@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00011298,
 author = {花薗, 誠 and Hanazono, Makoto},
 issue = {4},
 journal = {経済科学},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter.},
 pages = {149--157},
 title = {総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札 : 除算方式評価の場合},
 volume = {57},
 year = {2010}
}