@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00004705, author = {Rozsnyoi, Hedvig}, journal = {国際開発研究フォーラム, Forum of International Development Studies}, month = {Aug}, note = {The Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) - European Union accession negotiations have received a lot of attention during the last several years. The talks included numerous strategic considerations, for example time factors, bargaining processes, presence of power positions and psychological aspects. In order to analyze the negotiation strategies applied and to show the outcomes of them, the author utilized tools of experimental game theory. Using the“reverse”ultimatum game (RUG), time and other factors crucial to the results of the negotiation process were modeled. Evidence was found in the present case study of the agricultural negotiations between Hungary and the EU that these factors were used strategically to influence the outcome. The majority of the negotiatory events were observed just before the agreement, resembling the deadline effect of the reverse ultimatum game. It shows strategic use of time in favour of the EU. The power bargaining position was also captured in the behaviour of the EU by negotiating with the CEECs separately, which is similar to the multiple player version of the RUG. Modification of this model, therefore, might serve as a good reference point to describe tendencies and key elements of the negotiating strategies of the EU authorities in the future.}, pages = {145--167}, title = {Elements of Reverse Ultimatum Game in the Accession Negotiations between EU and CEE Countries : A Case Study of Hungary}, volume = {27}, year = {2004} }