@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00010108,
 author = {Ogawa, Hikaru},
 issue = {E04-4},
 journal = {Economic Research Center Discussion Paper},
 month = {Sep},
 note = {In the literature of local public finance, one of the well-known property of optimal matching grant program is that the matching grant rate should increase as the degree of benefit spillovers of public goods increases. This paper presents the re-examination of properties of optimal matching grant program, using the model of Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002). The result formally captures a quite counterintuitive property of matching grant that optimal matching grant rate might decrease with the degree of spillover externality.},
 title = {Tax Competition, Spillovers, and Subsidies},
 year = {2004}
}