@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00030818,
 author = {Tamai, Toshiki and Kikuchi, Yuya},
 issue = {E20-4},
 journal = {Economic Research Center Discussion Paper},
 month = {Nov},
 note = {This paper examines two different fiscal competition games under labor market imperfection. Given that capital moves across regions and affects regional employment, governments must choose expenditure levels and tax rates on such mobile capital by accounting for the effects of fiscal variables on both capital and labor. Then, governments may play these games with either tax rates on mobile capital or with public expenditures. The presence/absence of absentee ownership of capital and employment externalities are important factors for characterizing two distinct Nash equilibria, one that occurs with tax competition and the other with expenditure competition. In particular, and contrary to the existing literature, tax rates under tax competition are likely to be more competitive than under expenditure competition because of employment externalities. Furthermore, in some cases, governments prefer to choose government expenditure as their strategic variable rather than tax rates. The presence of employment externalities motivates governments to use government expenditure as the strategic variable through which it might encourage strategic effects., This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 16K03726, 16KK0077, and 20H01492.},
 pages = {1--20},
 title = {Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition with Unemployment},
 year = {2020}
}