{"created":"2021-03-01T06:08:55.399240+00:00","id":2512,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"ddea96bf-f5dc-4db4-b5ce-a9c3251b9f35"},"_deposit":{"id":"2512","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"2512"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002512"},"item_9_alternative_title_19":{"attribute_name":"\u305d\u306e\u4ed6\u306e\u8a00\u8a9e\u306e\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"The role of interpersonal trust and Machiavellianism in a2-person's prisoner's dilemma game: Cooperation rates and choicemotives"}]},"item_9_biblio_info_6":{"attribute_name":"\u66f8\u8a8c\u60c5\u5831","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"1994-12","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"78","bibliographicPageStart":"65","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"41","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"\u540d\u53e4\u5c4b\u5927\u5b78\u6559\u80b2\u5b78\u90e8\u7d00\u8981. \u6559\u80b2\u5fc3\u7406\u5b66\u79d1"}]}]},"item_9_description_4":{"attribute_name":"\u6284\u9332","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"A 2-person's Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2PDG) was used to test the role of general/specific interpersonal trust and Machiavellianism in an interdependent choice situation. Sixty (study I) and twenty-eight (study II) female undergraduates served as subjects and played 2PDG task with their friends and strangers. In study I, the effects of trust and Machiavellianism on cooperative behaviors were investigated. It was hypothesized that the effects of the variables would depend on the relationships of partners; 1) general trust would only affect cooperative choice for strangers; 2) specific trust would only have an effect on cooperaiton for friends; 3) the effects of Machiavellianism would be clearly found in friends groups rather than that of strangers. The second and third prediction were supported but the first one was not confirmed. In study II, the role of interpersonal trust and Machiavellianism in a choice situation was examined. Main effects of general trust and Machiavellianism were obtained indicating that 1) high-specific-trusters tended to be cooperative and not to be defensive in friends condition, 2) high-general-trusters tended to be altruistic in friends condition, and 3) high-Machiavellians' choice behaviors were siginificantly deffensive but not exploitative, whereas low-Machiavellians' choice were cooperative. The effects of game reiteration were discussed.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_9_description_5":{"attribute_name":"\u5185\u5bb9\u8a18\u8ff0","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"\u56fd\u7acb\u60c5\u5831\u5b66\u7814\u7a76\u6240\u3067\u96fb\u5b50\u5316\u3057\u305f\u30b3\u30f3\u30c6\u30f3\u30c4\u3092\u4f7f\u7528\u3057\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_9_identifier_60":{"attribute_name":"URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_type":"HDL","subitem_identifier_uri":"http://hdl.handle.net/2237/3935"}]},"item_9_identifier_registration":{"attribute_name":"ID\u767b\u9332","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.18999/bulfep.41.65","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"item_9_publisher_32":{"attribute_name":"\u51fa\u7248\u8005","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"\u540d\u53e4\u5c4b\u5927\u5b66\u6559\u80b2\u5b66\u90e8"}]},"item_9_select_15":{"attribute_name":"\u8457\u8005\u7248\u30d5\u30e9\u30b0","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_select_item":"publisher"}]},"item_9_source_id_7":{"attribute_name":"ISSN\uff08print\uff09","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"03874796","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_9_text_14":{"attribute_name":"\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30de\u30c3\u30c8","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"application/pdf"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"\u8457\u8005","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"\u68ee, \u4e45\u7f8e\u5b50"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"6842","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Mori, Kumiko"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"6843","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"\u30d5\u30a1\u30a4\u30eb\u60c5\u5831","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2018-02-16"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"KJ00000137452.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"1.6 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"KJ00000137452.pdf","url":"https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2512/files/KJ00000137452.pdf"},"version_id":"7dec8278-e60d-4e4b-a5dc-61234648255a"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"\u8a00\u8a9e","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"\u56da\u4eba\u306e\u30b8\u30ec\u30f3\u30de\u30b2\u30fc\u30e0\u306b\u304a\u3051\u308b\u4fe1\u983c\u611f\u3068\u30de\u30ad\u30e3\u30d9\u30ea\u30ba\u30e0\u306e\u52b9\u679c","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"\u56da\u4eba\u306e\u30b8\u30ec\u30f3\u30de\u30b2\u30fc\u30e0\u306b\u304a\u3051\u308b\u4fe1\u983c\u611f\u3068\u30de\u30ad\u30e3\u30d9\u30ea\u30ba\u30e0\u306e\u52b9\u679c"}]},"item_type_id":"9","owner":"1","path":["323/350/373/405"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"\u516c\u958b\u65e5","attribute_value":"2006-01-06"},"publish_date":"2006-01-06","publish_status":"0","recid":"2512","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["\u56da\u4eba\u306e\u30b8\u30ec\u30f3\u30de\u30b2\u30fc\u30e0\u306b\u304a\u3051\u308b\u4fe1\u983c\u611f\u3068\u30de\u30ad\u30e3\u30d9\u30ea\u30ba\u30e0\u306e\u52b9\u679c"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2021-03-01T21:18:38.138993+00:00"}