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Cyclic coevolution of cooperative behaviors and network structures
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11274
9cac9e50-9843-43c8-91c2-3e95864bd1c2
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション | |
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2009-03-09 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Cyclic coevolution of cooperative behaviors and network structures | |||||
著者 |
Suzuki, Reiji
× Suzuki, Reiji× Kato, Masanori× Arita, Takaya |
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権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | American Physical Society, All rights reserved. | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | decision theory | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | game theory | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | network theory (graphs) | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | nonlinear dynamical systems | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | This paper aims at understanding coevolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviors and network structures of interactions. We constructed an evolutionary model in which each individual not only has a strategy for prisoner's dilemma to play with its neighboring members on the network, but also has a strategy for changing its neighboring structure of the network. By conducting evolutionary experiments with various settings of the payoff matrix, we found that the coevolutionary cycles of cooperative behaviors of individuals and their network structures repeatedly occurred when both the temptation to defect and the cost for playing a game were moderate. | |||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | American Physical Society | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプresource | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | journal article | |||||
DOI | ||||||
関連識別子 | ||||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.77.021911 | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 1539-3755 | |||||
書誌情報 |
PHYSICAL REVIEW E 巻 77, 号 2, p. 021911-021911, 発行日 2008-02 |
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著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | publisher | |||||
URI | ||||||
識別子 | http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11274 | |||||
識別子タイプ | HDL |