@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00015748,
 author = {OKAWA, Masayuki and IGUCHI, Tatsuya},
 issue = {4},
 journal = {経済科学},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {In this paper we set up a simple model of a small open economy in which the government imposes an import tariff on intermediate goods and a profit tax on the profits of domestic oligopoly firms that produce final goods by using the intermediate goods. We examine whether the government can collect enough profit tax revenue to compensate the loss of government revenue caused by a tariff reduction when firms produce differentiated goods and compete in a Bertrand-Nash fashion. We will show that, for any given number of firms, there always exists a degree of product differentiation such that the government can always find a profit tax to achieve its objective. Under this reform both consumers and firms can be better off and the government can keep its revenue unchanged at the level before the tariff reduction. It is also shown that the government needs higher degree of product differentiation when firms compete in prices than when firms compete in quantities to attain the goal of the tariff and tax reform.},
 pages = {65--75},
 title = {On the Revenue Implication of Trade Liberalization under Bertrand Competition},
 volume = {60},
 year = {2013}
}