ログイン
言語:

WEKO3

  • トップ
  • コミュニティ
  • ランキング
AND
To
lat lon distance
To

Field does not validate



インデックスリンク

インデックスツリー

メールアドレスを入力してください。

WEKO

One fine body…

WEKO

One fine body…

アイテム

{"_buckets": {"deposit": "0635df7b-61f0-4360-890e-c8a890bc74f5"}, "_deposit": {"id": "10100", "owners": [], "pid": {"revision_id": 0, "type": "depid", "value": "10100"}, "status": "published"}, "_oai": {"id": "oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00010100"}, "item_9_biblio_info_6": {"attribute_name": "\u66f8\u8a8c\u60c5\u5831", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"bibliographicIssueDates": {"bibliographicIssueDate": "2006-02", "bibliographicIssueDateType": "Issued"}, "bibliographicIssueNumber": "E06-1", "bibliographic_titles": [{"bibliographic_title": "Economic Research Center Discussion Paper"}]}]}, "item_9_description_4": {"attribute_name": "\u6284\u9332", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "This article analyzes agent corruption in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in a duopoly model, in which an SOE competes with a private enterprise. The manager of the SOE contemplates to embezzle, and is caught and subject to punishment at a probability. The comparative statics of the compensation to the manager, \nthe legal loopholes in the SOE, the unit transaction cost of corruption, and the government\u2019s concern for employment are examined, and their effects on outputs, social welfare and the value of the government\u2019s objective function are considered. The conditions under which corruption may be socially good are also presented.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_9_identifier_60": {"attribute_name": "URI", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_identifier_type": "HDL", "subitem_identifier_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918"}]}, "item_9_publisher_32": {"attribute_name": "\u51fa\u7248\u8005", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "\u540d\u53e4\u5c4b\u5927\u5b66\u5927\u5b66\u9662\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u7814\u7a76\u79d1\u9644\u5c5e\u56fd\u969b\u7d4c\u6e08\u653f\u7b56\u7814\u7a76\u30bb\u30f3\u30bf\u30fc"}]}, "item_9_relation_40": {"attribute_name": "\u30b7\u30ea\u30fc\u30ba", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_relation_name": [{"subitem_relation_name_text": "E-Series;E06-1"}]}]}, "item_9_select_15": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005\u7248\u30d5\u30e9\u30b0", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_select_item": "publisher"}]}, "item_9_text_14": {"attribute_name": "\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30de\u30c3\u30c8", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "application/pdf"}, {"subitem_text_value": "application/pdf"}, {"subitem_text_value": "application/pdf"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "CAI, DAPENG"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "30521", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}, {"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "LI, JIE"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "30522", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_files": {"attribute_name": "\u30d5\u30a1\u30a4\u30eb\u60c5\u5831", "attribute_type": "file", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2018-02-20"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 0, "filename": "AbstractE06-1.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "21.8 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 21800.0, "url": {"label": "AbstractE06-1.pdf Abstract", "url": "https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10100/files/AbstractE06-1.pdf"}, "version_id": "a05566ec-2458-4a10-a158-d06c7f595b52"}, {"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2018-02-20"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 1, "filename": "CommentE06-1.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "17.5 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 17500.0, "url": {"label": "CommentE06-1.pdf Comment", "url": "https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10100/files/CommentE06-1.pdf"}, "version_id": "2f5f8adf-f1f6-484a-9c21-f6735634df5a"}, {"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2018-02-20"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 2, "filename": "paperE06-1.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "608.0 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 608000.0, "url": {"label": "paperE06-1.pdf Paper", "url": "https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10100/files/paperE06-1.pdf"}, "version_id": "5882ddd0-b719-4a7b-9c1c-c50fe3b74c5d"}]}, "item_keyword": {"attribute_name": "\u30ad\u30fc\u30ef\u30fc\u30c9", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "Agent corruption", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Information asymmetry", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "State-owned enterprises (SOEs)", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "Transitional economy", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "\u8a00\u8a9e", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "departmental bulletin paper", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]}, "item_title": "Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs"}]}, "item_type_id": "9", "owner": "1", "path": ["1076/1077/1078"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "\u516c\u958b\u65e5", "attribute_value": "2009-07-16"}, "publish_date": "2009-07-16", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "10100", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs"], "weko_shared_id": null}
  1. A450 国際経済政策研究センター
  2. A450b 紀要
  3. Economic Research Center Discussion Paper E-Series

Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs

http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918
69d6f139-c92a-4294-87f5-7c76817b1de0
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
AbstractE06-1.pdf AbstractE06-1.pdf Abstract (21.8 kB)
CommentE06-1.pdf CommentE06-1.pdf Comment (17.5 kB)
paperE06-1.pdf paperE06-1.pdf Paper (608.0 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2009-07-16
タイトル
タイトル Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs
著者 CAI, DAPENG

× CAI, DAPENG

WEKO 30521

CAI, DAPENG

Search repository
LI, JIE

× LI, JIE

WEKO 30522

LI, JIE

Search repository
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Agent corruption
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Information asymmetry
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Transitional economy
抄録
内容記述 This article analyzes agent corruption in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in a duopoly model, in which an SOE competes with a private enterprise. The manager of the SOE contemplates to embezzle, and is caught and subject to punishment at a probability. The comparative statics of the compensation to the manager,
the legal loopholes in the SOE, the unit transaction cost of corruption, and the government’s concern for employment are examined, and their effects on outputs, social welfare and the value of the government’s objective function are considered. The conditions under which corruption may be socially good are also presented.
内容記述タイプ Abstract
出版者
出版者 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
書誌情報 Economic Research Center Discussion Paper

号 E06-1, 発行日 2006-02
フォーマット
application/pdf
フォーマット
application/pdf
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
値 publisher
シリーズ
関連名称
関連名称 E-Series;E06-1
URI
識別子 http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918
識別子タイプ HDL
戻る
0
views
See details
Views

Versions

Ver.1 2021-03-01 19:37:26.998380
Show All versions

Share

Mendeley CiteULike Twitter Facebook Print Addthis

Cite as

Export

OAI-PMH
  • OAI-PMH JPCOAR
  • OAI-PMH DublinCore
  • OAI-PMH DDI
Other Formats
  • JSON
  • BIBTEX

Confirm


Powered by CERN Data Centre & Invenio


Powered by CERN Data Centre & Invenio