@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00007158,
 author = {中村, 岳穂 and NAKAMURA, Takeho},
 issue = {2},
 journal = {経済科学},
 month = {Sep},
 note = {This paper examines how the existence of asymmetric information and default risks affect capital inflows to a small open economy. First, in the symmetric information case, the benchmark case, it is shown that making contingent contracts conditioned on each borrower’s effort level yields the first-best solution. In this benchmark case, all private borrowers in the economy are able to finance their investment projects in an international capital market. Next, in contrast to the benchmark case, equilibrium credit rationing (a la Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) occurs in the asymmetric information case; that is, international capital inflows to the economy are insufficient to undertake all domestic investment projects. Lastly, we investigate the role of government as a financial intermediary in the asymmetric information case. We show that the government intervention is effective in getting rid of the equilibrium credit rationing, and it yields the second-best solution.},
 pages = {83--95},
 title = {小国開放経済における資本流入と情報の非対称性},
 volume = {55},
 year = {2007}
}