@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00006925,
 author = {加藤, 浩 and KATO, Hiroshi},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {経済科学},
 month = {Jun},
 note = {This paper analyzes the effects of a second-hand market on durable goods monopolist who subsequently introduces new and high quality products. When new products are introduced, customers of old products may repurchase new one and resale their products in the second-hand market. Thus the monopolist needs to consider the effect of the second-hand market on his profit when pricing his products. We present the model that has the form of “two-stage game”, where the sales of old products in the first-stage determine the state of the price-setting game with a second-hand market in the second-stage. In this setup, we seek the optimal sales strategy of the monopolist with a second-hand market. Next we consider the case (trade-ins) in which the monopolist buys back the old products from the customers who buy new products to eliminate the second-hand market. By comparing the two equilibria, we show that the monopolist prefers to practice trade-ins than to allow transactions in the second-hand market, when introducing new and higher quality products.},
 pages = {27--43},
 title = {新製品導入，中古市場および下取りの理論的考察},
 volume = {55},
 year = {2007}
}