

## Delimiter (*Avacchedaka*) in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy ( 1 )

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1. Navya-nyāya, the Nyāya school after the eleventh century A.D., frequently used the concept of relation in its philosophical analysis. Previously, Nyāya distinguished only two kinds of relation: contact (*saṃyoga*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Navya-nyāya, however, introduced the two new categories: self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha*) and identity (*tādātmya, abheda*). Self-linking relation, then, is further divided into many kinds.<sup>1)</sup> The structure of the Navya-nyāya system is built upon these four categories of relation.

The scholars of Navya-nyāya devised new concepts, 'describer' (*nirūpaka*) and 'delimiter' (*avacchedaka*), in order to identify the nature of a particular relation. Since the concept of 'describer' has been studied already,<sup>2)</sup> this paper attempts to analyze the concept of 'delimiter'. The latter concept, however, is closely concerned with the former concept. Precisely speaking, 'describer' serves its function of specifying the relation with the help of 'delimiter'. Hence, I will first discuss the concept of 'describer' to some extent.

2. In order to illustrate the notion of relation in Navya-nyāya, let us suppose a pot-maker (*kumbhakāra*) and a pot (*ghaṭa*) as two relata and see how Navya-nyāya describes the relation between them. It is possible to draw various relations between them, but here I am only concerned with that of causality. When a pot-maker produces a pot, he is the cause of the pot, and the pot is the effect of his production. There can be three ways of describing the relation between a pot-maker and a pot: (1) the relation between a pot-maker and a pot, (2) the relation of a pot-maker to a pot, and (3) the relation of a pot to a pot-maker. Relation (1) may be referred to by 'cause and effect relation' in English, while it is referred to by 'effect-cause-ness' (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) in Navya-nyāya. In Navya-nyāya, the term 'bhāva' in '*kāryakāraṇabhāva*' stands for 'tva' or 'tā', and '*kāryakāraṇabhāva*' can be divided into '*kāryabhāva*' and '*kāraṇabhāva*'.<sup>3)</sup> '*Kāryabhāva*' means causeness (*kāryatā*),

and '*kāraṇabhāva*' means effectness (*kāraṇatā*). Causeness is a property residing in a pot-maker who is the cause of a pot. Effectness is a property residing in a pot which is the effect of pot-maker's production. Therefore, 'cause-effect-ness' signifies a combination of causeness and effectness. Relation (1), thus, is expressed in terms of the two properties residing in the two different relata. Relation (2), the relation of a pot-maker to a pot, is referred to by 'is the cause of' in English, while it is referred to by 'effectness' (*kāryatā*) in Navya-nyāya. Effectness is a property residing in a pot which is the effect. Relation (3), the relation of a pot to a pot-maker, is referred to by 'causeness' (*kāraṇatā*) in Navya-nyāya. Thus, relations (2) and (3) are respectively expressed in terms of the properties residing in the two relata.

To differentiate the two relata, Navya-nyāya employs two concepts: counterrelatum (*pratiyogin*) and baserelatum (*anuyogin*). If the relation is that of  $x$  to  $y$  or if  $x$  is related to  $y$ ,  $x$  is a counterpositive, and  $y$  is a baserelatum. For instance, in case of the relation of a pot to a pot-maker called causeness, its counterrelatum is a pot, and its baserelatum is a pot-maker.

From the above example of the relation of a pot to a pot-maker, it may be observed that Navya-nyāya expresses the relation in terms of a property (e. g., causeness) residing in its baserelatum (e. g., a pot-maker<sup>4)</sup>). In Navya-nyāya, such a property is expressed by so-called a relative general term in modern Western logic plus the suffix '*tā*' or '*tva*'. Relative general terms such as '*kāraṇa*' (cause), '*kārya*' (effect), '*bhrātr*' (brather), and so forth are distinguished from absolute general terms like '*puruṣa*' (man), '*ghaṭa*' (pot), '*go*' (cow), and so forth. A relative general term applies to one of objects in pairs, i. e., an object with respect to another object. For instance, the term '*kāraṇa*' (cause) applies to a pot-maker in reference to a pot which is his product. An absolute general term, on the other hand, applies to an object in isolation. For example, the term '*puruṣa*' (man) applies to Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and so on without making reference to something else.<sup>5)</sup>

Now, a property such as the causeness residing in a pot-maker is a superstratum (*ādheya*) or an occurrent (*vṛttin*). The possessor of the property, e. g., a pot-maker, is a substratum (*ādhāra*) or a locus (*adhikaraṇa*). The connection between a property and its possessor can be illustrated as follows:




Figure 1

The rectangle X represents a property, and the rectangle Y represents its possessor. The line between X and Y indicates the relation between the entity denoted by X and the entity denoted by <sup>6)</sup>Y.

The relation indicated by the line may be a contact (*saṃyoga*), inherence (*samavāya*), or a self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha*).<sup>7)</sup> (1) The relation of contact is the physical connection between two substances (*dravya*) which can exist separately. For instance, when there is a pot on the ground, the pot exists on the ground through a contact. (2) The relation of inherence occurs between two entities which cannot exist separately.<sup>8)</sup> For example, when there is a blue pot, blue color exists in the pot through inherence. (3) A self-linking relation is that which is identical with one of its two relata.<sup>9)</sup> For instance, when there is a pot, this pot is considered to exist in time because the pot is retained for a certain period. In this case, Navya-nyāya regards the relation between the pot and time as time itself.

When a pot-maker is the cause of a pot, the connection among causeness, a pot-maker, and a pot can be illustrated as follows :




Figure 2<sup>10)</sup>

3. Now, as for the concept of 'describer', its example is as follows: the causeness residing in a pot-maker *described* by the effectness residing in a pot (*ghaṭaniṣṭha-*

*kāryatānirūpitakumbhakāraṇiṣṭhakāraṇatā*).<sup>11)</sup> The connection among a pot-maker, causeness, a pot, and effectness can be illustrated as follows:




Figure 3

The arrow of the double line indicates that the entity denoted by the rectangle rooted by the arrow is the describer and that the entity denoted by the rectangle to which the arrow points is the described.

In the above example, a pot-maker is the locus of causeness, and a pot is the locus of effectness. Hence, a pot-maker is the cause of a pot. In Navya-nyāya, the relation of a pot (i. e., effect) to a pot-maker (i. e., cause) is referred to as causeness. Causeness exists in one relatum, a pot-maker, while its describer, effectness, exists in another relatum, a pot. The describer indicates that one relatum of the relation designated as causeness is the locus of effectness. In other words, the describer indicates that its locus is the relatum of the relation. The specification of the relatum is one way to identify its relation. Thus, the describer (i. e., effectness) specifies the relation designated as causeness through fixing one relatum (i. e., a pot) which is not the locus of the described (*nirūpita*), or causeness in the above case.

But the describer does not precisely specify the relation, because the describer cannot determine the domain of the relatum which is the locus of itself. The describer (i. e., effectness) signifies that the relatum is the locus of effectness (i. e., effect) and not a pot. Furthermore, even if a pot is regarded as the relatum, it is not clear whether the relatum is one pot, some pots, or all pots. Unless the quantity of the referent of 'pot' is known, one cannot determine whether the relation connects a particular pot to a particular pot-maker, all pots to a particular pot-maker, or all pots to all pot-makers, and so forth. Similarly, it is necessary to determine the quantity of 'pot-maker' in order to specify the relation called causeness. To quantify

a relatum, the scholars of Navya-nyāya made use of the concept of 'delimiter'. This paper attempts to analyze how a delimiter can specify the quantity of a relatum and how a delimiter is connected with the entities relevant to itself.

4. The concept of 'delimiter' applies to (1) a property residing in a relatum and (2) the relation due to which some entity can be a relatum.<sup>12)</sup> The concept of the 'delimited' (*avacchinna*), which the concept of 'delimiter' prefigures, always applies to a property in a relatum where a delimiter of type (1) resides. The delimited is expressed in a relative general term plus its suffix 'tā' or 'tva'.<sup>13)</sup> A property expressed in such a term may be designated as 'relational abstract'.<sup>14)</sup> Some examples of relational abstracts are as follows: *kāraṇatā* (causeness), *kāryatā* (effectness), *pitṛtva* (fatherness), *sunutā* (sonness), *hetutā* (probansness), *sādhyatā* (probandumness) and so forth.

In order to see the function of (1) a delimiter, which is a property residing in a relatum, let us take the relation between a pot-maker and a pot (i. e., causeness or effectness) and assume that any pot is necessarily the product of some pot-maker. The property which enables an effect of the pot-maker's production to be a pot, residing in all pots, is potness (*ghaṭatva*).<sup>15)</sup> Effectness also resides in all pots, because they are the effect of pot-maker's production. Navya-nyāya regards potness to be the delimiter of effectness, *kāryatāvacchedaka*.<sup>16)</sup> The expression '*ghaṭatvam kāryatāvacchedakam*'<sup>17)</sup> can be divided into '*kāryatāyām avacchedakam ghaṭatvam*'.<sup>18)</sup> Potness (*ghaṭatva*) is supposed to demark the domain or locus wherein effectness (*kāryatā*) exists. Precisely speaking, potness restricts effectness to the locus of potness. In this sense, potness is called the delimiter of effectness, and it is a logical basis for affirming the existence of the effectness in the locus of potness. The connection among effectness, potness, and a pot can be illustrated as follows :




Figure 4

The arrow '→' is drawn from the rectangle denoting the delimiter to the rectangle denoting the delimited.

Not all properties residing in a pot can be the delimiters of effectness. A pot is a substance and is also composed of earth. It, therefore, possesses substanceness (*dravyatva*) and earthness (*pṛthivītvā*). Moreover, a pot has color (*rūpa*) and also possesses action (*karman*) when it turns on a lathe. The connection among effectness, potness, substanceness, earthness, color, action, and a pot can be illustrated as follows:




Figure 5

If substanceness is the delimiter of effectness, then time (*kāla*), space (*ākāśa*), etc. (the locus of substanceness) too will be the effect of pot-maker's production. This is because substanceness confines effectness within the locus of substanceness. Time, space, etc. in turn, possesses substanceness. It should be noticed that what possesses *x*-ness is *x*. If earthness is the delimiter of effectness, then flowers, animals, etc. will be the effect of pot-maker's production. This is because earthness restricts effectness to the locus of earthness and also because flowers etc. have earthness. If color or action is the delimiter of effectness, that which possesses color or action will be the effect of pot-maker's production. This is because color or action restricts effectness to the possessor of color or action. To say that substanceness, earthness, color, or action is the delimiter of effectness suggests that a pot-maker can produce that which he obviously cannot, such as time, space, etc. Therefore, none of these properties residing in a pot can be the delimiter of effectness.

If potness is the delimiter of effectness, all the loci of effectness will be the loci of potness. This is because potness confines effectness within the locus of potness. In other words, in accordance with the first assumption, all pots are the effect of

pot-maker's production. The relation between potness (i. e., the delimitor) and effectness (i. e., the delimited) can be regarded as follows: effectness exists only where potness exists. Therefore, the locus of effectness is that of potness. It can be induced from this example that the locus of the delimited is that of the delimitor.<sup>19)</sup> Let us call this formulation the first condition of the delimitor as a property.

If this is the sole condition in choosing the delimitor of effectness (among properties residing in a pot), a single property cannot be assigned to the delimitor. This is because various other properties may be ascribed as the delimitors to all pots. The locus (i. e., a pot) of one of those properties will be identical to the locus of effectness. Hence, this property, too, will be considered as the delimitor of effectness. For instance, a pot, due to its shape, can be referred to as that which possesses a neck resembling a conch etc. (*kambugrīvādimat.*). The 'state of possessing a neck resembling a conch etc.' (*kambugrīvādimattva*) attributed to a pot fulfills the first condition of the delimitor of effectness. This is because the state is attributed exclusively to all pots wherein effectness exists. Thus, there can be two delimitors of effectness: potness and the state of possessing a neck resembling a conch etc.<sup>20)</sup>

In fact, however, only one property can be regarded as the delimitor of effectness in a particular context. The criterion for choosing the delimitor depends upon the manner in which the object (the relatum) under discussion is recognized. This is to say that a delimitor is a property which allows one to recognize the object in a particular manner.<sup>21)</sup> From this point of view, the delimitor of effectness is potness alone and not the state of possessing a neck resembling a conch etc. It is because an entity, a pot, is recognized as a pot and not as that which possesses a neck resembling a conch etc. It is also because potness enables one to recognize the effect, in this case, of pot-maker's production as a pot.<sup>22)</sup> Moreover, the effect of pot-maker's production is not recognized as a substance, earthen product, the possessor of color and action, and so forth. Substanceness, earthness, color, action, and so forth, therefore, can never be the delimitors of effectness even in the present criterion. Let us name this criterion the second condition of the delimitor which is a property.

Thus, the delimitor of effectness, chosen under the second condition, restricts effectness to all pots. In other words, the delimitor of effectness indicates that all pots are the effect of pot-makers' production. It also clarifies the domain of one relatum (i. e., effect) of the relation between a pot-maker and a pot.

Just as potness is the delimiter of effectness, pot-maker-ness<sup>23)</sup> (*kumbhakāratva*) is the delimiter of the causeness (*kārṇatā*) residing in all pot-makers. As discussed before,<sup>24)</sup> causeness or effectness is described as the relation between the entire class of pot-makers and the entire class of pots. All pot-makers must be the relatum of those relations or the cause of pots. Hence, the pot-maker-ness residing in a pot-maker is a logical basis for affirming that causeness resides in a pot-maker. This is to say, the locus of causeness is the locus of pot-maker-ness. Thus, pot-maker-ness satisfies the first condition of a delimiter: the locus of the delimited must be that of the delimiter as well. Moreover, the cause of a pot is recognized as the possessor of pot-maker-ness, i. e., as a pot-maker. Thus, pot-maker-ness fulfills the second condition of a delimiter: the delimiter must enable one to recognize an entity in a certain manner, for instance, as a pot-maker. To say that pot-maker-ness is the delimiter of causeness suggests that all pot-makers are a relatum of the relation between 'pot-maker' and 'pot'. The connection among causeness, effectness, their delimiters, a pot-maker, and a pot can be illustrated as follows:




Figure 6<sup>25)</sup>

5. (2) The delimiter which applies to a relation will be explained hereafter. Such relation is of two kinds: (a) occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiniyāmaka*) and (b) non-occurrence-exacting (*vṛtṭyanīyāmaka*), which are the traditional categories of relation in Navya-nyāya. Any relation belongs to either of these two. An occurrence-exacting relation is that through which an entity can exist in or on another entity. For instance, when fire exists on the mountain, there is the relation of contact between fire and the mountain. Here, the relation is occurrence-exacting. A non-occurrence-exacting relation is that through which an entity cannot exist in or on another entity. For instance, when a man standing on the ground touches a tree with his hand, there exists the relation of contact between the man and the tree.



Here, the relation is non-occurrence-exacting, because the man does not exist on the tree through that relation.<sup>26)</sup> I shall deal with (a) and (b) in sections 5 and 6 respectively.

One can find a delimitor which is an occurrence-exacting relation, when the following inference is taken up: [the mountain] possesses fire, because [it possesses] smoke (*vahnimān dhūmāt*). Here, the probandum (*sādhyā*), or the entity whose existence is to be proved is fire, and the probans (*hetu*), or the reason is smoke. Since smoke is the entity possessed by the mountain, the existence of fire can be proved by the entity. Hence, the smokeness of smoke is a logical basis for affirming that probansness (*hetutā*) resides in smoke. At any rate, under any circumstances, smoke can serve to establish the existence of fire. It follows from this that the probansness of smoke always shares a locus with smokeness. Thus, smokeness fulfills the first condition of a delimitor: the locus of the delimited (probansness) must be the locus of the delimitor (smokeness). Moreover, in order for the entity rising on the mountain to prove the existence of fire there, the entity must be recognized as smoke. If this entity is recognized simply as black, it cannot prove the existence of fire on the mountain. It is not necessarily true that wherever a black thing exists, fire also exists. For instance, when we see a black cat, we do not necessarily see fire there with the cat. Therefore, smokeness fulfills the second condition of a delimitor: the delimitor must enable one to recognize an entity in a particular manner. Smokeness enables one to recognize the entity existing on the mountain as smoke, and this can prove the existence of fire. Thus, smokeness, satisfying those two conditions, is the delimitor of probansness.

According to the inference mentioned above, one can prove the existence of fire on the mountain, not only because the entity rising on the mountain is smoke but also because relation can be drawn between smoke and the mountain. If smoke and the mountain cannot be related with each other, smoke cannot be a valid probans.<sup>27)</sup> Hence, this relation which makes smoke the probans is also a logical basis for affirming that smoke is the probans (i. e., that smoke possesses probansness). The inferer considers the relation between smoke and the mountain as a contact and not as inherence and so on. If the inferer assumes that smoke and the mountain can only be related through inherence in the case of the above inference, then he cannot say that the smoke is rising from the mountain. It is because smoke

and the mountain cannot be connected by inherence in Navya-nyāya.<sup>28)</sup> From the point of view of this inferer, therefore, there is no smoke on the mountain. Thus, he cannot prove the existence of fire there. This is to say that if the inferer insists upon the relation of inherence between smoke and the mountain, smoke does not function as a probans. If he applies the notion of contact to the relation between smoke and the mountain, smoke functions as a probans, as explained above. In other words, a contact is a logical basis for affirming that there is probansness in smoke (i. e., that smoke is the probans).<sup>29)</sup> Therefore, the contact is the delimiter of probansness.

When, as in the above case, relation is a delimiter, it is referred to as a delimiting relation (*avacchedakasambandha*). When a property, like potness, is a delimiter, it is called a delimiting property (*avacchedakaharma*).<sup>30)</sup> Generally, 'delimiter' stands for a delimiting property.<sup>31)</sup> The connection among probansness, smokeness, smoke, and the mountain can be illustrated as follows :




Figure 7

A delimiting relation also demarks the domain of one relatum (e. g., probans). Let us take the relation (called probansness) of fire (the probandum) to smoke (the probans).<sup>32)</sup> One of the relata, in the present example, is the probans, smoke. The contact between smoke and the mountain is the delimiting relation of probansness. Smoke can exist in or on different entities through various relations. It exists on the mountain through a contact; its whole exists in its parts through inherence;<sup>33)</sup> it exists in time through the temporal self-linking relation (*kālikasambandha*).<sup>34)</sup> In the case of the inference mentioned above, only smoke that exists on some locus through

a contact can be the probans. This is because according to commonsense, the inferer assumes that the existence of fire on the mountain should be proved by smoke existing on the mountain through a contact. One cannot establish the existence of fire by smoke which exists in its locus through a relation other than a contact, e. g., inherence. This is because it is not true that wherever smoke exists through the relation of inherence, fire also exists. For instance, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in some part of smoke wherein the whole body of smoke resides through inherence, fire does not necessarily exist (through a contact). Smoke which exists through a relation other than a contact is excluded from the domain of the probans by the delimiting relation of probansness (i. e., a contact). The delimiting relation of probansness only allows a contact between the probans and its locus. Thus, the delimiting relation restrict one of the relata, the probans, to a property existing on some locus only through a contact.

It may be doubted whether or not the delimiting relation of probansness restricts the domain of the relatum (i. e., the probans) to smoke; just as the delimiting property of probansness (i. e., smokeness) does. As a matter of fact, even the delimiting property of probansness cannot completely restrict the relatum. As we have seen, it can restricts the relatum to smoke. It cannot, however, preclude from the relatum, smoke which exists in some locus through a relation other than a contact. As we have also seen, such smoke is never the probans. In other words, the delimiting property of probansness can reside in some smoke that lacks probansness. In this sense, the delimiting property of probansness cannot limit the relatum to smoke that exists through a contact.

The delimiting relation of probansness does not restrict the relatum strictly to smoke or the probans. It does restrict the relatum to a property which exists through a contact. If only the delimiting relation of probansness is taken into account in restricting the relatum, entities other than smoke (e.g., pots, trees, stones, etc.) will be accepted as the relatum. Therefore, in order to limit the relatum (i. e., the probans) to smoke which exists through a contact, both the delimiters are necessary.

#### Notes

- 1) B.K. Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Harvard Oriental Series 46 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.41-44.
- 2) T. Wada, "Describer (*Nirūpaka*) in Navya-nyāya", which is to be put to the *Annals of*

*Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.*

- 3) The same way of interpretation of the compound is found in the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra : ... *viśeṣaṇam ca viśeṣyam ca tayor bhāva iti dvandvāt paraḥ śrūyamāno bhāvaśabdah pratyekam abhisambandhyate. tathā ca viśeṣabhāva viśeṣabhāvaś cety āḥpannam...*(*Tarkabhāṣā*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 84(Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1979). p. 52.
- 4) D.C. Guha, *Navya Nyāya System of Logic* (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna : Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), p. 61.
- 5) Matilal, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
- 6) The present system of a diagram is partly based on the systems presented in the following works : M. Tachikawa, *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism*, Studies of Classical India 4 (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981) p.18 ; Y. Miyasaka, *The Concept of Avacchedakatva in Navya-Nyāya* (Ph. D. dissertation, Poona, 1980), pp.34-36, 40-44, 117 ; Y. Miyasaka, "The Definition of *Vyāpti* in Navyanyāya," *Sambhāṣā* 9, 1987, pp.52-53, 55, 57.
- 7) These three kind of relation are placed in a single category of relation, i. e., occurrence-exacting (*vr̥ttiniyāmaka*). Another category is non-occurrence-exacting (*vr̥tṭyanīyāmaka*). As for these categories, see pp.8-9.
- 8) The relation of inherence is accepted by Navya-nyāya only in five cases: (1) the whole and its parts, (2) a quality and a substance, (3) an action and a substance, (4) a generic property (*jāti* or *sāmānya*) and a manifested entity (*vyakti*, i.e., a substance, a quality, and an action), and (5) a particular (*viśeṣa*) and an eternal substance (i.e., an atom, space, time, direction, a soul, mind). Y. V. Athalye and M. R. Bodas, *Tarka-Saṃgraha*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 55 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974), p. 64.
- 9) Matilal, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-44.
- 10) The relation between causeness and a pot-maker is a self-linking relation, because it is neither a contact nor inference. A contact exists between two substances, and causeness is not a substance. Hence, the relation in question is not a contact. Causeness is not a substance, a quality, an action, a generic property, or a particular, so the relation in question is not inherence. (For the condition of inherence, see n. 8.)

One may have a doubt whether causeness is a generic property (*jāti*) or not. It cannot be a generic property. According to Matilal, the reason for it will be explained as follows : A generic property must be simple. This condition can be interpreted in two ways: (1) a class-property existing in each member of the logical product of two or more classes cannot be a generic property, and (2) when the notion of the entity *x* is essentially dependent upon the notion of the entity *y*, the entity denoted by 'x-ness' or 'y-ness' cannot be a generic property. Causeness is not derived from the logical product of two or more classes, so according to (1) causeness may be a generic property. The notion of 'cause', however, essentially depends upon the notion of 'effect'. Therefore, causeness cannot be a generic property. (B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* [The Hague: Mouton, 1971], p. 73.)

- 11) In order to make the explanation of the function of 'describer' clearer and simpler, it will be convenient to use 'ghaṭa', 'kāryatā', 'kumbhakāra', and 'kāraṇatā' in the example. The example is acquired from '*taḍvamiṣṭhaviśeṣyatānirūpītatamiṣṭhāprakāratā*' (the epistemic-

- qualifier-ness residing in  $x$  described by the qualificandness residing in the possessor of  $x$ ) by substituting '*tadvat*' with '*ghaṭa*', '*viśeṣyatā*' with '*kāryatā*', '*taṭ*' with '*kumbhakāra*', '*prakāratā*' with '*kāraṇatā*'. (*Nyāyabodhinī* [NB], p.24 [included in *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 55 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974)]). Here, two telata, i. e., *tadvat* (the possessor of  $x$ ) and *taṭ* ( $x$ ), happen to exist in a substratum-superstratum relation. But it is not necessary to insist that the relata exist in such a relation when the concept of 'describer' applies to some entity. Hence, although a pot-maker and a pot do not exist in the relation, '*tadvat*' can be replaced by '*ghaṭa*' and '*taṭ*' by '*kumbhakāra*'.
- 12) In Navya-nyāya. the term '*avacchedaka*' is also used in the sense of a part (Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, p.72 and fn.3) or a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*: *Nyāyakośa*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 49 [Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute], 1978, p. 86).
- 13) See p.2.
- 14) The property in question was first called a 'relational abstract' by Ingalls (D. H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Harvard Oriental Series 40 [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951], p. 45.).
- 15) One may pose the question how potness is recognized, or whether another entity is required to recognize potness or not. If one continues to seek a further ground for the cognition of potness, he will fall into infinite regress (*anavasthā*). Consequently, one cannot establish the cognition of a pot. To avoid this difficulty, Navya-nyāya holds that a generic property (*jāti*) like potness can be recognized without the help of any further ground. In other words, a generic property is perceived by itself or ostensively. According to this theory, one has to stop seeking a further ground for the cognition of a pot on a plane of a generic property. (G. Bhattacharya, *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā* on *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1976, pp.174-175.)
- Potness is an epistemic qualifier (*prakāra*) which is one of the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) residing in a pot. In Navya-nyāya, that an epistemic qualifier is  $x$ -ness implies that its qualificand is recognized as the possessor of  $x$ -ness, i.e., as  $x$ .
- 16) The NB (p.25) tells us that potness can be the delimiter of effectness: *kāryatvavyāpṣyadharmo ghaṭatvādirūpadharmaḥ tadavacchinna-kāryatā ghaṭe*.
- 17) This Sanskrit expression is obtained from '*prthivītvam lakṣyatāvacchedakam*' (earthness is the delimiter of the 'state of being the defined' or of definiendumness) in the NB (p.7) by replacing '*prthivītvam*' with '*ghaṭatvam*' and '*lakṣyatā*' with '*kāryatā*'.
- 18) According to the NB (p.7), when  $x$  is the delimiter of  $y$ ,  $y$  is expressed by a word which has the locative case-ending. (*yo dharmo yasyām avacchedakaḥ sā taddharmāvacchinmā lakṣyatā*.) But in some edition of the *Nyāyabodhinī*  $y$  is expressed by a word which has the genitive case-ending. (*yo dharmo yasya avacchedakaḥ, sa taddharmāvacchinmaḥ. Nyāyabodhinī*, Banaras: Bharga Pustakalaya, 1950. p.11.)
- 19) Ingalls, *op. cit.* p.49; A. Uno, "The Determination of Terms in Navya-nyāya," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 7-1, p. 332; *Nyāyakośa*, p. 84.

Stating that a property of a smaller domain than the domain where the delimited occurs is not the delimiter and that a property of a wider domain than the domain where the delimited occurs is not the delimiter, the *NSM* seems to contend that the locus of the

delimiter is identical to the locus of the delimited. *guṇatvajātau kiṃ mānam iti cet, idam dravyakarmabhime sāmānyavati yā kāraṇatā sā, kiṃcid dharmāvachchinmā, niravachchinmakāraṇatāyā asambhavāt. na hi rūṣatvādikaṃ sattā vā tatra avacchedikā nyūnādikadeśavṛttitvāt. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī (NSM), Kashi Sanskrit Series 212, Varanasi : Chawkamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1972, pp.364-365.*

- 20) *kambugrivādimān na asli iti pratītyā kambugrivādimattvācchinmapratīyogitāvīṣayīkāreṇa gurudharmasya api avacchedakatvasvikārād iti samkṣepaḥ. Ibid., pp. 245-246.*
- 21) The NSM accepts this criterion for selecting a delimiter. See n. 20. For instance, when one is aware of the absence of that which possesses a neck resembling a conch etc., the entity whose existence is negated is recognized as the possessor of a neck resembling a conch etc. and not as a pot. Therefore, according to the criterion, not potness but the state of possessing a neck resembling a conch etc. is the delimiter of the counterpositiveness residing in the 'possessor of a neck resembling a conch etc.', which is a counterpositive. A counterpositive is an entity whose existence is negated.
- 22) See note 15.
- 23) When a hyphen is used just before the suffix 'ness', the words connected by other hyphen or hyphens are regarded as one unit. The hyphen put just before 'ness' indicates that 'ness' is added to the unit. Hence, 'pot-maker-ness' should be divided into 'pot-maker' and 'ness', and not 'pot' and 'maker-ness'.
- 24) See p.2.
- 25) There exists a described-describer relation between causeness and effectness. See pp.3-4. The figure shows the case where effectness is the describer (*nirūṣaka*) of causeness.
- 26) Some contacts are occurrence-exacting, and others are not.
- 27) A valid probans is the probans of a valid inference.
- 28) See note 8.
- 29) When Mathurānātha comments on the first definition of the *Vyūṣṭipañcaka* in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi (TC) (sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam)*, he considers a contact to be the delimiter of probansness. *vṛttis ca hetutāvachchedakasambandhena vivakṣāṇīyā, tena vahnyabhāvavati dhūmāvayave jalahrādāu ca samavāyena kālikaviśeṣaṇatādinā ca dhūmasya vṛttāv api na kṣatīḥ. See Ingalls op. cit. p.94.*
- 30) Ingalls, *op. cit.*, pp.47-52 ; Uno, *op. cit.*, pp.333-334.
- 31) Ingalls, *op. cit.*, p.51.
- 32) Probansness can be described as the relation of a probandum (i.e., a counterrelatum) to a probans (i.e., a baserelatum) in Navya-nyāya.
- 33) In Navya-nyāya, the whole is the superstratum of its parts. For instance, cloth (the whole) is considered to reside in its thread (its part). (*kāraṇena paṭarūṣasamavāyīkāraṇībhūtapaṭena sahaikasmim arthe tanturūṣe 'the samavetam sat samavāyasambandhena vartamānaṃ tanturūṣaṃ paṭarūṣaṃ prati kāraṇam bhavati. NB, p.28.*) The relation between the whole and its parts is inherence. See note 8.
- 34) The temporal self-linking relation is of two kinds : (1) the relation between any two of non-eternal entities and (2) the relation between any entity, eternal or non-eternal, and universal time (*mahākāla*). Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, pp.43-44. In the present context, the latter is meant.