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  1. A400 経済学部/経済学研究科
  2. A400b 紀要
  3. 経済科学
  4. 53(1)

Illegal Migration and Capital Mobility under the Minimum Wage Legislation of a Host Country : The Case of Different Technologies

https://doi.org/10.18999/ecos.53.1.63
https://doi.org/10.18999/ecos.53.1.63
4fec36cf-ec7f-4de7-9eb8-6dcc201a7c70
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
ecos_53_1_63.pdf ecos_53_1_63.pdf (921.4 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2008-12-16
タイトル
タイトル Illegal Migration and Capital Mobility under the Minimum Wage Legislation of a Host Country : The Case of Different Technologies
著者 SUN, Shuqin

× SUN, Shuqin

WEKO 25211

SUN, Shuqin

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抄録
内容記述 In this paper, we show an international edition of Harris-Todaro Model in which illegal migration is incorporated. The framework we take is Ramaswami-Bond-Chen model where a two-country, two-factor and one-good economy is concerned. In their model we introduce the Harris-Todaro minimum wage legislation into the host country of illegal migration. Different from the previous issues where technologies are assumed to be identical between countries, we consider that they differ between countries. And then we examine how the minimum wage and the enforcement policies of the host countries affect factor prices, the amount of migrants, unemployment and economic welfare. Considering different technologies, we show two graphical examples of equilibrium, according to the factor intensity ranking between countries. An anti-intuitive result is that the intensification of enforcement by the host country would give rise to an increase in illegal migration. We found that the intensification of enforcement by increasing the penalty for fine might be a desirable policy to improve the Home welfare, and a rise in the minimum wage could make the Foreign better off.
内容記述タイプ Abstract
出版者
出版者 名古屋大学経済学会
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
ID登録
ID登録 10.18999/ecos.53.1.63
ID登録タイプ JaLC
ISSN(print)
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 0022-9725
書誌情報 経済科学

巻 53, 号 1, p. 63-72, 発行日 2005-06-30
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
値 publisher
URI
識別子 http://hdl.handle.net/2237/10765
識別子タイプ HDL
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