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Elements of Reverse Ultimatum Game in the Accession Negotiations between EU and CEE Countries : A Case Study of Hungary
https://doi.org/10.18999/forids.27.145
https://doi.org/10.18999/forids.27.14597514d2e-8d55-42c2-811c-c0ec8ee4d3ad
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2006-03-24 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Elements of Reverse Ultimatum Game in the Accession Negotiations between EU and CEE Countries : A Case Study of Hungary | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
著者 |
Rozsnyoi, Hedvig
× Rozsnyoi, Hedvig |
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アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | experimental reverse ultimatum game | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | modeling | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | deadline effect | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | accession negotiations | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | European Union | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | The Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) - European Union accession negotiations have received a lot of attention during the last several years. The talks included numerous strategic considerations, for example time factors, bargaining processes, presence of power positions and psychological aspects. In order to analyze the negotiation strategies applied and to show the outcomes of them, the author utilized tools of experimental game theory. Using the“reverse”ultimatum game (RUG), time and other factors crucial to the results of the negotiation process were modeled. Evidence was found in the present case study of the agricultural negotiations between Hungary and the EU that these factors were used strategically to influence the outcome. The majority of the negotiatory events were observed just before the agreement, resembling the deadline effect of the reverse ultimatum game. It shows strategic use of time in favour of the EU. The power bargaining position was also captured in the behaviour of the EU by negotiating with the CEECs separately, which is similar to the multiple player version of the RUG. Modification of this model, therefore, might serve as a good reference point to describe tendencies and key elements of the negotiating strategies of the EU authorities in the future. | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
出版者 | Graduate School of International Development. Nagoya University | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
出版タイプ | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
ID登録 | ||||||
ID登録 | 10.18999/forids.27.145 | |||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
関連情報 | ||||||
関連タイプ | isVersionOf | |||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/bpub/research/public/forum/27/08.pdf | |||||
ISSN(print) | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 1341-3732 | |||||
ISSN(Online) | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | EISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 2189-9126 | |||||
書誌情報 |
ja : 国際開発研究フォーラム en : Forum of International Development Studies 巻 27, p. 145-167, 発行日 2004-08 |
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フォーマット | ||||||
application/pdf | ||||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | publisher |