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  1. A400 経済学部/経済学研究科
  2. A400b 紀要
  3. 経済科学
  4. 53(2)

わが国の企業統治における機関投資家の役割 -新たなコーポレートガバナンスの構築は可能なのか-

https://doi.org/10.18999/ecos.53.2.39
https://doi.org/10.18999/ecos.53.2.39
2d216780-3aee-471c-8a15-19d83b3bef11
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
ecos_53_2_39.pdf ecos_53_2_39.pdf (1.5 MB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2008-09-11
タイトル
タイトル わが国の企業統治における機関投資家の役割 -新たなコーポレートガバナンスの構築は可能なのか-
その他のタイトル
その他のタイトル Do Institutional Investors Discipline Corporate managers in Japan? - Future Prospect of New Style Corporate Governance -
著者 浅井, 義裕

× 浅井, 義裕

WEKO 24619

浅井, 義裕

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ASAI, Yoshihiro

× ASAI, Yoshihiro

WEKO 24620

ASAI, Yoshihiro

Search repository
抄録
内容記述 Japan experienced a prolonged banking crisis in the 1990s. In the period after financial deregulation, it is widely recognized that the Main Bank’s influence on their customers weakened and firms lost fear of the disciplinary stick wielded by the Main Bank. This led to overinvestment on part of firms and consequently the event of ‘burst bubble’ in early 1990s. Alternative corporate governance system such as provided by institutional investors and the associated discipline is desperately needed. In this paper, I attempt to examine the effect of alternative or complementary corporate governance systems in Japan. Using an event study framework, this study examines the impact of shareholder proposals. This study finds that large institutional investor’s shareholder proposals have significant positive impacts, although small investor’s shareholder proposals have no significance. These opposite results suggest that institutional investors have incentives and skills to discipline corporate managers at their cost, while small investors have incentives and skills to discipline corporate managers at their cost, while small investors do not have them because their stakes are relatively smaller. This empirical result is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny(1986)’s model’s implication and institutional investors are expected to actively perform their roles in Japanese corporate governance in future.
内容記述タイプ Abstract
出版者
出版者 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科
言語
言語 jpn
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
ID登録
ID登録 10.18999/ecos.53.2.39
ID登録タイプ JaLC
ISSN(print)
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 0022-9725
書誌情報 経済科学

巻 53, 号 2, p. 39-52, 発行日 2005-09-30
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
値 publisher
URI
識別子 http://hdl.handle.net/2237/10504
識別子タイプ HDL
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