@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:02003942,
 author = {渡辺, 亮 and WATANABE, Toru},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {名古屋大学大学院教育発達科学研究科紀要. 教育科学, Bulletin of the Graduate School of Education and Human Development. Educational Sciences},
 month = {Oct},
 note = {In western thought, it has been thought that the object is one unto itself. Husserl proposed the idea that the object isn’t in itself an entity; rather it becomes an object by the objectification that comes of subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty inherited this idea and explains how there is an inability to objectify un-body. In this essay, I follow the course of this consideration to reveal some features of the process of objectification in Merleau-Ponty. In the first section, I review Descartes, who offered his argument of the body in western thought. He thought of un-body as an object. Husserl influenced by phenomenology, believed similarly. By comparison with these thinkers, Merleau-Ponty argues that the body is not only an un-object but also a phenomenon or an ability. He describes the body as the phenomenon in two layers; the jambe (bras) fantôme and refoulement are examples that le corps habituel and le corps actuel. Merleau- Ponty envisions le corps habituel and le corps actuel as an almost impersonal existence and a personal existence. In the second section, I confirm Merleau-Ponty’s description of space and the motion of physical phenomenon. He classified the motion of the Schneider subject as a concrete motion that a subject can perform (blow his nose, scratch a point where one is pricked by a mosquito, etc.) and abstract motions where a subject cannot (point at one’s nose, etc.) He suggests that any given world has a background of concrete motion; a constituted world is a background of abstract motion. In other words, abstract motion is realized by the function of a construction of a physical intentionnalité. The ability to objectify is inherent in abstract motion. The physical intentionnalité connects we and our past, our future, our human environment, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our mental situation, as it represents a frame of the preobjective world. At this juncture, this research demonstrates an interpretation that Merleau-Ponty finds the preobjective world as a place where we are things; additionally, the preobjective world supports an objective world by a system of objective sciences. In the third section, I show this interpretation’s justification in the history of thought, a developmental view of objectification and its predecessors, phenomenology and Husserl’s ideas.},
 pages = {37--47},
 title = {メルロ＝ポンティに於ける「客観化のプロセス」},
 volume = {69},
 year = {2022}
}