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  1. D100 大学院国際開発研究科
  2. D100b 紀要
  3. 国際開発研究フォーラム
  4. 27

Elements of Reverse Ultimatum Game in the Accession Negotiations between EU and CEE Countries : A Case Study of Hungary

https://doi.org/10.18999/forids.27.145
https://doi.org/10.18999/forids.27.145
97514d2e-8d55-42c2-811c-c0ec8ee4d3ad
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
c08.pdf c08.pdf (126.0 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2006-03-24
タイトル
タイトル Elements of Reverse Ultimatum Game in the Accession Negotiations between EU and CEE Countries : A Case Study of Hungary
言語 en
著者 Rozsnyoi, Hedvig

× Rozsnyoi, Hedvig

WEKO 87421

en Rozsnyoi, Hedvig

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アクセス権
アクセス権 open access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 experimental reverse ultimatum game
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 modeling
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 deadline effect
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 accession negotiations
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 European Union
抄録
内容記述 The Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) - European Union accession negotiations have received a lot of attention during the last several years. The talks included numerous strategic considerations, for example time factors, bargaining processes, presence of power positions and psychological aspects. In order to analyze the negotiation strategies applied and to show the outcomes of them, the author utilized tools of experimental game theory. Using the“reverse”ultimatum game (RUG), time and other factors crucial to the results of the negotiation process were modeled. Evidence was found in the present case study of the agricultural negotiations between Hungary and the EU that these factors were used strategically to influence the outcome. The majority of the negotiatory events were observed just before the agreement, resembling the deadline effect of the reverse ultimatum game. It shows strategic use of time in favour of the EU. The power bargaining position was also captured in the behaviour of the EU by negotiating with the CEECs separately, which is similar to the multiple player version of the RUG. Modification of this model, therefore, might serve as a good reference point to describe tendencies and key elements of the negotiating strategies of the EU authorities in the future.
言語 en
内容記述タイプ Abstract
出版者
言語 en
出版者 Graduate School of International Development. Nagoya University
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
出版タイプ
出版タイプ VoR
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
ID登録
ID登録 10.18999/forids.27.145
ID登録タイプ JaLC
関連情報
関連タイプ isVersionOf
識別子タイプ URI
関連識別子 http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/bpub/research/public/forum/27/08.pdf
ISSN(print)
収録物識別子タイプ PISSN
収録物識別子 1341-3732
ISSN(Online)
収録物識別子タイプ EISSN
収録物識別子 2189-9126
書誌情報 ja : 国際開発研究フォーラム
en : Forum of International Development Studies

巻 27, p. 145-167, 発行日 2004-08
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