@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00029466,
 author = {Tamai, Toshiki},
 issue = {E20-1},
 journal = {Economic Research Center Discussion Paper},
 month = {Feb},
 note = {The present study examines the government policy of public good provision and its effects on economic growth and welfare under intergenerational altruism. We consider an endogenous growth model with altruistic overlapping generations. The preferences of the current youth exhibit a future bias and so democratically elected governments are subject to this future bias. The optimal rule of public good supply under future bias differs from the original Samuelson rule. Unlike the standard growth model without any bias, the equilibrium growth rate is not independent of government size under the optimal rule. Future bias gives young generations the dynamic incentives to invest more. With future bias, intergenerational redistributive effects of public good stimulates such incentives. Hence, the government size affects economic growth via intertemporal changes in their resource allocations. The growth effect of the government size provides nontrivial outcomes of welfare analysis. Our numerical analyses show the growth and welfare superiority of the democratic but future-biased economy to the economy with nonbiased social planner.},
 pages = {1--24},
 title = {Economic Growth, Equilibrium Welfare, and Public Goods Provision with Intergenerational Altruism},
 year = {2020}
}