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Bargaining in Two-Sided Markets
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/00030467
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/00030467ebecb0a9-2988-40bb-8bd6-728fba921eac
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
E19-2.pdf (899.5 kB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2019-06-21 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Bargaining in Two-Sided Markets | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 著者 |
Adachi, Takanori
× Adachi, Takanori× Tremblay, Mark J. |
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| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Indirect network externalities | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | platforms | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | two-sided markets | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Nash cooperative bargaining | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | Negotiations regularly take place on the business-to-business side of two-sided markets. However, little is known about the consequences of these negotiations on participation, prices, and welfare when indirect network externalities exist between the business side and the consumer side. To fill this gap, we propose a tractable model of bargaining in two-sided markets where participating firms pay an entry fee and concession fee that is determined through negotiations with the platform. First, we show that as a platform has greater bargaining power, the concession fee and consumer entry fee rise, but the entry fee to firms goes down. In this case, more firms participate on the platform so that consumers are better off (even though they pay a higher entry fee), and firms with large network externalites are worse off (due to greater exploitation by the platform) while firms with small network externalites are better off. Altogether, greater platform bargaining power increases total welfare. We also show that these results are largely robust when considering platform competition using a Hotelling framework with bargaining. | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | Adachi acknowledges a Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (16KK0054) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター | |||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
| タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : Economic Research Center Discussion Paper 号 E19-2, p. 1-37, 発行日 2019-05-14 |
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| 著者版フラグ | ||||||
| 値 | publisher | |||||
| シリーズ | ||||||
| 関連名称 | E-Series;E19-2 | |||||
