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Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918
69d6f139-c92a-4294-87f5-7c76817b1de0
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション | |
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2009-07-16 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Causes, effects, and prevention of agent corruption in Chinese SOEs | |||||
著者 |
CAI, DAPENG
× CAI, DAPENG× LI, JIE |
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キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Agent corruption | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Information asymmetry | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | State-owned enterprises (SOEs) | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Transitional economy | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | This article analyzes agent corruption in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in a duopoly model, in which an SOE competes with a private enterprise. The manager of the SOE contemplates to embezzle, and is caught and subject to punishment at a probability. The comparative statics of the compensation to the manager, the legal loopholes in the SOE, the unit transaction cost of corruption, and the government’s concern for employment are examined, and their effects on outputs, social welfare and the value of the government’s objective function are considered. The conditions under which corruption may be socially good are also presented. |
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内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
書誌情報 |
Economic Research Center Discussion Paper 号 E06-1, 発行日 2006-02 |
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application/pdf | ||||||
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application/pdf | ||||||
フォーマット | ||||||
application/pdf | ||||||
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値 | publisher | |||||
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関連名称 | ||||||
関連名称 | E-Series;E06-1 | |||||
URI | ||||||
識別子 | http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11918 | |||||
識別子タイプ | HDL |