@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00026105,
 author = {伊藤, 遼 and Ito, Ryo},
 journal = {Nagoya journal of philosophy},
 month = {Jun},
 note = {This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'., ファイル公開日：2018年6月21日},
 pages = {16--25},
 title = {ブラッドリーの判断論と初期ラッセルの判断概念},
 volume = {13},
 year = {2018}
}