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Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition with Unemployment
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/00033003
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/00033003adf9fd04-0d9c-4bf7-bdc8-e7b931bb154e
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2020-11-12 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition with Unemployment | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
著者 |
Tamai, Toshiki
× Tamai, Toshiki× Kikuchi, Yuya |
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アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Fiscal Competition | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Unemployment | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | This paper examines two different fiscal competition games under labor market imperfection. Given that capital moves across regions and affects regional employment, governments must choose expenditure levels and tax rates on such mobile capital by accounting for the effects of fiscal variables on both capital and labor. Then, governments may play these games with either tax rates on mobile capital or with public expenditures. The presence/absence of absentee ownership of capital and employment externalities are important factors for characterizing two distinct Nash equilibria, one that occurs with tax competition and the other with expenditure competition. In particular, and contrary to the existing literature, tax rates under tax competition are likely to be more competitive than under expenditure competition because of employment externalities. Furthermore, in some cases, governments prefer to choose government expenditure as their strategic variable rather than tax rates. The presence of employment externalities motivates governments to use government expenditure as the strategic variable through which it might encourage strategic effects. | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述 | This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 16K03726, 16KK0077, and 20H01492. | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
言語 | ja | |||||
出版者 | 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
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資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
出版タイプ | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
書誌情報 |
en : Economic Research Center Discussion Paper 号 E20-4, p. 1-20, 発行日 2020-11 |
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値 | publisher | |||||
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関連名称 | E-Series;E20-4 |