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総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札 : 除算方式評価の場合
https://doi.org/10.18999/ecos.57.4.149
https://doi.org/10.18999/ecos.57.4.1491a7b7f99-acca-4067-ba6c-1f5a9eb49c11
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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hanazono.pdf (811.1 kB)
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2010-04-21 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | 総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札 : 除算方式評価の場合 | |||||
言語 | ja | |||||
その他のタイトル | ||||||
その他のタイトル | Equilibrium Bidding Behavior in Scoring Auctions: the Case of Value-for-Money Evaluation | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
著者 |
花薗, 誠
× 花薗, 誠× Hanazono, Makoto |
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アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter. | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
言語 | ja | |||||
出版者 | 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科 | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
出版タイプ | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
ID登録 | ||||||
ID登録 | 10.18999/ecos.57.4.149 | |||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
ISSN(print) | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 0022-9725 | |||||
書誌情報 |
ja : 経済科学 巻 57, 号 4, p. 149-157, 発行日 2010-03-25 |
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フォーマット | ||||||
application/pdf | ||||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | publisher | |||||
URI | ||||||
識別子 | http://hdl.handle.net/2237/13171 | |||||
識別子タイプ | HDL |