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  1. A400 経済学部/経済学研究科
  2. A400a 雑誌掲載論文
  3. 学術雑誌

Equity bargaining with common value

http://hdl.handle.net/2237/00028307
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/00028307
6e70a0dd-01a5-47a8-9044-b17b2ad61d42
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
resubmit2ndET20160712_Final.pdf resubmit2ndET20160712_Final (415.2 kB)
Item type 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1)
公開日 2018-06-13
タイトル
タイトル Equity bargaining with common value
言語 en
著者 Hanazono, Makoto

× Hanazono, Makoto

WEKO 78299

en Hanazono, Makoto

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Watanabe, Yasutora

× Watanabe, Yasutora

WEKO 78300

en Watanabe, Yasutora

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アクセス権
アクセス権 open access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
権利
言語 en
権利情報 “This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in [Economic Theory]. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1004-1”.
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Asymmetric information bargaining
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Information aggregation
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Common value
抄録
内容記述 We study a common-value bilateral bargaining model with equity offer. In particular, we consider a model in which players bargain over an equity share of a common-value stochastic pie (i.i.d. over time) and players receive private signals on the size of the pie each period. Efficient agreement is a stochastic rule: Delay is efficient if the expected size of today’s pie is small and the discount factor is high. Hence, information aggregation is crucial for efficiency. We derive the conditions under which an equilibrium that attains the efficient agreement exists. The key idea is that the proposer makes an offer in such a way that the responder will use her signal if the responder’s signal is crucial for an efficient agreement.
言語 en
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述
内容記述 ファイル公開:2019/03/01
言語 ja
内容記述タイプ Other
出版者
言語 en
出版者 Springer
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源タイプresource http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ journal article
出版タイプ
出版タイプ AM
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
DOI
関連タイプ isVersionOf
識別子タイプ DOI
関連識別子 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1004-1
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ PISSN
収録物識別子 0938-2259
書誌情報 en : Economic Theory

巻 65, 号 2, p. 251-292, 発行日 2018-03
著者版フラグ
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