@article{oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00009634,
 author = {小林, 照義 and Kobayashi, Teruyoshi},
 issue = {2},
 journal = {経済科学},
 month = {Sep},
 note = {This paper investigates the issue of central bank independence and lnacroeconomic perfomance with a simple Barro-Gordon model. As an index of central bank independence, the weight placed on interest rate stabilization is considered. It shows that if there exists political pressure on the monetary authority, which is described as the requirelnent for real interest rate, then the inflation bias will become large under a certain assumption and the stabilization of economic disturbances will be distorted. It also shows that the degree of central bank independence is negatively correlated with the average and variance of the inflation rate, while the relationship between independence and output variability remains an1biguous. These conclusions are consistent with many elnpirical studies.},
 pages = {111--121},
 title = {中央銀行の独立性、インフレーションおよび実体経済},
 volume = {50},
 year = {2002}
}