@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:02002849,
 author = {Tamai, Toshiki},
 issue = {E22-1},
 journal = {Economic Research Center Discussion Paper E-Series},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {This paper presents a study of the growth and welfare effects of four public pension systems under aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The equilibrium growth rate obtained under the pay-as-you-go pension system is lower than the growth rate achieved under the funded pension systems because the unfunded pension system hinders capital accumulation. However, pay-as-you-go with additional benefits for saving enhances capital accumulation by incentivizing people to save. Particularly, the equilibrium growth rate under the modified unfunded pension system exceeds that under the funded pension system if the degree of relative risk aversion is sufficiently small. With regard to social welfare, within the Rawlsian welfare function, pay-as-you-go without saving credit is superior to the fully funded system if people are highly risk-averse. By contrast, if they have low risk aversion, then pay-as-you-go with saving credit is preferable. Considering the Benthamite welfare function, these results hold if the low-income classes have thick population. This finding implies that the demographic structure of income classes is important to ascertain the optimal extent of social security.},
 pages = {1--36},
 title = {Social Security, Economic Growth, and Social Welfare in an Overlapping Generations Model with Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks},
 year = {2022}
}