@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00006927,
 author = {KODERA, Toshiki},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {経済科学},
 month = {Jun},
 note = {In this paper, we investigate the competition of two firms that adopt partially compatible technologies in the presence of indirect network effects. We show that the two firms change their strategies due to the degree of compatibility under a given set of conditions. The strategies that the incumbent firm can choose are to monopolize the market, deter the entry, or accommodate the entry and exit the market. When the degree of compatibility is relatively high under a given set of conditions, the incumbent firm cannot deter the entrant. Then, the incumbent firm exits the market and the entrant monopolizes. On the other hand, when the degree of compatibility is relatively low under a given set of conditions, the incumbent firm can deter the competitor’s entry. The social welfare when the incumbent firm deters the entry is larger than that when two firms compete within a certain degree of compatibility.},
 pages = {45--65},
 title = {Software Compatibility Alters Entry Deterrence},
 volume = {55},
 year = {2007}
}