@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00008751, author = {太田, 聰一 and OHTA, Souichi}, issue = {2}, journal = {経済科学}, month = {Sep}, note = {This paper investigates job-switching behavior of workers using an equilibrium model of job search. The model assumes that the labor market consists of two types of jobs which differ in productivity. The wage rate of a "good"job is higher than that of a "bad"job, resulting in on-the-job search undertaken by workers with bad jobs. It is shown that, if the workers can choose among job offers, average match quality is higher and the separation rate is lower when job matches are formed in a tighter labor market. This paper also examines the hypothetical labor market where there is no job switching, and compare its properties with the case with job switching. It is found that the existence of job switching behavior is social welfare improving when the labor market is sufficiently tight and the dispersion of match quality is wide enough.}, pages = {1--14}, title = {サーチ均衡における転職行動と社会厚生}, volume = {53}, year = {2005} }