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The comparative statics of the compensation to the manager, \nthe legal loopholes in the SOE, the unit transaction cost of corruption, and the government\u2019s concern for employment are examined, and their effects on outputs, social welfare and the value of the government\u2019s objective function are considered. The conditions under which corruption may be socially good are also presented.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_9_identifier_60": {"attribute_name": "URI", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_identifier_type": "HDL", "subitem_identifier_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918"}]}, "item_9_publisher_32": {"attribute_name": "\u51fa\u7248\u8005", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "\u540d\u53e4\u5c4b\u5927\u5b66\u5927\u5b66\u9662\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u7814\u7a76\u79d1\u9644\u5c5e\u56fd\u969b\u7d4c\u6e08\u653f\u7b56\u7814\u7a76\u30bb\u30f3\u30bf\u30fc"}]}, "item_9_relation_40": {"attribute_name": "\u30b7\u30ea\u30fc\u30ba", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_relation_name": [{"subitem_relation_name_text": "E-Series;E06-1"}]}]}, "item_9_select_15": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005\u7248\u30d5\u30e9\u30b0", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_select_item": "publisher"}]}, "item_9_text_14": {"attribute_name": "\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30de\u30c3\u30c8", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "application/pdf"}, {"subitem_text_value": "application/pdf"}, {"subitem_text_value": "application/pdf"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "CAI, DAPENG"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "30521", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}, {"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "LI, JIE"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "30522", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_files": {"attribute_name": "\u30d5\u30a1\u30a4\u30eb\u60c5\u5831", "attribute_type": "file", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2018-02-20"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 0, "filename": "AbstractE06-1.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "21.8 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 21800.0, "url": {"label": "AbstractE06-1.pdf Abstract", "url": "https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10100/files/AbstractE06-1.pdf"}, "version_id": "a05566ec-2458-4a10-a158-d06c7f595b52"}, {"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2018-02-20"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 1, "filename": "CommentE06-1.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "17.5 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 17500.0, "url": {"label": "CommentE06-1.pdf Comment", "url": "https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10100/files/CommentE06-1.pdf"}, "version_id": "2f5f8adf-f1f6-484a-9c21-f6735634df5a"}, {"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2018-02-20"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 2, "filename": "paperE06-1.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "608.0 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 608000.0, "url": {"label": "paperE06-1.pdf Paper", "url": "https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10100/files/paperE06-1.pdf"}, "version_id": "5882ddd0-b719-4a7b-9c1c-c50fe3b74c5d"}]}, "item_keyword": {"attribute_name": "\u30ad\u30fc\u30ef\u30fc\u30c9", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "Agent corruption", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Information asymmetry", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "State-owned enterprises (SOEs)", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Transitional economy", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "\u8a00\u8a9e", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "departmental bulletin paper", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]}, "item_title": "Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs"}]}, "item_type_id": "9", "owner": "1", "path": ["1076/1077/1078"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "\u516c\u958b\u65e5", "attribute_value": "2009-07-16"}, "publish_date": "2009-07-16", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "10100", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs"], "weko_shared_id": null}