

## A City of One: Desire and Isolation

Mark Weeks

The 1990s in America are often recalled as a boom time, and even as a kind of paradise lost. Yet we know that such recollection does not bear close scrutiny. Haynes Johnson, for example, in a history of the Clinton era, notes of the time that “(d)espite their blessings, Americans increasingly felt something was wrong with their society.”<sup>1</sup> Writing of a spate of American movies portraying social discontent at the end of the century, Gary Johnson writes that such films reveal “a certain hollowness has taken root and spread like cancer throughout suburbia. The American Dream has turned rotten. People are unsatisfied with their lives but they have trouble articulating that dissatisfaction.”<sup>2</sup> Taking these observations as my starting point, the challenge I have set myself here is simple: to make a very small contribution to the articulation of that somewhat nebulous sense of dissatisfaction, by which I mean not to enumerate symptoms but to attempt to clarify the malaise, and more than this, to examine why there is this problem of articulation.

Though mine is not at all a Marxist analysis, I will begin by briefly presenting some of the socio-economic aspects of the situation, since the tendency to underplay these in existential “quality of life” discussions has, I think, contributed to the aforementioned problem of diagnosis and articulation. An important issue that emerges from this is the role of the deterioration of labor power and of leftist political collectivism in general in undermining the economic security and well-being of a large swathe of

the population. That issue of declining collective participation leads, by implication, to the question of the growing isolation of citizens in the cities and towns of America. It was no accident, for instance, that a rather dry academic text published in 2000 called *Bowling Alone*, a study of the disintegration of community in the United States, should have become a bestseller: “In 1992 three-quarters of the US workforce said that ‘the breakdown of community’ and ‘selfishness’ were ‘serious’ or ‘extremely serious’ problems in America.”<sup>3</sup> Yet Putnam’s work, while superb in its description, is rather vague on causality. So, in part to address that point, I want to advance an explicatory thesis concerning the evident de-socialization in terms of just one particular cultural determinant... not the only one, of course, but one I think may be deceptively important. It is this: Ironically, the isolation of citizens in the modern advanced capitalist state, but perhaps particularly in America, is facilitated, and even driven, by the intense privilege accorded the notion of desire, which includes but is by no means limited to the various discourses of sex. I want, then, to sketch an outline of the ascendancy of the *myth* of desire over the latter decades of the twentieth century, to explore (albeit too briefly, given the limited space I have here) its ideological adaptations, and thereby to shed a little more light, from just one angle, on that apparent millennial discontent.

### **Economic Woes**

It is clear enough that work had become in the final decades of the twentieth century an increasingly invasive and hostile aspect of life. Linda McDowell would even describe it as “the dominant but unresolved question at the end of the twentieth century.”<sup>4</sup> The popular success at this time of another academic text, *The Overworked American*, by Harvard University Economist Juliet B. Schor, indicated the level of anxiety in the community around the subject. Like Putnam’s book, it provided a vast

array of statistical support for what people were feeling, data such as the report that since 1973 the amount of free time for the average American had fallen by 40% (p.22), that the American of the late twentieth century was probably working more than the laborer of 13th or 14th century Europe (45), that advanced economies in France and Germany had rocketed ahead of the United States in terms of progressively reducing the working week and ensuring generous annual paid leave (82).<sup>5</sup> At the same time, income distribution through the nineties, as in most advanced capitalist societies, was continuing to skew further and further towards the wealthy, with a “vastly widening gap between the ranks of the very rich and the very poor, while those in the middle were struggling merely to maintain their position.”<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, although unemployment was reduced during the economic boom of the 1990s, work was becoming far less secure. As observed by Edward Luttwak, there was around this time an increasing reliance by corporations upon the euphemistically named “downsizing”, retrenchment of workers in order to achieve short-term cost cutting that helped produce acceptable corporate ledgers during a business trough.<sup>7</sup> As Jack Boozer remarks, “the affluent consumer society based in the notion of endless corporate expansion and conglomeration was not eliminating serious social problems but showing a tendency rather to constantly create them.”<sup>8</sup> Among other things, the workplace, given its constant flux and general instability, could no longer provide a secure foundation upon which to build community or define one’s self.

By the end of the century, labor-centered political leftism had been in decline for some time, tipping the balance of power clearly toward employers.<sup>9</sup> Some have blamed the Reagan administration’s antipathy towards workplace collectives, but while this may be in part true, David Frum notes that the number of new union members was already in decline in the 1970s.<sup>10</sup> This would seem to be supported by Putnam, who remarks a 62% decline in membership since 1953, with a nosedive beginning in the mid-1970s. The movement of work away from traditional, heavily

unionized blue-collar labor is implicated here, but again that is not a sufficient cause for such a drastic shift. Significantly, Putnam cites a comprehensive study concluding that “virtually all the decline in unionization between 1977 and 1991 seems to be due to decline in the demand for union representation.”<sup>11</sup> This is to say, people didn’t *desire* to join unions; they were busy desiring other things. Along the same line, Schulman observes that Reagan garnered a considerable degree of popular support for his anti-unionism and other of his neo-liberal economic campaigns. From his perspective, “Reagan did not so much change the nation’s mind as his views expressed an ongoing trend... a privatization of everyday life. Americans deserted parks for private health clubs, abandoned town squares for shopping malls, enrolled their children in private schools, and moved into gated communities governed by neighborhood associations and policed by private security patrols.”<sup>12</sup> It appears, then, that the privatization of work through the decline of collective labor organizations was part, though arguably a central pillar, of a more general privatization of American lives.

### **Journey to the Centre of the Self**

In a neo-liberal economic environment the answers to problems must ultimately lie with the individual, and this is probably nowhere as true as in the United States workplace, where, as Luttwak observes, to seek redress through organized labor or any kind of “socialist” institution is increasingly perceived as an unacceptable admission of personal inadequacy.<sup>13</sup> Examining how such assumptions, especially in the absence of viable alternatives, affect employees, Jerry Seidler describes the process whereby very material issues, those relating to work conditions, for example, are turned inwards:

He might be lead to think ‘why is it that I always frustrate myself, end up in jobs that I find frustrating?’ The accompanying liberal assumption is that, ‘because we have free choice, we never have to stay in situations we don’t want to be in.’ This ‘freedom’ has been drummed into him, ever since he was a small boy. This is partly what makes him think that his unhappiness and frustration say something about the kind of person he is, rather than anything about the situation at work.<sup>14</sup>

We see operating here not just a deflection of potential criticisms away from the employer, but also an intensified concern with self-analysis, reflecting what Nicole Matthews has identified in the contemporary cultural scene as the neo-liberal assumption that “the *self* is the focus of one’s endeavors or work, rather than some outside object of interest.”<sup>15</sup> The rise over the past two decades of the “self-help” market of books, lecture tours, workshops and retreats, as “emblems of an attitude, signs of a willingness to think about inner truths”, epitomizes capitalism’s genius for driving critique inwards, not simply through workplace coercion (e.g. constant employee self-assessment) but also through particular types of therapeutic consumption—“explanation is resumed to interiority, to psychological disposition rather than social subjectivity”—and at the same time colonizing, through the “commercialization of the individual”,<sup>16</sup> even that last bastion of freedom, the mysterious inner-frontier of the self.

In the parallel universe of the intellectual marketplace the “Baudrillardian” cosmos has quickly become soiled goods, but Baudrillard, who struggled from the early years to establish his own relationship with traditional Marxist “otherness,” has produced important insights here. Firstly, there is his description of how capitalism’s hyperdynamic “insubstantiality” dissipates opposition: “Marx simply did not foresee that it would be possible for capital, in the face of the imminent threat to its existence, to transpoliticize itself as it were: to launch itself into an orbit beyond the relations of production and political contradictions.”<sup>17</sup>

If there is a single trope forming the hub of this capitalist

transcendence of the political, I want to suggest, it is the concept, the image, the myth of Desire. Malcolm Bowie claims desire is “the cosmological principle of our secular age.”<sup>18</sup> And Freud, he argues, is the primary modern prophet of that new religion, firstly by bringing the individual self to the center of the intellectual quest for truth, then by elaborating a complex definition of the self in terms of libidinal energies. Unconscious sexual desire, as apparently the most intense, universal, primal and yet pleasurable of desires would be the centerpiece of that psychic topology, the energy that held the system together even as it threatened to blow it apart. Bowie, like many literary critics over the past four decades, reads Freud above all as a writer, a mythologist, and it is worth noting that Baudrillard likewise views the Freudian unconscious as a narrative construct, “the last ambitious attempt to fabricate secrets in a society without secrets.”<sup>19</sup>

The associated narrative pleasure of self-discovery is one which clearly informs the contemporary self-help mindset: “self-help, like Freudianism, likes nothing better than a good story.”<sup>20</sup> That Freud’s tales explored the world of sex made them even more pleasurable, and in part for that reason, more effective. Miller and McHoul, drawing on Foucault’s assertion that “people are told that the secret of their truth lies in the region of their sex,”<sup>21</sup> are thus able to remark today a unique obsession with “analyzing and provoking sexualized interpretations of conduct as a means of discovering ‘truth’.”<sup>22</sup>

It is not necessarily that sex is presented as the answer, according to this view, but that sexual desire is offered as a privileged route of discovery. Of course, this is not to say that all Americans subscribe to that view, since there is a substantial religious right that would vehemently object (though, as Foucault points out, loud and repeated disavowal of sexual freedoms has historically been an important component in perpetuating and reinforcing sex as discourse); but there is little doubting its significance in the era of *Sex and the City* and *Mars and Venus in the Bedroom*. And there can be little doubt that this “obsession” has been

instrumental in seducing workers—even as they have been demonstrably pressured by certain capitalist imperatives—away from a community of resistance to increasingly private acquiescence.

### Switching on the Desire Machine

It is very important that the sexual manifestation of the desire myth has broadly pervaded the culture because it is this that has made it so powerful. Herbert Marcuse's book *Eros and Civilization* (1956), a work attempting to synthesize the thought of Marx and Freud, for example, had an enormous intellectual impact on the so-called counterculture of the 1960s, which defined itself in opposition to capitalist hegemony. A member of the Frankfurt School of social philosophers, Marcuse sought to establish consonances between the private and political unconscious, to see the mind as internalizing, and thus replicating social, political and economic structures... and vice versa.

Freud had deployed nineteenth century thermodynamics in developing an elaborate psychic topology that depended on an ergo-economic model of compression and release. In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, he had presented what is often regarded as a pessimistic view of society, based on his "reality principle", in which the libidinal energies of the individual psyche must be tightly restrained and channeled (a forced containment of energy that would inevitably cause a degree of unhappiness for the desiring subject) in order to serve the greater good of the community. On the other hand, and crudely put, the popular interpretation of writers such as Marcuse was that the taps needed to be opened to allow a free flow of energies, that what another important writer of the 1960s, Philip Rieff, conceptualized as a stoic "virtuoso of the self" in a "democracy of the sick" needed to be replaced by a healthy, a happily optimistic, transpersonal flow of energies.<sup>23</sup> The potential attributed to sexual freedom and the "erotic-aesthetic"—which is clearly still present in

various inscriptions of the “healthy” sexualized self today - was built to a more or less degree on this apparently liberating thermodynamics of desire and repression

A radical position in relation to labor was derived from this libidinal worldview. Since work epitomized the pessimistic notion of sublimation, the “necessary” dominance of the reality principle, the very concept of work (as opposed to battles *within* the workplace) became an area of conflict. This would become an important element of the counterculture, and one which distinguished it from conventional leftism. That difference is epitomized in the proclamation of Yippy leader Jerry Rubin: “The left demands full employment for all—we demand full unemployment for all.”<sup>24</sup> More than to simply wrest control of the machinery of production as traditional Socialism, even in its contemporary manifestation in the New Left, sought, the aim was to undermine the privileged role granted work in the definition of selves and the construction of society under capitalism. The central challenge to that traditional privilege of work in both capitalism and Marxism was the notion of non-deferred pleasure, the immediate gratification of desires, and so it was natural that sex should have become such a battleground at that time and throughout the ensuing “culture wars” that continue to rage in the United States.

One problem that emerged with this attempt at radical ontological reorientation, however, was that the political machinery itself necessitated a kind of work and was intimately bound up with the institutions of labor, so that political action, at least in a conventional sense, was itself seen as a legitimate target by what some called the “libidinal left”. On the other hand, in recently reflecting on this period, Hardt and Negri, who in their book *Empire* advocate a kind of postmodern Marxism, see this as “completely political”, claiming “the ‘merely cultural’ experiments had very profound political and economic effects”<sup>25</sup>: “The enormous rise in the social wage (in terms of both working wages and welfare) during the period of crisis in the 1960s and 1970s resulted directly from the accumulation of social struggles, the terrain of non-work, the terrain of



life.”<sup>26</sup> Just as importantly, however, they claim that in the turmoil of this period “the production of new subjectivities opened the way for a powerful transformation of labor power.”<sup>27</sup>

Nevertheless, the authors are forced to confess that the present reality is something different: “Well, as we write this book and the twentieth century draws to a close, capitalism is miraculously healthy, its accumulation more robust than ever.”<sup>28</sup> The author’s optimism in the face of that economic reality is based in part on technology—the growth, lead by the United States, of computerized information networks—since they see this as constructing vast, non-localized communications and collectivizations of restless labor. They are looking at the computer, then, in a very different light to many workers beavering away in their cubicled office spaces today. The real difference in that regard is marked by what they see as the relentless operation of those desires unleashed in the 1960s *through* the new technological apparatus. They proceed from this to eventually argue that it is in these desire-centered subjectivities that the real potential of the masses lies: “The real power... is the limitless desire and activity of the multitude and its virtual communicative power,” and from there they even prophesy “a resistance that becomes love and community.”<sup>29</sup>

The answer, then, is not sex specifically, but the broader energy/desire of which sex might simply be seen as the most pleasurable, bodily area of expression. Again, the authors explicitly connect this to the 1960s.

For understanding the desire of the multitude we must thank the French philosophers [presumably Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault primarily] who reread Nietzsche beginning in the 1960s and began to put an end to traditional dialectics.... This was a new materialism which negated every transcendent power and constituted a radical change of spirit.<sup>30</sup>

Deleuze, most notably in his ontology of “desiring machines” (with Felix Guattari), and Derrida, through his conception of being as the relentless communicative desire of *différance*, certainly did have a positive, stimulating effect on the intellectual community (and I am considerably indebted to their insights myself). But it is useful to note at this point that Foucault, who is obviously alluded to here, though he wrote extensively about desires, explicitly distanced himself from the “*philosophies of desire*.” Foucault seemed to me to recognize an almost laughable irony in the ecstatic exhortations to desire by writers who insisted on the need to deconstruct and so disempower what Derrida called “transcendental signifieds” (Hardt and Negri use “transcendent power” above), since *Desire* itself had clearly assumed that very same mantle; in fact this was the necessary “rhetorical blindness,” as the philosopher of deconstruction Paul de Man would call it, underwriting a certain poststructuralist ecstasy of *jouissance*.

What makes this a little more than an intellectual joke is that desire was, and is, being projected as a countercultural force when, as I remarked earlier, the dominant culture itself was and is founded on much the same mythos. It is clearly with French poststructuralist “Desire”, and Derrida’s *différance* specifically, in mind that Kroker and Cook long ago noted, “The fascination of capitalism today is that it works the terrain of every kind of *différance*...,”<sup>31</sup> by which they mean consumer capitalism’s enormous capacity for generating and purporting to satisfy an exponentially increasing range of desires.

One problem here, as I see it, is that in order for desire to be projected as a privileged image or myth it must be purified, which necessitates a certain selective vision... seeing “Desire” as we *desire* to see it. Take, for example, the following line from *Empire*: “We... struggle because desire has no limit and (since the desire to exist and the desire to produce are one and the same thing) because life can be continuously, freely, and equally enjoyed and reproduced.”<sup>32</sup> Firstly, there is the notion of limitless, insatiable desire (common to Derrida and Deleuze), which, apart from

being a questionable assertion as a point of fact, sits neatly with consumption-driven capitalist growth economics. At the same time, the notion that “the desire to exist and the desire to produce are one and the same thing” is a dubious rhetorical conflation serving the authors’ Marxist, or post- or para-Marxist, requirement to define the self as labor and thereby to maintain the materialist dialectic (which leads them to describe even the most anti-labor elements of the 60s counterculture as “*worker attacks*”<sup>33</sup>).

While the attempt to refocus attention on the sphere of production is salutary, however, selves are not, whatever the authors might hope, defining *themselves* entirely as desiring producers, and almost certainly no more so than as desirous consumers. So, is *consuming* desire the wrong desire, false desire, the desiring equivalent of Marxist “false consciousness”... the “false *unconscious*”? My point is that though they exhort the reader to embrace the notion of a limitless desire, the “desire” they are referring to, and using rhetorically as a kind of transcendental signified, is an already limited desire, the desire to produce and reproduce, not the desire to consume. And it is for this reason, because they have by definition little buying power, that the poor—within America, but more importantly throughout the world—have a privileged place in the scheme of *Empire*: “Only the poor lives radically the actual and present being, in destitution and suffering, and thus only the poor has the ability to renew being.”<sup>34</sup> Desiring only to survive, to produce a sufficiency, their desire is therefore pure, “the divinity of the multitude.”<sup>35</sup> Of course, even the desire of the poor is being curtailed by this sanctification, as if the poor could not also desire to desire more, to indulge the pleasures of consumption.

The poor are “divine” because their self is defined by its work and this makes them a “multitude”, or, in other words, a collective, social being. If work represents, to use Freud, the “reality principle” of delayed gratification and displaced desires, it by implication also means desire for the “other” who seduces us into the interactions and deferrals of workaday reality. It is in that assumption, implicit in *Empire*’s assertion that the

privileged kind of desire is above all, and endlessly, productive, that a large majority of Americans are condemned. For it is there that the evil *doppelgänger* of good, productive desire is seen to reside (and a kind of dialectics returns): the realm of consuming desire, which always threatens to corrupt—often through the very same technology that Hardt and Negri see as a revolutionary tool (global communications networks)—the pure potential of the poor.

Since Hardt and Negri draw directly and indirectly upon Nietzsche, let me access the same source to indicate where this optimistic quasi-religion of desire reveals its self-sustaining circular logic. Nietzsche, himself very much an isolate, writes in *Beyond Good and Evil*, “Ultimately one love’s one’s desires and not that which is desired.”<sup>36</sup> In short, we desire the *pleasure* of desire, which makes us desire only more desire. This is the perpetual motion machine, and arguably the “real” psychology, that underlies the myth of limitless desire. Moreover, because the object is subordinated to the privileged desire itself, this desire’s trajectory, as Nietzsche contended consistently, is *away* from those others that would, in defining and defending themselves, establish limitations upon one’s desire. What’s more, there is considerable evidence that that is precisely the direction in which desire has been heading... which will shortly take us back, after this necessary detour through sex and desire, to the America of *Bowling Alone*.

### **Desire, Self-Obsession and Self-Effacement**

Hardt and Negri return repeatedly to the idea that from the 1960s the selves of “workers” undertook a transformation, the “production of subjectivity” from within, beyond modernist disciplinary strategies of power. This is, in a sense, wholly consistent with Matthews’ idea that the self is the object of work, as well as with the whole self-help philosophy of “self-growth.” But the very recurrence of the word “self” here (and

within such New Age discourses) represents a challenge to the contention in *Empire* that the new subjectivity is driven inevitably by desire towards “cooperation.”<sup>37</sup> What has become increasingly clear, I think, at least since Christopher Lasch published *The Culture of Narcissism* (1979) and *The Minimal Self* (1984), is that the desire myth has subordinated not only the object-other, but also the object-self. Think of the self, for instance, in the context of the transpersonal desire of Lyotard’s “Energumen Capitalism” of 1977.

...all is swept away... capitalism deculturalizes peoples, dehistoricizes their inscriptions, repeats them anywhere at all as long as they are marketable.... You can produce and consume everything, exchange, work or inscribe anything anyway [sic] you want if it comes through, if it flows, if it is metamorphozable. The *only* untouchable axiom bears on the condition of metamorphosis and transfer: exchange value.<sup>38</sup>

How does one locate, identify, construct selfhood in this context, given that the movement of “fast capitalism”<sup>39</sup> dissolves both the spatiality and duration implied by the term “context” itself? Lasch asserts that narcissism “signifies a loss of selfhood, not-self assertion. It refers to a self threatened with disintegration and by a sense of inner emptiness.”<sup>40</sup> Narcissism, then, may be an anxious attempt to *establish* a self in a world in which beings, along with objects, have been subordinated to desires. The culture of narcissism is driven by an anxiety, a terrifying sense that we *lack* a self, and a consequent desire to construct one. Thus, self-growth philosophies, for example, may be driven not so much by the desire *of* the self (for others) but the desire *for* a self (in itself) amid the flux. Capitalism’s genius, again, is to create the problem and sell purported solutions. The self-help marketplace is simply the most obvious example; consumption in general may have this same function of solidifying, concretizing, distinguishing the self - from buying crucifixes and tattoos through the recent obsession with the ownership of massive houses and SUVs.<sup>41</sup>

Suffice to say, these attempts must always fall short, exposing the logical obverse of limitless desire... the endless dissatisfaction that is part of that pervasive sense of discontent with which this essay began.

An alternative, minimalist response—which Lyotard briefly advocated and later recanted—is to give up self-permanency, to pleurably immerse oneself in the flow. I guess this is what Baudrillard means when he refers to a “refusal by overacceptance,”<sup>42</sup> a hyperdynamic surrender of a subject’s will to the sovereignty of free-floating desire. It is the “purer” form of the love of our desires, untainted by selves and others and releasing us from what Sartre had called “the hell of other people” along with the purgatory of the self. This is, of course, the ultimate liberation of the desire myth and confirmation of its absolute dominion, and so it represents no threat at all, as Lyotard later acknowledged, to the hegemony of capitalism. Yet this is not simply radical-chic postmodern theorizing, I should point out, but an identifiable contemporary reality. It is the driving force behind a good deal of ephemeral pleasure-based consumption. In fact, the ultimate expression of this free-floating desire might be the explosion of the pornography market over the past three decades... again, partly through the same technology that Hardt and Negri place so much faith in.

Either way, whether through the former desire *for* a self or through the latter desire to *lose* one’s self, the result is a victory of the cosmology of desire. Both are logical consequences of the deployment of the desire myth in the service of consumption-driven growth economics. My point is this: the privileging of the desire myth as a rhetorical instrument for *critiques* of capitalism, as we have seen over the past few decades and most recently in *Empire*, is fraught with problems. Not the least of these is that the assumption that the intensification and permeation of the myth would inevitably lead to a deeper and broader sense of community is to this point short on results. On the contrary, while the cosmology of desire has indeed become ubiquitous in late capitalist cultures and has achieved some liberalizing cultural successes, Putnam’s *Bowling Alone* and

innumerable other sources attest it has probably not created the durable cultural and political bonds of community. Furthermore, the discourses of desire may not have generated particularly useful critical tools, and may even have helped to render certain socioeconomic realities more opaque, more inarticulate than they need to be. Perhaps, by discussing desire myself here, by continuing the chatter around desire, I have merely continued to muddy the water. I can only say that has not been my aim. If there is cause for optimism, I think, it's that the very dependency of consumer capitalism upon the desire cosmology could be seen to imply a certain vulnerability, suggesting that continued exposures and deconstructions of that same myth could yet have important economic and cultural effects.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Haynes Johnson, *The Best of Times: America in the Clinton Years* (New York: Harcourt, 2001) 4.

<sup>2</sup> Gary Johnson <http://www.imagesjournal.com/issue08/reviews/americanbeauty/>

<sup>3</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2000) 25.

<sup>4</sup> Linda McDowell, *Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1997) 14.

<sup>5</sup> Juliet B. Schor, *The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure* (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

<sup>6</sup> Haynes Johnson, 5. See also page 465, and Schor, 12, 107.

<sup>7</sup> See Edward Luttwak, *Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> Excerpt from the book "Career Movies: American Business and the Success Myth," published in 2003 by University of Texas Press [cited 2 October 2002]. Available at [www.utexas.com](http://www.utexas.com): INTERNET.

<sup>9</sup> See Schor, *The Overworked American*, 9, 48, 74, 77, 126. See also Bruce J.

Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002) 111.

<sup>10</sup> David Frum, *How We Got Here: The 70's* (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 328.

<sup>11</sup> Henry S. Farber and Alan B. Krueger, "Union Membership in the United States: The Decline Continues," National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. W4216 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1992), 17-18. Quoted in Putnam, 82.

<sup>12</sup> Schulman, 246.

<sup>13</sup> Luttwak, 21.

<sup>14</sup> Jerry Seidler, *Recreating Sexual Politics: men feminism, and politics* (London: Routledge, 1991) 120.

<sup>15</sup> Nicole Matthews, *Comic Politics: Gender in Hollywood after the New Right* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) 81.

<sup>16</sup> Toby Miller and Alec McHoul, *Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (London: Sage, 1998) 100, 109, 110.

<sup>17</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil: Essay on Extreme Phenomena*, trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, 1993) 10.

<sup>18</sup> Malcolm Bowie, *Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 3.

<sup>19</sup> Jean Baudrillard, "On Seduction," in *Selected Writings* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 160.

<sup>20</sup> Miller, 115.

<sup>21</sup> Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon, 1980) 214.

<sup>22</sup> Miller, 104.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted in Richard King, *The Party of Eros: Radical Social Thought and the Realm of Freedom* (New York: Dell, 1972) 193.

<sup>24</sup> Jerry Rubin, *Do it!* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970) 86.

<sup>25</sup> Hardt, 262, 274.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 273.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 275.



<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 270.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 362.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 378.

<sup>31</sup> Arthur Kroker and David Cook, *The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics* (New York: St. Martin's, 1986) 20.

<sup>32</sup> Hardt, 349.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 262.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 157.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 157.

<sup>36</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) 88.

<sup>37</sup> See Hardt, 275.

<sup>38</sup> Jean-Francois Lyotard, in *Semiotext(e)* 2:3 (1977): 20.

<sup>39</sup> Ben Agger, *Fast Capitalism: A Critical Theory of Significance* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989).

<sup>40</sup> Christopher Lasch, *The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times* (New York: Norton, 1984) 57.

<sup>41</sup> See Haynes, 150-1.

<sup>42</sup> Baudrillard, "The Masses," in *Selected Writings*, 219.