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  1. A450 国際経済政策研究センター
  2. A450b 紀要
  3. Economic Research Center Discussion Paper

A Generalization of the Revelation Principle in an Informationally Decentralized Economy

http://hdl.handle.net/2237/14043
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/14043
98bff8ac-3dc9-499f-bb47-02ca0a88e086
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
comment176.pdf comment176.pdf (49.1 kB)
abstract176.pdf abstract176.pdf (491.8 kB)
paper176.pdf paper176.pdf (10.2 MB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2010-08-26
タイトル
タイトル A Generalization of the Revelation Principle in an Informationally Decentralized Economy
言語 en
著者 Seh-Jin, CHANG

× Seh-Jin, CHANG

WEKO 38580

en Seh-Jin, CHANG

Search repository
アクセス権
アクセス権 open access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 generalized revelation principle
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 decentralized implementors
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 multiple truth-telling constraint
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 no repeated visit constraint
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 cash-in-advance constraint
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 linear pricing function
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 third-best solution
抄録
内容記述 When we design an allocation mechanism, we should take into account not only the resource constraints but also the incentive compatibility constraints. The revelation principle asserts that the incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced with the truth-telling constraint, i.e. each player should not be worse off by telling the truth. However, the standard revelation principle implicitly assumes that the social planner or designer himself implements the designed mechanism. This implicit assumption becomes easily inadequate in reality. In many cases, the planner or designer need to delegate the implementation to multiple implementors, who follow the designer’s instructions based on decentralized information. In such a case, the revelation principle should be changed accordingly. The informationally decentralized economy requires not only that each individual should tell the truth consistently to each social implementor (multiple truth-telling constraint: MTTC), but also that he should visit each class of social implementors once and only once (no repeated visit constraint: NRVC). The traditional revelation principle turns out to be a special case when there is only one social implementor. This paper further explores the implications of the generalized revelation principle in a pure exchange economy. It turns out that the linearity of value function, i.e. the existence of price, is required to ensure NRVC and that money becomes essential to ensure MTTC through cash-in-advance constraints. While the optimal allocation mechanism in the informationally decentralized economy looks similar to the first-best solution of the Arrow-Debreu economy, it is inferior even to the second-best solution. Hence it is referred as the third-best solution. Some numeric examples compare the optimal allocations under three different implemental conditions.
言語 en
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述
内容記述 Comments and Discussions : Yuko ARAYAMA (荒山裕行)
言語 en
内容記述タイプ Other
出版者
言語 ja
出版者 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
出版タイプ
出版タイプ VoR
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
書誌情報 en : Economic Research Center Discussion Paper

号 176, 発行日 2009-03
フォーマット
application/pdf
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
値 publisher
URI
識別子 http://hdl.handle.net/2237/14043
識別子タイプ HDL
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