@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00028271,
 author = {Adachi, Takanori and Tremblay, Mark J.},
 issue = {E19-2},
 journal = {Economic Research Center Discussion Paper},
 month = {May},
 note = {Negotiations regularly take place on the business-to-business side of two-sided markets. However, little is known about the consequences of these negotiations on participation, prices, and welfare when indirect network externalities exist between the business side and the consumer side. To fill this gap, we propose a tractable model of bargaining in two-sided markets where participating firms pay an entry fee and concession fee that is determined through negotiations with the platform. First, we show that as a platform has greater bargaining power, the concession fee and consumer entry fee rise, but the entry fee to firms goes down. In this case, more firms participate on the platform so that consumers are better off (even though they pay a higher entry fee), and firms with large network externalites are worse off (due to greater exploitation by the platform) while firms with small network externalites are better off. Altogether, greater platform bargaining power increases total welfare. We also show that these results are largely robust when considering platform competition using a Hotelling framework with bargaining., Adachi acknowledges a Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (16KK0054) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.},
 pages = {1--37},
 title = {Bargaining in Two-Sided Markets},
 year = {2019}
}