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Equity bargaining with common value
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/00028307
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/000283076e70a0dd-01a5-47a8-9044-b17b2ad61d42
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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resubmit2ndET20160712_Final (415.2 kB)
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2018-06-13 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Equity bargaining with common value | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
著者 |
Hanazono, Makoto
× Hanazono, Makoto× Watanabe, Yasutora |
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アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
権利情報 | “This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in [Economic Theory]. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1004-1”. | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Asymmetric information bargaining | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Information aggregation | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Common value | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | We study a common-value bilateral bargaining model with equity offer. In particular, we consider a model in which players bargain over an equity share of a common-value stochastic pie (i.i.d. over time) and players receive private signals on the size of the pie each period. Efficient agreement is a stochastic rule: Delay is efficient if the expected size of today’s pie is small and the discount factor is high. Hence, information aggregation is crucial for efficiency. We derive the conditions under which an equilibrium that attains the efficient agreement exists. The key idea is that the proposer makes an offer in such a way that the responder will use her signal if the responder’s signal is crucial for an efficient agreement. | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述 | ファイル公開:2019/03/01 | |||||
言語 | ja | |||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
出版者 | Springer | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプresource | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | journal article | |||||
出版タイプ | ||||||
出版タイプ | AM | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
DOI | ||||||
関連タイプ | isVersionOf | |||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1004-1 | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 0938-2259 | |||||
書誌情報 |
en : Economic Theory 巻 65, 号 2, p. 251-292, 発行日 2018-03 |
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著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | author |