

A Study of Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (1)

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Abbreviations

- AK:** *Akutoḥhayā* (Tibetan translation). *TTP* (*Tibetan Tripitaka*, the Peking edition, reproduced by Suzuki Research Foundation), No. 5229.
- AV:** Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (Tibetan translation). *TTP*, No. 5259.
- D:** The Sde dge edition of the *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (Tibetan translation), deposited in Tokyo University. *Tohoku Catalogue*, No. 3842.
- GR:** Go ram pa's *Dmu ma rtsa baḥi śes rab kyī rnam par bśad pa yañ dag lta baḥi ḥod zer*. ("The complete works of the great masters of the Sa skya sect of the Tibetan Buddhism," Vol.12) compiled by Bsod nams rgya mtsho, and published by the Toyo Bunko, Tokyo, 1968-69.
- May:** May, J. *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris, 1959.
- MMK:** *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.
- MMV:** Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (Tibetan translation). *TTP*, No. 5242.
- N:** The Snar than edition of *MMV*, deposited in the Toyo Bunko, Tokyo.
- P:** The Peking edition of *MMV*. *TTP*, No. 5242.
- PD:** Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (Tibetan translation). *TTP*, No. 5253.
- PDC:** The Chinese translation of *PD*, *Po jê têng lun shih* 般若燈論釈 T, No. 1566, Vol. 30.
- PI:** Piṅgala's commentary on *MMK*, *Chung lun* 中論 (Chinese translation). T, No. 1564, Vol. 30.
- PP:** Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, edited by Louis de la Vallée Poussin.
- PPT:** The Tibetan translation of *PP*. *TTP*, No. 5260.
- ST:** Sthiramati's commentary on *MMK*, *Ta ch'êng chung kuan shih lun* 大乘中觀釈論 (Chinese translation). T, No. 1567; 卅 *Tripitaka*, Vol. 26, Part 1.
- T:** Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 edited by J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe.
- TSK:** Tsoñ kha pa's *Rigs paḥi rgya mtsho*. *TTP*, No. 6153.
- TTP:** *Tibetan Tripitaka*, the Peking edition, reproduced by Suzuki Research

Foundation.

W: The Tibetan text of *MMV*, edited by M. Walleser. S.-Petersburg, 1913-4.

Walleser 1: Walleser, M. *Die Mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna*, Heidelberg, 1911.

Walleser 2: Walleser, M. *Die Mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna*. Heidelberg, 1912.

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The *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (*MMV*), i. e., Buddhapāliṭa's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*MMK*), has been preserved only in the Tibetan version. Sanskrit manuscripts of this work have been lost, and no Chinese version seems to have been made. In 1913-14 Max Walleser published the first twelve chapters and the very beginning of the thirteenth chapter of the Tibetan version of this text which consists of twenty-seven chapters in all.¹⁾ It has been pointed out that from the twenty-third chapter, this work and the *Akutobhayā*,²⁾ the oldest commentary on *MMK*, coincide except for slight differences in particle usage, punctuation, etc.³⁾ Judging from the content of those coincident parts, one could say that those parts originally belonged to the *Akutobhayā*. I have used the Peking edition⁴⁾ as the basic text for my translation, and where I found it necessary to depend upon the Sde dge edition or the Snar than edition, I have indicated it in a note.

PART I: Annotated translation⁵⁾

Chapter II (verses 1-6)

1. Basic concepts

The author of *MMK* attempts in the second chapter to deny the existence of the action of going (*gamana*), or coming (*āgamana*), which one can see here in this

1) *Buddhapāliṭa. Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. Pt. 1-2. S.-Petersburg, 1913-14. (Bibliotheca Buddhica. XVI.)

2) *TTP*, No. 5229, Vol. 95.

3) Tadashi Hirano, "Muichū to butsugochū tonō idō ni tsuite" 無畏註と仏護註との異同について (The Identity of *Akutobhayā* and Buddhapāliṭa's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*), *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 236-238.

4) *TTP*, No. 5242, Vol. 95.

5) Part I will contain a translation of several chapters of the *Buddhapāliṭamadhyamakavṛtti*; Part II, a logical analysis of arguments found in those chapters.

world. Everyday one sees entities moving: the sun rising, people walking, water flowing, and so on. Movement appears when an entity goes over or *traverses* a certain amount of *distance*. Everybody seems to admit the existence of the action of going or coming in this world, for he actually sees entities moving. It is almost nonsensical to deny the existence of the action of traversing a certain amount of distance in this world, at least, if one wants to use normal language and to stand on the level of everyday life, which is mainly dominated by common sense. Nāgārjuna, the author of *MMK*, however, tries to prove that no action of traversing can exist in the world of absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*).

In order to deny the existence of the action of traversing in the world of absolute truth, Nāgārjuna adopts a peculiar method that has been often taken for sophistic or nihilistic. The features characteristic of his "polemics" will become clearer as we go along. It is in the second chapter that one can find one of the most typical arguments found in *MMK*. Arguments found in other chapters, such as III and VIII, are based upon the arguments given in the second chapter.

Several concepts play important roles in the arguments found in the second chapter. I shall explain their meanings by an example. Suppose a boy, say, John, is on his way home from school. According to the way Nāgārjuna analyses this type of situation, one can point out that there are three factors involved in this phenomenon:

- (1) that which is to be traversed (or the object of the action of traversing),
- (2) the action of traversing, and
- (3) the agent, or John, that traverses.

Let us call the school "Point A," the point on which John is standing, "Point B," and his house, "Point C."

John has already finished walking the distance from Point A to Point B. In other words, the road or distance \overline{AB} has been traversed by him. Notice that the passive form "has been traversed" is used here. Nāgārjuna calls the distance \overline{AB} "*gata*" (that which has been traversed). Although the Sanskrit word "*gata*," which is the past participle of the verb *gam*, may also mean 'that which has gone' (or 'that which is gone'), the word is not used in that sense, at least in Buddhapāli's commentary. One will recognize that the action of traversing and the *gata* are found

in the relation of a property (*dharmā*) and its possessor (*dharmin*) or locus (*adhikāraṇa*).

It should be added that some commentators on *MMK* take the word “*gata*” to mean an action in the past (or the state wherein the action of traversing is finished), and think that the past action of traversing is not now being carried out. In this case, the action in the past is to be identified with the first factor, i. e., ‘that which is to be traversed’, and time, which may be compared to a straight line, is to be considered as a kind of distance. We find this interpretation especially in the Chinese and Tibetan traditions.

John has not yet walked the distance from Point B to Point C. That is to say, the distance \overline{BC} is not yet traversed or the future action of traversing is not yet carried out or “traversed.” Nāgārjuna designates the distance \overline{BC} with the term “*agata*” (that which is not traversed). This term refers to a substratum or locus of the action of traversing at some moment in the past. As in the case of the action of traversing and the *gata*, the action of traversing and the *agata* are found in the relation of a property and its possessor. One should add that some Mādhyamikas take the word “*agata*” to mean the future action of traversing (or the state wherein the action of traversing has not yet begun).

John is standing on Point B. This is the point which is being traversed and is designated by the term “*gamyamāna*,” which is the present participle, middle (or passive), of *gam*. It is clear that the action of traversing and the *gamyamāna* are also found in the relation of a property and its possessor. The Chinese translation of the word “*gamyamāna*” is “去時,” which means ‘the very moment whereon there is the action of going’. The Chinese translator seems to have considered time to be ‘that which is to be traversed’.

Nāgārjuna designates the totality of the *gata*, the *agata*, and the *gamyamāna* with the term “*gantavya*” (that which is to be traversed), which is the future participle of *gam*. The relation of the action of traversing and that which is to be traversed is dealt with especially in verses 1 through 5; the relation of the action of traversing and the agent of traversing, especially in verses 6 through 11. Toward the end of this chapter (vs. 22-25) the combination of these two relations is treated.

2. Translation

Question: You [Nāgārjuna] have explained the principle that [things] do not arise.¹ We [students] were impressed as we heard [the principle of] Void-ness (*śūnyatā*). But why is it unreasonable to assume the existence [of the action] of traversing [i. e., going] or coming, which we actually see in the world?²

Answer:

[The distance] that has already been traversed (*gata*) is not being traversed (*na gamyate*). Neither is [the distance] that is not yet traversed (*agata*) being traversed. (lab)³

If [the action of] traversing ever exists here [in this world], it will exist either in [the distance] that has already been traversed or in [the distance] that is not yet traversed.⁴ Of these [alternatives], [the action of] traversing does not exist in [the distance] that has already been traversed [or the traversed distance], for the action of traversing is finished [there]. Nor is there [the action of] traversing in the distance that is not yet traversed [or the non-traversed distance], for the action of traversing has not yet begun [there].

Objection: That is true. Then, even if [the action of] traversing exists neither in the traversed distance nor in the non-traversed distance, [the action of] traversing exists on [the very point of a road] that is being traversed (*gamyamāna*).

Answer:

[The very point of a road] that is being traversed, being different from [both] the traversed and the non-traversed distances, is not perceived (*na gamyate*). (lcd)⁵

How can there be [the very point of a road] that is being traversed [or the point being traversed], which is different from [both] the traversed and the non-traversed distances? It is not perceived (*na gamyate, śes par mi ḥgyur*). If one asks in what sense [it is not perceived], [we will answer] as follows: "Not perceived" (*śes par mi ḥgyur*) means that it [i. e., the point being traversed] cannot come into being (*mi ḥthad*) because it cannot be recognized (*gzun du med pa*). Thus, since the point being traversed which is different from [both] the traversed distance and the non-traversed distance, is not recognized (*gzun du med pa*), that is to say, [it] cannot come into being (*mi ḥthad*), [it] does not exist (*med pa*). Therefore, [the action of] traversing

does not exist (*med pa*).

Objection: The thing with which we are concerned is precisely the point being traversed, on which [the action of] traversing exists. The reason is as follows:

Where there is movement (*ceṣṭā*), there is [the action of] traversing (*gati*). It [i. e., movement] exists on the point that someone is traversing [lit., on someone's *point being traversed*].⁶ Movement is found neither in the traversed distance nor in the non-traversed distance. Therefore (*dehi phyir*), [the action of] traversing exists on the point being traversed. (2)⁷

In your verse (*lab*) indicating that there is no [action of] traversing, you have shown the action of traversing is finished [in the traversed distance] or it has not yet begun [in the non-traversed distance]. Then, one could say that where there is movement, there is [the action of] traversing. That means that when movement is seen on someone's *point being traversed*, [there is the action of traversing]. "Someone's" (*yataḥ, gaṇ gi*) means 'of a traverser'. Movement thus exists neither in the traversed distance nor in the non-traversed distance, but it exists on the point being traversed. Therefore, where there is movement, there is [the action of] traversing. [The action of] traversing exists on the point being traversed.⁸

Answer:

How is it possible that there is [the action of] traversing on the point being traversed? For if there is not [the action of] traversing, the point being traversed cannot exist. (3)⁹

If you think that the point being traversed exists because it is connected with (*daṅ ldan pa*) [the action of] traversing,¹⁰ and therefore there is [the action of] traversing on it, [then we would answer] as follows: There is only one action of traversing here, and [you think that] it [i. e., the action of traversing] is connected with [the expression] "the point being traversed" (*gamyamāna*). Hence, it will follow that [the expression] "is being traversed" (*gamyate*), being disconnected from the action of traversing, does not exist (*med pa*). But that is impossible (*mi ḥthad*). Thus, how is it possible [for some distance] to be traversed (*ḥgro bar ḥgyur*) without [the action of] traversing. When [the expression] "is being traversed" is impossible, how can [the action of] traversing be found on the point being traversed.

[Nāgārjuna] goes on:

If one holds that there is [the action of] traversing on the point being traversed, one will be forced to accept that the point being traversed [itself] lacks [the action of] traversing. For the point being traversed is accepted [to exist]. (4)¹¹

Thinking it incorrect to maintain the fallacious argument above, one may hold that [the expression] "is being traversed" is connected with (*dañ Idan pa*) [the action of] traversing, and therefore [some distance] is traversed. In that case, [the action of] traversing is connected with [the expression] "is being traversed." Then one would be forced to accept that the point being traversed is without [the action of] traversing and separate from [the action of] traversing, just like a village or a city [which itself does not possess the property of being traversed as one of its original characteristics]. But one cannot accept that, because, [if that were the case,] one would be led to compare the point being traversed to, for example, [a village referred to in the statement,] "A village is traversing" (*groñ hgro*).¹² Therefore, it is by no means reasonable to say that there is the action of traversing on the point being traversed.

Thinking it incorrect to maintain the fallacious argument above, one may hold that [both the expression] "is being traversed" and [the expression] "the point being traversed" are connected with [the action of] traversing. Then there would be the following fault:

[Nāgārjuna] says:

If there is [the action of] traversing on the point being traversed, it will follow that there are two [actions of] traversing: that through which there is the point being traversed, and that through which [the action of] traversing is found on it [i.e., the point being traversed]. (5)¹³

If one assumes that there is [the action of] traversing through connections with [both] the point which is being traversed and [the action of] traversing, one will be forced to accept that there are two [actions of] traversing: one is [the action of] traversing through which the point being traversed is established; the other is [the action of] traversing which is found on it [i.e., the point being traversed]. One cannot accept the existence of two [actions of] traversing [when one entity traverses some distance]. Therefore, that [assumption] is not correct either. There is also

another fault [in that assumption].

[Nāgārjuna] says:

If it follows that there are two [actions of] traversing, one will be forced to accept the existence of two traversers also; no [actions of] traversing could exist without a traverser. (6)¹⁴

If it necessarily follows that there are two [actions of] traversing, there will be two traversers also. If someone asks why, [we would answer] as follows: because [the action of] traversing could not exist without a traverser. When a traverser exists, [the action of] traversing also exists. But [the action of] traversing could not exist apart from a traverser. Therefore, if it follows that there are two [actions of] traversing, then there will be two traversers also. We do not accept that [assumption].

Therefore, various faults are involved [in the assumption that there is the action of traversing on the point being traversed]. There is no [action of] traversing on the point being traversed. Since there is no [action of] traversing which belongs to the traversed distance, the non-traversed distance, and the point being traversed, there is no [action of] traversing [in the world].¹⁵

(to be continued)

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3. Notes

1. Cf. *MMK*, 1,1 (*PP*, p.12).

2. It is Buddhapālita's understanding that Nāgārjuna sets forth the second chapter of *MMK* in answer to this question. Bhāvaviveka (?-570), the author of the *Prajñāpāradīpa* (*PD*), however, opposes this view on the grounds that students, who are basically stupid, could not ask such a reasonable question (*PD*, 75a, 7; *AV*, 253a, 2).

3. Skt., *gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiva gamyate* / (*PP*, p.92)

My translation is based upon the Sanskrit text. The Tibetan translation may be rendered somewhat more literally as "There is no going in the *soṅ ba*, and there is no going in the *ma soṅ ba*." It seems that "*soṅ ba*" and "*ma soṅ ba*" here mean

respectively 'the state wherein the action of going is finished' and 'the state wherein the action of going has not yet begun'.

Kumārajīva's translation of v. lab reads as follows: 已去無有去, 未去亦無去 (*PI*, p.3c). 已去 does not mean 'that which has been traversed', but it means an accomplished action of going, the state wherein the action of going is finished, or that which has gone. One can consider the meaning of 未去 in a similar way. Hence, the above-mentioned Chinese translation means: [That which] has gone does not go, and [that which] has not yet gone does not go. M. Walleser renders it as follows: "Das Gegangene geht nicht, das noch nicht Gegangene auch geht nicht" (*Walleser* 2, p.12).

4. In other words, if the action of traversing exists, it will exist either in the traversed distance or in the non-traversed distance. As we have seen in the introduction, the traversed or the non-traversed distance serves the action of traversing as its locus or substratum (*adhikaraṇa*). Nāgārjuna is going to examine the existence of the action of traversing in connection with its loci. Note that the sum of the traversed and the non-traversed distances is considered here to be the entire distance, i. e., that which is to be traversed (*gantavya*). No room is left here for the third possibility, i. e., the point being traversed which is different from the traversed and the non-traversed distances. What is important is that the entire distance, which is the locus of the action of traversing here, is divided into such a way that the two divided parts are complementary.

5. Skt., *gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate*// (*PP*, p.92)

Here the verb *gam* is used in the sense of 'to perceive'. As in the case of v. lab, my translation is also based upon the Sanskrit text. The Tibetan translators render "*gamyamāna*" as "*bgom pa*," which means the action of stepping rather than the point of a road which is being traversed. Candra Das' and Jāsche's dictionaries do not mention 'the point being traversed' among the meanings of the term "*bgom pa*." Tsoñ kha pa and Go ram pa take the word "*bgom pa*" (or "*bgom bshin*") to mean movement, for they indicate *bgom pa* by the term "action" (*las*) (*TSK*, 295a, 2; *GR*, p.298, 4, 6). It should be added that one can find the expression "the going which is called stepping" (*bgom pa shes paḥi ḥgro ba*) in *TSK*, 196a, 1.

M. Walleser translates 2,1 of *AK* as follows:

Im Gegangenen eben ist nicht Gehen, im (noch) nicht

Gegangenen auch ist nicht Gehen,

Ohne Gegangenes und (noch) nicht Gegangenes wird

ein (gegenwärtiges) Gehen nicht wahrzunehmen sein (*Walleser* 1, p.15).

“Ein (gegenwärtiges) Gehen” here means ‘a present action of going’, not an object that is undergoing the action of going (or traversing). It seems that he follows the usual meaning of the Tibetan term “*bgom pa*.” J. May translates this verse as follows:

Tout d’abord, le mouvement accompli ne comporte pas mouvement; pas davantage le mouvement non accompli. Un mouvement actuel indépendant des deux autres est inintelligible (*May*, p.52).

He thus takes “*bgom pa*” to mean ‘a present movement’.

T. R. V. Murti, on the other hand, takes “*gamyamāna*” to mean ‘the space which is being traversed’, “*gata*,” ‘the traversed space’, and “*agata*,” ‘the space to be traversed’ (*The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, 1960, pp.178-181). R. Robinson translates “*gamyamāna*” as ‘the just-being-gone’, “*gata*,” as ‘the gone’, and “*agata*,” as ‘the ungone’. And he declares that “going is treated as a relation between agent and locus” in the second chapter of *MMK* (*Early Madhyamika in India and China*, Madison, Milwaukee, and London, 1967, p.42). He renders 2, 1 of *MMK* as follows:

The gone is not arrived at, and the ungone is not arrived at; the just-being-gone is not arrived at separate from the gone and the ungone (*ibid.*, p. 42).”

(Cf. F. J. Streng, *Emptiness: A study in religious meaning*. Nashville, U. S. A., 1967, p. 184.)

We must not forget that Indian commentators allude or declare that “*gamyamāna*” indicates that which is being traversed. In Buddhapālita’s commentary (*MMV*, ad. 2, 4) a village or a city is compared to the *gamyamāna* that is separate from the action of traversing. (Cf. note 12.) Avalokitavrata, a commentator on Bhāvaviveka’s *Prajñāpradīpa*, explains *gamyamāna* as “the ground whereon there is movement in the form of lifting up and placing down one’s feet” (*AV*, 266a, 1: *sa phyogs gañ na rkañ pa hdeg pa dañ hjoj pañi mtshan ñid kyi gyo ba snañ ba de...*).

6. Buddhapālita takes “*yataḥ (gañ gi)*” to mean ‘of a traverser’. Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita’s view for the following three reasons: (1) The expression

“*tataḥ (deḥi phyir)*,” which means ‘therefore’, should be anticipated by words such as “*yataḥ (gaṅ gi or gaṅ gi phyir)*,” which mean ‘since’. But the word “*tataḥ*” should not be there if “*yataḥ*” is to be taken to mean ‘of a traverser’. (2) There is no doubt about what the substratum of the action of traversing is. That is to say, it is obvious that the substratum of the action of traversing is the *lam* (road) which is being traversed. Hence there is no need of introducing a traverser as the substratum of the action of traversing. (3) He has already shown that the action of traversing of a traverser does not exist in the traversed distance and the non-traversed distance (*PD*, 77a, 7-8; *AV*, 266a, 8-267a, 2).

Tsoñ kha pa, who follows the Prāsaṅgika tradition established by Buddhapālita and consolidated by Candrakīrti, supports this view of Buddhapālita and criticizes that of Bhāvaviveka. Furthermore, Tsoñ kha pa holds that Candrakīrti also takes “*gaṅ gi*” to mean ‘of a traverser’. (*TSK*, 196a, 2-6; cf. *TSK*, 195b, 8: *gyo ba de yaṅ ḥgro ba po gaṅ gi bgom pa la dmigs pa de na yod do.*) Go ram pa, who often criticizes Tsoñ kha pa vehemently, takes “*gaṅ gi*” to mean ‘since’ (*gaṅ gi phyir*) (*GR*, p. 299, 1, 6).

7. Skt., *ceṣṭā yatra gatis tatra gamyamāne ca sū yataḥ/*
na gate nāgate ceṣṭā gamyamāne gatis tataḥ// (*PP*, p. 93)

My translation of this verse is based upon the Sanskrit text, not upon the Tibetan version. The meaning of the third *pada* of the Sanskrit text differs from that of the Tibetan text, which reads: *gyo ba soṅ min ma soṅ min* (Movement is neither the *gata* nor the *agata*). The word “*soṅ*” here cannot mean the traversed distance, rather it means the state wherein the action of traversing is finished. In the Tibetan text the identity of movement and the *gata* (or the *agata*) is denied. But, strange to say, Buddhapālita does not interpret the third *pada* in the way it is interpreted in the Tibetan translation of the third *pada*, for he says in his commentary: “Movement thus exists neither in the *gata* nor in the *agata*...” The commentary makes it clear that he deals with movement and the *gata* (or the *agata*) as being in the relation between a property and its possessor.

8. S. Yamaguchi is of the opinion that the opponent here probably belonged to the Vātsyaputriyas, who maintain that movement has duration and is not momentary (S. Yamaguchi, *Chūron shaku* 中論釈 (A Japanese translation of the *Prasannaṭṭhā*), Part I, Tokyo, 1947, p. 146; S. Yamaguchi, *Seshin no jōgōron* 世親の成業論 (The

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa of Vasubandhu), Kyoto, 1951, pp. 79-80).

It is interesting that the *Nīhnavāda*, a Jain text, contains an argument very similar to the argument with which we have been concerned. The text, which seems to have been composed in the seventh century, says in the first chapter (v. 13 and v. 15):

“13. Sakkham ciya santhāro na kajjamāṇs kan tti me jamhā |
Bei Jjamāli sarvam na kajjamāṇam kayam tamhā ||
[Sākṣādeva samstaro na kriyamāṇah kṛita iti mama yasmāt |
Bravīti Jamāliḥ sarvam na kriyamāṇam kṛitam tasmāt ||]

Trans 13. Jamāli says that ‘Since the bed which is being prepared, does not (actually) happen to have been prepared in my presence, everything that is being prepared cannot be said to have been (actually) prepared.’

Jamāli:—It is clearly evident that the bed (of blankets etc.) which is being spread at present, has not actually been spread. We can, therefore, easily remark that all objects that are being prepared or that are under the process of preparation, cannot be said to have been actually prepared, but those that have been already prepared *could alone* be said to have been prepared.

The doctrine of Caliyamāṇe calitam, Udīryamāṇe udīritam etc.” explained in the Bhagavatī Sūtra [1, 1, 5] will therefore prove invalid. 13

Ṭīkā:—13, *yasmād mama sākṣāt pratyakṣam evedam vṛttam yad uta kambalāstarāṇarūpaḥ samstārakaḥ kriyamāṇam kṛtam na bhavati, kintu kṛtam eva kṛtam ucyate/ tato bhagavatyādiṣu yad uktam-calāmāṇe calie, uīrīñjamāṇe uīrie, vedajjamāṇe veie (calayamāṇe calitam, udīryamāṇe udīritam, vedyamāṇe veditam) bhagavatyām prathamaśatake prathamodveṣe/ ityādi, tat sarvaṃ mithyetyabhiprāya iti//*

.....

15. Kayamiha na kajjamāṇam sabbhāvāo cirantana ghaḍo vva |
Ahavā kayam pi kīrai kīrau niccam ya samatti ||
[Kritamiha na kriyamāṇam sadbhāvāccirantana ghata iva |
Athavā kṛitamapi kriyate kriyatām nityam na ca samāptiḥ ||]

Trans. 15. That which has (already) been prepared (kṛita) could not be said as being prepared (kriyamāṇa) on account of its being existent like a ghata (which is) prepared since long. Or (if it is said that) What has already been prepared (kṛita) is also prepared, let it be prepared (for ever) and there would be no end (of it).”

This long quotation is from *Kṣamāśramaṇa Jinabhadra Gaṇi's NIHNAVAVĀDA along with Maladhārin Hemcandra Sūri's Commentary*, ed. by Muni Ratna-prabha Vijaya, Jaina Siddhanta Society, Ahmedabad, 1947, pp. 18-20.

9. The first half of this verse found in *PP* reads: *gamyamānasya gamanaṃ kathaṃ nāmoṣaṇḍyate/ (PP, p. 94)*. The latter half of the same verse reads: *gamyamāne dvigamanaṃ yadā naivoṣaṇḍyate//* (since two actions of traversing cannot be found in the point being traversed). L. de la Vallée Poussin guesses the original Sanskrit expression to be as follows: *gamyamānaṃ hy agamanaṃ yadā naivoṣaṇḍyate// (PP, p. 94)*.

According to Buddhapālita, v. 3 refers to the case wherein the action of traversing is considered to be connected with the expression “*gamyamāna*”; v. 4, to the case wherein the action of traversing is considered to be connected with the expression “*gamyate*”; and v. 5, to the case wherein the action of traversing is considered to be connected with both the expression “*gamyamāna*” and the expression “*gamyate*.”

The idea of the connection of the action of traversing with an expression does not appear in the *Akutobhayā (AK)*, in Piṅgala's commentary (*PI*), or in Sthiramati's commentary (*ST*), at least with respect to the arguments found in vs. 3-5 of the second chapter. That idea is found in Buddhapālita's commentary, and then in succeeding commentaries, such as Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā (PP)*, and Tsoñ kha pa's *Rigs paḥi rgya mtsho (TSK)*. Hence, Buddhapālita seems to have been the first to introduce the idea of the connection of an expression with its object as a clue in the interpretation of vs. 3-5.

The concept of “the connection of an expression with its object” may need some explanation. The establishment of the expression “*gamyamāna*” presupposes its connection with the action of traversing. In other words, the expression “*gamyamāna*” is considered to be established through its connection with the action of traversing (*gamana*). In a similar way, the expression “*gamyate*” is considered to be established through its connection with *gamana*. Insofar as the expression can anticipate that which is presupposed, i. e., its “reference,” it is considered to be “established” (*siddha, grub pa*). If the expression “the point being traversed” is left without its “reference,” i. e., the action of traversing, then it is considered to be not established. Indian realists hold that each expression or word must possess its own separate “reference.” However, the Mādhyamikas, who hold a sort of nominalistic view, do

not think that a word always possesses its “reference.” The author of *MMK* tries to prove the invalidity of the statement: the point being traversed is being traversed, by showing that the two expressions included in that statement, i. e., “the point being traversed” and “is being traversed,” do not possess separate “references.”

As mentioned before, Buddhapālita interprets v.3 as referring to the case wherein the action of traversing is considered to be connected with the expression “the point being traversed” (*gamyamāna*). When the expression “*gamyamāna*” is established through its connection with the action of traversing, the expression “is being traversed” (*gamyate*), which is the predicate of the statement: *gamyamānaṃ gamyate*, remains disconnected from the action of traversing. Buddhapālita here thinks that even a predicate must possess its “reference,” but modern philosophers do not. This argument is illustrated in Diagram 1.




Diagram 1

In v.4 the action of traversing is considered to be connected with the expression “is being traversed” (*gamyate*) with the result that the expression “the point being traversed” is left disconnected from the action of traversing. (See Diagram 2.)




Diagram 2

In v.5 both the expressions “*gamyamānam*” and “*gamyate*” are considered to be connected with the action of traversing. In this case two actions are needed.




Diagram 3

10. Here the point being traversed is considered to possess the action of traversing in that the point being traversed acts as the locus of the action of traversing.

11. *PP* reads: *gamyamānasya gamanaṃ yasya tasya prasajyate/ r̥te gater gamyamānaṃ gamyamānaṃ hi gamyate//* (*PP*, p. 95)

The Tibetan translator of *PP* renders the fourth *pada* as follows: *bgom la ḥgro ba yin ḥyir ro*, where the Sanskrit word “*gamyate*” is taken to mean ‘is being traversed’. On the other hand, the word is taken to mean ‘is accepted [to exist] or is perceived’ in the Tibetan translations of this *pada* in *AK*, *MMV*, and *PD*.

12. *Gamyamāna* is that which is qualified by the action of traversing. A distance or a point, such as a city, a village, or a road, upon which the action of traversing is not found, can no longer be called “*gamyamāna*.”

13. *gamyamānasya gamane prasaktaṃ gamanadvayam/ yena tad gamyamānaṃ ca yac cātra gamanaṃ punaḥ//* (*PP*, p. 95)

Nāgārjuna holds that there must be two *gamanas* if *gamana* resides in *gamyamāna*, which is the substratum of the *gamana*. One *gamana* makes possible the existence of the *gamana* residing in the substratum; the other *gamana* makes possible the existence of the *gamyamāna*, which must possess the *gamana* as its necessary constituent. But there cannot be two *gamanas* in one *gamyamāna*. When a certain amount of distance is traversed, there is one action of traversing in that distance.

14. *dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye/ gantāraṃ hi tiraskṛtya gamanaṃ noḥapadyate//* (*PP*, p. 96)

15. According to the Sde dge edition, this passage should be rendered as follows: “Since [the action of] traversing can exist neither in the traversed distance nor in the non-traversed distance, nor yet on the point being traversed, there is no [action of] traversing [in the world].” (Cf. note 42 of the text.)

4. Tibetan text

P: Tsa, 190a, 1-191a, 6 (TTP, Vol. 95, p. 78, 2, 1 - p. 78, 4, 6).

D: Tsa, 168b, 2-169b, 3.

N: Tsa, 180b, 6-182a, 3.

smras pa/ khyod¹⁾ k²⁾kyis skye ba med paḥi rigs pa ḥdi rjes su rab tub bstan pas³⁾ kho
boḥi yid stoñ pa ñid ñan pa la ño mtshar sñiñ po can du byas k⁴⁾kyis/ ji ltar ḥjig rten
gyi mñon sum gyi ḥgro⁵⁾ ba dañ ḥoñ ba mi ḥthad pa je smros⁶⁾ śig/⁷⁾

bśad pa/

re shig soñ la ḥgro med te/⁸⁾ ma soñ ba laḥan gro ba med// (1ab)

ḥdi la gal te ḥgro ba shig yod par gyur na de soñ ba la ḥam/⁹⁾ ma soñ ba la yod
par ḥgyur grañ na/ de la re shig soñ ba la ni ḥgro ba med do// ḥgro baḥi bya ba
ḥdas zin paḥi phir ro// ma soñ ba la yañ ḥgro ba med de/ ḥgro baḥi bya ba ma
brtsams paḥi phyir ro//

smras pa/ de ni de bshin te/ soñ ba dañ ma soñ ba la ḥgro ba me mod k¹⁰⁾kyi/ ḥon
kyañ bgom pa la ḥgro ba yod do//

bśad pa/

soñ dañ ma soñ ma gtogs par// bgom pa śes par mi ḥgyur ro//¹¹⁾ (1cd)

soñ ba dañ ma soñ ba ma gtogs par bgom pa ji shig yod de/¹²⁾ śes par mi ḥgyur ro//
ij ltar she na/ ḥdi ltar/ śes par mi ḥgyur ro// she bya ba ni/ gzuñ du med pas te mi
ḥthad do shes bya baḥi tha tshig go/¹³⁾ de ltar gañ gi phyir soñ ba dañ ma soñ ba ma
gtog par bgom pa gzuñ du med pa kho na te mi ḥthad pa deḥi phyir med pa kho na¹⁴⁾

1. D khyed.
2. AV, 253a, 4 kyi.
3. AV, 253a, 4 par byas pas.
4. AV, 253a, 4 kyi.
5. AV, 253a, 4 kyi; D gyis.
6. AV, 253a, 5 sum ḥgro.
7. AV, 253a, 5 pa de ci smros; N ba de ji smros.
8. N //.
9. D /.
10. D /.
11. D ci.
12. D do.
13. D //.
14. D ste.

yin pas ḥgro ba med do//

smras pa/ bgom pa kho na yin te/ de la ḥgro ba yod do//¹⁵⁾ ji ltar she na/
gañ na gyo ba de na ḥgro/ de yañ gañ gi bgom pa la//
*gyo ba soñ min ma soñ min// de phyir bgom la ḥgro ba yod//*¹⁶⁾ (2)

ḥdi la khyod kyi ḥgro ba med paḥi gtan tshigs su ḥgro baḥi bya ba ḥdas zin pa
 dañ ma brtsams pa bstan pa deḥi phyir//¹⁷⁾ gañ na gyo ba de na ḥgro/ shes bya ba ḥdi
 ḥbyuñ bar ḥgyur te/ de yañ gañ gi bgom pa la gyo ba dmigs pa naḥo//¹⁸⁾¹⁹⁾ gañ gi shes
 bya ba ni ḥgro ba poḥi shes bya baḥi tha tshig go/ de ltar gañ gi phyir gyo ba ni
 soñ ba la yañ med//²¹⁾ ma soñ ba la yañ med kyi bgom pa la yod pa deḥi phyir gañ na
 gyo ba yod pa de na ḥgro ba yod do//²²⁾ de ltar ḥgro ba yod pas bgom pa la ḥgro ba
 yod do//

bśad pa/

*bgom la ḥgro ba yod par ni// ji ltar bur na ḥthad par ḥgyur//*²³⁾
*gañ tshe ḥgro ba med pa yi//*²⁴⁾ *bgom pa ḥthad pa med phyir ro//* (3)

de la²⁵⁾ khyod ḥgro ba dañ ldan pas bgom par ḥdod la/ de la ḥgro ba yod do shes
 zer na ḥdi la ḥgro baḥi bya ba ni gcig tu zad la/ de ni bgom pa shes bya ba de la
 ñe bar sbyar bas deḥi phyir ḥgro ba shes bya ba de ni ḥgro baḥi bya ba dañ bral
 bas ḥgro ba med par thal bar ḥgyur ro// de yañ mi ḥthad de/ ḥdi ltar ḥgro ba med
 par ji ltar ḥgro bar ḥgyur/ de la gañ gi tshe ḥgro ba shes bya ba de ḥgro baḥi bya
 ba²⁶⁾ dañ bral bas mi ḥthad pa deḥi tshe bgom pa la ḥgro ba yod par ji ltar ḥthad par
 ḥgyur/ yañ gshan yañ/ bśad pa/

*gañ gi bgom la ḥgro yod pa/ deḥi*²⁷⁾ *bgom pa ḥgro med par//*

-
15. N de.
 16. D /.
 17. N /.
 18. D gyo ba de.
 19. N /.
 20. D //.
 21. D la med.
 22. N /.
 23. D /.
 24. D /.
 25. D ḥdi la.
 26. D pas.
 27. D // de yi.

thal bar hgyur de gañ gi phyir ro// ²⁸⁾ *bgom pa khoñ du chud phyir ro//* (4)

gañ gi blo la skyon der gyur na mi ruñ ño sñam pas hgro shes bya ba de hgro ²⁹⁾
ba dañ ldan bas hgro bar sems pa dehi yañ hgro ba hgro ba shes bya ba de la ñe
bar sbyar ba byas pas bgom pa ni hgro ba med pa hgro ba dañ bral ba groñ dan
groñ khyer lta bur thal bar hgyur te/ dper na groñ hgro shes bya ba de bshin du
bgom pa yañ thal bar hgyur bas de yan mi h̄dod de/ dehi phyir bgompa la hgro ba
yod do// shes bya ba de ji ltar yañ mi h̄thad do//

ci ste skyon der gyur na mi ruñ ño sñam pas hgro shes bya ba de dañ bgom pa
shes bya ba de gñi ³⁰⁾ ga yañ hgro ba dañ ldan par sems na/ de la skyon h̄di yod de// ³¹⁾
bśad pa/ ³²⁾

bgom la hgro ba yod na ni// hgro ba gñis su thal bar hgyur te// ³³⁾
gañ gis bgom pa de dañ ni// de la hgro ba gañ yin paño// (5)

bgom pa hgro ba dañ ldan pa la hgro bar brtag na/hgro ba gñis su thal bar
hgyur te/hgro ba dañ ldan pas bgom pa shes bya bar hgyur ba dañ/de la hgro ba
shes bya bañi hgro ba gñis par brtag paño// ³⁴⁾ hgro ba gñis su ni mi h̄dod pas dehi
phyir de yañ mi h̄thad do//

de la skyon gshan h̄di yañ ³⁶⁾ de/ ³⁷⁾ bśad pa/

hgro ba gñis su thal gyur na// hgro ba po yañ gñis su hgyur// ³⁸⁾

gañ phyir hgro po med par ni// hgro ba h̄thad par mi hgyur phyir// (6)

hgro ba gñis su thal bar gyur na hgro ba po yañ gñis su thal bar hgyur te/
cihi phyir she na/ gañ phyir hgro po med par ni// ³⁹⁾ hgro ba h̄thad par mi hgyur phyir//
gañ gi phyir hgro ba po yod na hgro ba yañ yod kyi/ ⁴⁰⁾ hgro ba po spañs na hgro ba

28. D gañ gi phyir.

29. D hgro ba shes.

30. D gñis ka.

31. D, N /.

32. D //.

33. D thal hgyur.

34. D, N bar; P h̄da (?).

35. N /.

36. D do //; N do/.

37. D //.

38. D hgyur.

39. N /.

40. N //.

med pa deḥi phyir ḥgro ba gñis su thal bar gyur na ḥgro ba po yañ gñis su thal bar ḥgyur bas de yañ mi ḥdod do⁴¹⁾//

deḥi phyir de ltar skyon du ma yod pas bgom pa la ḥgro ba med pa fiid do// gañ gi phyir soñ ba dañ ma soñ ba dañ bgom pa pa ḥgro ba mi ḥthad pa deḥi phyir ḥgro ba med pa kho naḥo//

(to be continued)

41: N de /.

42: D pa la.