentioned from 2001 to 2013. This is followed by a slight increase in 2014 and a massive surge in 2015 (Figure 4.6). This shift is similarly observed in CAN's Annual Policy Documents; while human rights are seldom mentioned in any prior years, the 2015 document released before COP 21 makes repeated emphatic references to human rights throughout. Notably, the increase of human rights language in *ECO* came one year after a similar change was observed in developing parties' efforts to include human rights as part of their framing of climate change.



**Figure 4.6 Average Mentions of Human Rights by CAN (per *ECO* Issue) and UNFCCC Member States**

The biggest element contributing to the rise in human rights in CAN’s framings was CAN’s participation in the CIEL-facilitated cross-constituency push to include human rights language in the Paris Agreement. This was not a CAN-led effort; it was just one of the eight constituencies participating in a unified platform. As one of the individuals responsible explained, “The objective was to avoid using CAN, because CAN is just one of the [constituencies], so we wanted to be *across* constituencies, and CIEL will make a bridge with CAN” (Duyck, interview by author, 05/02/2019). In acting as mediators between constituencies, framing and messaging was harmonized by CIEL, including contributing to and screening CAN policy documents and *ECO* articles.

This was a deliberate frame bridging strategy, as the concept of human rights holds its own power – both institutionally, through the various human rights agreements signed by states, and discursively, due to the decades of precedent activity on the international stage concerning human rights:

If you want to really refer to something that's hard enough, you need to have a reference to

human rights or access to remedies. There's a few words that if they are missing, you can really expect that whenever states are not going to be willing to play along, they will just be able to be granted whatever flexibility they want – unless you use these words. So I would say that's a criticism that we faced a lot: “You’re focusing too much on a controversial word!” But at the end of the day, the word is controversial because it carries some true meaning. (Duyck, interview by author, 05/02/2019)

CIEL acted as an intermediary between multiple constituencies, making sure to not rely on any single actor to promote the human rights package. However, the campaign created momentum for human rights framing throughout the UNFCCC, motivating CAN to amplify human rights in the framings promoted by their working groups in *ECO*. Members of the ENGO constituency recognized the effectiveness of frame bridging, understanding that pressuring states and threatening to shame them for opposing human rights in the Paris Agreement would be a useful tactic due to human rights already being established as an international norm:

That was an effort of getting [human rights] into *ECO*, raising it with negotiators, talking to media about it, and just having a mass of civil society there who are demanding it. But also I don't think you want to be the country who says in negotiation, "We don't want human rights in the Paris Agreement." That's sort of like a “name-and-shame” thing – do you want that to be your historical record? Probably not, that's pretty cut-and-dry. So civil society would have been ready to make that the story if some country said flat-out, “We want to delete this reference.” Which is a powerful weapon to have, the shame of the media. (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018)

Another relevant factor in the increase of human rights framing is the inter-movement spillover of non-environmental NGOs into the UNFCCC after COP 15. This rise in outside engagement came as numerous organizations increasingly realized that not only is preventing climate change necessary to achieving their goals, but also that the UNFCCC is a relatively fresh and fertile battleground to secure human rights and international aid commitments from states. Human rights and international aid

organizations, researchers, academics, and lawyers with a background in the field all have become a significant part of civil society ENGOs and networks through joint activities, consulting, employment, and relationship-building at COP conferences. These interactions have resulted in a significant degree of crossover between human rights and environmental NGOs, heavily influencing the missions of organizations in both fields.<sup>69</sup>

However, a major reason this change was not reflected in the number of mentions of human rights in *ECO* for so many years was due to CAN, a multi-issue network with limited resources, focusing its campaigns on what issues they perceived to be “winnable” in the UNFCCC. For many years, fighting for human rights inclusions in UNFCCC decisions and policies was not believed to be a battle with a high chance of success, and so the limited space of *ECO* was dedicated to other campaigns CAN was working on:

It was quite a strong fight about bringing in human rights into the Paris Agreement...and I think that is why you cannot see it necessarily as prominently in *ECO*, because we always have more important issues that we *can* win. If you look at the latest *ECOs* I think we actually mention it quite a bit now, because we considered that there is a window of opportunity. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019).

Similar to CAN’s adoption of loss and damage after observing developing states’ successes in negotiations, the effectiveness of CIEL’s coordination of constituencies highlighted human rights as an issue with momentum in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement. In addition to this, many human rights and climate justice activists (both within and outside of CAN) that had disengaged with the UNFCCC process after Copenhagen saw the drafting of a new framework treaty as an opportunity to reenter the climate space.<sup>70</sup> This further contributed to the momentum of human rights within the network in the lead up to Paris, motivating CAN to bridge the resonant norm of human

---

<sup>69</sup> See: Cabré, 2011; Fisher, 2010; Hadden, 2014; Jacobs, 2016; Jinnah, 2011; Koivurova et al., 2013; Lövbrand et al., 2017; Reitan & Gibson, 2012.

<sup>70</sup> Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019; Thanki, interview by author, 02/04/2019




rights into its climate change framing.

## **Social Inequality**

The impacts of climate change on existing social inequalities also became an increasingly important part of CAN's climate justice framing in the post-Copenhagen era, especially in regard to issues of gender. Like the other climate justice principles discussed so far, mentions in *ECO* peaked in 2015, with its largest surge happening as the Paris Agreement was entering its final negotiations (Figure 4.7). Before 2014, mentions by CAN were static and relatively low, despite the successful campaign by the Women and Gender constituency at the Doha COP in 2012.

However, the momentum generated from this victory resulted in a revitalization of the fight for gender equality and the empowerment of women as the Paris Agreement negotiations approached. This motivated interest, activism and support by civil society organizations and individuals who saw an opportunity for further progress in the UNFCCC. In addition to this, gender equality had become part of the messaging of CIEL's human rights package, ensuring that CAN would coordinate its norm promotion accordingly and bridge this issue into its own prognostic framings of how to address climate change.



**Figure 4.7 Average Mentions of Social Inequality by CAN (per *ECO* Issue) and UNFCCC Member States**

Although CAN contributed by integrating CIEL’s human rights framing into *ECO* articles when applicable, most of the responsibility regarding advocacy for gender issues was left to the Women and Gender constituency. CAN found it a more efficient use of resources to leave the campaign to the group dedicated to that specific issue; organizations and individuals prioritizing gender inequality would naturally approach the Women and Gender constituency to work together instead of putting in a great deal of effort competing for influence within CAN:

We have a policy on [gender inequality], but the people who are interested in the topic, they actually work with the gender constituency, so they don't necessarily work as part of the CAN network...it's very hard for them to be part of both networks, and particularly to coordinate one of the networks, so they have been quite inactive within the CAN Network, I would say. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

However, by 2015 many organizations in CAN were paying increasingly more attention to issues of social inequality and its connections to climate change. The failure of Copenhagen had opened the eyes of many ENGOs to both ideological and practical disconnects with the grassroots organizations on the ground, and with this understanding came new strategies and efforts to collaborate and engage with those groups. From these experiences, they became more aware of the challenges minority communities and their representative organizations faced and the issues important to them:

It was perceived that the only people who had time to deal with environmental issues weren't dealing with the everyday realities of racial inequality – before you add the issue of climate into it. And I would say that's changing now, on the basis of the environmental NGOs recognizing that you can't just have disconnected middle class and upper-middle class white people trying to deal with environmental problems which are especially exacerbated in less privileged communities. (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018)

As many of these ENGOs strengthened their engagement with minority communities and grassroots environmental organizations, supporting them became an increasingly larger part of their activities. This support took the form of the provision of resources and technical knowledge, using their platform to advocate for issues important to these groups, and amplifying and elevating their framings to the international stage. After developing a closer relationship with minority communities and organizations, many influential CAN members were much more receptive to bridging social inequality framings into its diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational climate change framings during their campaigns in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement.<sup>71</sup>

---


<sup>71</sup> Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018; Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019

## **Contextual Vulnerability**

Closer engagement with local and regional organizations also influenced CAN's amplification of regional and contextual differences in vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. After Copenhagen, many large international ENGOs shifted to regional outreach strategies, diverting their resources into building up their national and regional networks, supporting grassroots partner organizations, and engaging in joint activities with local groups. This led to a higher degree of collaboration between local and international organizations as local groups sought an international platform to disseminate their message and international organizations realized that local strategies would be even more necessary to effectively address climate change in the post-Kyoto NDC system:

It's this shift I think in large part prompted by the wind of the Paris Agreement after Copenhagen, where many people thought the international process had failed us. But then we were able to emerge from [the failure of] Copenhagen and reinvent the way international climate cooperation works... But once that happened, we had to move to implementation, which is necessarily embedded in local regional realities, and that forces the realization that you cannot address climate change practically without also addressing the realities of the people whose lives are being impacted by climate change. (Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019)


While there was an overall increase in mentions of contextual vulnerability and adaptation capacity, it appears that the agenda of the UNFCCC played a major role in determining CAN's attention to this issue. A spike in adaptation mentions in 2004-2005 is consistent with the Kyoto Protocol entering into force in 2005, and along with it the push by delegates of developing nations to initiate the Adaptation Fund Board. Similarly, a surge can be seen from 2014-2015, due to an effort to give the issue of vulnerability more attention in the final negotiations of the Paris Agreement. Both increases were followed by significant drops in the years following each of these two events (Figure 4.8).



**Figure 4.8** Average Mentions of Contextual Vulnerability by CAN (per *ECO* Issue)

## Indigenous Rights

Although references to the rights of indigenous peoples and traditional knowledge did show an observable increase from 2014-2015, they peaked at an average of 0.5 mentions per issue, notably less than the other principles that exhibited an increase in the lead-up to COP 21 in Paris (Figure 4.9). The rise in mentions this year is attributed to the inclusion of the issue in CIEL's human rights package and the coordination of messaging between constituencies. References to indigenous rights were added to relevant *ECO* articles where appropriate, especially in cases where connections could be made to human rights.



**Figure 4.9 Average Mentions of Indigenous Rights by CAN (per *ECO* Issue) and UNFCCC Member States**

Protection of indigenous rights is not in any way a contentious issue within CAN, but it is also not a priority issue for many ENGOs. This is due to a number of factors, such as a particular organization’s mission and objectives, or the relevance of indigenous rights in its country of origin. CAN’s positions come from consensus between participating network members, but advocacy for these positions in *ECO* come from momentum within the network. If there is not a strong constituency of CAN members writing articles about a topic and advocating for its inclusion in other articles, then that topic will not advance to the forefront of CAN’s framing and thus will make fewer appearances in *ECO*:

For CAN to have a position, it largely has to do with [members] bringing that to the attention of the network. But [indigenous rights] hasn’t been usually picked up by the big globals, and there hasn’t been a strong push from across the network. It could be because we have the indigenous constituency, but also because I think the other NGOs haven’t necessarily picked it up as a priority... (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

Similar to the issue of gender equality, if an NGO wants to advocate for indigenous issues in the UNFCCC, the most effective platform for this would not be through ENGOs. Instead, they would naturally approach and collaborate with the IPO constituency. This is exactly what civil society participants witnessed in the post-Copenhagen era, with some CAN members noting the lack of engagement between indigenous organizations and CAN. CAN and its member organizations have also deliberately left much of the advocacy efforts to the indigenous peoples organizations themselves; if one constituency is already dedicated to a particular issue, then the limited time, energy, and money available to ENGOs could be better put to use on issues without the full attention of other networks and constituencies.

Additionally, CAN and many of its members also acknowledge not only the Eurocentric history of the network and many of its members, but also the numerous troubled relationships between environmental and indigenous rights movements in the past. This includes a history of non-indigenous organizations coopting indigenous movements, and ENGOs ignoring or even opposing indigenous concerns in their environmental campaigns. More recently, there has been a greater sense of self-awareness among many of CAN's larger ENGOs. Strategies have been developed to support indigenous organizations only when requested, taking care to recognize when their involvement is not wanted:

I think there's been more recognition of this by the environmental NGO community...Now it's more we try to get the permission of and with the theory of a local [indigenous] group...recognizing that sometimes communities are not interested in the large NGOs' help, and being able to have the lack of ego to say "Greenpeace isn't wanted here," so we're not going to come in and do this thing if we're not welcome. (Ages, interview by author, 17/12/2018).


This evolution also explains why advocacy for indigenous rights in the UNFCCC has largely been deferred to the IPO constituency and seen relatively little presence in the framings utilized by CAN: "We don't want to speak on behalf of

[indigenous peoples' organizations], so we usually try to stay in touch and see if they want to use the CAN network” (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019).

### 4.3 Climate Justice Principles Absent from CAN’s Framing

#### Historical Responsibility

Just as with UNFCCC member states, the only climate justice principle with an observable decrease of mentions in *ECO* over time is historical responsibility. Mentions of this peaked in 2007, but have since decreased dramatically and have been almost entirely absent from CAN’s framings in recent years (Figure 4.10). While historical responsibility was never a major aspect of CAN’s framings, the decline in mentions over time is noteworthy. Explicit references to historical responsibility appeared on average in one out of every three issues of *ECO* in 2007, but had essentially been completely removed from CAN’s framing of climate change only five years later.



**Figure 4.10** Average Mentions of Historical Responsibility by CAN (per *ECO* Issue)



After COP 15 in Copenhagen, developed countries have framed historical responsibility as an issue that risks destroying the spirit of cooperation in the UNFCCC. CAN officials emphasize that they see civil society's role in the UNFCCC process as one of supporting the initiatives of developing nations in climate negotiations. Thus, as negotiations moved towards the voluntary system of NDCs, civil society followed suit and placed their efforts toward climate justice initiatives with greater momentum in negotiations:

I just feel like people are shying away now to mention historical responsibility...it hasn't been helpful in the process to talk about historical responsibility. And to create an environment of dialogue, it rather actually contributes to the firewall, so I think this is the main reason why [NGOs] don't use it anymore. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

While frustrations with the limitations of civil society's influence in the UNFCCC are not uncommon, CAN believes that contentious action from NGOs is not facilitative or helpful in supporting the agendas of developing countries and moving the process along. Although such actions are not completely absent from the network's toolkit of advocacy tactics, CAN's objectives and strategies prioritize participation in the UNFCCC over protest. Therefore, CAN and many of its members have adapted to the normative environment and negotiation agenda of the UNFCCC in order to assist states, largely eliminating explicit discussion of historical responsibility in its diagnostic framings of climate change.

However, while many in CAN recognize that raising the issue of historical responsibility in the UNFCCC may be un conducive to achieving their goals, they have not entirely abandoned the concept. Although the language may have changed, the concept of historical responsibility still guides CAN's prognostic framings when advocating for developed countries to take the lead in addressing climate change, as well as their motivational framings to encourage states to take collective action:

In the Paris era, developed countries really reject or try to gloss over the notion of historical

responsibility, and sometimes civil society does the same, because we now have a treaty that necessitates shared responsibility. And you know there's perhaps a fear that if we as civil society overemphasize historical responsibility, we will lose that spirit of collective action that underlies the Paris Agreement, or we will jeopardize it. But I see a very strong insistence from developing countries and from our civil society colleagues in developing countries that we continue to keep the understanding of historical responsibility at the heart of our engagement as civil society, and that's for sure the approach that CAN Canada takes. (Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

### **Other Issues: Criticism of Market Mechanisms and Global Systems**

Similar to as was observed in the rhetoric of states, opposition to market-based approaches to climate change and criticism of global economic and political structures made few appearances in *ECO* over the period analyzed. While these issues are important to some of CAN's members, they were never integrated into CAN's framings due to a lack of consensus within the network.

The relative absence of opposition to market mechanisms in CAN's framing would come as no surprise to those familiar with the history of the network. In the years preceding Copenhagen, support for market-based climate change solutions was a major point of contention between traditional ENGOs and those more receptive to climate justice and was the primary issue at the heart of the ENGO constituency split (Bond, 2013; Hadden, 2015).

However, this does not mean that only organizations supporting market mechanisms remained in CAN after the split. Rather, it left CAN with a diverse spectrum of stances among its members, ranging from organizations starkly against the Kyoto Protocol's market instruments to those working to improve the adoption and efficiency of those mechanisms. Due to this wide variety of stances, nothing approaching a consensus on market-based approaches could be reached within the network. As CAN sought to unify ENGOs and repair any divisions remaining between members after Copenhagen, the issue was left for members to engage with on an individual level rather than as a network:

It has been one of the issues that also traditionally was in CAN always a little bit difficult, because it's very hard to find a common position if you have NGOs who are opposing the market-based solutions, and then you have the ones that are working actively with government to find market-based solutions. CAN is consensus based...so if we cannot find a position then we don't have a position... Many organizations haven't prioritized it, or haven't prioritized it within CAN, because they know traditionally it's very hard for CAN to find a workable solution... So this has been one of the sticky issues I guess, but it is because of the huge ideological divide. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

However, the common sentiment among all interviewees was that opinion in the civil society climate space regarding market-based climate change solutions has gradually shifted to one of skepticism. Although there are many that believe market mechanisms can work in theory, the Kyoto mechanisms like the Clean Development Mechanism and global carbon markets have proven over the years to be unsuccessful. Market-based mechanisms have yet to be implemented in any successful way thus far, and their impacts on justice and human rights have proven too great to ignore. As one expert stated:

If there was going to be a market, there would be a market by now. I mean, they've been trying it since the mid 90's. Do we have to try for another 30 years?...Based on all of the science that we have, we haven't really got time to waste. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019).

A major reason given by multiple NGO officials for the lack of engagement in market mechanisms was the immense amount of time and technical capacity required to tackle an issue as complex and demanding as improving global carbon market systems. Many organizations simply do not have these resources, and those that do often find it to be a more efficient use of them to focus on issues that have more momentum within CAN:

It's also a very technical issue...many organizations don't have the money to invest and think

about it...in the end it's better for me to personally spend my time [on other issues] than on what a market mechanism should look like, which then actually would get backlash from part of the membership. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019).

In a consensus-based network such as CAN, issues controversial within the membership lack the support to make it into the network's framing processes. Organizations will avoid engaging with the issue on the network level, choosing to instead focus any efforts on those issues elsewhere. Acknowledging the difficulty in finding a solution agreeable to all members within the network, some members continue to work on the issue through channels other than CAN: "Many organizations haven't prioritized it – or haven't prioritized within CAN because they know traditionally it's very hard for CAN to find a workable solution" (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019).

These explanations similarly apply to the criticism of global economic and political systems such as capitalism, neoliberal governance, and free trade. Political stances this contentious do not extend past the level of individual member organizations in CAN, as it would be practically impossible to form a consensus among the network's members – many of which rely on such systems for their campaign activities and survival as an organization.

Many NGOs also recognize that these stances are not popular amongst their supporters or target audiences. Similar to the issue of historical responsibility, organizations understand that such positions are easily dismissible by critics and only serve to hinder the UNFCCC process and impair the progress of the states they work to support:

Friends of the Earth, we say "system change, not climate change." We think corporate power and the current financial system will need transformative change...there are some other groups around the world that are actively anti-capitalist in the FoE network, but we're not, because it's deeply unpopular and is very dismissible. It's very extreme. [You'd hear] "Go join the black bloc!" You're just very easily dismissible at that point. (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018).

NGOs that do wish to voice these criticisms often present them in a less contentious manner. In place of direct critiques, framings instead incorporate general concepts of “system change” and “transformative change,” promote behavioral changes in consumers, and support localization of production systems and processes. Organizations that hold criticisms of global systems as a fundamental part of their platform generally do not actively participate in CAN. This occurs through self-selection, as these organizations often do not see much value in attempting to influence a UNFCCC process they view as ineffective in addressing climate change.

#### **4.4 Conclusions: CAN International’s Role in Climate Justice Advocacy**

By examining the language used by the most prominent environmental NGO network involved in the UNFCCC climate change negotiation process, this study has found evidence that, in addition to states, the presence of climate justice also increased in NGOs’ framing of climate change in the post-Copenhagen era of climate negotiations. Three main findings were presented in this chapter:

First, climate justice framings started to increase in CAN’s newsletter only *after* they had gained momentum in the rhetoric of UNFCCC member states; presence of climate justice principles began their increase, spiked, and peaked later in CAN’s framings than in states’. The utilization of climate justice in CAN’s framings was observed from 2013 onwards, six years after CJC was established to promote climate justice in the UNFCCC.

From this, it can be concluded that CAN’s unique role in the UNFCCC is not that of a norm entrepreneur. In the case of CAN, norm promotion is a reactive process rather than a proactive one, as it has found that its influential power in UNFCCC negotiations predominately comes through using its advocacy to support state positions. Therefore, following the definition of norm entrepreneurs adopted in this dissertation, CAN cannot be regarded as a norm entrepreneur.

Second, although civil society’s promotion of climate justice principles in the UNFCCC has followed the lead of developing countries, the overall adoption of these

principles by NGOs has advanced past that of states, despite developing states being the actors responsible for the initial introduction and promotion of them. It was concluded in Chapter 3 that many climate justice principles meet the criteria for Stage 2 of the Norm Life Cycle among states. Internalization is a characteristic of norms in the third stage, indicating that climate justice has progressed further among civil society than in states.

Even with its institutionalization in the Paris Agreement, the extent to which climate justice principles should be considered in climate change solutions remains a major point of contention among state actors. While this is to some degree also true among some NGOs, overall there is little disagreement over the importance of climate justice in the response to climate change. Many climate justice principles have become so uncontroversial among NGOs that they are taken for granted as fundamental in defining climate change and developing its solutions.

Third, both the content and overall trends of CAN's adoption of climate justice principles are congruent with that of states. The six climate justice issues that appeared in CAN's framings were the same six adopted by states in Chapter 3: i) Rawlsian justice, ii) human rights, iii) social inequality, iv) loss and damage, v) contextual vulnerability, and vi) indigenous rights. Just as observed in the rhetoric of states, mentions of historical responsibility have decreased, and criticisms of market mechanisms and global systems were not incorporated in CAN's framing of climate change. Additionally, the shift to emphasizing technical prognostic framings after fundamental conceptual issues were agreed upon in the Paris Agreement is similarly reflected in a decrease of climate justice mentions CAN's promoted frames.

When climate justice principles are examined individually, a number of factors come together to explain why climate justice has become internalized by NGOs. These include deeper engagement with justice-focused minority communities and regional NGOs after the failure of Copenhagen, increased activity in climate advocacy by organizations and individuals from diverse backgrounds with justice-based perspectives, and the emergence of issues such as loss and damage and human rights to serve as a rallying point for civil society organizations to collaborate in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement.

## 5 Constraints on CAN International's Climate Justice Norm Entrepreneurship

The previous chapter analyzed CAN's promotion of climate justice in the post-Copenhagen era of the UNFCCC, highlighting its role as an actor that advocates for norms in support of developing state positions rather than as a norm entrepreneur that introduces new normative concepts. The next step in this research is to analyze why CAN undertook this role and examine the factors constraining and aiding its ability to emerge as a norm entrepreneur. By looking at CAN's framing processes in the context of the growing resonance of climate justice in the UNFCCC space, more extensive conclusions can be drawn regarding the importance of an actor's internal organizational characteristics in preventing or facilitating successful norm entrepreneurship.

In its analysis of the role of CAN's internal organizational characteristics on the network's norm entrepreneurship in the post-Copenhagen era, this chapter compares CAN with the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ) – or as it operates in the UNFCCC, the CJN constituency.<sup>72</sup> CAN's split and the formation of CJN still defines the shape of CAN and the ENGO constituency and continues to influence the civil society climate space to this day.

Much of the literature written around the split emphasizes ideological disagreements over the role of climate justice in the network's agenda, describing it as a watershed moment where traditional environmental activism clashed with a newer, more radical environmental movement with social justice at its core. The two groups are often framed as two blocs of NGOs with seemingly irreconcilable differences, representing two fundamentally different ideological points of view and perspectives on the role of civil society in UNFCCC negotiations. While it is true these differences were

---

<sup>72</sup> While the official designation as half of the ENGO constituency in the UNFCCC remains Climate Justice Now!, it has been relaunched as a formal NGO network with the name Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice. Although it is the same group, in this chapter “DCJ” refers to the official network, while “CJN” is used to refer to it specifically in its role as a UNFCCC constituency.

at the center of this split – especially over the role of market-based approaches in addressing climate change – personal differences between NGO leaders involved in the network were also responsible, and there has always been a relatively fluid crossover of member organizations and individuals between CAN and DCJ.

Even at the time of the formation of CJN in 2007, ideological differences between the two groups of NGOs were never clearly-defined; a significant number of organizations and individuals within CAN personally supported climate justice advocacy and shared similar opinions to the climate justice organizations that disengaged with the network. Privately, there was always a great deal of sincere interaction between CAN and climate justice groups:

CJN was perceived to be speaking more about climate justice issues than CAN was, but internally that was actually not so much the case, because many of the members of CJN were still members of CAN. And at the same time, it wasn't as if CAN wasn't dealing with these issues. It just wasn't the exclusive focus of CAN, it was one of a number of issues. And so there was actual, I would say an evolution of the question of climate justice and equity taking place, and more collaboration behind the scenes than you would have thought...even though there was this public and sometimes very personal disagreement about the importance of climate justice in the negotiations, behind-the-scenes there was actually close collaboration as well as intense debate. (Verolme, interview by author, 28/01/2019)

Despite this, along with developing states, DCJ – not CAN – emerged as the leading civil society norm entrepreneur in the promotion of climate justice in the UNFCCC, and it was not until six years after the split of the network until CAN incorporated climate justice into its framing. This chapter examines why CAN, the most prominent ENGO network participating in the UNFCCC, was constrained in introducing and promoting these norms.

In light of the ENGO studies discussed in Chapter 2, Benford and Snow's (2000) theoretical framework of collective action frames is applied as a foundation for assessing transnational NGO networks' norm advocacy through their framing processes. This framework outlines three factors that constrain an actor's strategic construction of



frames: the political opportunity structure in which an actor operates, the external cultural context the actors and issues are embedded in, and the audience effects of what actors a chosen frame is targeted to.

Because CAN and DCJ both operate with the same political opportunity structure of the UNFCCC and are embedded in the same cultural environment, two of Benford and Snow's constraining external factors were concluded to have had little influence on limiting CAN's framing processes. However, audience effects were determined to play a significant role in constraining CAN from emerging as a norm entrepreneur through its construction and spread of frames while DCJ was able to advocate for climate justice in the UNFCCC years earlier.

This chapter highlights the importance of CAN's internal organizational characteristics in constraining its ability to engage in climate justice norm entrepreneurship. CAN's identity as a UNFCCC insider and its consensus-based decision-making processes are compared to those of DCJ to illustrate their role in enabling audience effects to act as constraints on CAN's norm advocacy. Analysis in this chapter utilizes data collected through semi-structured interviews with CAN officials and representatives of member organizations along with network analysis of CAN member lists to develop a thorough picture of CAN's framing processes and organizational characteristics.

## **5.1 Identity as a UNFCCC “Reformist”**

As the preeminent ENGO network participating in UNFCCC negotiations, CAN's framing activities are significantly constrained by one of its internal characteristics: its self-identity, and how it perceives its own place in the political setting of the UNFCCC. CAN views its role in UNFCCC negotiations as that of a representative of civil society ENGOs, working in a state-led process by supporting the countries whose positions align with those of the network and its members. In contrast to what Yanacopulos (2005) terms “revolutionaries,” CAN has adopted a “reformist” identity rather than aiming to replace the UNFCCC system. CAN views its mission as working within the UNFCCC system and cooperating with state actors to achieve its

goals, and thus insider tactics serve as the foundation of its international climate advocacy strategies.

Because of its identity and mission, CAN's diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing tasks – or how it defines climate change, proposes solutions, and encourages action – are all shaped to conform to the rules, agenda, and normative environment of the UNFCCC in order to maximize frame resonance. If diagnostic framings venture too far from the definitions and attributions of climate change considered acceptable within the normative boundaries of the UNFCCC, then they will be less salient to the state actors participating in negotiations. Accordingly, policies and approaches advocated for by CAN must be within the realm of what actions it is possible for member states to take through a UNFCCC treaty, and attempts to motivate action by states must fall within what is considered appropriate in the context of the UNFCCC negotiation setting.

In contrast, despite working in the same political opportunity structure of the UNFCCC and acting as one half of the ENGO constituency, DCJ has never viewed itself as an actor attempting to influence the UNFCCC from the position of an insider or otherwise dependent on the UNFCCC process. For a significant time, it did not even identify as a network to promote policy-centric campaigns for COP conferences. Any advocacy strategies for influencing specific policies were left for individual member organizations to develop and implement on their own or with other members.

Rather, DCJ better aligns with Yanacopulos' "revolutionary" identity, as it sees its role as one to challenge dominant structures and discourses by advancing ideas and building the capacity of its members to promote them (Thanki, interview by author, 02/04/2019). On a fundamental level, this has allowed DCJ to develop and promote frames regardless of whether or not they fit within the bounds of what is considered acceptable in the UNFCCC setting; those within DCJ understand that "to challenge existing logics of appropriateness, activists may need to be explicitly 'inappropriate'" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). DCJ's framing processes are thus not constrained in the same way by the possibility of losing insider status or becoming excluded from future participation opportunities. DCJ faces fewer limitations than CAN in its ability to challenge the ideas and conceptions dominant in the UNFCCC and introduce new

norms, suggesting that this “revolutionary” identity is more facilitative toward norm entrepreneurship.

### **UNFCCC Member State Delegates as CAN’s Target Audience**

Although numerous actors from civil society, local and regional governments, and business and industry participate in COP conferences, the UNFCCC negotiation process is still guided by states. While the UNFCCC Secretariat works closely with states and has a strong influence in agenda setting, negotiations are first and foremost state-led, with the agenda generally flowing naturally from previous positions and negotiations. After a policy or issue is negotiated, state parties determine to what extent it needs to be further developed, and it will then be accordingly placed on the next COP’s agenda. Parties are elected to the COP Bureau, which essentially acts as a board of directors for the Secretariat. Much work is put into setting the agenda of each COP, and introducing new issues onto the agenda without strong support from parties is extremely difficult and unlikely.

The nature of this process plays a significant role in determining what issues CAN incorporates into its framing at each COP conference. As CAN’s approach is to work within the UNFCCC system, issues or positions not already on the negotiation agenda are perceived as irrelevant. Working groups generally do not find them worth spending time and energy on, as CAN does not have the influential power to change the UNFCCC agenda through their advocacy alone. Thus, CAN chooses to focus its efforts on supporting the positions of states that are most compatible with its own:

It’s about the agenda, and the agenda is set basically by countries, because it’s a country-driven process...and then you see where the entry points are for you...I think there's no precedent for an issue that an NGO said, “We want this,” and where we had no country champion it and it really came through, so we always have to work with some [state delegations]. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

This strategy is reflected in the issues and framings presented in *ECO*. The

newsletter is one of CAN's most effective tools at COP negotiations for spreading their messages to state delegates. As a valuable method of influence, CAN makes a significant effort to ensure that *ECO* takes advantage of these "entry points" by following the momentum of negotiations and amplifying the framings and positions of states it wants to support. This is both a deliberate strategy and a logical reaction to witnessing *ECO*'s influence during negotiations:

It's not that the official agenda determines what's in *ECO*, but *ECO* is trying to be relevant to it. You often actually see negotiators in negotiations using *ECO*. I'm pretty sure I've seen before people actually reading off of *ECO* during their interventions. So, we know that happens. We know that when *ECO* makes points that are directly relevant to ongoing debates in the negotiation rooms, people actually make use of it. And if you know that, then that's all positive feedback, then you want to say more things that people can directly make use of in negotiation rooms. (Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019)

This process explains the results of the analysis of *ECO* presented in Chapter 4; working within the UNFCCC system, CAN's role in advocating for norms is not to introduce new concepts and norms into negotiations, but rather to support states by promoting relevant norms early in their life cycle. Therefore, CAN's integration of climate justice into its frames trails behind that of states, as their principal method of norm advocacy is to develop framings that bolster issues that have already begun to gain momentum in UNFCCC negotiations. If a position or issue is not on the COP negotiation agenda, it is also unlikely to appear in *ECO*; CAN has learned over time that the UNFCCC process does not facilitate NGOs taking the lead on setting the agenda or pushing for issues that are not already being discussed by state actors.

By identifying as an actor working within the system, CAN has little inclination to disrupt the UNFCCC agenda-setting process or attempt to change its direction. It therefore focuses its efforts on lending its power to support the frames and positions of states congruent with the stances and priorities of CAN's member organizations. These are often the most vulnerable countries, and so as delegates from developing countries increasingly integrated climate justice into their framings, CAN

followed suit as those framings picked up momentum in negotiations.

Very little large-scale formal coordination actually occurs between state parties and CAN. Instead, much of the interaction with state negotiators takes place on the fringes, through informal talks or meetings on individual issues with CAN working groups. Here, state delegates and members of the working groups meet to exchange information, discuss the status of a particular issue in negotiations, and share any relevant technical knowledge with each other. Often, CAN formulates its positions and framings based on the information gathered in these meetings, as the working groups – who write and submit articles for publication in *ECO* – will adjust their framing strategies to follow the direction of UNFCCC negotiations:

That's one of the things that when working groups plan their work, they think about: “Okay, which are the countries that we need to talk to in order to understand the landscape of our issue better? What are the political landscapes, what is the field of opportunity?” So either to understand their positions, to definitely share our positions, to explain our position...working groups do those meetings with parties. We think about who we should meet, and then we try and schedule a meeting with the relevant negotiator from that party or from the group of parties and then have a chat. Sometimes parties requests meetings...that's at the CAN working group level. (Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019)

Additionally, CAN will act as unofficial intermediaries between state parties and provide an avenue for delegates to informally communicate positions that may be deemed unacceptable in a formal negotiation setting. Through these indirect negotiations between states, CAN is able to assist them in formulating compromise positions that may otherwise not have been raised in formal negotiations. For CAN, these interactions provide an opportunity to coordinate its promoted framings and positions with states:

States use ENGOs or NGOs...to talk to each other indirectly, to sort of get information about the other's position that they couldn't just ask the other party, but also to pass on information about their own position via the NGOs that they couldn't just tell the other party in a

negotiation...And definitely if you have a state party that is more aligned with your organization's (or your network's, in CAN's case), priorities and objectives, then you are perhaps not just doing this passive shuttling information back and forth, but actually strategizing a bit with that party on how you could best advance the shared objective. (Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019)

By making states its target of influence in its messaging, CAN's framing processes are dependent on what issues and stances are relevant to state positions. The network's construction of frames is rooted in attempts to find compromise within the boundaries of those positions, not to introduce new ideas into them. Therefore, CAN's direct interactions with state delegates also constrain any efforts to become norm entrepreneurs.

While many of DCJ's members meet with state delegates on their own and in groups, DCJ as a network does not work with states in any official coordinated capacity. Within its membership is a diversity of relationships organizations have with state governments and their approaches to working with them. Those in the network have come to understand that working with states officially as DCJ sometimes risks damaging those relationships or misrepresenting the positions of many of its members. For example, some NGOs that oppose their home government's domestic policies find themselves unable to publicly share a platform with them at the UNFCCC. On the other hand, some organizations may feel that the UNFCCC delegates do not represent all aspects of their home country's government and are worth allying with in the case of international climate policy.<sup>73</sup>

Overall, DCJ has found such differences too divisive within the network to overcome easily. Therefore, to achieve its goals, it views its role more of as a networking tool for its members to share information and collaborate, build their capacity, and develop approaches for engaging with states individually or in groups. As a network, DCJ is then able to use its official messaging to introduce and promote broader normative ideas to states, media, and other NGOs without the same concern for the boundaries that constrain CAN due to its targeting of state actors as its main

---

<sup>73</sup> Thanki, interview by author, 02/04/2019

audience.

### **“Winnable” Issues and Pragmatic Messaging to Influence Framing Targets**

The self-identity of CAN and how it views its role in the UNFCCC has long been a topic of discussion within the network. An especially recurring issue is whether to focus its efforts on achieving what are perceived as pragmatically attainable goals in the UNFCCC, or to emphasize a more morally-salient but possibly contentious justice-centric frame. Many participants in CAN’s agenda setting believe that climate justice has never been exceedingly divisive within the network as an ideological issue. Rather, members left or disengaged from CAN due to differences in opinion regarding the most effective political strategy for the network – and the priority given to climate justice in that strategy.<sup>74</sup>

Within the network, many members feel that CAN’s resources could be best utilized by promoting more moderate framings with a higher likelihood of salience among state actors. Others believe that, as the most prominent civil society ENGO network participating in the COP conferences, it is CAN’s responsibility to broadcast a stronger, more potent moral message and promote norms and positions that may be more contentious in the UNFCCC:

Part of our activities will always involve thinking about political realities and defining the possible within those political realities in terms of actual wins. But it's generally the role of civil society to actually push the spectrum of what political parties or governments think is possible. And that's why networks are powerful – because within a network you're going to have a huge diversity of where groups sit on that spectrum of whether they're more interested in thinking about what gains can be made given current political realities, or whether they're more interested in ignoring current political realities and just pushing for what they think is right. And it's really

---

<sup>74</sup> While political differences were at the heart of the CAN split, the ideological overlap between CAN and DCJ members was noted by multiple interviewees, including Dabbagh, Holz, Kennerley, and Verolme.

healthy within a network to facilitate a dialogue between those two different theories of change and find a way forward that takes elements from both. (Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

Because it views its role as an actor working to influence the UNFCCC from within, to be effective CAN must develop frames that are resonant in the context of UNFCCC negotiations and based on the norms that it determines have the highest probability of progressing further in their life cycle. How “winnable” an issue is – or how salient a framing is – plays a significant role in whether or not CAN decides to dedicate money, time, and human resources to develop a campaign for it. This is a dilemma also faced by ENGOs within the network that engage with multiple climate issues. To determine the chances of a norm or issue’s success, CAN and its members closely follow the progress and momentum of issues promoted by states in negotiations and the reactions and changes to negotiating positions of states opposing it.

Many of CAN’s framing decisions are based on what it perceives as political realities in the UNFCCC system and what state actors will be most responsive to. This was the reason for the strong emphasis on adaptation in *ECO* from 2004-2005; with the Kyoto Protocol entering force in 2005, momentum was building in climate negotiations leading up to it to initiate the Adaptation Fund Board. CAN believed that this was an opportunity to use their advocacy to secure an achievable victory, and so it focused its resources on developing and promoting framings centered on vulnerability and adaptation as fundamental to climate change as a problem and necessary in its solutions.

Prior to Copenhagen, the moderate strategies promoted by the most influential global ENGOs led CAN to adopt more modest positions, causing some of its members to become discouraged with the network’s reluctance to publicly take on stronger justice-centric positions. This disagreement over strategy reemerged as the Paris Agreement approached, with many advocating for a low-risk approach while others saw this time for conceptualization as the moment to push for more idealistic goals and messaging. CAN’s focus remained on adding their support to the framings being pushed by developing states, but by 2015, climate justice issues such as justice, loss and damage, and human rights played a larger role in the framings of developing states than they did in Copenhagen.



CAN's self-perceived role as UNFCCC insiders constraining its framing processes can be observed in the issue of historical responsibility. Support for this principle has been non-controversial within the CAN network, but its salience in the UNFCCC has decreased as negotiations have moved in the direction of voluntary emissions reductions for all member countries. Although the network's position has not changed on historical responsibility, CAN understands that adopting this perspective in its framing only makes its frames less resonant in the context of the UNFCCC, the process that it seeks to influence from the inside as part of its fundamental mission.

Human rights was another issue initially thought by CAN as unlikely to be institutionalized in the Paris Agreement, and thus was for a time not emphasized in its promoted frames. Due to years of precedent meanings of the term, CAN believed that bridging it with its climate change framings might lower the salience of CAN's frames among state actors if the issue proved to be too controversial in negotiations. However, the increase of human rights framings utilized by states in the year preceding the Paris COP increased the likelihood of the issue being addressed in the Paris Agreement. This presented an opportunity for CAN to bridge its framing of climate change with an issue that carried the momentum and support of numerous state actors and NGO constituencies.

DCJ, on the other hand, had been able to make human rights a key part of its promoted frames from the very beginning of the network, and continues to advocate for the principle of historical responsibility in its framings and activities. While insider tactics are by no means unwelcome in DCJ, the network and its member organizations do not consider operating as insiders as fundamental to its identity and objectives. The mission and role of DCJ is to introduce norms that challenge the existing logic of appropriateness, and thus it has been able to incorporate these issues into its promoted frames without feeling the constraints experienced by targeting UNFCCC member states in the same as CAN.

### **Appropriate Framings Among Target Actors**

As a network whose identity and objectives are based on cooperating and

working within the rules, procedures, and normative environment of the UNFCCC, CAN's ability to engage in climate justice norm entrepreneurship was also constrained by limits on what issues and framings are considered as appropriate in that setting. Since the disenfranchisement experienced by civil society organizations at COP 15, NGOs have faced stricter barriers to participation at COP summits,<sup>75</sup> including more stringent restrictions on speech:

Longer-term, there's this just gradual diminishing of the role of civil society with the UNFCCC and it's becoming increasingly difficult to do anything within that space...it's very corporate captured...the censoring of what we can say gets more and more...So there are some UN rules around you are not allowed to name specific countries...now it's got the extent where we can't bring materials that name specific countries into the conference centers, or give them out, which is a whole new level of censorship that we never experienced before. (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018)

NGO campaigners commented that in recent years, censoring has included a tightening of restrictions on speech the UNFCCC Secretariat considers contentious or disruptive. This includes shaming fossil fuel corporations by name, explicitly mentioning climate-related court cases against states and businesses, or even referring to the fossil fuel industry's framing of "clean coal" as "dirty energy." In cases where NGOs have defied these restrictions, individuals have been removed from COP summits and organizations have faced difficulty receiving entry badges in the future.

This has significant implications for all three framing tasks of a frame articulator seeking to promote climate justice within the UNFCCC. Diagnostic frames cannot attribute climate change to the fossil fuel industry or nations with the highest emissions, prognostic frames cannot focus on holding them accountable and taking legal action, and motivational frames must not directly challenge the frames created and promoted by the actors most responsible for climate change. In choosing to remain as UNFCCC insiders instead of changing to an outsider identity, CAN is limited in what framings it can use in the UNFCCC setting without defying the logic of appropriateness

---

<sup>75</sup> Ciplet et al., 2015, pp. 172-5; Hadden, 2015

held by state actors.

DCJ operates in the same cultural setting and political opportunity structure as CAN, but it has felt far less constrained by the efforts to restrict civil society participation because of its identity as a network to challenge dominant power structures – including criticism of the UNFCCC itself. Although a portion of DCJ’s framing activities is performed at COP conferences as the CJN constituency, the UNFCCC is not the principal platform for its climate advocacy actions:

“We will continue to be at the COPs doing as we have been doing in terms of trying to put a message out there, using it as a platform...But I think that there are those opportunities there for climate justice movements more broadly” (Thanki, interview by author, 02/04/2019).

Because of this, DCJ has the freedom to advocate for climate justice without as much concern for risking insider status or losing access to the UNFCCC; penalties imposed by the UNFCCC Secretariat that would impact their participation and status in the UNFCCC system are less detrimental to DCJ achieving its goals compared to CAN. Thus, while there may be more direct political opportunities available to an insider network like CAN than to DCJ, its organizational identity more severely constrains its construction and promotion of frames.

Although CAN’s efforts to adhere to the UNFCCC’s normative boundaries of appropriateness has constrained it as a norm entrepreneur, it has led to a relationship with the CJN constituency that has facilitated CAN’s effectiveness as an advocate for climate justice in the UNFCCC. Dividing the ENGO constituency into two groups has resulted in an ENGO constituency representing two different perspectives: one that can strongly emphasize issues of justice and introduce ideas and positions that may be more contentious (CJN), and one that takes a more mainstream insider approach by promoting frames appropriate within the normative boundaries of the UNFCCC (CAN). This way, CAN is able to maintain its status as an insider network, while some of the climate justice issues it may not be able to promote publicly still get introduced into negotiations to act as discursive hooks for CAN to use in its frame amplification and bridging processes in the future:

We recognize the strengths of having two separate positions within the environmental NGO constituency, one that is much more radical and progressive, and one that's a bit more [mainstream]. And we work together, and we support that. And actually it's probably quite a good thing to have that; instead of one compromise position, we have that variety. (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018).

This strategy has guided CAN's role as an advocate for norms in support of developing state positions rather than as a norm entrepreneur. As climate justice issues became increasingly pertinent in the UNFCCC and gained momentum in negotiations for the Paris Agreement, CAN was able to progressively bridge climate justice principles into its framing of climate change. With the institutionalization of some of these norms in the Paris Agreement, CAN has found even more opportunities to take advantage of discursive hooks to incorporate climate justice into its promoted frames:

I'd say that the influence over CAN has come largely because of some of the successes that some of the climate justice organizations have had in terms of the outcomes in Paris, such as inclusion of human rights, gender, indigenous peoples rights, and I think that that to some extent has helped to broaden out the emphasis that CAN have within the negotiations. (Leonard, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

## **5.2 Consensus-based Decision Making**

Because it maintains a large presence at COP conferences and serves as the focal point for the UNFCCC ENGO constituency, CAN International is often mistakenly perceived as a singular organization that develops its own focused agenda from the top down. The notoriety of the constituency's split over climate justice lines has to some extent further perpetuated this notion, aiding in projecting an image of a battle between CAN and some of its member organizations. The reality, however, reveals a consensus-based network made up of hundreds of NGOs, a complex system of relationships between them, and varying degrees of influence in the decisions and

actions undertaken as a network. Internally, CAN is a much contested space, with a member base that holds an incredibly diverse set of worldviews.

In order for CAN to strongly advocate for a certain position, there must be proactive individuals wanting to tackle the issue as well as enough momentum within the network to support it. Those working in CAN emphasize that the network's official positions and framings promoted in *ECO* are an amalgamation – and essentially a compromise – of the wide range of stances held by its diverse member base; if no consensus is reached on an issue, CAN does not adopt a position on it. Therefore, the positions it does adopt are either those that are so uncontroversial and taken for granted among its membership that a consensus is reached, or are more tempered versions of stronger positions to make them more agreeable to a wider range of member organizations.<sup>76</sup>

This consensus-based system has been a significant factor in constraining CAN's amplification of climate justice issues. As one example, CAN has deliberately refrained from adopting an official position on the utilization of market mechanisms to address climate change due to too much disagreement among its members. Even if CAN's members largely support alternative approaches (as some who have worked on the issue in CAN speculate), they have instead chosen to engage with the issue individually or through channels other than CAN because of the history of friction within the network over support for market mechanisms.

Although DCJ maintains the ideological and behavioral consistency of what Eccleston categorizes as a network (which CAN is classified as), structurally it operates closer to a networking. While recently it has developed a secretariat for coordinative purposes, it has always functioned as a much more horizontal network, with no individual or NGO speaking for the entire membership. Instead, NGOs speak on behalf of themselves but choose when to identify as members of DCJ and use the network's "branding" to amplify their own voices.

Coordinated DCJ statements and positions are passed around to member organizations, who may then choose to officially support each statement. Public comments are attributed to DCJ when released, but they also include a list of signatories

---

<sup>76</sup> Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019; Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019

that explicitly identifies the organizations endorsing the content of each statement and action. Just as in CAN, a diversity of organizations is also present in DCJ, and all of its member organizations will not endorse every statement. However, the internal structure of DCJ allows members to take advantage of the framing opportunities the network offers without the necessity of gaining consensus approval for each statement, thus minimizing conflict within its membership. This flexible structure allows a network seeking to act as a norm entrepreneur to more easily introduce and advocate for new, more contentious norms compared with a network that develops its framing strategies by consensus of its members.

Additionally, DCJ avoids the consensus-based problems faced by CAN when advocating for norms by focusing their efforts on pushing broader conceptual ideas instead of engaging in intricate policy debates. Ideas promoted by DCJ have become uncontroversial within the network due to a normative cohesiveness developed through years of interaction between members through its horizontal structure:

I think we avoid getting into the specifics of what's our written position on X, Y, and Z by not really engaging at that level of the policy debate. There are groups within DCJ that will do that, and they might actually speak for 90% of the membership, but they wouldn't on behalf of the [entire] membership, because there may be a very small percentage that has a slightly different take. So we get around it by the groups coordinating their policy in as much as they can, and then speaking as themselves and advocating as themselves on their own behalf, and then DCJ sort of having a more top-line political messaging which has already been agreed through a democratic process over the years. (Thanki, interview by author, 02/04/2019)

This focus on promoting normative concepts over making specific policy recommendations allows DCJ to avoid friction that may emerge among its diverse member base over disagreements over a range of policy issues. Facilitating its ability to act as a norm entrepreneur, DCJ instead concentrates on promoting the broader concepts and perspectives that are congruent with the ideological beliefs that connect its members. CAN, on the other hand, is much more constrained in introducing new norms to the UNFCCC due to the compromises it is forced to make by constructing its frames based on policy positions determined through consensus of its diverse membership base.

As a result, many organizations dedicated to climate justice focus their framing

efforts in the NGO networks and UNFCCC constituencies more receptive to these perspectives, while CAN promotes its consensus positions through *ECO*. The writing, editing, and approving of *ECO* articles and their content is performed by CAN's working groups, which individually fluctuate in activity over time as issues become more or less relevant and actors within CAN take the initiative to work on them. The articles are then approved through daily meetings and circulated to all members before an editorial board reviews them to ensure they are in line with CAN's official positions. For all of these steps, the content of the articles relies on the consensus approval of its base of member organizations.

CAN's frame construction is based on the consensus positions and priorities of its members, and thus the evolution of CAN's framings in *ECO* outlined in Chapter 4 did not come from decisions made at the top of the network. Rather than CAN making a concerted, conscious effort to move the direction of the network towards that of climate justice, it was instead shifting internally as its member organizations evolved independently:


CAN is not an organization - CAN is a network. It's sort of like an internal marketplace of ideas. Whatever position CAN has at a given point in time is the position that the most members find is suitably appropriate for the political moment. So to the degree that you see a shift in the way that CAN embraces climate justice, I think it is a symptom of members making that shift, and then is aggregating up to a CAN position...I think this reflects a shift of the climate space in general, not just CAN. (Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019)

### **CAN Member Makeup**

Because CAN's positions and promoted frames are determined through consensus of its members, looking at what kinds of organizations the network membership consists of can offer a picture of who is behind its decision-making processes. Analyzing CAN's official member lists provides further insight in determining how the shape of the network's membership has changed along with its framing of climate change, and if CAN's adoption of climate justice in the

post-Copenhagen era is also reflected in an increase of non-environmental organizations and Southern NGOs in the network.

In 2011, 62.67% of the 675 member organizations making up CAN were ENGOS, with only 34.22% being other types of NGOs.<sup>77</sup> A trend can be observed from 2011 to 2017 of a decreasing proportion of ENGOS and an increasing proportion of non-environmental organizations – 57.64% and 40.38% in 2017, respectively. However, it should be noted that CAN already contains a large number of member organizations, and their capacity to add new members is limited. Thus, any significant shift in the makeup of the network will take a fairly significant amount of time to manifest, as it is limited by their capacity to add new organizations while maintaining its current membership.



**Figure 5.1. Ratio of CAN Member Organizations by Type**

<sup>77</sup> 22.81% were human rights or aid organizations, 3.11% environmental justice NGOs, and 8.3% other non-environmental NGOs – mostly think tanks and labor organizations. The remaining 3.11% of organizations unaccounted for were categorized as “Unknown” organizations, where no information on them or their agenda could be found outside of being listed in the CAN member list. In 2017, “Unknown” NGOs made up 1.98% of the total members.



With this in mind, it was determined that the most useful method of evaluating the extent of the change in CAN's makeup is to compare the proportion of ENGOs and non-ENGOs in 2011 to the proportion of new member organizations *added* from 2011 to 2017. Overall, 436 member organizations were added to CAN from 2011 to 2017, with 218 (50%) being ENGOs, 136 (31.12%) human rights/ international aid organizations, 42 (9.61%) environmental justice NGOs, and 40 (9.15%) other non-environmental organizations. From this perspective, a change can be observed from the 63-34 ratio of ENGOs to non-ENGOs in 2011 to a 50-50 split of organizations added since then.

This ratio is still very different compared to that of the official CJN member list from just after Copenhagen in 2010, which contained only 27.03% ENGOs and a much larger variety of non-environmental NGOs (72.55%). However, it should be emphasized that CAN is still fundamentally an environmental network, while DCJ's crossover with other global movements (e.g. social justice, anti-globalization, workers' rights) affords it the freedom to craft a more diverse network of NGOs to focus on a specific aspect of a singular issue – in this case, the justice implications of climate change.

While one cannot expect the ratio of CAN's member organizations to approach anything near that of DCJ's, the change from a 63-34 ratio to a 50-50 one with an overall sample size of 1,112 organizations provides a strong indication that CAN is diversifying their network. Post-Copenhagen, it has shifted over time from a chiefly environmentally-focused network to one which contains a greater variety of perspectives on climate change, particularly those typically in line with the climate justice framing.

An even more dramatic shift can be observed in the proportion of NGOs from developed countries and those from developing countries. As Figure 5.2 shows, in 2011 a majority of the 676 member organizations of CAN were from developed countries compared to those from developing nations: 56.74% to 43.11%, respectively.<sup>78</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> Two categories other than "Developed" and "Developing" were "Joint" (organizations with joint activities between a developed and a developing country) and "Unknown." In all four data


Between 2011 and 2017, a varying number of new members were added each year, with the total number of organizations from developed and developing countries evening out to a near 50-50 split, and the majority shifting to developing countries for two of those years. While this is again a far cry from the makeup of a climate justice network like DCJ,<sup>79</sup> it is still a noticeable change from CAN's 2011 numbers. More importantly, from 2011 to 2017, 58.35% of the 436 members added were from developing countries, while 41.88% were located in developed nations, a reversal of the majority seen in the 2011 numbers.

As mentioned previously, because there is no single standard metric of what defines a nation as “developed” or “developing,” organizations were categorized according to a number of different data sources to account for any irregularities that may occur due to one particular source’s method of classification (for example, how emerging economies or economies in transition are classified). However, across all four sources used, results were strikingly similar, and the same trends could be observed in each data set.

---

sources, for any given year, the number of organizations in “Joint” and “Unknown” combined made up less than 1% of the total number of organizations.

<sup>79</sup> In 2010, 26.62% of the organizations making up Climate Justice Now! were from developed countries, with 72.83% from developing countries.



**Figure 5.2. Ratio of CAN Member Organizations by Country of Origin**

Despite this shift in CAN’s member makeup, interviews with CAN officials revealed that CAN International did not implement any coordinated strategy to actively recruit more non-environmental NGOs and climate justice-focused organizations into the network.<sup>80</sup> Rather, these changes were attributed to the growing realization among various communities, activists, and non-environmental organizations that engaging in climate advocacy is necessary to effectively address their own issue areas:

More and more people – and more and more advocacy fields – realize that their issue is deeply connected to climate change. If you are a development organization and you want to fight global hunger, ten years ago you might not have realized that there's no chance you can get rid of hunger without fixing the climate crisis. But if you didn't realize it ten years ago, you would have realized it by now. So then then your mandate of ending hunger in the world would absolutely now include working to address the climate crisis. And where do you do that? You do that at the UNFCCC, right? And so if you are just coming new to the game, you're trying to

---

<sup>80</sup> Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019; Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019; Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019

find a network, and you look at the big development organizations...and see where they are engaging, then you see “oh, they are engaging with this CAN thing, well I guess I have to join.” (Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019)

## **Influence within CAN**

While CAN has always included a diverse group of NGOs with a wide range of objectives, this has not always translated to a proportional amount of power and influence when it comes to shaping its agenda. Due to the extensive size and scope of the network, it is simply not possible to solicit feedback from every single member organization; not all NGOs have the means to attend meetings or provide input. Issues of geographical distance, variances in specializations and priorities, and deficiencies in resources and organizational capacity (e.g. reliable internet access, easy and regular access to UNFCCC policy insiders and CAN staff, and access to the latest information on an issue) create barriers to participation for many member organizations. This is particularly an issue faced by smaller Southern NGOs.<sup>81</sup>

As a result, certain CAN members are inadvertently favored in its agenda-setting and framing processes. These are often large Northern NGOs that cover a wide scope of policy issues, have a high amount of organizational resources and highly-developed infrastructure, are able to regularly attend COP summits and CAN meetings, and have consistent and reliable access to other CAN members and UNFCCC insiders. This skews the agenda-setting procedures of CAN to the interests and priorities of the “big globals,” which benefit from bases of operation and offices in Europe, long-established personal and professional connections with the UN, more sources of funding to allow for frequent travel, and more experience working with the UNFCCC (Duwe, 2001, pp. 179-181; Hadden, 2015, pp. 99-100; Matsumoto, 2010, pp. 197-201).

CAN has encountered difficulty in facilitating continued engagement by local and regional Southern NGOs in CAN’s UNFCCC activities. A number of programs, stipends and training initiatives, most notably the Southern Voices Leadership Program,

---

<sup>81</sup> Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019

were implemented by CAN with the goal of increasing coherency within the network by strengthening the participation of these groups in the network's UNFCCC activities. However, many organizations found themselves without the money or resources to continue training individuals to navigate the complicated UNFCCC processes and send them to participate in COP conferences. Additionally, CAN International itself is governed by a number of complex procedures and mechanisms that must be mastered in order to effectively participate in its UNFCCC activities.<sup>82</sup>

Due to this, the members heavily participating in CAN's UNFCCC activities have not changed much since Copenhagen. The most active NGOs remain the large, international Northern NGOs with the resources and capacity to engage in the process and attend COP conferences, while a large number of CAN's members from developing countries instead interact mainly with their national and regional nodes. The organizations participating the most in CAN's international decision-making processes are those that emphasize international climate negotiations in their long-term advocacy strategies and activities:

It really needs to come from NGOs that they prioritize the issue of international negotiation, and that put money behind it for a longer time. Because also it's not that you bring somebody to one session and that they will have a huge impact - it's not like that. Because usually you have like 5,000 people coming to one or 30,000 people like in the case of Paris, and if you just bring them for one session, what kind of voice can [they] have? I mean to even understand how the CAN network works, it takes I would think a year. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

This is reflected in the makeup of the ENGOs registered with the UNFCCC as CAN organizations: of the 168 organizations officially claiming CAN affiliation, roughly 63% come from developed countries, and only 28% are non-environmental NGOs.<sup>83</sup> Thus, the members of CAN International most influential in its

---

<sup>82</sup> Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019; Holz, interview by author, 15/02/2019

<sup>83</sup> This does not include the more than 700 NGOs registered as an "ENGO" but without official CAN affiliation. However, CAN still represents them by serving as the focal point for the UNFCCC ENGO constituency.

decision-making processes determining its climate change framings targeting UNFCCC member states remain international ENGOs from Northern countries. Although CAN is fundamentally consensus-based, the interests and priorities of large Northern ENGOs are more likely to appear in its promoted frames due to those organizations' increased participation within the network's decision-making procedures.

In contrast to CAN's consensus-based procedures, DCJ's flexible and more horizontal structure facilitates frame construction with less necessity to find compromise between a wide range of positions held by its member base. DCJ's main function is as a networking tool, and so members are free to form groups within the network and draft public statements with a list of the NGOs that support it. Framings can be generated and utilized without the approval of all members, and therefore the network can more easily advocate for less-established norms that challenge the UNFCCC's logic of appropriateness.

As the primary representative of ENGOs in the UNFCCC, CAN speaks for hundreds of organizations that bring a wide range of views, approaches, and priorities to the network, and therefore some degree of disharmony within the network is unavoidable. Along with the disparity of influence between members, this has a self-regulating effect on CAN's framing processes; it leaves the members with more radical positions and contentious approaches to either conform by dulling their positions to support the network, or disengage with CAN if they feel the network does not adequately align with their interests and priorities.<sup>84</sup>

This constrained CAN's promotion of indigenous rights and gender equality norms, both of which were largely left to their respective constituencies to promote in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement. Internally, CAN did not have enough organizations prioritizing these issues to generate momentum within the network. Most NGOs with these issues as their primary focus instead chose to work with the constituencies dedicated to them rather than approach CAN and dedicate the significant amounts of effort required to influence its framing processes:

It's a little bit like this division of labor...If you are active on gender, then you're more active

---

<sup>84</sup> Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018; Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019

in the gender constituency – then you have your own channel, and your own outreach, and you don't necessarily use *ECO* as one of the key communication tools. (Dabbagh, interview by author, 11/01/2019)

Many non-environmental NGOs choose to advocate for their prioritized issues by aligning framings with like-minded organizations in other constituencies instead of attempting to influence CAN's framings by competing within the network with less politically-focused ENGOs that emphasize the environmental frame of climate change. This also leads organizations to join DCJ; while there are some NGOs that see it worthwhile to advocate within CAN for more climate justice representation in their framing, many organizations that strongly prioritize justice issues first approach DCJ for their networking activities, resulting in a network with a more cohesive identity and member makeup to introduce and promote less-established norms:

The fact that [DCJ] exists means that if you're an organization that self-identifies as a climate justice organization, you're probably going to turn to thinking about CJN membership before you think about CAN International membership anyway. (Abreu, interview by author, 24/01/2019)

### **Supporter Bases as Members' Target Audiences**

A significant factor in determining what norms an organization chooses to promote and how to frame them is the necessity of NGOs to target their donors and audiences that they rely upon for financial support. In a network that sets its agenda and constructs its frames through consensus-based procedures, decisions do not come from the top down; consensus positions rely on the stances and priorities of network members. Thus, constraints faced by those organizations shape the strategies and norms they bring with them to advocate for within CAN.

Each organization has a unique set of characteristics that influences the degree of freedom it has in developing framings and campaigns. An NGO's carefully crafted public image, base of supporters to appeal to, relationship with its domestic government,

and organizational mission all vary from organization to organization. In a network with as diverse a member base as CAN's, these factors have made it difficult for CAN to diverge from the environmental framing expected by its members' supporters. This has created obstacles to incorporating a more politically charged climate justice frame that has yet to gain mainstream acceptance in the UNFCCC or salience in members' domestic settings:

What we talk about externally doesn't necessarily reflect [environmental justice] all the time, I would say. And I think that's always a challenge. Because lots of our supporters started with us in the 70's when we started, so our definitions of climate justice or environmental justice might have moved on since the 70's, but not necessarily all of our supporters have. So there's balance between what we say and where our principles and our core values are, I think. It's the politics. (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018).

Fundamentally, CAN is a network representing environmental NGOs. Therefore, despite many within CAN holding perspectives that align with climate justice concerns, its member base still primarily consists of ENGOs that prioritize environmentally-focused messaging over people-focused issues of social justice. Shifting away from a frame emphasizing environmental problems is difficult for a number of ENGOs that are expected to focus their attention on issues of the natural environment.

Many of CANs members, including the large international Northern ENGOs, arose from 20<sup>th</sup> century environmental movements and have been publicly active for decades. Their public image was crafted from these movements, which often avoided politics to focus more on issues of the natural environment such as preservation of nature and wildlife conservation (Jamison, 2010). These organizations' base of supporters in turn developed around these issues, and the risk of losing them by deviating too far from their expectations is a perpetual factor when choosing which norms to promote and how to frame them.

No climate justice principle is a better example of this than that of critiques of global political and economic systems. Anti-corporate and anti-fossil fuel sentiment is



not uncommon amongst climate activists, as the fossil fuel industry and private sector are two primary actors responsible for the rise in greenhouse gas emissions over the past century. However, an NGO that incorporates these sentiments into its framings will be painted and perceived by many as radical and disruptive. The organization's credibility – a key factor in the resonance of a frame – will be undermined among supporters in countries that benefit from these systems, as well as in a negotiation process that is reliant upon the cooperation of capitalist actors.

This also applies to the struggle international Northern NGOs face when balancing their engagement of domestic and international issues. Although they often feel compelled to focus their efforts on assisting the developing countries that will be more severely impacted by climate change, they still have a responsibility to integrate the local issues prioritized by many of their Northern supporters into their framings:

The danger is we only talk about the impacts in the UK or in the US, because they are lives that feel comparable to our supporters' lives, and we don't talk about the people who it will actually affect – much, much worse, much, much earlier, and in fact is already affecting, and destroying lives and livelihoods. So it's getting that balance between that international aspect and others. (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018).

Many of these NGOs also encounter limitations on integrating climate justice into their agendas due to their history and reputation among the communities where grassroots climate justice movements develop. A lack of trust and credibility from minority communities prevents many of these organizations from more actively engaging in some climate justice issues. Acknowledging that they are traditionally perceived as largely Caucasian, middle-upper class, first-world organizations, these NGOs understand that inserting themselves into grassroots movements built by minority communities is likely to be seen as fake or disingenuous. Pursuing these issues without the trust of these audiences may actually harm the credibility of the organization, a key factor in the construction of resonant frames. Building this credibility takes years of effort and meaningful engagement, and so integrating climate justice into its framings often takes more time than an organization would like:

Really having an organizational ethos that puts climate justice and intersectionality at its heart is really hard to do...It involves a lot of long-term relationship building, and trust building, and being uncomfortable, and doing that work of making climate justice and intersectionality a real thing in the identity of your organization and not just lip service...There is this emerging understanding within the network and a push by many of our members to also do better work reaching out to communities of color, to migrant communities, and to do a better job also of reaching out to indigenous communities...But those are places where I think the environmental movement has many times in the past, in many ways, in many countries, tokenized members of those communities...And for sure a priority for me is not to be like, “Hey, join our network” without there being a very real relationship underlying that. And that relationship building takes time. (Abreu, interview with author, 24/01/2019)

On the other hand, officials from both CAN and member NGOs expressed frustration with the inability to adopt some issues into their framings due to fear that their messages may become misconstrued and unintentionally motivate undesired sentiment among supporters. One issue in particular was climate change’s inducement and exacerbation of forced migration and the resulting human health, economic, and security issues. Although NGOs recognize that these issues will only grow in importance as the impacts of climate change intensify, drawing attention to issues stemming from migration runs the chance of provoking xenophobia and inadvertently feeding into anti-immigrant attitudes that have in recent years gained momentum in many countries. Prioritizing these issues in the current cultural climate risks alienating members and supporters, nor is there a desire to inspire sentiment among supporters that so considerably contradicts an organization’s values.

The framing strategies of DCJ’s member organizations are also not developed independently of the expectations of their supporters and target audiences. However, while CAN’s members overlap ideologically only as environmental organizations, values and priorities of DCJ’s membership base additionally align over issues of social justice as well. DCJ was established specifically to prioritize a specific perspective, exhibits a self-identifying member base closely aligned ideologically, and focuses on

promoting broader normative concepts. When pursuing norm entrepreneurship, a network with these attributes will have relatively fewer constraints when constructing frames that satisfy the expectations of its members' supporters. Not requiring consensus in its decision-making and framing strategies also means DCJ can form campaigns and release statements that may conflict to some degree with some members' organizational missions, as members are free to participate in only the campaigns that align with the values and priorities of their supporters.

NGO campaigners interviewed remarked that constraints on incorporating climate justice into their promoted frames have loosened as its supporters became more open to people-centered framings of climate change. Utilizing the increased occurrence and intensity of extreme weather events and stronger connections made between them and climate change by media and scientists, ENGOs not only amplified the importance of such weather events in their framing, but also transformed them; the damage incurred from a typhoon, drought, or wildfire was no longer an unfortunate act of nature, but a consequence of human-induced climate change. As NGOs have realized the resonance of the climate justice frame among their supporters, they have increasingly adopted it into their diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing tasks:

There's definitely been a shift with climate change in general about originally framing it as an environmental problem, a scientific problem...and then we started trying to make it more tangible, and getting the pictures of polar bears on icebergs, looking at the impacts but in a very nature-based way. And I think now there's been a lot of research into actually what works or what creates deep enough engagement in people that they feel kind of concerned, and feel like there's a problem that needs something done about it, but also empowered enough.... So that framing as an environmental and a scientific problem has definitely been... some people say it's the greatest mistake the environmental movement ever made...Because if 30 years ago we'd been talking about how it's actually going to impact people, we might be in a very different place to where we are now. (Kennerley, interview by author, 20/12/2018)

### 5.3 Conclusions: Internal Network Characteristics and Audience Effects

After examining CAN's promotion of various climate justice principles over time in the previous chapter, this chapter applied Benford and Snow's theoretical framework of collective action frames with reference to previous ENGO studies to investigate why CAN did not emerge as the leading norm entrepreneur for climate justice and analyze the factors responsible for constraining its norm entrepreneurship. This analysis produced three principal conclusions:

First, CAN is significantly constrained in introducing norms into the UNFCCC due to its identity as an insider in UNFCCC negotiations. As the largest representative of ENGOs in a state-led process, CAN utilizes insider tactics to support state positions congruent with their own. Working within the UNFCCC system and cooperating with state actors is perceived by CAN as fundamental to the network's identity and objectives.

Thus, CAN's chosen framings must fit within the normative boundaries of UNFCCC negotiations and state positions in order to maximize their salience with the state actors they target in their framing strategies. The norms and framings chosen by CAN to promote must not stray too far from what is considered by state actors and the UNFCCC Secretariat as appropriate within the UNFCCC setting. Additionally, its framings are limited to what those in the network consider "winnable" in light of what they perceive as the political realities in the current normative environment of climate negotiations.

Second, CAN's frame construction is also constrained by its consensus-based agenda-setting and decision-making procedures. CAN International is a consensus-based network with hundreds of member organizations; if no consensus is reached on an issue, CAN does not adopt a position on it and does not incorporate it into the network's framing. The positions it adopts and promotes in *ECO*, then, must be those that are uncontroversial among its membership.

However, the uneven influence in those procedures results in framing processes skewed toward the interests of the "big globals" – large Northern ENGOs that historically have favored the environmental framing of climate change and been slower to adopt climate justice into their organizational mission. In the post-Copenhagen era,

the makeup of CAN's membership base has shifted to include significantly more Southern NGOs and non-environmental organizations (especially human rights, development, and international aid NGOs), but Northern ENGOs remain the most active and influential members of CAN's UNFCCC activities.

This has had a self-regulating effect on CAN; organizations that heavily favor the climate justice frame or focus on particular climate justice issues instead often approach DCJ or other NGO constituencies before CAN, preferring to collaborate with like-minded organizations instead of competing for influence over CAN's framing processes with other organizations within the network.

Third, audience effects – specifically, the target audiences of CAN's framings – were determined to be the only one of Benford and Snow's three constraining factors relevant to the case of CAN's promotion of climate justice. Political opportunity structure and cultural constraints and opportunities were concluded to have had little impact on CAN's ability to engage in climate justice norm entrepreneurship; DCJ was able to promote climate justice years before CAN despite being embedded in the same external cultural conditions and working in the same political opportunity structure of the UNFCCC.

As a network of environmental NGOs attempting to influence the UNFCCC process, CAN must tailor its framings to maximize the resonance of its messaging to its target audiences: the state delegates that determine the UNFCCC negotiation agenda and the supporters of its member organizations. Its framings must be relevant to both groups, simultaneously following the UNFCCC negotiation agenda while not straying too far from the focus on environmental issues expected by members' donors.

However, what enable these constraints and make them effective are CAN's internal characteristics. CAN's identity as a network that operates and cooperates within the UNFCCC system leads it to construct its frames to maximize salience among UNFCCC member states. Additionally, the limitations faced by member organizations in their own framing processes also constrains CAN's frame construction due to the network's consensus-based decision-making procedures.

These characteristics have led CAN to adopt the role of an actor advocating for norms in support of relevant state positions rather than of a norm entrepreneur that

introduces new normative ideas into the UNFCCC setting. DCJ was instead able to promote climate justice principles earlier in their life cycle due to its own internal organizational characteristics: a network that focuses on promoting broader normative ideas, perceives its role as one to challenge dominant power structures, and adopts a more flexible organizational structure to minimize contention within the network throughout its frame construction processes.

The results of this study suggest a typology of NGO networks that may be applicable to cases outside of CAN. Proactively introducing and advocating for new norms is facilitated by a “revolutionary” identity and more flexible and horizontal network structure, while actors prioritizing a “reformist” identity and consensus-based network structure may be constrained by these characteristics and thus more suited to reactive norm promotion.

## 6 Research Summary, Limitations, and Opportunities for Future Studies

This chapter returns to the initial research question and synthesizes the conclusions of the research presented throughout this dissertation. The structure of this chapter is as follows: First, the principal conclusions of this study are summarized, and the academic significance of the research is revisited. Next, limitations encountered during research are discussed, followed by a number of suggested possible directions it can be continued or expanded in order to gain a deeper understanding of the role of NGO networks in the UNFCCC process.

### 6.1 Summary of Results and Analysis

The principal question guiding the research and analysis presented throughout this dissertation was: *What role did NGOs play from the perspective of norm entrepreneurship in the emergence and promotion of climate justice in the post-Copenhagen era of climate negotiations?*

To answer the research question, it was divided into three sub-questions, each addressed in its own chapter: i) *How have climate justice norms progressed in the UNFCCC?*, answered in Chapter 3 by analyzing the rhetoric of UNFCCC member states and the content of the Paris Agreement using the Norm Life Cycle as a theoretical framework; ii) *Was CAN's role in the promotion of climate justice that of a norm entrepreneur?*, answered in Chapter 4 by comparing CAN's adoption of climate justice norms to that of states; and iii) *Why did CAN play that role, and what were the factors behind it?*, answered in Chapter 5 by analyzing expert interview data using the theoretical framework of collective action frames.

Chapter 3 showed that the increasing relevance of climate justice in the UNFCCC is observable in the rhetoric utilized by state parties in COP speeches. The global conception of climate change has expanded since COP 15 in 2009 from being viewed as a primarily scientific and environmental problem to one that increasingly

emphasizes human rights and social justice issues in its fundamental definition. This evolution of the conception of climate change has also shifted its solutions to a more justice-oriented approach, culminating in a stronger emphasis on climate justice issues in the Paris Agreement compared to its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol.

Through the institutionalization of six climate justice principles in the Paris Agreement, it can be claimed that climate justice has progressed into the second stage (Norm Cascade) of Finnemore and Sikkink's Norm Life Cycle. The progression of these principles in the Norm Life Cycle is supported by the manner in which climate justice has come to be promoted in the UNFCCC setting: states are the primary actors, legitimacy and esteem are the motivating factors, and socialization, rather than persuasion, is the dominant mechanism.

The conception of climate justice in the UNFCCC is made up of six institutionalized climate justice principles. These same six principles were also observed to have increased in the rhetoric of UNFCCC member states: i) Rawlsian justice, ii) human rights, iii) social inequality, iv) loss and damage, v) contextual vulnerability, and vi) indigenous rights.

The remaining three principles (historical responsibility, criticism of market mechanisms, and criticism of global systems) were not institutionalized, and similarly were not represented in states' framing of climate change. Of the nine principles, historical responsibility was notably the only that has shown an observable decrease since Copenhagen, as negotiators have shifted their focus from the Kyoto Protocol's top-down Annex-based system to a voluntary system of Nationally Determined Contributions.

Chapter 4 illustrated that the normative progression of climate justice is also reflected in ENGOs; CAN and its member organizations have evolved along with states, increasing their public advocacy for climate justice in the UNFCCC setting. This change is observable in the growing emphasis on climate justice issues in their framing of climate change, but this evolution took place after climate justice had already gained momentum in the rhetoric of developing countries and began to be adopted by Northern states. However, the six climate justice principles that showed an increase in the rhetoric of states have progressed further as norms among ENGOs, becoming internalized and



taken for granted as fundamental in the conception of climate change and approach to its solutions, a characteristic of Stage 3 of the Norm Life Cycle.

Although CAN and many of its members were vital in promoting these principles in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, they were not norm entrepreneurs for climate justice. The observed increase in CAN's utilization of climate justice framings began long after developing states had already significantly integrated climate justice into its rhetoric, six years after CJA broke away from CAN in order to promote climate justice in the UNFCCC. CAN instead has taken on a different role in the UNFCCC, using its advocacy to support state positions and issues relevant to the UNFCCC agenda that align with its own values and priorities.

Chapter 5's analysis concluded that Political Opportunity Structure and Cultural Constraints were not significantly responsible for constraining CAN's framing processes or preventing them from becoming a norm entrepreneur; DCJ was able to promote climate justice more than half a decade before CAN in the same cultural setting and working with the same political opportunity structure.

Audience Effects, however, were instrumental in constraining CAN's emergence as a climate justice norm entrepreneur. This factor was found to be reliant on two of CAN's internal characteristics: its identity as an organization working as an insider in the UNFCCC system, and its consensus-based decision-making procedures. Both of these characteristics influence who CAN chooses to target with its framing processes. As a result, CAN's framings must simultaneously stay relevant to the negotiation agenda and normative boundaries of the UNFCCC while also satisfying the support base of a diverse range of member organizations by maintaining a focus on the environmental issues they expect.

By identifying as a network that works within the UNFCCC system, CAN encountered constraints on its frame construction that prevented it from challenging the "logic of appropriateness" of the UNFCCC setting by introducing new norms. This role limited CAN to framings that were already within the normative boundaries of UNFCCC negotiations and the positions of states, especially those considered acceptable in the normative environment of the UNFCCC and salient enough to be "winnable" in the context of the perceived political realities of negotiations.

Additionally, CAN's consensus-based decision-making procedures resulted in only being able to utilize *ECO* to promote positions and framings uncontroversial among its membership. Due to their more active participation in the network's UNFCCC activities, ENGOs that emphasize the environmental framing of climate change have held a disproportionate influence in CAN's decision-making processes. This has led many organizations that prioritize climate justice issues to instead engage with other networks rather than compete for influence within CAN. CAN's framings were then constructed based on the audiences of its most influential members, heavily favoring the environmental framing of climate change until CAN's members were able to evolve in the direction of climate justice on their own.

The internal characteristics of DCJ facilitated more suitable conditions for it to take the lead in civil society's push for climate justice in the post-Copenhagen UNFCCC. In comparison to CAN's "reformist" identity, DCJ is a "revolutionary" network that sees its role as one to challenge dominant structures. Additionally, rather than a consensus-based network structure that limits official policy positions and allows some members to exert a disproportionate amount of influence over the network's decisions, DCJ instead focuses on promoting broader normative ideas through a more flexible and horizontal organizational structure.

Through the analysis presented throughout this dissertation, this research has made three principal academic contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on the conception of climate justice by connecting the gap between academic articulations and the concrete issues advocated for by the climate justice movement and in the UNFCCC, as highlighted by Schlosberg and Collins (2014). Second, it illustrates the role of NGOs in international environmental politics by illuminating their role in shaping and promoting norms in the UNFCCC. By using the framing perspective to analyze what constrained CAN's norm entrepreneurship, it deepens the understanding of the factors that influence an actor's strategic construction of frames theorized by Benford and Snow (2000). Third, it contributes to the literature of international norms by furthering the understanding of how norm entrepreneurs emerge. Analyzing the influence of an actor's internal characteristics in determining its ability to engage in norm entrepreneurship strengthens and expands Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) Norm Life

Cycle framework.

## **6.2 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities**

### **Research Limitations**

In reviewing the academic significance of this study, it is necessary to address the limitations of the research and any questions left unanswered, as well as new questions that have emerged through the analysis presented in this dissertation. Overall, three main limitations have been identified: the unpredictability of and fluctuations in climate negotiations, availability of data, and a narrow pool of interview subjects.

The first limitation is one common to any research on UNFCCC negotiations and global climate politics: it is an extremely fast-moving field, with multiple negotiating sessions every year and unique workstreams for individual climate issues that progress both on their own as well as reactively to the overall direction of climate negotiations.

As the normative environment of the UNFCCC evolves, some climate justice issues may become less relevant in years to come. One example of this is historical responsibility. Although many NGO participants assert that the principle is still the ideological core of developing countries and civil society positions, the course of global development along with the Paris Agreement's shift to the NDC system have made basing mandatory greenhouse gas emission reductions on historical emission levels an endeavor perceived as not worth pursuing by actors wishing to make progress in negotiations.

Furthermore, the relevance of various climate issues can change abruptly due to political developments and external events around the world, necessitating fresh research throughout the course of negotiations. As one example, the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will force diplomats from around the world to rethink their climate strategies in order to ensure that the Paris Agreement is still effective without the participation of the world's second-largest emitter of greenhouse

gases (Friedman, 2019; Friedrich et al., 2017). These changes in strategies and approaches could impact the normative landscape of the UNFCCC, and thus may require additional research in the future.

A second limitation encountered in this research concerns the availability of data and resources to analyze it. Public access to scanned transcripts of UNFCCC member state speeches was limited to only statements from the most recent COP conferences. Audio and video recordings of previous COP conferences were generously provided by the UNFCCC Records Management Office, but the amount of time and labor required to perform manual content analysis of recordings proved to be beyond the scope of a one-person study. The period of time analyzed was limited to that of COP 15 and later due to its significance in the climate justice movement and in the history of the UNFCCC, but analyzing all member statements from COP 1 to the present would be valuable in identifying longer-term trends in climate negotiations.

Additionally, while issues of CAN's *ECO* newsletter from as far back as 2001 were obtainable for analysis, member lists were only available from 2011 onward. Although trends were still observable in the data from this period, having a larger pool of data dating back to CAN's origins would more clearly illustrate how the network has grown in the long-term. Member lists for DCJ (both as a network and as a UNFCCC constituency) were also sparse and often incomplete due to the lack of a formal structure in the network for many years. While cross-referencing interview data and previous academic research confirmed their respective conclusions when describing CAN and DCJ's member makeup, having more membership data from both networks would have provided a more in-depth picture of how their membership bases have overlapped over the years and how they may have evolved differently in the same political and cultural setting.

The third limitation concerns the limited pool of interview subjects consulted with during this study. Because the subject of research was CAN and its processes and characteristics, the topic of interviews focused on CAN and its members. Therefore, the experts interviewed were those with extensive experience working in or with CAN, and so the group of interview subjects mostly included CAN officials, working group leaders and coordinators, and members of some of CAN's most active member NGOs.

However, with more time and resources available, interviews with a wider range of experts would be valuable in gaining a more complete picture of how CAN operates and its greater role in the UNFCCC. Interviews with representatives of smaller Southern NGOs within CAN, organizations that have left CAN or disengaged with the UNFCCC process, coordinators of other UNFCCC NGO constituencies, and state delegates that have worked closely with CAN could provide unique perspectives with valuable insight into CAN's processes and the place of the network in the UNFCCC.

### **Future Research Opportunities**

Taken together with the limitations discussed in the previous section, the conclusions of this study present a number of opportunities to expand on this research or branch out into new studies. This section briefly outlines four possibilities for future research: i) a continuation of analysis of climate justice in the UNFCCC with an updated and more detailed palette of principles; ii) an expanded international-level study on the influence of CAN and other NGO networks on states' adoption of norms in the UNFCCC; iii) a domestic-level study tracing the growth of climate justice as a norm in the developing countries that introduced them to the UNFCCC; and iv) an examination of the framing processes of other NGO networks to test for the influence of the internal characteristics identified in this study.

First, a continuation of this study's analysis of climate justice in UNFCCC member speeches and public communications by NGOs could be conducted with a more in-depth group of issues than the nine identified for this research. Based on recent communications from climate justice groups and information gathered in interviews, the concept of a "just transition" would be added as a tenth climate justice principle.<sup>85</sup> This

---

<sup>85</sup> Although there is no universally accepted definition of "just transition," it generally refers to the transition from an extractive fossil fuel-based economy to a renewable energy-based sustainable economy through an approach attentive to social, economic, and political justice. This perspective emphasizes the empowerment of marginalized citizens and ensuring the minimization of harm to all people during the process of transition to this new economy (Climate Justice Alliance, 2017).

is a principle that did not appear extensively enough in the texts analyzed to include in this study,<sup>86</sup> but recently has differentiated itself and gained momentum in the UNFCCC as labor groups have campaigned for it.

Additionally, separating some of the principles into more specific categories would provide detailed insight on the progress of particular climate justice issues in the UNFCCC. This includes separating “social inequality” into sub-categories of gender, race/ethnicity, and economic inequality, and separating the “vulnerability” category into sub-categories of vulnerable regions/countries and vulnerable communities within those areas. Examining these norms in more detailed sub-categories presents opportunities to better understand the significance of these concepts in the global conception of climate change, and how this significance may vary among different actors. It would also invite research into climate justice issues that have thus far seen few studies, such as the vulnerability of LGBTQ individuals and communities to the impacts of climate change (Brady et al. 2019; Calma, 2018).

Applying this analysis to legal instruments other than the UNFCCC may also reveal the strength of climate justice outside of international negotiations. Lawsuits filed against governments, private businesses, and the fossil fuel industry related to damages from climate change have in recent years expanded to at least 28 countries (Setzer & Byrnes, 2019). Analyzing documents related to these cases for the presence of climate justice principles could contribute to the understanding of how climate change is being framed in legal contexts outside of the UNFCCC.

Second, limitations concerning expert interview data also raise an opportunity for a more extensive international-level study on the influence of civil society in the progression of climate justice in the UNFCCC. The goal of this dissertation was to explain why CAN failed to emerge as a norm entrepreneur for climate justice, not to trace the events and processes behind states’ adoption of climate justice. Such an objective was beyond the possible scope of this study, but future research with this aim would be valuable in obtaining a fuller picture of how climate justice has progressed in the UNFCCC and assess the influence of various actors and coalitions.

---

<sup>86</sup> The small number of mentions that were observed were categorized as part of the “justice” principle.

Instead of NGOs' norm promotion acting as the dependent variable, making it the independent variable in a study analyzing the influence of NGOs on the adoption of norms by states could provide the data necessary to explain in detail why states adopted climate justice principles, and why climate justice took the shape it did in the Paris Agreement. This presents opportunities for global governance-focused research on the role of NGOs in the UNFCCC, including the possibility of conceptualizing some of the relationships and behavior discussed in this study through a lens of orchestration.<sup>87</sup>

This research would require interviews with a considerable variety of actors, including UNFCCC state delegates, members of the UNFCCC Secretariat, private sector representatives, and participants from other NGO constituencies. The data collected from these interviews could be used to assess the extent of CAN and numerous other actors' impact on states' adoption of climate justice, as well as their influence on the final text of the Paris Agreement.

Third, a number of domestic-level studies could be performed to trace an individual state's adoption of a particular climate justice principle and the role of domestic actors and institutions in that adoption. Separate from the norm promotion occurring at the international level in the UNFCCC, this study could shed light on any relevant domestic processes behind the adoption of climate justice principles by states, and the role domestic conditions played in motivating states to advocate for them.

Particularly valuable would be research on the developing countries that first promoted climate justice issues in the UNFCCC, as well as research on the critical states necessary for these norms to be institutionalized in the Paris Agreement. This study would require a deep examination of the domestic political processes in many of these countries to investigate how state actors were influenced outside of the UNFCCC. Interviews with UNFCCC delegates, domestic policymakers, local NGO officials, and

---

<sup>87</sup> Orchestration is a method of governance in which an orchestrating actor utilizes a third-party as an intermediary to influence a target actor instead of attempting to influence the target directly (Abbott et al., 2015). Possible interpretations of this relevant to this research include CIEL orchestrating non-government constituencies to campaign to states for the inclusion of human rights language in the Paris Agreement, or party delegates utilizing CAN as an intermediary in informal negotiations taking place outside of official negotiating sessions.

other relevant domestic actors would be necessary in order to determine the level of domestic influence compared to that on the international stage in the UNFCCC.

Interviews with members of CAN's regional nodes could also be used to evaluate how CAN's norm advocacy differs on the domestic and international levels. The constraining factors theorized by Benford and Snow and the internal characteristics responsible for limiting CAN's strategic frame construction in the UNFCCC could be tested on the framing processes of its regional nodes to evaluate if these factors play a different role domestically than they do on the international stage.

Finally, the results of this study regarding the influence of two of CAN's internal characteristics on its framing processes could be generalized to form a typology of NGO networks and tested on other networks' promotion of norms. When compared to DCJ, CAN's identity as an actor working within the UNFCCC system and its consensus-based decision-making procedures constrained its ability to emerge as a norm entrepreneur. One could generalize this to say that an NGO network with an "insider" (or "reformist") identity and consensus-based processes is more suited to reactive norm promotion, while one with an "outsider" (or "revolutionary") identity and more flexible, horizontal network structure is better suited for proactive norm entrepreneurship.

Additional studies on other NGO networks could test the generalizability of this hypothesis. While these characteristics and specific conditions have proven to be significant in the case of CAN and DCJ's climate justice advocacy efforts, it cannot be said how this typology may apply to other cases, or what other factors may affect their influence. Such studies could not only be used to evaluate the transferability of the results of this research, but could also analyze the two types of NGO networks that fit into typologies other than CAN and DCJ: insider networks with a horizontal network structure, and outsider networks with consensus-based decision-making processes. Through these studies, a full typology of NGO networks based on their identity and decision-making structure could be made in relation to proactive or reactive norm advocacy.



## Appendix A: Analyzed Climate Justice Texts

	Document Title	Date Published
1	Documents from the Seventh ALBA Summit: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Special Declaration for a Universal Declaration of Mother Earth Rights</li> <li>• Special Declaration on Climate Change of ALBA-TCP Towards the XV Copenhagen Conference</li> <li>• Joint Declaration</li> </ul>	October 17, 2009
2	Climate Justice Alliance “Just Transition Principles”	2016
3	Declaration of the World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Defense of Life (Tiquipaya – Bolivia)	October 12, 2015
4	Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice “Fight for Climate Justice!”	November 2015
5	System change – not climate change: A People’s Declaration from Klimaforum09	December 2009
6	Manila-Paris Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum	November 30, 2015
7	The Margarita Declaration on Climate Change	July 18, 2014
8	International Climate Justice Network “Bali Principles of Climate Justice”	August 29, 2002
9	Peoples Agreement – World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth	April 22, 2010
10	Mary Robinson Foundation “Principles of Climate Justice”	May 24, 2017
11	Climate Justice Now! “Climate Justice Statement”	November 3, 2008

## Appendix B: Interview Questions

### For NGO Representatives:

1. Please introduce yourself and describe your job, background, and any details you wish to share about your experience with climate change negotiations.
2. In your view, how has your organization's overall conception of the problem of climate change and priority issues changed over the years? When did this start happening? Was there any internal or external change(s) or event(s) that triggered this change?
3. Our research identified nine common climate justice themes: 1) framing climate change as an issue of justice and equality, 2) loss and damage compensation, 3) human rights, 4) climate change impacts on existing gender / racial / social inequality, 5) focus on differing regional/national vulnerabilities and adaptation capacities, 6) indigenous rights and protection of cultural heritage 7) historical responsibility, 8) criticism of "false solutions" (market-based solutions and some technological solutions), 9) criticism of capitalism, free trade, neoliberal governance, and other international systems and institutions.
  - a) To the best of your knowledge, please discuss your organization's history and relationship with each of the above. Which of the above has your organization emphasized over time? Which issues has it de-emphasized? What events or actors have influenced these decisions?
  - b) Please talk about how these issues have affected your interactions and relationships with UNFCCC member states/delegates.
    - Was your organization influenced by any actions or strategies by states or state coalitions, or conversely was it pushing these issues in order to influence their negotiating positions?
    - Did your organization adopt those climate justice issues, which were gaining momentum in UNFCCC negotiations in order to lend support to that momentum, or did national delegates adopt the issues that your organization was pushing the most?
    - How have the relationships or interactions between your organization and UNFCCC member states and delegates changed over the years with respect to climate justice?
4. Historically, what has been your organization's relationship with the Climate Action Network? Has it changed in any way, and if so, how? If relevant, please discuss the

change with respect to the following issues:

- a) Priorities in climate issues (including climate justice)
- b) Process of decision-making and agenda-setting
- c) Strategies and tactics (re: media, negotiating with UNFCCC member states, etc.)

5. Have any other NGOs or outside groups influenced those in #4 (e.g. prioritized issues, activism tactics, broader strategies)? If so, which ones, and in what ways?
6. Did the turn of events at COP15 in Copenhagen (e.g., disenfranchisement of NGOs by the UNFCCC, increasing prominence of climate justice NGO networks) have any effect on the organizational behavior listed in #5 (e.g., prioritized issues, activism tactics, broader strategies) in your organization? If so, how?
7. How did the organizational behavior listed in #5 (e.g., prioritized issues, activism tactics, broader strategies) change in your organization as the drafting of the Paris Agreement approached? Were there any climate justice issues your organization emphasized or de-emphasized in an attempt to influence the contents of the Paris Agreement?
8. Our research has identified six climate justice principles that were featured in the Paris Agreement: 1) inclusion of the term “climate justice,” 2) protection of human rights, 3) protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, 4) a loss and damage mechanism, 5) gender/racial/social equality, and 6) contextual and regional differences in vulnerability to climate change.
  - a) How did these issues make it into the final text of the Paris Agreement? Which actors were responsible?
  - b) What motivated different countries to agree to their inclusion?
  - c) What climate justice issues didn’t make it into the Paris Agreement? What prevented them?
9. In your observation, have there been any changes in emphasis on climate justice issues by UNFCCC member states or civil society organizations since the Paris Agreement? Why/why not?
10. Please include any other thoughts or insight you’d like to share regarding the growth of climate justice since the Kyoto Protocol (and especially since COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009).

For CAN Representatives:

1. Please introduce yourself and describe your job, background, and any details you wish to share about your experience with climate change negotiations.
2. In your view, how has your organization's overall conception of the problem of climate change and priority issues changed over the years? When did this start happening? Was there any internal or external change(s) or event(s) that triggered this change?
3. Our research identified nine common climate justice themes: 1) framing climate change as an issue of justice and equality, 2) loss and damage compensation, 3) human rights, 4) climate change impacts on existing gender / racial / social inequality, 5) focus on differing regional/national vulnerabilities and adaptation capacities, 6) indigenous rights and protection of cultural heritage 7) historical responsibility, 8) criticism of "false solutions" (market-based solutions and some technological solutions), 9) criticism of capitalism, free trade, neoliberal governance, and other international systems and institutions.
  - a) To the best of your knowledge, please discuss your organization's history and relationship with each of the above. Which of the above has your organization emphasized over time? Which issues has it de-emphasized? What events or actors have influenced these decisions?
  - b) Please talk about how these issues have affected your interactions and relationships with UNFCCC member states/delegates.
    - Was your organization influenced by any actions or strategies by states or state coalitions, or conversely was it pushing these issues in order to influence their negotiating positions?
    - Did your organization adopt those climate justice issues, which were gaining momentum in UNFCCC negotiations in order to lend support to that momentum, or did national delegates adopt the issues that your organization was pushing the most?
    - How have the relationships or interactions between your organization and UNFCCC member states and delegates changed over the years with respect to climate justice?
4. How has the makeup of CAN member organizations (type, nation/region of origin, prioritized issues) changed over the years? Have there been any changes in how member organizations are involved in the agenda-setting and decision-making processes?

5. Has the transnational climate justice movement influenced your organization's prioritized issues, activism tactics, broader strategies, and other activities including intra-organizational restructuring? If so, how?
6. Have any other NGOs influenced those in #5 (e.g. prioritized issues, activism tactics, broader strategies)? If so, which ones, and in what ways?
7. Did the turn of events at COP15 in Copenhagen (e.g., disenfranchisement of NGOs by the UNFCCC, increasing prominence of climate justice NGO networks) have any effect on the organizational behavior listed in #5 (e.g., prioritized issues, activism tactics, broader strategies) in your organization? If so, how?
8. How did the organizational behavior listed in #5 (e.g., prioritized issues, activism tactics, broader strategies) change in your organization as the drafting of the Paris Agreement approached? Were there any climate justice issues your organization emphasized or de-emphasized in an attempt to influence the contents of the Paris Agreement?
9. Our research has identified six climate justice principles that were featured in the Paris Agreement: 1) inclusion of the term "climate justice," 2) protection of human rights, 3) protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, 4) a loss and damage mechanism, 5) gender/racial/social equality, and 6) contextual and regional differences in vulnerability to climate change.
  - a) How did these issues make it into the final text of the Paris Agreement? Which actors were responsible?
  - b) What motivated different countries to agree to their inclusion?
  - c) What climate justice issues didn't make it into the Paris Agreement? What prevented them?
10. In your observation, have there been any changes in emphasis on climate justice issues by UNFCCC member states or civil society organizations since the Paris Agreement? Why/why not?
11. Please include any other thoughts or insight you'd like to share regarding the growth of climate justice since the Kyoto Protocol (and especially since COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009).

## Appendix C: UNFCCC Member State COP Statement Data

(Percent of Parties by Category)

### Justice / Equality / Equity / Fairness

	<u>All</u> <u>Countries 1</u> <u>+ 2</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>1</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>
2009	31.03	19.54	11.49	27.03	24.32	2.70	32.12	18.25	13.87
2010	37.11	25.16	11.95	36.11	25.00	11.11	37.70	25.41	12.30
2011	43.42	26.32	17.11	35.29	26.47	8.82	46.15	26.50	19.66
2012	46.30	27.16	19.14	36.36	24.24	12.12	50.00	28.57	21.43
2013	40.31	24.81	15.50	21.43	17.86	3.57	46.46	27.27	19.19
2014	51.16	34.88	16.28	55.56	50.00	5.56	50.00	30.88	19.12
2015	50.42	29.41	21.01	42.86	34.29	8.57	53.57	27.38	26.19
2016	28.19	17.45	10.74	16.22	13.51	2.70	34.29	20.00	14.29
2017	37.04	25.93	11.11	25.81	19.35	6.45	40.78	28.16	12.62

### Loss and Damage

	<u>All</u> <u>Countries 1</u> <u>+ 2</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>1</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>
2009	4.60	4.02	0.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.84	5.11	0.73
2010	24.53	10.69	13.84	2.78	2.78	0.00	31.15	13.11	18.03
2011	23.03	13.16	9.87	2.94	2.94	0.00	29.06	16.24	12.82
2012	32.72	12.96	19.75	6.06	6.06	0.00	40.48	15.08	25.40
2013	51.94	18.60	33.33	10.71	10.71	0.00	64.65	21.21	43.43
2014	39.53	16.28	23.26	5.56	5.56	0.00	48.53	19.12	29.41
2015	37.82	15.97	21.85	5.71	5.71	0.00	51.19	20.24	30.95
2016	24.83	10.07	14.77	5.41	2.70	2.70	33.33	13.33	20.00
2017	36.30	18.52	17.78	6.45	6.45	0.00	45.63	22.33	23.30

### Human Rights

	<u>All Countries 1 + 2</u>	<u>All Countries 1</u>	<u>All Countries 2</u>	<u>Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Annex I 1</u>	<u>Annex I 2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 2</u>
2009	7.47	5.17	2.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	9.49	6.57	2.92
2010	11.32	7.55	3.77	0.00	0.00	0.00	14.75	9.84	4.92
2011	10.53	6.58	3.95	2.94	2.94	0.00	12.82	7.69	5.13
2012	9.26	8.02	1.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	11.90	10.32	1.59
2013	10.85	6.20	4.65	10.71	7.14	3.57	11.11	6.06	5.05
2014	20.93	11.63	9.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	26.47	14.71	11.76
2015	23.53	16.81	6.72	20.00	14.29	5.71	25.00	17.86	7.14
2016	18.12	14.77	3.36	18.92	16.22	2.70	19.05	15.24	3.81
2017	11.85	8.89	2.96	9.68	6.45	3.23	12.62	9.71	2.91

### Gender / Racial / Social Inequality

	<u>All Countries 1 + 2</u>	<u>All Countries 1</u>	<u>All Countries 2</u>	<u>Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Annex I 1</u>	<u>Annex I 2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 2</u>
2009	19.54	12.07	7.47	8.11	2.70	5.41	22.63	14.60	8.03
2010	26.42	13.21	13.21	19.44	8.33	11.11	28.69	14.75	13.93
2011	26.32	16.45	9.87	14.71	11.76	2.94	29.91	17.95	11.97
2012	37.65	22.84	14.81	27.27	21.21	6.06	41.27	23.81	17.46
2013	25.58	13.95	11.63	17.86	10.71	7.14	28.28	15.15	13.13
2014	45.35	20.93	24.42	22.22	5.56	16.67	51.47	25.00	26.47
2015	44.54	22.69	21.85	42.86	20.00	22.86	45.24	23.81	21.43
2016	30.87	20.13	10.74	27.03	21.62	5.41	34.29	20.95	13.33
2017	32.59	15.56	17.04	41.94	29.03	12.90	30.10	11.65	18.45

### Indigenous Rights / Cultural Preservation

	<u>All Countries 1 + 2</u>	<u>All Countries 1</u>	<u>All Countries 2</u>	<u>Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Annex I 1</u>	<u>Annex I 2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 2</u>
2009	4.02	2.87	1.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.11	3.65	1.46
2010	10.69	7.55	3.14	8.33	8.33	0.00	11.48	7.38	4.10
2011	9.87	8.55	1.32	5.88	5.88	0.00	11.11	9.40	1.71
2012	6.17	4.94	1.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.94	6.35	1.59
2013	6.98	5.43	1.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	9.09	7.07	2.02
2014	9.30	5.81	3.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	11.76	7.35	4.41
2015	8.40	5.04	3.36	2.86	0.00	2.86	10.71	7.14	3.57
2016	4.03	3.36	0.67	2.70	0.00	2.70	4.76	4.76	0.00
2017	11.11	5.19	5.93	16.13	6.45	9.68	9.71	4.85	4.85

### Criticism of Market-Based Solutions

	<u>All Countries 1 + 2</u>	<u>All Countries 1</u>	<u>All Countries 2</u>	<u>Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Annex I 1</u>	<u>Annex I 2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 2</u>
2009	4.02	0.57	3.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.11	0.73	4.38
2010	5.66	3.77	1.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.38	4.92	2.46
2011	3.95	1.32	2.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.13	1.71	3.42
2012	3.09	0.62	2.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.97	0.79	3.17
2013	3.88	1.55	2.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.05	2.02	3.03
2014	6.98	3.49	3.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.82	4.41	4.41
2015	3.36	3.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.76	4.76	0.00
2016	3.36	2.01	1.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.76	2.86	1.90
2017	3.70	1.48	2.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.85	1.94	2.91



### Criticism of Capitalism / Trade Liberalization / Globalization

	<u>All</u> <u>Countries 1</u> <u>+ 2</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>1</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>
2009	6.90	1.72	5.17	2.70	2.70	0.00	8.03	1.46	6.57
2010	7.55	3.77	3.77	2.78	0.00	2.78	9.02	4.92	4.10
2011	7.24	2.63	4.61	5.88	5.88	0.00	7.69	1.71	5.98
2012	5.56	1.23	4.32	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.14	1.59	5.56
2013	5.43	2.33	3.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.07	3.03	4.04
2014	8.14	1.16	6.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.29	1.47	8.82
2015	10.08	6.72	3.36	2.86	0.00	2.86	13.10	9.52	3.57
2016	5.37	1.34	4.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.62	1.90	5.71
2017	5.19	1.48	3.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.80	1.94	4.85

### Historical Responsibility

	<u>All</u> <u>Countries 1</u> <u>+ 2</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>1</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>1</u>	<u>Non-Annex</u> <u>I</u> <u>2</u>
2009	18.97	10.92	8.05	10.81	8.11	2.70	21.17	11.68	9.49
2010	25.16	13.84	11.32	11.11	5.56	5.56	29.51	16.39	13.11
2011	21.71	13.82	7.89	2.94	0.00	2.94	27.35	17.95	9.40
2012	17.28	14.20	3.09	3.03	3.03	0.00	21.43	17.46	3.97
2013	20.93	14.73	6.20	7.14	7.14	0.00	25.25	17.17	8.08
2014	24.42	17.44	6.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	30.88	22.06	8.82
2015	24.37	18.49	5.88	14.29	14.29	0.00	28.57	20.24	8.33
2016	12.08	8.05	4.03	8.11	8.11	0.00	14.29	8.57	5.71
2017	12.59	10.37	2.22	3.23	3.23	0.00	15.53	12.62	2.91

### Adaptation / Vulnerability

	<u>All Countries 1 + 2</u>	<u>All Countries 1</u>	<u>All Countries 2</u>	<u>Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Annex I 1</u>	<u>Annex I 2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 2</u>
2009	66.09	22.41	43.68	43.24	37.84	5.41	72.26	18.25	54.01
2010	81.13	23.27	57.86	55.56	36.11	19.44	89.34	19.67	69.67
2011	80.92	27.63	53.29	50.00	38.24	11.76	90.60	24.79	65.81
2012	74.07	20.99	53.09	45.45	27.27	18.18	83.33	19.84	63.49
2013	86.05	31.01	55.04	64.29	53.57	10.71	93.94	25.25	68.69
2014	90.70	26.74	63.95	66.67	27.78	38.89	97.06	26.47	70.59
2015	81.51	22.69	58.82	65.71	34.29	31.43	88.10	17.86	70.24
2016	80.54	27.52	53.02	64.86	40.54	24.32	91.43	24.76	66.67
2017	89.63	25.19	64.44	77.42	29.03	48.39	94.17	24.27	69.90

### Average Climate Justice Mentions per COP Statement

	<u>All Countries 1 + 2</u>	<u>All Countries 1</u>	<u>All Countries 2</u>	<u>Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Annex I 1</u>	<u>Annex I 2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1+2</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 1</u>	<u>Non-Annex I 2</u>
2009	1.63	0.79	0.83	0.92	0.76	0.16	1.82	0.80	1.02
2010	2.30	1.09	1.21	1.36	0.86	0.50	2.59	1.16	1.43
2011	2.27	1.16	1.11	1.21	0.94	0.27	2.60	1.24	1.36
2012	2.32	1.13	1.19	1.18	0.82	0.36	2.67	1.24	1.44
2013	2.52	1.19	1.33	1.32	1.07	0.25	2.91	1.24	1.67
2014	2.97	1.39	1.58	1.50	0.89	0.61	3.35	1.52	1.84
2015	2.84	1.41	1.43	1.97	1.23	0.74	3.20	1.49	1.71
2016	2.07	1.05	1.03	1.43	1.03	0.41	2.44	1.12	1.31
2017	2.40	1.13	1.27	1.81	1.00	0.81	2.60	1.18	1.43

## Appendix D: *ECO* Newsletter Data

(Mentions Per Issue)

	<u>Justice / Equality / Equity / Fairness</u>	<u>Loss and Damage</u>	<u>Human Rights</u>	<u>Adaptation / Vulnerability</u>	<u>Gender / Racial / Social Inequality</u>	<u>Indigenous Rights / Cultural Preservation</u>	<u>Criticism of Market- Based Solutions</u>	<u>Criticism of Capitalism / Trade Liberalization / Globalization</u>	<u>Historical Responsibility</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2001	0.80	0.00	0.10	0.80	0.70	0.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.00
2002	1.00	0.00	0.10	0.90	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.10	2.40
2003	0.40	0.00	0.20	1.20	0.40	0.30	0.10	0.10	0.10	2.80
2004	0.27	0.00	0.09	1.73	0.27	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.64
2005	0.43	0.00	0.14	1.36	0.21	0.29	0.00	0.07	0.00	2.50
2006	0.44	0.06	0.00	1.13	0.19	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.13	2.00
2007	0.61	0.04	0.17	0.83	0.13	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.35	2.35
2008	0.26	0.00	0.13	0.96	0.13	0.39	0.04	0.09	0.35	2.35
2009	0.42	0.17	0.21	1.19	0.51	0.23	0.02	0.00	0.17	2.91
2010	0.31	0.26	0.14	1.20	0.46	0.29	0.00	0.06	0.14	2.86
2011	0.67	0.24	0.18	1.15	0.42	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.09	2.94
2012	0.76	0.52	0.17	0.93	0.31	0.10	0.07	0.00	0.03	2.90
2013	1.19	0.59	0.15	1.30	0.30	0.19	0.04	0.07	0.11	3.93
2014	1.13	0.78	0.34	1.25	0.63	0.22	0.03	0.06	0.03	4.47
2015	1.32	1.21	0.95	2.05	1.03	0.50	0.08	0.05	0.11	7.29
2016	1.00	0.67	0.63	1.63	0.79	0.42	0.17	0.08	0.00	5.38
2017	1.30	1.05	0.35	1.55	0.75	0.45	0.15	0.00	0.05	5.65

## Appendix E: CAN International Membership Data

### By Organization Type:

	<u>ENGO</u>	<u>HRNGO</u>	<u>EJNGO</u>	<u>Other NGO</u>	<u>Unknown NGO</u>	<u>HR+EJ+Other</u>	<u>TOTAL (n)</u>
2011	62.67	22.81	3.11	8.30	3.11	34.22	675
2012	61.35	25.64	4.05	6.26	2.70	35.95	815
2013	61.00	25.80	4.04	6.66	2.50	36.50	841
2014	61.48	25.54	3.97	6.97	2.04	36.48	932
2015	60.19	25.91	4.60	7.42	1.88	37.93	957
2016	57.28	27.26	4.82	8.76	1.87	40.85	1016
2017	57.64	26.08	5.67	8.63	1.98	40.38	1112
CJN 2010	27.03	39.86	10.62	22.07	0.41	72.55	725
UNFCCC Registered (2019)	72.02	16.07	6.55	5.36	0.00	27.98	168

### By Country – United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

	<u>Developed</u>	<u>Developing</u>	<u>Transitional</u>	<u>Joint</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>TOTAL (n)</u>
2011	55.85	41.63	2.52	0.00	0.00	675
2012	52.52	45.03	2.45	0.00	0.00	815
2013	50.06	47.68	2.26	0.00	0.00	841
2014	49.57	47.00	3.43	0.00	0.00	932
2015	48.17	48.90	3.03	0.00	0.00	957
2016	44.98	52.17	2.85	0.00	0.00	1016
2017	50.09	46.76	3.15	0.00	0.00	1112
CJN 2010	25.10	72.83	1.38	0.28	0.41	725
UNFCCC Registered (2019)	63.10	35.12	1.79	0.00	0.00	168

By Country – Kyoto Protocol Classification

	<u>Annex I</u>	<u>Non-Annex I</u>	<u>Joint</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>TOTAL (n)</u>
2011	57.48	42.52	0.00	0.00	675
2012	54.11	45.89	0.00	0.00	815
2013	51.37	48.63	0.00	0.00	841
2014	51.61	48.39	0.00	0.00	932
2015	50.26	49.84	0.00	0.00	957
2016	46.85	53.15	0.00	0.00	1016
2017	51.89	48.11	0.00	0.00	1112
CJN 2010	25.93	73.52	0.14	0.41	725
UNFCCC Registered (2019)	64.88	35.12	0.00	0.00	168

By Country – International Monetary Fund

	<u>Advanced</u>	<u>Emerging / Developing</u>	<u>Joint</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>TOTAL (n)</u>
2011	54.67	45.04	0.00	0.30	675
2012	51.53	47.98	0.00	0.37	815
2013	48.75	50.89	0.00	0.36	841
2014	48.39	51.29	0.00	0.32	932
2015	47.54	52.25	0.00	0.31	957
2016	44.29	55.41	0.00	0.30	1016
2017	49.01	50.90	0.00	0.09	1112
CJN 2010	26.07	73.24	0.28	0.41	725
UNFCCC Registered (2019)	63.10	36.90	0.00	0.00	168

By Country – United Nations Development Programme

	<u>Developed</u>	<u>Developing</u>	<u>Joint</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>TOTAL (n)</u>
2011	56.74	43.11	0.00	0.15	675
2012	53.37	46.26	0.00	0.25	815
2013	50.77	48.99	0.00	0.24	841
2014	50.43	49.36	0.00	0.21	932
2015	49.01	50.89	0.00	0.21	957
2016	45.77	54.04	0.00	0.20	1016
2017	50.90	49.10	0.00	0.00	1112
CJN 2010	26.62	72.83	0.14	0.41	725
UNFCCC Registered (2019)	63.10	36.90	0.00	0.00	168

## References

- Abbott, K. W., Genschel, P., Snidal, S. & Zangl, B. (2015). Orchestration: Global governance through intermediaries. In *International organizations as orchestrators* (pp. 3-36). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Acharya, A. (2004). How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. *International Organization*, 58(2), 239-275.
- Adachi, K. (2013). Countering norm creation: Tug-of-war between norm entrepreneurs and norm protectors on access to essential medicines. *立命館国際研究*, 26, 1-13.
- Adger, W. N. (2001). Scales of governance and environmental justice for adaptation and mitigation of climate change. *Journal of International Development*, 13(7), 921-931.
- Adger, W. N., Benjaminsen, T. A., Brown, K., & Svarstad, H. (2001). Advancing a political ecology of global environmental discourses. *Development and Change*, 32(4), 681-715.
- Agyeman, J. (2013). Global environmental justice or Le droit au monde?. *Geoforum*, 54, 236-238.
- Ahmed, S., & Potter, D. M. (2006). *NGOs in international politics*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- ALBA Countries. (2009, December 28). ALBA declaration on Copenhagen climate summit. Retrieved from <https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5038>
- Allan, J. I., & Hadden, J. (2017). Exploring the framing power of NGOs in global climate politics. *Environmental Politics*, 26(4), 600-620.
- Anand, R. (2017). *International environmental justice: A north-south dimension*. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Angus, I. (Ed.) (2009, December 18). Full text: Chavez speech on climate change in Copenhagen. *Climate & Capitalism*. Retrieved from <https://climateandcapitalism.com/2009/12/18/full-text-chavez-speech-on-climate-change-in-copenhagen/>
- Anshelm, J., & Hultman, M. (2014). *Discourses of global climate change: Apocalyptic*

- framing and political antagonisms*. London: Routledge.
- Arts, B. (1998). *The political influence of global NGOs: Case studies on the climate and biodiversity conventions*. Jan van Arkel: International Books.
- Audet, R. (2013). Climate justice and bargaining coalitions: a discourse analysis. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 13(3), 369-386.
- Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1095-1111.
- Bäckstrand, K., & Lövbrand, E. (2007). Climate governance beyond 2012: competing discourses of green governmentality, ecological modernization and civic environmentalism. In M. Pettenger (Ed.), *The social construction of climate change: Power, knowledge, norms, discourses* (pp. 123-147). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bäckstrand, K., & Lövbrand, E. (2016). The road to Paris: Contending climate governance discourses in the post-Copenhagen era. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 1-19. DOI: 10.1080/1523908X.2016.1150777.
- Bäckstrand, K., Kuyper, J. W., Linnér, B. O., & Lövbrand, E. (2017). Non-state actors in global climate governance: From Copenhagen to Paris and beyond. *Environmental Politics*, 26(4), 561-579.
- Barnett, M. N. (1999). Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel's road to Oslo. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(1): 5-36.
- Barrett, S. (2013). The necessity of a multiscalar analysis of climate justice. *Progress in Human Geography*, 37(2), 215-233.
- Benford, R. D. (1997). An insider's critique of the social movement framing perspective. *Sociological Inquiry*, 67(4), 409-430.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26(1), 611-639.
- Bernstein, S. (2000). Ideas, social structure and the compromise of liberal environmentalism. *European Journal of International Relations*, 6(4), 464-512.
- Betsill, M. (2002). Environmental NGOs meet the sovereign state: The Kyoto Protocol negotiations on global climate change. *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy*, 13, 49.



- Betsill, M. M. (2006). Transnational actors in international environmental politics. In M. Betsill, K. Hochstetler, & D. Stevis (Eds.), *Palgrave advances in international environmental politics* (pp. 172-202). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Betsill, M. M. (2008). Environmental NGOs and the Kyoto Protocol negotiations: 1995 to 1997. In M. Betsill & E. Corell (Eds.), *NGO diplomacy: the influence of nongovernmental organizations in international environmental negotiations* (pp. 43-66). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Betsill, M., & Corell, E. (2008). Introduction to NGO diplomacy. In M. Betsill & E. Corell (Eds.), *NGO diplomacy: The influence of nongovernmental organizations in international environmental negotiations*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Björkdahl, A. (2002). Norms in international relations: Some conceptual and methodological reflections. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15(1), 9-23.
- Black, R. (2010, March 16). Copenhagen climate summit undone by 'arrogance'. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8571347.stm>
- Blaxekjær, L. Ø., & Nielsen, T. D. (2015). Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC. *Climate Policy*, 15(6), 751-766.
- Bob, C. (2005). *The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bodansky, D. (2001). The history of the global climate change regime. In Luterbacher & Sprinz (Eds.), *International relations and global climate change*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Treaty. (2009, October 17a). Joint declaration. Retrieved from <http://alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/joint-declaration-vii-summit>
- Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Treaty. (2009, October 17b). Special declaration for a universal declaration of mother earth rights. Retrieved from <http://alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/special-declaration-universal-declaration-mother-earth-rights>
- Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Treaty. (2009, October 17c). Special declaration on climate change of ALBA-TCP towards the XV

- Copenhagen conference. Retrieved from <http://alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/special-declaration-climate-change-alba-tcp-vii-summit-towards-xv-copenhagen-conference>
- Bond, P. (2013). Justice. In C. Death (Ed.), *Critical environmental politics*. (pp. 133-145). London: Routledge.
- Bond, P., & Dorsey, M. K. (2010). Anatomies of environmental knowledge and resistance: Diverse climate justice movements and waning eco-neoliberalism. *Journal of Australian Political Economy* (66), 286.
- Brady, A., Torres, A., & Brown, P. (2019, April 9). What the queer community brings to the fight for climate justice. *Grist*. Retrieved from <https://grist.org/article/what-the-queer-community-brings-to-the-fight-for-climate-justice/>
- Breidenich, C., Magraw, D., Rowley, A., & Rubin, J. W. (1998). The Kyoto protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change. *American Journal of International Law*, 92(2), 315-331.
- Bryant, B. (Ed.) (1995). Introduction. In *Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies, and Solutions*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
- Bulkeley, H., Edwards, G. A., & Fuller, S. (2014). Contesting climate justice in the city: Examining politics and practice in urban climate change experiments. *Global Environmental Change*, 25, 31-40.
- Cabré, M. M. (2011). Issue-linkages to Climate Change Measured through NGO Participation in the UNFCCC. *Global Environmental Politics*, 11(3), 10-22.
- Calma, J. (2018, October 29). Yes, trans rights are an environmental issue, too. *Grist*. Retrieved from <https://grist.org/article/transgender-rights-climate-intersectionality/>
- Carpenter, R. C. (2005). "Women, children and other vulnerable groups": gender, strategic frames and the protection of civilians as a transnational issue. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(2), 295-334.
- Carpenter, R. C. (2007). Setting the advocacy agenda: Theorizing issue emergence and nonemergence in transnational advocacy networks. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(1), 99-120.
- Chabria, A. & Luna, T. (2019, October 11). PG&E power outages bring darkness, stress and debt to California's poor and elderly. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved from

<https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-11/pge-power-outage-darkness-stress-debt-vulnerable>

Chatterjee, P., & Finger, M. (1994). *The earth brokers: Power, politics and world development*. London: Routledge.

Chatterton, P., Featherstone, D., & Routledge, P. (2012). Articulating climate justice in Copenhagen: Antagonism, the commons, and solidarity. *Antipode*, 45(3), 602-620.

Ciplet, D., Roberts, J. T., & Khan, M. R. (2015). *Power in a warming world: The new global politics of climate change and the remaking of environmental inequality*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Climate Action Network. (n.d.). CAN Working Groups. Retrieved from <http://climatenetwork.org/working-groups>

Climate Action Network. (2009). Outrage over lockout. *ECO*, Climate Negotiations Copenhagen, 2009 December 18.

Climate Action Network. (2012). *CAN Charter*. Retrieved from <http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/cancharter-adopteddec2012.pdf>

Climate Action Network. (2014). *Small window, bright light: A history of Climate Action Network*. Beirut: CAN International.

Climate Action Network. (2019). About CAN. Retrieved from <http://climatenetwork.org/about/about-can>

Climate Justice Alliance. (2016). Just transition principles. Retrieved from [https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BxqkHpIIFq\\_eWk9QR1JwNFRDSndzZEVwRmtWZkZFcXdWWTBn](https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BxqkHpIIFq_eWk9QR1JwNFRDSndzZEVwRmtWZkZFcXdWWTBn)

Climate Justice Alliance. (2017). Just transition: A framework for change. Retrieved from <https://climatejusticealliance.org/just-transition>

Climate Justice Now!. (2007, December 14). What's missing from the climate talks? Justice! [Press release]. Retrieved from [https://www.foei.org/press\\_releases/archive-by-subject/climate-justice-energy-press/whats-missing-from-the-climate-talks-justice](https://www.foei.org/press_releases/archive-by-subject/climate-justice-energy-press/whats-missing-from-the-climate-talks-justice)

Climate Justice Now!. (2008, November 03). Climate justice statement. Retrieved from [http://www.carbontradewatch.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=227&Itemid=95](http://www.carbontradewatch.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=227&Itemid=95)

- Climate Vulnerable Forum. (2015, November 30). Manila-Paris Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum. CVF/2015/1. Retrieved from <https://thecvf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/High-Level-Meeting-1.pdf>
- Conca, K. (1995). Greening the United Nations: Environmental organisations and the UN system. *Third World Quarterly*, 16(3), 441-458.
- Declaration of the World Peoples' Conference on Climate Change and the Defense of Life (Tiquipaya – Bolivia). (2015, October 12). Retrieved from [https://observatoriocdbolivia.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/declaration-world-peoples-tiquipaya-ii\\_12-10-2015.pdf](https://observatoriocdbolivia.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/declaration-world-peoples-tiquipaya-ii_12-10-2015.pdf)
- Della Porta, D., & Parks, L. (2014). Framing processes in the climate movement: From climate change to climate justice. In M. Diets & H. Garrelts (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of the climate change movement* (pp. 19-30). London: Routledge.
- Depledge, J. (2013). *The organization of global negotiations: Constructing the climate change regime*. London: Routledge.
- Dimitrov, R. S. (2016). The Paris Agreement on climate change: Behind closed doors. *Global Environmental Politics*, 16(3), 1-11.
- Dolowitz, D. P., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making. *Governance*, 13(1), 5-23.
- Dombrowski, K. (2010). Filling the gap? An analysis of non-governmental organizations responses to participation and representation deficits in global climate governance. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 10(4), 397-416.
- Downie, C. (2014a). *The politics of climate change negotiations: Strategies and variables in prolonged international negotiations*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Downie, C. (2014b). Transnational actors in environmental politics: Strategies and influence in long negotiations. *Environmental Politics*, 23(3), 376-394.
- Drezner, D. W. (2008). *All politics is global: Explaining international regulatory regimes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Duwe, M. (2001). The Climate Action Network: A glance behind the curtains of a transnational NGO network. *Review of European, Comparative & International*

- Environmental Law*, 10(2), 177-189.
- Eccleston, B. (2005). Does North-South collaboration enhance NGO influence on deforestation policies in Malaysia and Indonesia?. In *NGOs and environmental policies* (pp. 71-92). London: Routledge.
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58.
- Finger, M. (1994). NGOs and transformation: Beyond social movement theory. In T. Princen and M. Finger (Eds.), *Environmental NGOs in world politics: Linking the local and the global* (pp. 48-68). London: Routledge.
- Finnemore, M. (1996a). *National interests in international society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Finnemore, M. (1996b). Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism. *International Organization*, 50(2), 325-347.
- Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917.
- Fisher, D. R. (2010). COP-15 in Copenhagen: How the merging of movements left civil society out in the cold. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10(2), 11-17.
- Florini, A. (1996). The evolution of international norms. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3), 363-389.
- Fox, J. (2010). Coalitions and networks. *International encyclopedia of civil society*, 486-492.
- Friedman, L. (2019, November 4). Trump serves notice to quit Paris Agreement. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreement-climate.html>
- Friedrich, J., Ge, M., & Pickens, A. (2017, April 11). This interactive chart explains world's top 10 emitters, and how they've changed. *The World Resources Institute*. Retrieved from <https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chart-explains-worlds-top-10-emitters-and-how-theyve-changed>
- Fritze J. and Wiseman J. (2009) Climate justice: Key debates, goals and strategies. In Moss, J. (Ed.) *Climate change and social justice* (pp. 187-211). Melbourne:

Melbourne University Press.

Garman, J. (2009, December 20). Joss Garman: Copenhagen – Historic failure that will live in infamy. *Independent*. Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joss-garman-copenhagen-historic-failure-that-will-live-in-infamy-1845907.html>

Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice. (2015). Fight for climate justice!. Retrieved from <https://demandclimatejustice.org/fight-for-climate-justice/>

Global Carbon Project. (2018, December 5). Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rise again in 2018 according to latest data [Press release]. Retrieved from [https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/18/files/Norway\\_CICERO\\_GC PBudget2018.pdf](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/18/files/Norway_CICERO_GC PBudget2018.pdf)

Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. (1992). Toward a theory of international norms: Some conceptual and measurement issues. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(4), 634-664.

Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. Harvard University Press.

Gulbrandsen, L. H., & Andresen, S. (2004). NGO influence in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, flexibility mechanisms, and sinks. *Global Environmental Politics*, 4(4), 54-75.

Hadden, J. (2014). Explaining variation in transnational climate change activism: The role of inter-movement spillover. *Global Environmental Politics*, 14(2), 7-25.

Hadden, J. (2015). *Networks in contention: The divisive politics of climate change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hajer, M. A. (1995). *The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hale, T. (2016). “All hands on deck”: The Paris Agreement and nonstate climate action. *Global Environmental Politics*, 16(3), 12-22.

Hanegraaff, M. (2015). Interest groups at transnational negotiation conferences: Goals, strategies, interactions, and influence. *Global Governance*, 21, 599.

Humphreys, D. (2004). Redefining the issues: NGO influence on international forest negotiations. *Global Environmental Politics*, 4(2), 51-74.

Ikeme, J. (2003). Equity, environmental justice and sustainability: incomplete

- approaches in climate change politics. *Global Environmental Change*, 13(3), 195-206.
- Ingebritsen, C. (2002). Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's role in world politics. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(1), 11-23.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2018). *Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty*. Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
- International Climate Justice Network. (2002, August 29). Bali principles of climate justice. Retrieved from <https://www.ejnet.org/ej/bali.pdf>
- Jacobs, M. (2016). High pressure for low emissions: How civil society created the Paris climate agreement. *Juncture*, 22(4), 314-323.
- Jamison, A. (2010). Climate change knowledge and social movement theory. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 1(6), 811-823.
- Jasanoff, S. (1997). NGOs and the environment: From knowledge to action. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(3), 579-594.
- Jinnah, S. (2011). Climate change bandwagoning: The impacts of strategic linkages on regime design, maintenance, and death. *Global Environmental Politics*, 11(3), 1-9.
- Jordan, L., & Van Tuijl, P. (2000). Political responsibility in transnational NGO advocacy. *World Development*, 28(12), 2051-2065.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (1996). Introduction. In *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics*. Columbia University Press.
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Khagram, S., Riker, J. V., & Sikkink, K. (2002). From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational advocacy groups restructuring world politics. In S. Khagram, J.V. Riker, & K. Sikkink (Eds.), *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms* (pp. 3-23). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Kingdon, J. W. (2011). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies* (Second edition). Glenview, IL: Pearson Education Inc.
- Klotz, A. (1999). *Norms in international relations: The struggle against apartheid*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kneebone, S. (2016). Comparative regional protection frameworks for refugees: norms and norm entrepreneurs. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 20(2), 153-172.
- Knox, J. H. (2013). Mapping human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment: Individual report on global and regional environmental agreements. United Nations: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from <http://ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/MappingReport.asp>
- x
- Koivurova, T., Duyck, S., & Heinämäki, L. (2013). Climate change and human rights. *Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice*, 21, 287-325.
- Kratochwil, F., & Ruggie, J. G. (1986). International organization: A state of the art on an art of the state. *International Organization*, 40(4), 753-775.
- Kriebel, D., Tickner, J., Epstein, P., Lemons, J., Levins, R., Loechler, E.L., Quinn, M., Rudel, R., Schettler, T. & Stoto, M. (2001). The precautionary principle in environmental science. *Environmental Health Perspectives*, 109(9), 871-876.
- Kriesi, H. (1996). The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 152-184.
- Krook, M. L., & True, J. (2012). Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(1), 103-127.
- Kuchler, M. (2017). The human rights turn: ENGOs' changing tactics in the quest for a more transparent, participatory and accountable CDM. *Environmental Politics*, 26(4), 648-668.
- Lövbrand, E., Hjerpe, M., & Linnér, B. O. (2017). Making climate governance global: How UN climate summitry comes to matter in a complex climate regime. *Environmental Politics*, 26(4), 580-599.



- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international political orders. *International Organization*, 52(4), 943-969.
- The Margarita Declaration on Climate Change. (2014 July 18). Retrieved from <http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/08/08/the-margarita-declaration-on-climate-change-we-reject-the-implementation-of-false-solutions-to-climate-change-such-as-carbon-markets-and-other-forms-of-privatization-and-commodification-of-life/>
- Martin, A. (2013). Global environmental in/justice, in practice: Introduction. *The Geographical Journal*, 179(2), 98-104.
- Mary Robinson Foundation. (2017, May 24). Principles of climate justice. Retrieved from <https://www.mrfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Principles-of-Climate-Justice.pdf>
- Matsumoto, Y. (2010). 異なる問題領域における非政府組織（NGO）の役割. 新澤秀則 編著. 『温暖化防止のガバナンス』. ミネルヴァ書房, 185-212.
- Mayer, B. (2016). Human rights in the Paris Agreement. *Climate Law*, 6(1-2), 109-117.
- McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., Zald, M. N., & Mayer, N. Z. (Eds.). (1996). *Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McGregor, I. M. (2011). Disenfranchisement of countries and civil society at COP-15 in Copenhagen. *Global Environmental Politics*, 11(1), 1-7.
- Mehta, L., Allouche, J., Nicol, A., & Walnycki, A. (2014). Global environmental justice and the right to water: the case of peri-urban Cochabamba and Delhi. *Geoforum*, 54, 158-166.
- Mintrom, M., & Vergari, S. (1996). Advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, and policy change. *Policy Studies Journal*, 24(3), 420-434.
- Moss, J. (2009) Climate justice. In *Climate change and social justice* (pp. 51-66). Melbourne University Press.
- Murdie, A., & Davis, D. R. (2012). Looking in the mirror: Comparing INGO networks across issue areas. *The Review of International Organizations*, 7(2), 177-202.
- Nadelmann, E. A. (1990). Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society. *International Organization*, 44(4), 479-526.

- Nelson, P. J. (1997). Conflict, legitimacy, and effectiveness: Who speaks for whom in transnational NGO networks lobbying the World Bank?. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 26(4), 421-441.
- Newell, P. (2000). *Climate for change: Non-state actors and the global politics of the greenhouse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Newell, P. (2005). Race, class and the global politics of environmental inequality. *Global Environmental Politics*, 5(3), 70-94.
- Nicholson, S., & Chong, D. (2011). Jumping on the human rights bandwagon: How rights-based linkages can refocus climate politics. *Global Environmental Politics*, 11(3), 121-136.
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014a). Mapping human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment: Focus report on human rights and climate change. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/MappingReport.aspx>
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014b). A new climate change agreement must include human rights protections for all. Retrieved from [www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/SP\\_To\\_UNFCCC.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/SP_To_UNFCCC.pdf)
- Ohanyan, A. (2012). Network institutionalism and NGO studies. *International Studies Perspectives*, 13(4), 366-389.
- Ohanyan, A. (2015). Network institutionalism: A new synthesis for NGO studies. In W.E. DeMars & D. Dijkzeul (Eds.), *The NGO challenge for international relations theory* (pp. 102-124). London: Routledge.
- Okereke, C. (2006). Global environmental sustainability: Intragenerational equity and conceptions of justice in multilateral environmental regimes. *Geoforum*, 37(5), 725-738.
- Okereke, C. (2008). *Global justice and neoliberal environmental governance: Ethics, sustainable development and international co-operation*. London: Routledge.
- Okereke, C. (2010). Climate justice and the international regime. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 1(3), 462-474.

- Page, E. A. (2008). Distributing the burdens of climate change. *Environmental Politics*, 17(4), 556-575.
- Parks, B. C., & Roberts, J. T. (2006). Environmental and ecological justice. In M. Betsill, K. Hochstetler, & D. Stevis (Eds.), *Palgrave advances in international environmental politics* (pp. 329-360). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Parks, B. C., & Roberts, J. T. (2010). Climate change, social theory and justice. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 27(2-3), 134-166.
- Payne, R. A. (2001). Persuasion, frames and norm construction. *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(1), 37-61.
- Peltier, E. (2019, November 2). U.K. halts fracking in England, citing quake concerns. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/world/europe/uk-fracking.html>
- Peoples Agreement. (2010, April 22). World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. Retrieved from <https://pwccc.wordpress.com/support>
- Pottier, A. A., Méjean, O., Godard, J-C. (2017). A survey of global climate justice: From negotiation stances to moral stakes and back. *International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics* 11(1), 1-53.
- Price, R. (1998). Reversing the gun sights: transnational civil society targets land mines. *International Organization*, 52(3), 613-644.
- Princen, T. (1994). NGOs: Creating a niche in environmental diplomacy. In T. Princen and M. Finger (Eds.), *Environmental NGOs in world politics: Linking the local and the global* (pp. 29-47). London: Routledge.
- Princen, T. & Finger, M. (1994). Introduction. In T. Princen and M. Finger (Eds.), *Environmental NGOs in world politics: Linking the local and the global* (pp. 1-28). London: Routledge.
- Princen, T., Finger, M., & Manno, J. (1995). Nongovernmental organizations in world environmental politics. *International Environmental Affairs*, 7, 42-58.
- Ramakrishna, K. (2000). The UNFCCC—history and evolution of the climate change negotiations. In *Climate change and development*. New Haven, CT: Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 47-62.

- Rapp, T., Schwägerl, C., & Traufetter, G. (2010, May 5). The Copenhagen Protocol: How China and India sabotaged the UN climate summit. *Spiegel Online*. Retrieved from <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-copenhagen-protocol-how-china-and-india-sabotaged-the-un-climate-summit-a-692861.html>
- Raustiala, K. (2001). Nonstate actors in the global climate regime. In U. Luterbacher & D. F. Sprinz (Eds.), *International relations and global climate change* (pp. 95-118). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rawls, J. (2009). *A theory of justice: Revised edition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Raymond, G. A. (1997). Neutrality norms and the balance of power. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32(2), 123-146.
- Reitan, R., & Gibson, S. (2012). Climate change or social change? Environmental and leftist praxis and participatory action research. *Globalizations*, 9(3), 395-410.
- Rietig, K. (2011). Public pressure versus lobbying—how do Environmental NGOs matter most in climate negotiations?. *Center for Climate Change Economics and Policy*. Retrieved from [http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP70\\_environmental-NGOs-climate.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP70_environmental-NGOs-climate.pdf)
- Ritchie, H., & Roser, M. (2018). CO<sub>2</sub> and Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Our World in Data. Retrieved from <https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions>
- Roberts, J. T., & Parks, B. C. (2006). *A climate of injustice: Global inequality, north-south politics, and climate policy*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT press.
- Roberts, J. T., & Parks, B. C. (2007). Fueling injustice: globalization, ecologically unequal exchange and climate change. *Globalizations*, 4(2), 193-210.
- Rohrschneider, R., & Dalton, R. J. (2002). A global network? Transnational cooperation among environmental groups. *Journal of Politics*, 64(2), 510-533.
- Routledge, P. (2011). Translocal climate justice solidarities. In J. Dryzek, R. Norgaard & D. Schlosberg (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of climate change and society* (pp. 384–398). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Ruggie, J. G. (1998). *Constructing the world polity: Essays on international institutionalisation*. London: Routledge.
- Savaresi, A. (2016). The Paris Agreement: A new beginning?. *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law*, 34(1), 16-26.
- Schlosberg, D. (2004). Reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories. *Environmental Politics*, 13(3), 517-540.
- Schlosberg, D. (2013). Theorising environmental justice: The expanding sphere of a discourse. *Environmental Politics*, 22(1), 37-55.
- Schlosberg, D., & Collins, L. B. (2014). From environmental to climate justice: Climate change and the discourse of environmental justice. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 5(3), 359-374.
- Schneider, M., & Teske, P. (1992). Toward a theory of the political entrepreneur: evidence from local government. *American Political Science Review*, 86(3), 737-747.
- Setzer, J., & Byrnes, R. (2019). Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot. London. Retrieved from [http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GRI\\_Global-trends-in-climate-change-litigation-2019-snapshot-2.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GRI_Global-trends-in-climate-change-litigation-2019-snapshot-2.pdf)
- Sikkink, K. (2002). Restructuring world politics: The limits and asymmetries of soft power. In S. Khagram, J.V. Riker, & K. Sikkink (Eds.), *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms* (pp. 301-318). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sikor, T., & Newell, P. (2014). Globalizing environmental justice?. *Geoforum*, 54, 151-157.
- Smith, H. A. (2007). Disrupting the global discourse of climate change: The case of indigenous voices. In M. Pettinger (Ed.) *The social construction of climate change: power, knowledge, norms, discourses* (pp. 197-215). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. *International Social Movement Research*, 1(1), 197-217.
- Stone, D. A. (1989). Causal stories and the formation of policy agendas. *Political Science Quarterly*, 104(2), 281-300.
- Sunstein, C. R. (1997). *Free markets and social justice*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University

Press.

Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 273-286.

System change – not climate change: A people’s declaration from Klimaforum09.

(2009). Retrieved from [http://klimaforum.org/declaration\\_english.pdf](http://klimaforum.org/declaration_english.pdf)

Tabimasmass, C.S. (2017). Statement at the High-Level Segment of the 23rd Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Retrieved from

[http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn\\_nov\\_2017/statements/application/pdf/vanuatu\\_cop23cmp13cma1-2\\_hls.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_nov_2017/statements/application/pdf/vanuatu_cop23cmp13cma1-2_hls.pdf)

Tickner, J. A., Raffensperger, C., & Myers, N. (1999). *The precautionary principle in action: A handbook*. Windsor, North Dakota: Science and Environmental Health Network.

United Nations. (1972). Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment.

UN Doc. A./CONF. 48/14/Rev.1. Stockholm: United Nations, General Assembly.

United Nations. (1992). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

New York: United Nations, General Assembly.

United Nations Environment Programme. (2015). Climate change and human rights.

Retrieved from

<https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/report/climate-change-and-human-rights>

United Nations Environment Programme. (2019, March 13). 3-5°C temperature rise is now ‘locked-in’ for the Arctic [Press release]. Retrieved from

<https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-release/temperature-rise-locked-coming-decades-arctic>

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (n.d.a). Admitted NGOs.

Retrieved from

<https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/admitted-ngos>

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (n.d.b). Non-governmental organization constituencies. Retrieved from

[https://unfccc.int/files/parties\\_and\\_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituencies\\_an](https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituencies_an)

d\_you.pdf

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (n.d.c). Parties & observers.

Retrieved from <https://unfccc.int/parties-observers>

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (1995). Report of the Conference of the Parties, on its first session, held at Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1. Berlin: United Nations, UNFCCC.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (1997). Kyoto protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change. Kyoto: United Nations.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2008). Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1. Bali: United Nations, UNFCCC.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2011). Fact sheet: The Kyoto Protocol. Retrieved from [https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact\\_sheet\\_the\\_kyoto\\_protocol.pdf](https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact_sheet_the_kyoto_protocol.pdf)

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2012a). Decision 23/CP.18. Promoting gender balance and improving the participation of women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in bodies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.3. Doha: United Nations, UNFCCC.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2012b). Promoting Gender equality and improving the participation of women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in bodies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol: Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.36. Doha: United Nations, UNFCCC.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2014). Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its nineteenth session. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013. Warsaw: United Nations, UNFCCC.

- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2016a). Decisions adopted by the conference of the parties. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015. Paris: United Nations, UNFCCC.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2016b). Paris agreement. Paris: United Nations.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2019a). Conference of the Parties (COP). Retrieved from <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop>
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2019b). Introduction to the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP). Retrieved from <https://unfccc.int/10475>
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2019c). The Kyoto Protocol - Status of Ratification. Retrieved from <https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/status-of-ratification>
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2019d). Status of Ratification of the Convention. Retrieved from <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/status-of-ratification/status-of-ratification-of-the-convention>
- Vidal, J. (2009, December 19). Rich and poor countries blame each other for failure of Copenhagen. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/19/copenhagen-blame-game>
- Vidal, J., Stratton, A., & Goldenberg, S. (2009, December 19). Low targets, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal>
- Vogler, J. (2016). *Climate change in world politics*. New York: Springer.
- Walker, G. (2009). Beyond distribution and proximity: Exploring the multiple spatialities of environmental justice. *Antipode*, 41(4), 614-636.
- Wapner, P. (1995). Politics beyond the state: Environmental activism and world civic politics. *World Politics*, 47(3), 311-340.
- Wapner, P. (1996). *Environmental activism and world civic politics*. Albany, NY: State



University of New York Press.

- Wapner, P. (2002). Horizontal politics: Transnational environmental activism and global cultural change. *Global Environmental Politics*, 2(2), 37-62.
- Wexler, L. (2003). The international deployment of shame, second-best responses, and norm entrepreneurship: The campaign to ban landmines and the landmine ban treaty. *Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law*, 20(3), 561-606.
- White, A. (2009, December 10). The movement of movements: From resistance to climate justice. *Common Dreams*. Retrieved from <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2009/12/10/movement-movements-resistance-climate-justice>
- Wiener, A. (2009). Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international relations. *Review of International Studies*, 35(1), 175-193.
- Williams, M., & Ford, L. (1999). The World Trade Organisation, social movements and global environmental management. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 268-289.
- Yanacopulos, H. (2005). The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence. *Global Networks*, 5(1), 93-110.